Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bulgarian native Vladimir Vladimirov petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order of removal based on marriage fraud. Much of the government’s evidence came from written reports prepared by immigration officers and other written materials contained in the agency’s files. Vladimirov claimed the BIA’s reliance on such materials denied him due process of law and without the disputed evidence the government failed to make its case. After consideration of the process due in immigration cases, particularly as it applied to the consideration of evidence that might be excluded in other contexts, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in this case and denied the petition for review. View "Vladimirov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In this case, TransAm Trucking, Inc. petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of an email it received from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) counsel expressing the agency’s refusal to issue TransAm a third amended compliance review report pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement. After granting review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that email was not a "final order" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2342(3)(A), and dismissed TransAm’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Transam Trucking v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety" on Justia Law

Charles Jernegan committed suicide at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma (“Jail”). His mother, Plaintiff-Appellee Carolyn Cox, brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendant-Appellant Tulsa County Sheriff Stanley Glanz. Sheriff Glanz moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied the Sheriff’s motion (without mentioning qualified immunity) based on the existence of genuinely disputed material facts. In this interlocutory appeal, Sheriff Glanz argued to the Tenth Circuit that extant caselaw at the time of Jernegan’s suicide did not clearly establish that he could be held liable as a supervisor under the circumstances of this case: Jernegan denied having a suicidal intent during booking and no Jail staff members detected a basis for referring him for additional mental-health screening based on their interactions with him. The Sheriff also argued that none of the policies or procedures he had implemented at the Jail could be characterized as the moving force behind any alleged violation of Jernegan’s constitutional rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the facts of this case, the district court erred in denying the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Cox's individual-capacity claim. As for Cox's official-capacity claim, the Court concluded that the district court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment was indisputably not a final decision amenable to interlocutory review: "Our assumption of jurisdiction over the court’s resolution of the official-capacity claim would therefore only be appropriate if we invoked our discretionary power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over this claim. Sheriff Glanz, however, has not relied upon this generally disfavored doctrine; furthermore, we discern no legally cognizable basis for exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case." The Sheriff's appeal of the denial of his motion for summary judgment on Cox's official-capacity claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cox v. Glanz" on Justia Law

In this case, the parents of an autistic child withdrew him from the Douglas County School District because they believed his educational progress was inadequate. They later sought reimbursement of tuition and related expenses pursuant to federal law that required public schools to reimburse parents if the school could not meet the student's educational needs. The District’s denial of reimbursement was upheld after a due process hearing in administrative court, and that determination was also upheld in federal district court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient support in the record to affirm the findings of the administrative law judge that the child received some educational benefit while in the District’s care and that is enough to satisfy the District’s obligation to provide a free appropriate public education. View "Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District" on Justia Law

Dennis Rodebaugh ran D&S Guide and Outfitters. Rodebaugh took mostly out-of-state clients on elk and deer hunts in the White River National Forest near Meeker, where they waited in tree stands for elk and deer to approach before shooting them. To attract the elk and deer, Rodebaugh spread salt around the base of the tree stands. Colorado law prohibited “baiting.” And selling wildlife taken in violation of state law is a federal crime under the Lacey Act. After an extensive investigation, Rodebaugh was indicted for several Lacey Act violations. A jury found him guilty on six counts. The district court sentenced him to 41 months in prison and three years of supervised release. He appealed, raising various trial and sentencing issues. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and prison sentence, rejecting Rodebaugh’s challenges to the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the validity of the underlying Colorado regulations, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction on each count, and the application of enhancements to the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Rodebaugh" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Oklahoma legislature created the Oklahoma License Plate Design Task Force to update the design of the standard Oklahoma vehicle license plate. The task force also viewed the redesign as an opportunity to “market Oklahoma as a tourist destination.” In 2008, the task force chose a design that included an image of a Native American man shooting an arrow towards the sky, and featured the words “Native America.” The image was based on a sculpture by a local artist which depicted the story of a young Apache warrior who fired an arrow that was blessed by a medicine man into the heavens; as the tale goes, the arrow carried prayers for rain to the Spirit World. Plaintiff-appellant Keith Cressman, professed "historic Christian beliefs," and objected to the license plate design, because in his view, taught that there were “multiple gods” and that “the arrow is an intermediary for prayer.” Finding the license plate image to be irreconcilable with his beliefs, plaintiff tried various means to avoid displaying it. Concealing a state-issued license plate was a misdemeanor under Oklahoma law. To avoid the image, plaintiff obtained specialty plates for his vehicles, paying a fee above that of a standard license plate (ranging from eighteen to thirty-eight dollars). Plaintiff sought reimbursement of that vanity-plate-fee from the State of Oklahoma, or be allowed to cover the image on the standard plate. When he did not receive a response to these requests, plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil-rights lawsuit, alleging that he was forced to display the Native American image (and thereby communicate its allegedly pantheistic message) in violation of his free-speech, free-exercise, and due-process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought an injunction prohibiting state officials from prosecuting him for covering the image on his license plate or, alternatively, an order requiring the Oklahoma Tax Commission to provide him with a specialty license plate at the same cost as a standard license plate. Defendants filed motions to dismiss based on a lack of standing and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court found that plaintiff had standing, but nonetheless dismissed the complaint. In a prior appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that plaintiff had standing and that he had stated a plausible compelled-speech claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. On remand, and after a bench trial, the district court concluded that a reasonable person would not understand the vehicle license plate image to convey the pantheistic message to which plaintiff objected; it thus held that he was not compelled to speak. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "Mr. Cressman has repeatedly stated, both before this court and the district court, that he does not object to this message. His lack of objection to the only message that a reasonable observer would discern from the image is fatal to his compelled-speech claim; he has not been compelled to express a view he otherwise would not." View "Cressman v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Dr. Mila Means, a Wichita family practitioner announced she would begin offering abortion services to the public. At that time, no doctors were performing abortions in Wichita. The last doctor to do so, Dr. George Tiller, had been shot to death in 2009 by an anti-abortion activist named Scott Roeder. On about January 15, 2011, Defendant Angel Dillard wrote a letter to Dr. Means and mailed it to her office in an envelope bearing Defendant’s name and return address. Upon receipt, Dr. Means notified Wichita police. Shortly after receiving the letter, Dr. Means’ staff found an Associated Press article on the internet which discussed Defendant’s friendship with Scott Roeder, Dr. Tiller’s murderer. This article reported that Defendant had befriended Roeder while he was in jail for the murder. The article indicated that Defendant admired Roeder for following his convictions and being “the only one able to stop abortions in Wichita.” These cross-appeals arose out of a civil enforcement action brought by the United States under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE) .The government alleged Defendant violated FACE by sending a threatening letter to Dr. Means. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss but subsequently granted her motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendant’s letter did not contain a true threat because: (1) it did not suggest unconditional, imminent, and likely violence; and (2) it predicted violence by third parties but did not suggest Defendant would herself engage in violence against the doctor. The government appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Defendant then cross-appealed, arguing the district court should have granted her earlier motion to dismiss both because the government lacked standing to bring this action against her and because FACE is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant’s letter conveyed a true threat, that she subjectively intended to threaten Dr. Means, and that she wrote to Dr. Means in order to intimidate her from providing reproductive health services. The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant was reversed. The Court found no other reversible error. The case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dillard" on Justia Law

The appeals before the Tenth Circuit in this opinion concerned the regulations (as a part of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")) that required group health plans to cover contraceptive services for women as a form of preventive care ("Mandate"). In response to religious concerns, the Departments implementing the ACA (Health and Human Services ("HHS"), Labor, and Treasury) adopted a regulation that exempted religious employers (churches and their integrated auxiliaries) from covering contraceptives. When religious non-profit organizations complained about their omission from this exemption, the Departments adopted a regulation that allowed them to opt out of providing, paying for, or facilitating contraceptive coverage. Under this regulation, a religious non-profit organization could opt out by delivering a form to their group health plan’s health insurance issuer or third-party administrator or by sending a notification to HHS. The Plaintiffs in the cases here were religious non-profit organizations. They argued that complying with the Mandate or the accommodation scheme imposed a substantial burden on their religious exercise. The Plaintiffs argued the Mandate and the accommodation scheme violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the Religion and Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. While Tenth Circuit recognized the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ beliefs and arguments, it concluded the accommodation scheme relieved Plaintiffs of their obligations under the Mandate and did not substantially burden their religious exercise under RFRA or infringe upon their First Amendment rights. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, (6 F.Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Colo. 2013)), and reversed the district courts’ grants of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in "Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius," (No. CIV-13-1015-F, 2013 WL 6804265 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013)), and "Reaching Souls International, Inc. v. Burwell," (No. CIV-13-1092-D, 2013 WL 6804259 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013)). View "Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Andalex Resources, Inc. petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the Mine Safety and Health Administration's (MSHA) decision to revoke previously granted modifications to the application of certain mine safety regulations. In 2008, Andalex ceased mining and sealed two of its mines, the Pinnacle and Aberdeen mines. Although it sealed the mines, Andalex left some infrastructure in place, presumably so it could one day reopen the mines. Andalex complied with one of MSHA's regulations requiring the operator to submit updated maps with notations that it had sealed all openings to the underground mines. After Andalex sealed the two mines, MSHA issued a proposed decision revoking the six modifications it had previously granted to Andalex. When Andalex sealed the two mines, MSHA declared the Pinnacle Mine "[non-producing]" and the Aberdeen Mine "[a]bandoned." MSHA considered Andalex's sealing of the two mines a change of circumstances, allowing revocation under 30 C.F.R. 44.52(c). Andalex disagreed, sought a hearing with an ALJ, and moved for a summary decision, arguing that revocation was improper under section 44.52(c) because MSHA had not demonstrated a change of circumstances or shown that any of the findings MSHA had made in granting the modifications were now invalid. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in the agency's decision and affirmed. View "Andalex Resources, Inc. v. MSHA" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of Jemez brought suit against the United States under the federal common law and the Quiet Title Act (QTA), seeking to quiet its allegedly unextinguished and continuing aboriginal title to the lands of what was known as Valles Caldera National Preserve. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law and dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). It reasoned that sovereign immunity barred the action based on its conclusion that the Jemez Pueblo’s title claim against the United States accrued in 1860 when the United States granted the lands in question to the heirs of Luis Maria Cabeza de Baca (the Baca heirs). The claim thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA), which waived sovereign immunity and provided a cause of action to all Indian claims against the government that accrued before 1946 so long as they were filed within a five year statute of limitations period. Because the claim was not so filed, it became barred by sovereign immunity. The Pueblo appealed, arguing that its aboriginal title was not extinguished by the 1860 grant to the Baca heirs and that its claim for interference with its Indian title did not accrue until 2000, after the United States acquired an interest in the Valles Caldera and began interfering with the Jemez Pueblo’s access to the land. Upon careful consideration of the arguments made on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings: "This appeal is not about whether the Jemez Pueblo holds aboriginal title. On remand, the Jemez Pueblo will have to prove that it had, and still has, aboriginal title to the land at issue in the case. This appeal concerns whether the 1860 Baca grant extinguished the Jemez Pueblo’s alleged aboriginal title to the lands which are the subject of this action. We hold it did not and the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, the 1860 Baca grant itself provided a pre-1946 claim against the United States the Jemez Pueblo could have brought under the ICCA." View "Pueblo of Jemez v. United States" on Justia Law