Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A retail brokerage firm and registered broker-dealer sought to challenge a regulation requiring broker-dealers to comply with certain reporting and record-retention requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces compliance with these requirements pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 17a-8, which incorporates BSA obligations for brokers and dealers. The plaintiff argued that the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by applying BSA requirements through Rule 17a-8 without promulgating its own regulations via notice-and-comment procedures. The plaintiff’s legal challenge was prompted by the SEC’s filing of an enforcement action in a New York federal court against a related entity, Alpine Securities Corporation, alleging numerous violations of Rule 17a-8.In the United States District Court for the District of Utah, the SEC moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiff had not identified a reviewable “final agency action” as required by the APA. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, finding that the SEC’s decision to file an enforcement action was not a final agency action and that the plaintiff therefore lacked statutory standing. The court also noted, but did not reach, other grounds raised by the SEC, such as Article III standing and timeliness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the SEC’s filing of a federal court enforcement action did not constitute final agency action under the APA, as it did not itself determine rights or obligations or give rise to legal consequences beyond the burden of litigation. The Tenth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of statutory standing. View "Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. USSEC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a Colorado statute enacted in 2024, which imposed a “congestion impact fee” of up to $3 per day on all short-term vehicle rentals in the state, including rentals at airports and elsewhere. The fee revenue is designated for transportation infrastructure projects to reduce traffic congestion and benefit users of rental vehicles. The statute specifies that the fee applies to all short-term vehicle rentals statewide, including both traditional rental companies and car-sharing programs.The American Car Rental Association, representing car rental companies operating in Colorado, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The Association argued that the Colorado fee was preempted by the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (“AHTA”), specifically 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)(2)(A)(v), which prohibits states from imposing certain taxes or fees “upon any business located at a commercial service airport” unless those taxes or fees are generally imposed on sales or services by the state. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants, finding that the fee was not preempted by the AHTA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but for a different reason. The Tenth Circuit held that the AHTA’s preemption provision applies only to fees or taxes imposed directly upon airport businesses, while Colorado’s congestion impact fee is imposed on consumers who rent vehicles, not on the rental businesses themselves. The court determined that rental companies and car-sharing programs merely act as collection agents for the fee, which is ultimately paid by consumers. Therefore, the federal statute does not preempt Colorado’s fee, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "American Car Rental Association v. Humphreys" on Justia Law

The plaintiff participated in a clinical trial for an experimental COVID-19 vaccine manufactured by AstraZeneca in November 2020. Before receiving the vaccine, she signed an informed-consent form stating that AstraZeneca would compensate her for injuries caused by the vaccine, including providing medical care and reimbursement, and that the company had an insurance policy to cover such costs. The form also disclosed that federal law may limit her right to sue for vaccine-related injuries, referencing the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), which provides broad immunity to vaccine manufacturers during a public health emergency.After suffering debilitating medical injuries from the vaccine, the plaintiff requested compensation and care from AstraZeneca, which was denied. She then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging breach of contract and breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. AstraZeneca moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the PREP Act immunized it from liability. The district court denied the motion, holding that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies only to tort claims, not to contract-based claims. The court further reserved judgment on whether AstraZeneca had waived its statutory immunity in the informed-consent form.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies to “all claims for loss,” including those arising from breach of contract, provided they bear a causal relationship to the administration or use of a covered countermeasure like a vaccine. The court remanded the case for the district court to consider whether AstraZeneca waived immunity in the informed-consent form. View "Dressen v. AstraZeneca AB" on Justia Law

President Biden expanded the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah, designating over 3.23 million acres under the Antiquities Act and identifying more than 500 items for protection. Plaintiffs—including the State of Utah, two counties, individuals, and an organization—objected to the scope of these expansions. They argued that the President exceeded his authority by designating items and reserving land that, in their view, did not qualify under the Act’s requirements for “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” and by not limiting the land to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management” of those objects.Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the claims. It held that sovereign immunity barred review of the President’s actions, found some plaintiffs lacked standing, and concluded that challenges to agency management plans were not ripe because those plans were not final agency actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that sovereign immunity barred all review of the President’s actions under the ultra vires doctrine, since the Antiquities Act imposes discernable statutory limits on presidential authority. The court found that plaintiffs could bring ultra vires claims alleging that the President exceeded specific statutory limits, and remanded for the district court to consider whether the President’s actions were indeed ultra vires. The Tenth Circuit also vacated and remanded the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims due to subsequent agency action, but affirmed the dismissal of claims by individual plaintiffs and one organization for lack of standing. View "Garfield County v. Biden" on Justia Law

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. was engaged in gas production from two New Mexico units under a federal lease, which required payment of royalties to the federal government. State officials, acting under federal authority, audited Devon Energy’s operations and disallowed certain deductions related to the treatment and transportation of natural gas over a four-year period. The charges for these services were bundled, making it difficult to separate deductible from non-deductible costs. A related Devon entity had previously resolved a similar dispute with the government through a settlement agreement, which established formulas for calculating allowable deductions.The Office of Natural Resources Revenue, a federal agency, reviewed Devon Energy’s objections to the audit and upheld the disallowance, ordering payment of the contested royalties or further documentation. Devon Energy sought review in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, arguing that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not considering the prior settlement agreement. The district court affirmed the agency’s decision, reasoning that the agreement did not cover all disputed royalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Tenth Circuit found that the agency erred by failing to consider the prior settlement agreement, which may have had significant legal and factual implications for the calculation of deductions. The court also found that the record was insufficient to support the government’s alternative arguments for affirmance, such as the identity of the contracting entity and the expiration of the agreement’s terms. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine the appropriate remedy—whether vacatur of the agency’s decision or a remand to the agency is warranted. View "Devon Energy Production Company v. DOI" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to expand its underground coal mine situated beneath Indian lands. To proceed, it needed approval for a revised permit, a new federal lease, and a modification of its operations plan. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Bureau of Land Management jointly conducted an environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and ultimately granted the necessary authorizations for expansion.Two advocacy groups opposed the expansion, citing potential impacts on water resources and basing their challenges on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. They previously sued, raising claims under the rescinded Stream Protection Rule, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected those claims. The groups later amended their complaint to invoke different provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 1270 and 1276. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied their petition for judicial review, concluding the claims were substantially similar to those previously rejected and finding the agency had fulfilled its nondiscretionary duties.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the advocacy groups could not obtain relief under Section 1270 because they failed to provide adequate notice of the alleged violations and had advanced claims implicating discretionary, not mandatory, agency actions. The court also found that Section 1276 did not authorize judicial review for the groups because they had not participated in the permit-review process as required by the statute. The court clarified that commenting on an environmental assessment was not a substitute for objecting to the permit application itself. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for judicial review. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States" on Justia Law

Several rural electricity distribution cooperatives entered into long-term, all-requirements contracts with a generation-and-transmission cooperative, requiring them to purchase nearly all of their electric service from the cooperative through 2050. Some of these distribution cooperatives later sought to terminate their memberships and contracts early. In response, the generation-and-transmission cooperative proposed a methodology for calculating an exit fee and submitted it to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for approval.FERC initiated hearing procedures to determine a just and reasonable exit-fee methodology. In those proceedings, both the cooperative and FERC’s Trial Staff presented different approaches: the cooperative advocated a lost-revenues approach, while Trial Staff proposed a balance-sheet approach. An administrative law judge found that the cooperative’s methodology was not just and reasonable, but that the balance-sheet approach, with modifications, was. The cooperative sought review from FERC, which agreed with the administrative law judge, rejecting the lost-revenues approach and directing the cooperative to adopt the modified balance-sheet methodology.The cooperative then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that FERC’s adopted methodology was arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the lost-revenues approach, adopting the balance-sheet approach, implementing a transmission-crediting mechanism, or applying the methodology to certain members despite existing contracts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, supported by substantial evidence, and denied the petitions for review. View "Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, v. FERC" on Justia Law

During a prolonged standoff in Las Vegas, New Mexico, Alejandro Alirez shot Cristal Cervantes and her grandfather inside their home while livestreaming the incident on Facebook. Law enforcement officers from multiple agencies responded after being alerted that Alirez, believed to be armed and mentally ill, was acting erratically at the residence. Upon the deputies’ arrival and their attempt to make contact, gunshots were fired almost immediately, with Cristal and her grandfather ultimately killed during the ordeal. Law enforcement officers established a perimeter and called for tactical support, but Cristal was found unresponsive after Alirez surrendered hours later.The plaintiffs, including Cristal’s personal representative and her mother, brought suit against various law enforcement agencies and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico state law, alleging failure to intervene and negligence. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment for all defendants, concluding that qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claims and that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their state-law claims, including negligent investigation, negligent training, and loss of consortium.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the law enforcement officers did not affirmatively act to create or increase the danger to Cristal, a necessary element for liability under the substantive due process “danger-creation” exception, and thus the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the court found that the officers’ inability to intervene was caused by the immediate deadly threat posed by Alirez, precluding liability under New Mexico law for negligent investigation or related torts. The disposition of the case was affirmed in favor of the defendants. View "Salcido v. City of Las Vegas" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and organizations challenged rules of decorum established by certain Colorado state legislators during public hearings on legislation concerning transgender rights. The rules prohibited misgendering and deadnaming—referring to transgender individuals in ways inconsistent with their gender identity or using names they no longer use. The plaintiffs asserted that these rules violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their speech during legislative hearings and by removing certain comments from the official legislative record.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case after the legislators, sued in both their official and individual capacities, moved to dismiss. The legislators argued that they were protected by legislative immunity, that the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits, and that the requests for relief were moot. The district court granted the legislators’ motion to dismiss, holding that the rules and their enforcement were within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and thus subject to absolute legislative immunity. The court also found the matter moot regarding prospective relief, concluding it was speculative whether the plaintiffs would face the same situation again.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs continued to seek relief and the legislators confirmed that the challenged rules would remain in effect. However, the Tenth Circuit found that legislative immunity applied, protecting legislators from suit for actions taken in their legislative capacity, regardless of whether the relief sought was prospective or retrospective, or whether the suit was brought against them in their individual or official capacities. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims due to the application of legislative immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Gays Against Groomers v. Garcia" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in a Colorado state prison, the plaintiff, a practicing member of the Sac & Fox faith, brought suit seeking monetary and injunctive relief. He alleged that certain prison regulations and practices violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. His claims focused on being denied possession of sacred items, spiritual cleansing of his cell, use of donated firewood for religious ceremonies, and access to faith grounds during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff named numerous officials and employees, including the Governor of Colorado, in both their official and individual capacities.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the Governor’s motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, rejecting his assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Governor argued he lacked the required connection to the challenged regulations to qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception. During the appeal, the plaintiff was transferred to another facility within the Colorado Department of Corrections. The Governor raised the issue of mootness due to this transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the claims for injunctive relief against the Governor were moot because of the transfer and whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applied. The court held that the claims were neither constitutionally nor prudentially moot, as the plaintiff’s affidavit showed ongoing exposure to substantially similar conditions at the new facility. The court further held that, under Colorado law and the facts alleged, the Governor had sufficient authority and demonstrated involvement in the challenged practices to satisfy the Ex Parte Young exception. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Eaves v. Polis" on Justia Law