Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Mostafa v. Blanche
A man serving a life sentence for terrorism-related convictions at a federal prison in Colorado, who is severely disabled with both arms amputated above the elbow and vision loss in one eye, filed suit against several federal officials. He alleged violations of his federal constitutional and statutory rights stemming from his conditions of confinement and medical care while incarcerated. His claims included inadequate dental and medical care, denial of a medical diet, lack of proper prosthetics, and insufficient accommodation for his disabilities.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed most claims on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Some claims were dismissed as moot or for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, while others, including his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court also found his Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim challenging his placement at the prison was time-barred. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims with prejudice and then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff could not pursue his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim under the APA because he failed to allege a final agency action and sued individual officers rather than the agency or officials in their official capacities. The court also held that his Bivens claim for deliberate indifference arose in a new context and was foreclosed due to the existence of the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative remedies. The appellate court further found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint and ruled that the plaintiff had waived his challenge to deposition transcript fees by failing to object before the magistrate judge. View "Mostafa v. Blanche" on Justia Law
Cozy Inn, Incorporated v. City of Salina, Kansas
The owner of a long-standing hamburger restaurant in Salina, Kansas hired an artist to paint a large, UFO-themed display on the exterior wall of the business. The display included playful imagery related to the restaurant and a slogan. Shortly after painting began, city officials determined the display was a "sign" under Salina's sign code, not an unregulated mural, because it referenced the restaurant's products. They concluded the display was too large to qualify for a permit, informed the owner to pause work, and instructed him to submit a permit application. The city later placed the application on indefinite hold, citing a review of the sign regulations. The owner disputed consenting to this hold and subsequently filed suit challenging the sign code and the city's enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their First Amendment claims. The court found Salina's sign code failed intermediate scrutiny because there was insufficient evidence connecting the city’s distinction between signs and murals to its stated interests of safety, aesthetics, and property values. Declaratory relief was granted, but a permanent injunction was denied. Salina appealed.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Salina did not produce evidence demonstrating that regulated signs—as defined by the city—posed greater risks to its interests than unregulated murals. Therefore, the sign code failed intermediate scrutiny. The court further held that placing the permit application on indefinite hold constituted an impermissible prior restraint on speech, as the city did not show the applicant consented to the hold or that it complied with required time limits. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Cozy Inn, Incorporated v. City of Salina, Kansas" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zeldin
Oklahoma was authorized by Congress in 2005 to extend its administration of federal environmental programs into Indian country, upon approval by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For many years, Oklahoma did not invoke this provision. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma expanded the definition of Indian country in the state, Oklahoma requested EPA approval to apply its environmental programs to these areas. The EPA initially granted the request in 2020, then withdrew it to allow for further tribal consultation. After extensive engagement with tribal nations, the EPA issued a new approval in January 2025 with added conditions requiring tribal engagement, but subsequently rescinded those conditions in May 2025 and reissued its approval without them.The Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s May 2025 decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Pawnee Nation argued that the EPA's action was unlawful because the congressional provision authorizing Oklahoma's request, § 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA), had expired in 2009, that the EPA erred by refusing to impose conditions on Oklahoma’s approval, and that the EPA failed to make contemporaneous determinations of Oklahoma’s programs’ compliance with federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction and denied Pawnee Nation’s petition for review. The court held that § 10211(a) was unambiguous and remains active, not expired. It determined that EPA’s statutory obligation to approve Oklahoma’s request did not permit the agency to impose additional conditions, and found that EPA acted within the provision’s requirements by relying on its previous determinations that Oklahoma’s programs complied with federal law. The court affirmed EPA’s interpretation and approval. View "Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zeldin" on Justia Law
Mukantagara v. Mullin
A woman and her son, admitted as refugees to the United States in 2005, had their refugee status terminated by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) after an investigation concluded that the woman had participated in the Rwandan genocide. This determination rendered her ineligible for refugee status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically due to the “persecutor bar.” Both were placed in removal proceedings. The woman denied the allegations, asserting they were politically motivated. In removal proceedings, an immigration court found her credible and granted her asylum, but denied asylum to her son, who had aged out of dependent eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded the woman’s asylum grant and affirmed the denial for her son. The government’s appeal and the son’s petition for review were abated pending the outcome of related litigation.The pair then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging USCIS’s termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of actions specified to be in the agency’s discretion. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the termination decision was not discretionary under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that termination of refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) involves a two-step process: a mandatory, nondiscretionary determination whether the individual met the statutory definition of “refugee” at admission, followed by a discretionary decision whether to terminate status. Because the plaintiffs challenged only the nondiscretionary threshold determination, the court concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar judicial review. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mukantagara v. Mullin" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law
Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. USSEC
A retail brokerage firm and registered broker-dealer sought to challenge a regulation requiring broker-dealers to comply with certain reporting and record-retention requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces compliance with these requirements pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 17a-8, which incorporates BSA obligations for brokers and dealers. The plaintiff argued that the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by applying BSA requirements through Rule 17a-8 without promulgating its own regulations via notice-and-comment procedures. The plaintiff’s legal challenge was prompted by the SEC’s filing of an enforcement action in a New York federal court against a related entity, Alpine Securities Corporation, alleging numerous violations of Rule 17a-8.In the United States District Court for the District of Utah, the SEC moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiff had not identified a reviewable “final agency action” as required by the APA. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, finding that the SEC’s decision to file an enforcement action was not a final agency action and that the plaintiff therefore lacked statutory standing. The court also noted, but did not reach, other grounds raised by the SEC, such as Article III standing and timeliness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the SEC’s filing of a federal court enforcement action did not constitute final agency action under the APA, as it did not itself determine rights or obligations or give rise to legal consequences beyond the burden of litigation. The Tenth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of statutory standing. View "Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. USSEC" on Justia Law
American Car Rental Association v. Humphreys
The case concerns a challenge to a Colorado statute enacted in 2024, which imposed a “congestion impact fee” of up to $3 per day on all short-term vehicle rentals in the state, including rentals at airports and elsewhere. The fee revenue is designated for transportation infrastructure projects to reduce traffic congestion and benefit users of rental vehicles. The statute specifies that the fee applies to all short-term vehicle rentals statewide, including both traditional rental companies and car-sharing programs.The American Car Rental Association, representing car rental companies operating in Colorado, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The Association argued that the Colorado fee was preempted by the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (“AHTA”), specifically 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)(2)(A)(v), which prohibits states from imposing certain taxes or fees “upon any business located at a commercial service airport” unless those taxes or fees are generally imposed on sales or services by the state. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants, finding that the fee was not preempted by the AHTA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but for a different reason. The Tenth Circuit held that the AHTA’s preemption provision applies only to fees or taxes imposed directly upon airport businesses, while Colorado’s congestion impact fee is imposed on consumers who rent vehicles, not on the rental businesses themselves. The court determined that rental companies and car-sharing programs merely act as collection agents for the fee, which is ultimately paid by consumers. Therefore, the federal statute does not preempt Colorado’s fee, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "American Car Rental Association v. Humphreys" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law
Dressen v. AstraZeneca AB
The plaintiff participated in a clinical trial for an experimental COVID-19 vaccine manufactured by AstraZeneca in November 2020. Before receiving the vaccine, she signed an informed-consent form stating that AstraZeneca would compensate her for injuries caused by the vaccine, including providing medical care and reimbursement, and that the company had an insurance policy to cover such costs. The form also disclosed that federal law may limit her right to sue for vaccine-related injuries, referencing the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), which provides broad immunity to vaccine manufacturers during a public health emergency.After suffering debilitating medical injuries from the vaccine, the plaintiff requested compensation and care from AstraZeneca, which was denied. She then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging breach of contract and breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. AstraZeneca moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the PREP Act immunized it from liability. The district court denied the motion, holding that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies only to tort claims, not to contract-based claims. The court further reserved judgment on whether AstraZeneca had waived its statutory immunity in the informed-consent form.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies to “all claims for loss,” including those arising from breach of contract, provided they bear a causal relationship to the administration or use of a covered countermeasure like a vaccine. The court remanded the case for the district court to consider whether AstraZeneca waived immunity in the informed-consent form. View "Dressen v. AstraZeneca AB" on Justia Law
Garfield County v. Biden
President Biden expanded the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah, designating over 3.23 million acres under the Antiquities Act and identifying more than 500 items for protection. Plaintiffs—including the State of Utah, two counties, individuals, and an organization—objected to the scope of these expansions. They argued that the President exceeded his authority by designating items and reserving land that, in their view, did not qualify under the Act’s requirements for “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” and by not limiting the land to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management” of those objects.Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the claims. It held that sovereign immunity barred review of the President’s actions, found some plaintiffs lacked standing, and concluded that challenges to agency management plans were not ripe because those plans were not final agency actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that sovereign immunity barred all review of the President’s actions under the ultra vires doctrine, since the Antiquities Act imposes discernable statutory limits on presidential authority. The court found that plaintiffs could bring ultra vires claims alleging that the President exceeded specific statutory limits, and remanded for the district court to consider whether the President’s actions were indeed ultra vires. The Tenth Circuit also vacated and remanded the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims due to subsequent agency action, but affirmed the dismissal of claims by individual plaintiffs and one organization for lack of standing. View "Garfield County v. Biden" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Devon Energy Production Company v. DOI
Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. was engaged in gas production from two New Mexico units under a federal lease, which required payment of royalties to the federal government. State officials, acting under federal authority, audited Devon Energy’s operations and disallowed certain deductions related to the treatment and transportation of natural gas over a four-year period. The charges for these services were bundled, making it difficult to separate deductible from non-deductible costs. A related Devon entity had previously resolved a similar dispute with the government through a settlement agreement, which established formulas for calculating allowable deductions.The Office of Natural Resources Revenue, a federal agency, reviewed Devon Energy’s objections to the audit and upheld the disallowance, ordering payment of the contested royalties or further documentation. Devon Energy sought review in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, arguing that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not considering the prior settlement agreement. The district court affirmed the agency’s decision, reasoning that the agreement did not cover all disputed royalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Tenth Circuit found that the agency erred by failing to consider the prior settlement agreement, which may have had significant legal and factual implications for the calculation of deductions. The court also found that the record was insufficient to support the government’s alternative arguments for affirmance, such as the identity of the contracting entity and the expiration of the agreement’s terms. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine the appropriate remedy—whether vacatur of the agency’s decision or a remand to the agency is warranted. View "Devon Energy Production Company v. DOI" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law
Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States
A mining company sought to expand its underground coal mine situated beneath Indian lands. To proceed, it needed approval for a revised permit, a new federal lease, and a modification of its operations plan. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Bureau of Land Management jointly conducted an environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and ultimately granted the necessary authorizations for expansion.Two advocacy groups opposed the expansion, citing potential impacts on water resources and basing their challenges on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. They previously sued, raising claims under the rescinded Stream Protection Rule, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected those claims. The groups later amended their complaint to invoke different provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 1270 and 1276. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied their petition for judicial review, concluding the claims were substantially similar to those previously rejected and finding the agency had fulfilled its nondiscretionary duties.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the advocacy groups could not obtain relief under Section 1270 because they failed to provide adequate notice of the alleged violations and had advanced claims implicating discretionary, not mandatory, agency actions. The court also found that Section 1276 did not authorize judicial review for the groups because they had not participated in the permit-review process as required by the statute. The court clarified that commenting on an environmental assessment was not a substitute for objecting to the permit application itself. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for judicial review. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law