Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

David Lesh, a social media content creator and owner of an outdoor apparel brand, posted photos on Instagram of himself snowmobiling at Keystone Resort, Colorado, during its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States charged him with using an over-snow vehicle on National Forest Service (NFS) land off a designated route and conducting unauthorized work activity on NFS land. A magistrate judge convicted him of both counts after a bench trial.The magistrate judge found Lesh guilty of using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, taking judicial notice of a publicly available map indicating that Keystone Resort was not designated for snowmobile use. Lesh's argument that the map's undated nature failed to provide sufficient notice was not preserved for appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Lesh's conviction for using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, finding that Lesh had waived his challenge to the judicial notice of the map. However, the court reversed his conviction for unauthorized work activity under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The court held that the regulation was impermissibly vague as applied to Lesh's conduct, as it did not provide fair warning that posting images on social media could constitute a federal crime. The court also found insufficient evidence to prove that Lesh's primary purpose in posting the photos was to sell goods or services, as required by the regulation. The court concluded that Lesh was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the maximum penalty he faced did not exceed six months of imprisonment. View "United States v. Lesh" on Justia Law

The case involves a congressional program that awards grants for family-planning projects, with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) setting eligibility requirements. Oklahoma, a grant recipient, expressed concerns about these requirements, citing state laws prohibiting counseling and referrals for abortions. HHS proposed that Oklahoma provide neutral information about family-planning options, including abortion, through a national call-in number. Oklahoma rejected this proposal, leading HHS to terminate the grant. Oklahoma challenged the termination and sought a preliminary injunction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Oklahoma's motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that Oklahoma was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims. Oklahoma then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Oklahoma argued that it would likely succeed on the merits for three reasons: (1) Congress's spending power did not allow it to delegate eligibility requirements to HHS, (2) HHS's requirements violated the Weldon Amendment, and (3) HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that:1. The spending power allowed Congress to delegate eligibility requirements to HHS, and Title X was unambiguous in conditioning eligibility on satisfaction of HHS's requirements. 2. The Weldon Amendment, which prohibits discrimination against health-care entities for declining to provide referrals for abortions, was not violated because HHS's proposal to use a national call-in number did not constitute a referral for the purpose of an abortion. 3. HHS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating Oklahoma's grant, as the eligibility requirements fell within HHS's statutory authority, and Oklahoma did not demonstrate a likely violation of HHS's regulations.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that Oklahoma had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. View "State of Oklahoma v. HHS" on Justia Law

The case involves a civil rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Peatinna Biggs, an intellectually disabled prisoner, against Sedgwick County, the Sedgwick County Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Hanna in his individual and official capacities. Biggs alleged that Sheriff Hanna sexually assaulted her while transporting her between county jails. The district court dismissed the complaint against the County and the Sheriff’s Department, reasoning that the County could only be liable if the challenged conduct had been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials, and Hanna’s actions were not pursuant to Department policies, but in direct contravention of them. Hanna was then found liable by a jury in his individual capacity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Sheriff Hanna’s actions fell within the scope of his policymaking authority regarding the custody and care of prisoners and subjected the municipal defendants to liability. The court reasoned that when an official takes action over which he or she has final policymaking authority, the policymaker is the municipality, so it is fair to impose liability on that entity for that action. The court concluded that given that Hanna raped a prisoner in his custody while transporting the prisoner to another jail, that requirement was undoubtedly satisfied. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Whitson v. Hanna" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Maurice Williams, whose supervised release was revoked after evidence was presented that he sold fentanyl to a confidential informant (CI) during a controlled buy. Williams had previously pleaded guilty to charges of distributing crack cocaine and unlawful possession of a firearm. His supervised release was revoked in 2020 due to violation of his release conditions, and he was sentenced to an additional 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. In 2023, his supervised release was recommended for revocation again due to alleged violations including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and committing another crime.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held a revocation hearing where the government introduced evidence of the controlled buy, including testimony from Kansas City Police Officers and a video of the controlled buy. The court found that Williams sold fentanyl and therefore committed a Grade A violation, but did not find a violation related to the firearm. The court revoked his term of supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Williams argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of the controlled buy without conducting an interest-of-justice balancing test under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) to determine whether the CI should have been required to be available for cross-examination at the hearing, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that he sold fentanyl. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that no balancing test was required because the court did not rely on any hearsay statements by the CI, and the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

This case arose from a raid by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at Abel Ramirez-Peñaloza’s family home in Heber City, Utah. After Mr. Ramirez-Peñaloza was indicted for unlawful entry into the U.S., ICE officials attempted to arrest him at his home. During two searches of his home, officials detained and questioned his family members. The plaintiffs, some of Mr. Ramirez-Peñaloza’s family members who were detained during the searches, filed claims against the U.S. and the agents alleging Fourth Amendment and state law violations.The district court dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims, but allowed three claims to go to trial, where a jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers on the excessive use of force and false arrest claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dismissed claims were barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) judgment bar, which precludes suits against federal employees after the entry of final judgment on a claim against the U.S. for an analogous cause of action. Since the district court entered final judgment in favor of the U.S. on the plaintiffs’ analogous FTCA claims, the claims against the individual defendants were barred. View "Ramirez v. Reddish" on Justia Law

The defendant, Darnell Tyree-Peppers, was on supervised release after pleading guilty to stealing a firearm from a federally licensed dealer. During his supervised release, his probation officer filed a petition to modify the conditions of his supervision due to alleged violations. Later, the probation officer filed a petition for his arrest and revocation of supervision based on three alleged violations of his supervision conditions. The district court issued the requested warrant. The probation officer later submitted an amended petition alleging that Tyree-Peppers had been arrested by state police officers on charges of first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, potentially violating the condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime.The district court for the District of Kansas did not conduct the hearing on the petition until after the expiration of Tyree-Peppers' supervised release term. The court granted the petition in part and ordered an additional one year of supervised release. Tyree-Peppers challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release, arguing that the delay in the revocation proceedings was not “reasonably necessary for the adjudication,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with Tyree-Peppers. The court found that the delay was attributable to an ongoing state prosecution of Tyree-Peppers on the very serious charge of first-degree murder. The outcome of that proceeding was directly related to the question of whether Tyree-Peppers violated the condition of his supervised release forbidding him from committing a state crime. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Tyree-Peppers" on Justia Law

Anthony Buntyn, an employee of a private company that transported detainees for law enforcement agencies, was charged with willfully violating the detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause due to inhumane conditions of confinement. The conditions developed while Buntyn transported the detainees in a van to various detention facilities. The government alleged that Buntyn had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause through deliberate indifference to intolerable conditions of confinement and that this indifference had resulted in bodily injury to three detainees. The jury found Buntyn guilty of depriving the detainees of humane conditions, acting willfully and with deliberate indifference, and causing bodily injury to one detainee.Buntyn appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for a finding of guilt, that the district court erred in preventing his attorney from using the term malice in closing argument, and that the court coerced the jury to reach a verdict. The Tenth Circuit rejected Buntyn's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of inhumane conditions, deliberate indifference, and willfulness. The court also found that the district court did not err in prohibiting the use of the term malice in closing argument, and that Buntyn had waived his challenge to the district court's instruction for the jury to continue deliberating. View "United States v. Buntyn" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Breeze Aviation Group, Inc. (Breeze), an airline company, and its dispute with the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA). Breeze challenged the administration of a union-representation election by the NMB, which resulted in the NMB’s certification of ALPA as the representative of pilots employed by Breeze. Breeze argued that the NMB improperly excluded trainee pilots from voting in the union election and improperly refused to extend the cut-off date for voter eligibility to allow more pilot trainees to complete their training and become eligible to vote.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district court dismissed Breeze's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction to review NMB certification of union representation only where the complaining party shows that the certification decision was a gross violation of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) or that it violated the constitutional rights of an employer, employee, or Union. The district court determined that Breeze’s complaint did not make the required showing.Breeze appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the NMB had fulfilled its statutory duty to investigate and acted within the broad bounds of its statutory discretion when it designated who could participate in the election, set the rules that governed that election, and held the election itself. The court concluded that Breeze's arguments did not point to any specific requirement in the RLA that the NMB violated, and were more in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the RLA should provide. View "Breeze Aviation Group v. National Mediation Board" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Gary Avant, was a truck driver for Muskogee County. County officials believed that Avant was complaining to other citizens about the county’s road plan and the assignment of a county worker. Avant was subsequently fired by the county commissioner. Avant sued the commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. However, during the litigation, Avant denied making the statements that led to his firing. The commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the perceived speech hadn’t involved a matter of public concern. The district court denied this part of the motion, and the case was remanded for the district court to develop the record.After remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, leading the commissioner to appeal again. On appeal, the commissioner argued that Avant hadn’t pleaded a claim for perceived speech and that qualified immunity applies given the lack of precedent on how to assess a public concern for perceived speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the pleadings. However, it did have jurisdiction over the commissioner’s argument for reversal based on the absence of a clearly established violation. The court concluded that Avant had not shown that the perceived speech involved a clearly established public concern. Therefore, the commissioner was entitled to qualified immunity, and the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for the district court to grant summary judgment to the commissioner in his personal capacity on the First Amendment claim for retaliation based on perceived speech. View "Avant v. Doke" on Justia Law

Leachco, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation that manufactures and markets various products, appealed the denial of its request for a preliminary injunction to halt administrative enforcement proceedings by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Leachco argued that the statutory removal protections for CPSC commissioners and administrative law judges (ALJs) violated Article II of the Constitution and the separation of powers. The district court denied Leachco's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating that even if Leachco's constitutional arguments were valid, the alleged constitutional violations were insufficient to establish that Leachco would suffer "irreparable harm" if the injunction was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that under current Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, Leachco's subjection to proceedings before an agency whose officials allegedly have unconstitutional protection against removal is insufficient, by itself, to establish irreparable harm. The court also found that Leachco failed to show that the removal protections for CPSC commissioners and its administrative law judge were unconstitutional. Therefore, Leachco failed to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction. View "Leachco v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law