Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) grants grazing permits to private individuals who own land adjacent to public lands; adjacent, private lands are called "base properties." Grazing permits limit both the number of animals grazing on a specific allotment of public land and the number of days they are permitted to graze. Appellant Stanley Jones appealed his convictions for one count of unlawful use or occupation of public lands, and two counts of allowing his livestock to graze without authorization on public lands. While Mr. Jones owned cattle in Wyoming, he was not the owner of the base properties adjacent to the two BLM public lands or allotments involved in this suit. Instead, his brother owned the adjacent base properties During the periods at issue, no grazing permit had been issued to Mr. Jones or his brother, nor has Mr. Jones leased his brother's property, as required for obtaining such a permit. After issuing Mr. Jones multiple administrative trespass notices and fines over the years for grazing his cattle on these and other allotments without a permit, the BLM, through the United States Attorney's Office for Wyoming, brought criminal charges against him, including one count of unlawful use or occupation, and for unauthorized grazing. A jury convicted Mr. Jones of all three criminal counts, and thereafter, the district court sentenced him to two years of supervised probation for each count, to be served concurrently, together with a $3,000 fine, contingent on his compliance with certain terms and conditions, and a $75 special assessment. Appearing pro se, Mr. Jones appealed, arguing that "the handling of the district court proceeding caused the jury to come to the wrong conclusion and that the true and honest facts should have been considered." Furthermore, Mr. Jones argued: (1) the district court improperly granted the government's motion in limine and excluded his witness from testifying, thereby depriving him of a fair trial; and (2) the proceedings against him were fundamentally unfair and denied him due process for a multitude of reasons. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

This appeal consolidated two cases about United States Forest Service actions in the Black Hills National Forest (BHNF). Appellants, (collectively, "Biodiversity") were largely non-profit organizations interested in species and habitat protection in the BHNF. Appellees were the Forest Service and several of its officials tasked with managing the BHNF. Intervenors-Appellees were state and county governments and private groups concerned with how management of the BHNF affected nearby private land, state and county citizens, and visitors. Biodiversity sued the Forest Service regarding the BHNF in two separate proceedings: (1) in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming, Biodiversity claimed the Forest Service had failed to comply with various federal statutes and regulations; and (2) in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Colorado, Biodiversity moved for relief, arguing the Forest Service had violated a settlement agreement. The district courts denied Biodiversity's petition for review and dismissed Biodiversity's motion, respectively. After careful consideration of the district courts' records, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible errors and affirmed the Wyoming and Colorado courts.View "Biodiversity Conservation, et al v. Jiron, et al" on Justia Law

Chris Hogan lost his job with the Utah Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Agency("UTOPIA"). Claiming he was fired for revealing a conflict of interest in contract awards, he threatened to sue the agency for wrongful termination. Shortly after making this threat, he was subject to several unflattering media articles about his job performance and his termination dispute with the agency’s leaders. Several of the stories claimed his threats to sue the agency amounted to extortion or blackmail. One of the stories was written pseudonymously by Michael Winder, the mayor of West Valley City where UTOPIA did much of its business. Hogan sued UTOPIA, the mayor, the City, and a number of other people he believed were involved in the publication of the articles. He claimed the articles were defamatory, portrayed him in a false light, invaded his privacy, were an intentional infliction of emotional distress, a deprivation of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and a civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 1985. He also sued UTOPIA for First Amendment violations, breach of contract, wrongful termination, and other violations of state law in a separate lawsuit. The district court dismissed all of the claims, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "because the articles' critical statements are explained by their context, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the articles were neither defamatory nor otherwise tortiously offensive. And we further agree that Hogan's federal law claims cannot go forward because he has insufficiently pleaded that the defendants' actions were exercises of their power under state law and that the defendants conspired to punish Hogan for bringing his claims to court." View "Hogan v. Winder, et al" on Justia Law

Ramirez-Coria illegally entered the United States in 1995. He was placed in removal proceedings in April 2009, and conceded removability at his initial hearing. At a second hearing in May 2009, Ramirez-Coria requested a continuance in order to complete his application for cancellation of removal (Form EOIR-42B). The instructions on Form EOIR-42B directed Ramirez-Coria to: (1) attend an appointment with a nearby immigration Application Support Center (ASC) to provide biometric information; (2) obtain a biometrics confirmation notice from the ASC and bring it to his hearing as evidence he had provided his biometrics; and (3) file the completed Form EOIR-42B application and all supporting documentation with the Immigration Court within the time period directed by the IJ. Because Ramirez-Coria had not included the biometric information with his application, the IJ rescheduled his hearing to October 2010, eighteen months away. The IJ later rescheduled the hearing to January 2012, but shortly before the hearing Ramirez-Coria’s counsel moved to withdraw, stating his client had “lost interest in his own case.” New counsel entered an appearance, and the hearing was rescheduled for March 2, 2012. Ramirez-Coria submitted his supporting documentation for the application two days before the March hearing, but without the biometric information. At the hearing, counsel told the IJ that Ramirez-Coria had gone to an ASC the day before and provided his fingerprints. Officials at ASC would not take Ramirez-Coria’s fingerprints without any identification or birth certificate, and counsel stated that Ramirez-Coria had lacked any form of identification for the past three years until the day before the hearing. The government stated that DHS had no record that Ramirez-Coria had provided his fingerprints. Counsel did not dispute the IJ’s observation that the DHS obviously had not had time to complete its required investigation. The IJ also noted that all of Ramirez-Coria’s supporting documentation for the application was untimely because the Immigration Court Practice Manual requires all filings to be submitted at least fifteen days in advance of the hearing. Counsel stated her office had been diligent in contacting Ramirez-Coria, but he had been working a lot and it had been difficult to get the documentation. The IJ determined that Ramirez-Coria’s application for cancellation of removal should have been deemed abandoned and concluded that he had not shown good cause for failing to complete the biometric requirement in over two years, nor had his counsel ever informed the IJ that he was having any problem obtaining his fingerprints. The IJ dismissed his application, but granted Ramirez-Coria voluntary departure. Ramirez-Coria appealed to the BIA, which concluded the IJ properly deemed his cancellation-of-removal application abandoned, and it dismissed his appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit denied Ramirez-Coria's petition. View "Ramirez-Coria v. Holder" on Justia Law

Brooklyn Coons (called "Brook" by her estate) died from being shaken and possibly struck on the head while in the care of her father's girlfriend. Her estate, the remaining plaintiff in this case, alleged that Defendant Linda Gillen, a social worker, knew that Brook was in danger and subject to abuse but did not respond to reports of the abuse, increasing Brook's vulnerability to danger. The estate sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating Brook's right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment, holding that she was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not take any affirmative action that increased the child's vulnerability to danger and because there was no clearly established law that her alleged conduct violated Brook's due-process rights. Finding that Defendant’s conduct was not a violation of clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.View "Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen" on Justia Law

In an effort to reduce illegal gun trafficking "along and across the Southwest border" of the United States, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) issued a demand letter to certain federal firearms licensees (FFLs) in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, requiring them to report sales to the same customer within five consecutive business days of "two or more semiautomatic rifles capable of accepting a detachable magazine and with a caliber greater than .22." Appellants Ron Peterson Firearms, LLC, Dale Rutherford, doing business as The Cop Shop, and Tracy Rifle and Pistol, Inc. were FFLs subject to the letter. They argued that ATF lacked the statutory authority to issue the demand letter and that the decision to target FFLs in the four Mexican border states was arbitrary and capricious. Concluding that ATF neither exceeded its statutory authority nor engaged in arbitrary and capricious action, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. View "Ron Peterson Firearms v. Jones" on Justia Law

Marvin Green, a former postmaster, claimed the U.S. Postal Service retaliated against him after he made employment-discrimination claims. He was investigated, threatened with criminal prosecution, and put on unpaid leave. Shortly after being put on leave, he signed a settlement agreement with the Postal Service that provided him paid leave for three and a half months, after which he could choose either to retire or to work in a position that paid much less and was about 300 miles away. Ultimately, he decided to retire. He then filed a complaint against the Postmaster General alleging five retaliatory acts in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: (1) a letter notifying him to attend an investigative interview; (2) the investigative interview; (3) a threat of criminal charges against him; (4) his constructive discharge; and (5) his placement on unpaid leave (also known as emergency placement). The district court dismissed the first three claims for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. On the two remaining claims it granted summary judgment for the Postmaster, holding that the constructive-discharge claim was untimely and that emergency placement was not a materially adverse action. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects save one: the Court agreed with Green that the emergency placement was a materially adverse action (being put on unpaid leave would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity). The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Green v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

In September 2009, Plaintiff Bridget Dalpiaz was terminated from her position as the benefits administrator for Carbon County, Utah. She sued, raising several claims against the county and various county officials, including one claim of "Violation of the [Family and Medical Leave Act] – Interference with FMLA Rights" against the county. The district court granted summary judgment to all Defendants on all claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged only the denial of her FMLA claim against Carbon County. Based on all of the evidence in the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, was sufficient to meet the county’s burden of establishing that Plaintiff would have been dismissed regardless of her request for FMLA leave. Plaintiff’s interference claim therefore failed as a matter of law. View "Dalpiaz v. Carbon County, Utah, et al" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a final Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to reduce regional haze by regulating emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter (PM) at the five units of the Four Corners Power Plant on the Navajo Reservation. WildEarth Guardians filed a petition under 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) for review of the FIP. It argued that promulgation of the FIP did not comply with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) because the EPA failed to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service about the effect of the FIP even though the EPA had discretion to act to protect endangered fish near the Plant from mercury and selenium emissions. WildEarth argued that the EPA had four grounds for the exercise of discretion that could have benefitted the fish. But the principal ground was mooted by the closure of three units of the Plant, and two other grounds were not raised in WildEarth’s opening brief. "As for the fourth alleged ground, it could not create a duty to consult under the ESA because it would have required the EPA to exceed the clearly delineated boundaries of the FIP." The Tenth Circuit denied the petition. View "WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Anthony and Melissa Stonecipher became targets of an investigation because of their purchases and sales of firearms and explosives. During the investigation, federal officers discovered that Mr. Stonecipher had pled guilty in 2007 to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in Missouri. One of the officers, Carlos Valles, concluded Mr. Stonecipher had violated federal law, which made it illegal for anyone convicted of even a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. Acting on this knowledge, Valles obtained a search warrant for the Stoneciphers' home, ending with Mr. Stonecipher's arrest. It turned out that Mr. Stonecipher had not been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of federal law. Prosecutors soon learned that the conviction did not count because the sentence had been suspended and, under Missouri law, a suspended sentence in these circumstances did not amount to a conviction. The government dismissed the criminal complaint. The Stoneciphers filed a "Biven"s action against Valles and other law enforcement officers involved in the investigation, alleging violations of their Fourth and First Amendment rights in connection with the search of their home and Mr. Stonecipher's arrest and prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity. The Stoneciphers appealed the grant of summary judgment on their claims for unreasonable search and seizure, unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution, and violation of their First Amendment rights. For purposes of qualified immunity, Valles had enough information to: (1) conclude he had probable cause to search the Stoneciphers' home; and (2) arrest and file charges based on Mr. Stonecipher's possession of firearms and explosives. Further, there was no evidence that Mr. Stonecipher's arrest and prosecution were in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Stonecipher, et al v. Valles, et al" on Justia Law