Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Mila Means, a Wichita family practitioner announced she would begin offering abortion services to the public. At that time, no doctors were performing abortions in Wichita. The last doctor to do so, Dr. George Tiller, had been shot to death in 2009 by an anti-abortion activist named Scott Roeder. On about January 15, 2011, Defendant Angel Dillard wrote a letter to Dr. Means and mailed it to her office in an envelope bearing Defendant’s name and return address. Upon receipt, Dr. Means notified Wichita police. Shortly after receiving the letter, Dr. Means’ staff found an Associated Press article on the internet which discussed Defendant’s friendship with Scott Roeder, Dr. Tiller’s murderer. This article reported that Defendant had befriended Roeder while he was in jail for the murder. The article indicated that Defendant admired Roeder for following his convictions and being “the only one able to stop abortions in Wichita.” These cross-appeals arose out of a civil enforcement action brought by the United States under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE) .The government alleged Defendant violated FACE by sending a threatening letter to Dr. Means. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss but subsequently granted her motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendant’s letter did not contain a true threat because: (1) it did not suggest unconditional, imminent, and likely violence; and (2) it predicted violence by third parties but did not suggest Defendant would herself engage in violence against the doctor. The government appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Defendant then cross-appealed, arguing the district court should have granted her earlier motion to dismiss both because the government lacked standing to bring this action against her and because FACE is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant’s letter conveyed a true threat, that she subjectively intended to threaten Dr. Means, and that she wrote to Dr. Means in order to intimidate her from providing reproductive health services. The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant was reversed. The Court found no other reversible error. The case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dillard" on Justia Law

The appeals before the Tenth Circuit in this opinion concerned the regulations (as a part of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")) that required group health plans to cover contraceptive services for women as a form of preventive care ("Mandate"). In response to religious concerns, the Departments implementing the ACA (Health and Human Services ("HHS"), Labor, and Treasury) adopted a regulation that exempted religious employers (churches and their integrated auxiliaries) from covering contraceptives. When religious non-profit organizations complained about their omission from this exemption, the Departments adopted a regulation that allowed them to opt out of providing, paying for, or facilitating contraceptive coverage. Under this regulation, a religious non-profit organization could opt out by delivering a form to their group health plan’s health insurance issuer or third-party administrator or by sending a notification to HHS. The Plaintiffs in the cases here were religious non-profit organizations. They argued that complying with the Mandate or the accommodation scheme imposed a substantial burden on their religious exercise. The Plaintiffs argued the Mandate and the accommodation scheme violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the Religion and Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. While Tenth Circuit recognized the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ beliefs and arguments, it concluded the accommodation scheme relieved Plaintiffs of their obligations under the Mandate and did not substantially burden their religious exercise under RFRA or infringe upon their First Amendment rights. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, (6 F.Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Colo. 2013)), and reversed the district courts’ grants of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in "Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius," (No. CIV-13-1015-F, 2013 WL 6804265 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013)), and "Reaching Souls International, Inc. v. Burwell," (No. CIV-13-1092-D, 2013 WL 6804259 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013)). View "Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Andalex Resources, Inc. petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the Mine Safety and Health Administration's (MSHA) decision to revoke previously granted modifications to the application of certain mine safety regulations. In 2008, Andalex ceased mining and sealed two of its mines, the Pinnacle and Aberdeen mines. Although it sealed the mines, Andalex left some infrastructure in place, presumably so it could one day reopen the mines. Andalex complied with one of MSHA's regulations requiring the operator to submit updated maps with notations that it had sealed all openings to the underground mines. After Andalex sealed the two mines, MSHA issued a proposed decision revoking the six modifications it had previously granted to Andalex. When Andalex sealed the two mines, MSHA declared the Pinnacle Mine "[non-producing]" and the Aberdeen Mine "[a]bandoned." MSHA considered Andalex's sealing of the two mines a change of circumstances, allowing revocation under 30 C.F.R. 44.52(c). Andalex disagreed, sought a hearing with an ALJ, and moved for a summary decision, arguing that revocation was improper under section 44.52(c) because MSHA had not demonstrated a change of circumstances or shown that any of the findings MSHA had made in granting the modifications were now invalid. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in the agency's decision and affirmed. View "Andalex Resources, Inc. v. MSHA" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of Jemez brought suit against the United States under the federal common law and the Quiet Title Act (QTA), seeking to quiet its allegedly unextinguished and continuing aboriginal title to the lands of what was known as Valles Caldera National Preserve. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law and dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). It reasoned that sovereign immunity barred the action based on its conclusion that the Jemez Pueblo’s title claim against the United States accrued in 1860 when the United States granted the lands in question to the heirs of Luis Maria Cabeza de Baca (the Baca heirs). The claim thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA), which waived sovereign immunity and provided a cause of action to all Indian claims against the government that accrued before 1946 so long as they were filed within a five year statute of limitations period. Because the claim was not so filed, it became barred by sovereign immunity. The Pueblo appealed, arguing that its aboriginal title was not extinguished by the 1860 grant to the Baca heirs and that its claim for interference with its Indian title did not accrue until 2000, after the United States acquired an interest in the Valles Caldera and began interfering with the Jemez Pueblo’s access to the land. Upon careful consideration of the arguments made on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings: "This appeal is not about whether the Jemez Pueblo holds aboriginal title. On remand, the Jemez Pueblo will have to prove that it had, and still has, aboriginal title to the land at issue in the case. This appeal concerns whether the 1860 Baca grant extinguished the Jemez Pueblo’s alleged aboriginal title to the lands which are the subject of this action. We hold it did not and the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, the 1860 Baca grant itself provided a pre-1946 claim against the United States the Jemez Pueblo could have brought under the ICCA." View "Pueblo of Jemez v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five women who were formerly incarcerated at the Hillside Community Corrections Center in Oklahoma City. They filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against multiple defendants, alleging they were sexually abused and harassed in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs’ complaint named fifteen defendants, including Defendant-Appellant Charlotte Day and Defendant-Appellant Mary Pavliska, both of whom were guards at Hillside during the relevant period. Plaintiffs alleged Day and Pavliska were aware of the abuse and did nothing to prevent it. The claims against several defendants were dismissed without prejudice. The remaining defendants (except the alleged perpetrator Anthony Bobelu) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to all movants except Day and Pavliska. The district ruled a jury could conclude from the evidence presented that Day and Pavliska were deliberately indifferent to a known substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs. In an interlocutory appeal, Day and Pavliska argued to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the district court erred by ruling they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Day’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Pavliska. View "Castillo v. Day" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendant-appellant Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) argued the district court should have dismissed plaintiff-appellee Kathleen Arbogast's suit because: (1) KDOL lacks the capacity to sue and to be sued under Kansas law; and (2) even if KDOL was a proper defendant, it was immune from suit by operation of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Arbogast was employed in the Workers Compensation Division of KDOL. She suffered from asthma and, in April 2008, complained that perfumes and other strong fragrances in the workplace were impairing her ability to work. In September 2010, Arbogast was moved to a workspace in the basement of her office building in an attempt to alleviate the problem. But Arbogast continued to suffer asthma attacks when coworkers wearing fragrances would come speak with her, prompting Arbogast to make additional complaints to her supervisor. In 2011, Karin Brownlee, then-Secretary of Labor, terminated Arbogast's employment at KDOL. The Tenth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider KDOL's capacity argument, but the Court exercised jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and affirmed the district court's determination that KDOL was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Arbogast's claims. View "Arbogast v. Kansas Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Nearly forty years ago the Ute Tribe filed a lawsuit alleging that Utah and several local governments were unlawfully trying to displace tribal authority on tribal lands. After a decade of proceedings at the district court and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc. In the decision that followed, "Ute III," the court ruled for the Tribe and rejected Utah's claim that congressional action had diminished three constituent parts of Ute tribal lands (the Uncompahgre Reservation, the Uintah Valley Reservation, and certain national forest areas. When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, that "should have been the end of the matter." State officials chose "to disregard the binding effect of the Tenth Circuit decision in order to attempt to relitigate the boundary dispute in a friendlier forum" by continuing to prosecute tribal members in state court for conduct within the boundaries recognized by Ute III. Utah argued to the Utah Supreme Court that Ute III did not diminish tribal territory did diminish at least a part of the Uintah Valley Reservation. The Court agreed, as did the U.S. Supreme Court (despite having denied certiorari to "Ute III"). The issue of what to do with the mandate of "Ute III" remained: keeping it in place could leave the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hagen to control only cases arising from Utah state courts and not federal district courts. In "Ute V," the Tenth Circuit elected to recall and modify Ute III's mandate. On appeal, Utah sought to diminish parts of the national forest and Uncompahgre lands. "Ute V" rejected this request. The Tribe filed suit in federal court, seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the State and its counties from pursuing criminal prosecutions of Indians in state court for offenses arising in areas declared by Ute III and V to be Indian country, and prohibiting the State and its subdivisions from otherwise relitigating matters settled by those decisions. Before the Tenth Circuit in this matter were three interlocutory (but immediately appealable) collateral orders this latest litigation has spawned: (1) the Tribe's request for a preliminary injunction; (2) the Tribe's claim of immunity from the counterclaims; and (3) Uintah County's claim of immunity from the Tribe's suit. In all three decisions the district court denied the requested relief. But the Tenth Circuit found Tribe's arguments on all three points as "well taken." The district court should have issued a preliminary injunction; the Tribe was shielded by sovereign immunity; and Uintah County was not. View "Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah" on Justia Law

Albuquerque police sergeant Adam Casaus had ended his shift when he drove home in his squad car, lights flashing and going at a high rate of speed. He ran a red light, hitting Ashley Browder's car. Browder died, and her sister Lindsay suffered serious injuries. Casaus was ultimately charged with reckless vehicular homicide in state court. Lindsay and her parents filed a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages. Casaus moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied relief, and Casaus appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Browder v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Kansas developed a school financing scheme that sought to avoid “mak[ing] the quality of a child’s education a function of his or her parent’s or neighbors’ wealth.” Displeased with the outcome of school finance litigation in state court, plaintiffs, parents of students in the relatively wealthy Shawnee Mission School District (“SMSD”), sought federal intervention to upend decades of effort toward establishing an equitable school finance system in Kansas. Adopting a "kitchen-sink approach," they claimed that aspects of the state’s school financing regime violated their rights to free speech, to petition the government, to associate, to vote, to education, to equal protection of the laws, to direct the upbringing of their children, and to dispose of their property. Upon review of plaintiffs' "novel and expansive claims," the Tenth Circuit found no support and affirmed the district court’s orders denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, granting in part defendants’ motions to dismiss, and denying reconsideration. View "Petrella v. Brownback" on Justia Law

Movant-Appellant Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, Inc. (KCEC) appealed the district court’s denial of its motion seeking intervention as of right or permissive intervention in a pending case. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. (Tri-State), a Colorado non-profit regional cooperative that provides wholesale electric power, filed suit against the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (NMPRC) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Tri-State argued that the NMPRC’s exercise of jurisdiction and suspension of Tri-State’s wholesale electric rates in New Mexico violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. In September 2013, Tri-State approved a wholesale rate increase for 2014 and filed an Advice Notice with the NMPRC. After rate protests by KCEC and three others, the NMPRC proceeded to suspend Tri-State’s 2014 rate increases as well. The NMPRC consolidated the proceedings on both the 2013 and 2014 wholesale rates. These proceedings remained pending before the NMPRC. In February 2014, Tri-State filed an amended complaint adding factual allegations regarding the NMPRC’s suspension of its 2014 wholesale rate. Tri-State’s amended complaint asserted Tri-State was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief because “[t]he Commission’s exertion of jurisdiction to suspend and subsequently review and establish Tri-State’s rates in New Mexico constituted economic protectionism and imposed a burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.” KCEC sought to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and permissively pursuant to Rule 24(b). Tri-State opposed intervention, but the NMPRC did not. Though not a party to the litigation, KCEC filed an answer to Tri-State’s complaint in which it asserted essentially the same affirmative defenses to Tri-State’s claims as had the NMPRC. The only unique defense KCEC presented was that Tri-State’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Prior to the district court’s ruling on KCEC’s motion, the NMPRC moved for summary judgment, arguing both that: (1) Tri-State was estopped from challenging the NMPRC’s rate-making jurisdiction given its agreement to the earlier Stipulation; and (2) the NMPRC’s order did not violate either New Mexico law or the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Though still not a party to the litigation, KCEC filed a proposed response to the NMPRC’s motion for summary judgment, presenting essentially the same arguments as the NMPRC and providing no additional evidence. The district court then denied KCEC’s motion to intervene, finding that neither intervention as of right nor permissive intervention was appropriate. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that KCEC did not show that the district court’s denial of permissive intervention was “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” View "Tri-State Generation v. NM Public Regulation Comm." on Justia Law