Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Two elderly individuals, Ms. Penelope Lamle and Ms. Maxine Houston, applied for Medicaid but faced delays and additional questions from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, allegedly directed by attorney Susan Eads. They refused to answer these questions and subsequently sued, seeking an expedited decision, payment of Medicaid benefits, and damages. Both applicants died during the litigation, and their estates were substituted as parties in the appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the action with prejudice, citing the plaintiffs' failure to state a valid claim. However, the court was unaware that the applicants had died while the action was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the claims for an injunction became moot when the agency denied benefits and the applicants died. The court noted that the requested relief would no longer benefit the estates, as the Oklahoma Department of Human Services had already denied the applications. The court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the requested retrospective relief. Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment on the claim for a prospective injunction and dismiss it without prejudice.Regarding the claim against Ms. Eads in her individual capacity, the Tenth Circuit held that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiffs did not allege facts showing the violation of a clearly established right. As a result, the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the claim for damages against Ms. Eads. View "Lamle v. Eads" on Justia Law

Fiorisce, LLC, a limited liability company, filed a qui tam lawsuit against Colorado Technical University (CTU) under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that CTU misrepresented compliance with federal credit hour requirements to fraudulently obtain federal student aid funds. Fiorisce claimed that CTU's online learning platform, Intellipath, provided insufficient educational content and falsified learning hour calculations to meet federal standards. Fiorisce's principal, a former CTU faculty member, created the company to protect their identity while exposing the alleged fraud.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. CTU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded the suit because the allegations were substantially similar to previously disclosed information. The district court denied CTU’s motion, finding that Fiorisce’s specific claims about misrepresentation of credit hours and the use of Intellipath were not substantially the same as prior disclosures. The court also suggested that Fiorisce might qualify as an original source of the information.CTU appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, seeking interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, as the public disclosure bar did not confer a right to avoid trial and could be effectively reviewed after final judgment. The court emphasized that expanding the collateral order doctrine to include such denials would undermine the final judgment rule and dismissed CTU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fiorisce, LLC v. Colorado Technical University" on Justia Law

The Center for Biological Diversity and 350 Colorado challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule that partially approved Colorado’s plan to reduce ozone pollution. The Clean Air Act required Colorado to lower ozone levels by July 2021, but the state failed to meet this deadline. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan violated the Clean Air Act in three ways: by approving the plan after the deadline, by including state-only emissions reductions, and by violating the anti-backsliding provision.The EPA approved Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration and motor-vehicle-emissions budget, determining that the state showed emissions reductions of at least three percent per year from 2018 to 2020. The EPA also found that the SIP’s projected emissions reductions were based on creditable, federally enforceable measures and complied with the anti-backsliding mandate. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval was unlawful because the state failed to attain the required ozone levels by the deadline and included non-federally enforceable control measures in its calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA did not act unlawfully in approving Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration after the state missed its attainment deadline. The court found that reasonable-further-progress demonstrations are distinct from attainment demonstrations and that the EPA’s approval was based on compliance with reasonable-further-progress requirements. The court also held that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s motor-vehicle-emissions budget was lawful, as it was consistent with reasonable-further-progress requirements. Additionally, the court found that the EPA’s approval did not violate the anti-backsliding provision, as the SIP revisions would not increase emissions and would not hinder attainment.The court denied the petition for review, upholding the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) second attempt to regulate small, high-powered magnets that pose serious health risks to children when ingested. These magnets, used in various consumer products like jewelry and puzzles, can cause severe internal injuries or death if swallowed. The CPSC's first attempt to regulate these magnets was struck down by the Tenth Circuit in 2016 due to inadequate data supporting the rule. The CPSC then revised its approach and issued a new rule, which is now being challenged by industry groups.The industry groups petitioned for review of the CPSC's new rule, arguing that the CPSC's cost-benefit analysis was flawed and that the rule was promulgated by an unconstitutionally structured agency. They contended that the CPSC's data on magnet ingestions was unreliable, that the CPSC failed to consider the impact of its own enforcement efforts, and that the rule was underinclusive and arbitrary. They also argued that existing voluntary standards were sufficient to address the risks posed by the magnets.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the CPSC's rule was supported by substantial evidence, noting that the CPSC had adequately addressed the shortcomings identified in the previous case and had conducted a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The court also held that the CPSC's structure, which includes removal protections for its commissioners, was constitutional, reaffirming its previous decision in Leachco, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the CPSC's rule regulating small, high-powered magnets. The court concluded that the rule was necessary to address the significant health risks posed by these magnets and that the CPSC had acted within its authority in promulgating the rule. View "Magnetsafety.org v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jason Fabrizius and Fabrizius Livestock LLC sought review of a USDA Judicial Officer's order that denied their appeal of two USDA ALJ orders. The ALJ found Fabrizius Livestock responsible for ensuring animals transported interstate had required documentation and issued a $210,000 fine against the company. Fabrizius Livestock, a Colorado corporation dealing in horses, often sold horses intended for slaughter and kept them in conditions that made them vulnerable to disease. The company sold horses across state lines without the necessary documentation, including ICVIs and EIA test results.The ALJ found Fabrizius liable for violations of the CTESA and AHPA regulations, including transporting horses without owner/shipper certificates and selling horses without ICVIs. The ALJ imposed a $210,000 fine, which included penalties for each violation. Fabrizius appealed to a USDA Judicial Officer, arguing that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague, they were not among the "persons responsible," they lacked adequate notice, the fine was arbitrary and capricious, and the fine was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The Judicial Officer rejected these arguments and affirmed the ALJ's orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation was not unconstitutionally vague and provided adequate notice. The court found that the term "persons responsible" reasonably included sellers like Fabrizius. The court also held that the $200,000 fine for the AHPA violations was not arbitrary or capricious, as the Judicial Officer had considered all relevant factors. Finally, the court found that the fine was not excessive under the Eighth Amendment, given the gravity of the violations and the potential harm to the equine industry. The court denied the petition for review. View "Fabrizius v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

A transgender woman, Darlene Griffith, filed a civil rights lawsuit regarding her pretrial confinement at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado. She alleged that the jail's policies, which assigned housing based on genitalia and denied her access to female clothing and products, violated her constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed her complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Ms. Griffith’s complaint, concluding that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court applied rational-basis review to her Equal Protection claim, finding that transgender individuals are not a protected class under existing precedent. The court also dismissed her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as she did not properly name the county as a defendant according to state law requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that remand was required for some of Ms. Griffith’s claims. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment cross-gender search claims against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, and her Fourth Amendment abusive search claim against Deputy Mustapick. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Ms. Griffith’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because those claims were dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and that ruling was unchallenged on appeal. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the remaining claims. View "Griffith v. El Paso County, Colorado" on Justia Law

A federal inmate, Dustin Rowland, developed a hernia after a pretrial detention fight. A physician deemed the hernia "reducible and stable," recommending non-surgical treatments. Rowland, desiring surgery, utilized the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Administrative Remedial Program, which involves a four-step grievance process. His initial requests were denied, but a later appeal led to approval for a surgical consultation. However, Rowland's final appeal was denied for procedural reasons, and he did not correct the deficiency. He eventually received surgery but filed a lawsuit claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, seeking damages under Bivens, injunctive relief for post-operative care, and a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Rowland's Bivens claim, granted summary judgment against his injunctive relief claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Rowland's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens claim, noting that Rowland's case presented a new context not covered by previous Bivens cases and that the BOP's Administrative Remedial Program provided an adequate alternative remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the injunctive relief claim, as Rowland failed to exhaust administrative remedies specifically for post-operative care. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FTCA claim, emphasizing the jurisdictional requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Rowland's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. View "Rowland v. Matevousian" on Justia Law

the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. The Act makes clear that MOHELA’s debts and obligations are not debts or obligations of the State. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.410. This includes any judgments against MOHELA. The State’s lack of legal liability for MOHELA’s debts and judgments is a strong indicator that MOHELA’s finances are independent from the State’s. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978.In sum, the third Steadfast factor weighs against arm-of-the-state status. MOHELA receives no direct financial assistance from the State, has the ability to generate its own revenue, retains control over its own funds, and the State bears no legal liability for MOHELA’s debts or judgments.d. Factor Four: State or Local AffairsThe fourth Steadfast factor considers whether the entity is concerned primarily with state or local affairs. This factor examines the entity’s function, composition, and purpose. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528; Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1253. Here, the district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of arm-of-the-state status, and we agree.MOHELA’s primary function is to help Missourians access student loans needed to pay for college. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. This is a statewide concern, not a local one. MOHELA’s activities are not confined to any particular locality within Missouri; rather, they are intended to benefit residents across the entire state. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366 (noting that MOHELA was established to perform the “essential public function” of helping Missourians access student loans).Moreover, MOHELA’s board is composed of members appointed by the Governor and representatives from state agencies, further indicating that its focus is on statewide, rather than local, affairs. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. The fact that MOHELA’s profits are used to fund education in Missouri, including providing grants and scholarships for Missouri students, also supports the conclusion that MOHELA is concerned with state affairs. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366.In conclusion, the fourth Steadfast factor weighs in favor of arm-of-the-state status.3. The Second Step of the Arm-of-the-State Test: The Twin Goals of the Eleventh AmendmentBecause the Steadfast factors point in different directions, we proceed to the second step of the Hennessey test and consider the twin goals underlying the Eleventh Amendment: avoiding an affront to the dignity of the state and the impact of a judgment on the state treasury. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.As discussed above, the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. This means that a judgment against MOHELA would not impact the state treasury. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978. The lack of impact on the state treasury is a strong indicator that MOHELA is not an arm of the state. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.Regarding the dignity of the state, MOHELA operates with substantial autonomy and is financially independent from the State. The State has not clearly demarcated MOHELA as sharing its sovereignty. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 529. Therefore, treating MOHELA as an arm of the state would not accord with the dignity interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment.In conclusion, considering the twin goals of the Eleventh Amendment, we determine that MOHELA is not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Good v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including Free Speech Coalition, Inc. and others, sought to prevent Utah officials from enforcing a law requiring age verification for online pornography. They argued that the law violated the First Amendment and other constitutional rights. The law allows private parties to sue commercial entities that fail to verify users' ages. Plaintiffs claimed this law imposed unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney General of Utah and the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the case, ruling that the defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court found that the defendants did not enforce or give effect to the law, thus the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity did not apply. The district court also noted that the Commissioner’s oversight of a mobile driver's license program did not constitute enforcement of the law, as the program did not yet provide for online age verification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner enforced or gave effect to the law. The court held that the Ex parte Young exception did not apply because the law placed enforcement authority with private individuals, not state officials. The court also found that the Commissioner’s management of the mobile driver's license program was too attenuated to constitute enforcement of the law. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. View "Free Speech Coalition v. Anderson" on Justia Law