Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. The Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court's jurisdiction. The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town's sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent. The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts' exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the Tribal Town presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But the Court agreed the Tribal Town should have exhausted its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action was abated. View "Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, et al" on Justia Law

When negotiations between the Teamsters and Harborlite reached an impasse, management told the union that unless it would agree to the company's final offer it would lock out union members and "immediately begin hiring permanent replacements for locked out employees." Several days later, the company backed off its threat: while it continued the lockout and began hiring new workers, it said that "until further notice" these workers would only be temporary. After three months, the company let its temporary workers go and permitted union members to return to work even though the union never did accept the company's purportedly final offer. The union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board, and the Board agreed with the union that the act of threatening to hire permanent replacement workers violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The Board ordered Harborlite to cease making such threats and to post a notice admitting its violation of the law. The union appealed the Board's decision, arguing that Harborlite's lockout was itself unlawful and therefore entitled its union employees to back pay. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Board did not err in refusing to order additional remedial measures against the company, namely, back pay. View "Teamsters Local Union No. 455 v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Husband and wife Alberto Martinez Molina and Cristina Ramirez Rivera were Mexican citizens subject to final orders of removal from the United States. After an immigration judge declined to cancel their removal orders, the couple filed a motion to reopen based on ineffective representation of counsel. With the motion, they submitted evidence that they had resided in the United States since 1998. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion, reasoning that the couple had not shown prejudice because the evidence that they submitted: (1) could not overcome discrepancies in their testimony, and (2) was the same or substantially similar to the evidence considered by the immigration judge. The spouses then filed a petition for review, arguing that: (1) the Board abused its discretion in rejecting their claim for ineffective representation, and (2) the immigration judge failed to consider the entire record. As to Ms. Ramirez, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: the Board acted within its discretion in rejecting her ineffective-representation claim, and Ms. Ramirez did not exhaust her claim involving failure of the immigration judge to consider the entire record. As to Mr. Martinez, the Court remanded to the Board: Mr. Martinez did not exhaust his claim involving failure to consider the entire record, but he did exhaust his ineffective-representation claim, and the Board abused its discretion when it mistakenly concluded that the newly submitted evidence was the same or substantially similar to the evidence considered by the immigration judge. View "Molina v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lucrecia Carpio Holmes appealed a district court’s ruling that her claim for disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was barred due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Holmes v. Colorado Coalition" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity in an Eighth Amendment case brought by a Colorado state prisoner. Plaintiff Homaidan Al-Turki filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several prison officials, including Defendant Mary Robinson (a prison nurse) based on these officials’ failure to provide him with any type of medical evaluation or treatment while he was suffering through several hours of severe abdominal pain from what turned out to be kidney stones. The district court granted qualified immunity to the other prison officials, none of whom were medical professionals, but denied Defendant Robinson’s summary judgment motion for qualified immunity. Defendant then filed this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the issues this case presented to the Tenth Circuit were: (1) whether the hours of severe pain Plaintiff experienced constituted a sufficiently serious medical need to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference test; and (2) whether Defendant’s alleged actions violated clearly established law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on both issues. View "Al-Turki v. Robinson, et al" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case were David and Barbara Green, their three children, and the businesses they collectively owned and operated: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc. As owners and operators of both Hobby Lobby and Mardel, the Greens organized their businesses with express religious principles in mind. As was particularly relevant to this case, one aspect of the Greens’ religious principles was a belief that human life begins when sperm fertilizes an egg. In addition, the Greens believed it was immoral for them to facilitate any act that caused the death of a human embryo. Plaintiffs brought an action to challenge portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) whereby employment-based group health plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) were required provide certain types of health services for women that implicated contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling (without cost-sharing by plan participants or beneficiaries) - all "abortifacients" that went against plaintiffs' religious beliefs. Plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the contraceptive-coverage requirement of the ACA under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction on the basis of their RFRA and Free Exercise claims. The district court denied that motion. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the injunction. After review by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held that Hobby Lobby and Mardel were entitled to bring claims under RFRA, established a likelihood of success that their rights under statute were substantially burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement, and established an irreparable harm. However, the case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings on two remaining factors governing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Hobby Lobby Stores, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law

Sixteen years ago Carolyn Bayless began to suffer from a mysterious illness. As her condition deteriorated, she sought to learn what caused (and how to treat) her illness. In 2008, convinced that she was the victim of exposure to nerve gas emitted by an Army testing facility, she filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. When this lawsuit followed in 2009, the Army responded that she knew of her claim by at least 2005 and had waited too long to assert it. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment dismissing the case. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the "unusual circumstances presented here," the period of limitation did not accrue until February 2007. Therefore, the Court reversed. View "Bayless v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Salt Creek Road is an unimproved 12.3-mile road intertwined with the creek bed in Salt Creek Canyon. The state and county wanted to use their claimed right-of-way to prevent the United States from closing the Salt Creek Road to vehicle traffic. The road is the primary way for tourists to reach several scenic sites within the Canyonlands National Park, including Angel Arch. Without vehicle access, the only way to access Angel Arch is to make the nine-mile trek by foot. The state and county based their claim on Revised Statute (R.S.) 2477: "[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." Congress enacted R.S. 2477 in 1866, and it remained in effect until 1976. Even then, however, Congress preserved the rights-of-way established under the statute. This Quiet Title Act case presented to the Tenth Circuit the issue of whether the district court erred in rejecting the claims of San Juan County and the State of Utah to Salt Creek Road. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "San Juan County, Utah v. United States " on Justia Law

In May 2011 Kansas Governor Sam Brownback signed into law an appropriations bill restricting the classes of entities eligible for Title X of the Public Health Service Act subgrants. The restriction disqualified two family-planning clinics operated by Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri (Planned Parenthood). Planned Parenthood sued Governor Brownback and Robert Moser, M.D., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), challenging the legislation: (1) that it violated Title X and was therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause; (2) that it violated Planned Parenthood's First Amendment rights by penalizing it for associating with providers of abortion and for its advocacy of access to abortion services; and (3) that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an unconstitutional burden on the rights of women to choose abortion (a claim not raised on appeal). Ruling that Planned Parenthood had established a likelihood of success on the merits of the first two claims and had otherwise satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, the district court enjoined KDHE from implementing the legislation. After review, the Tenth Circuit vacated the injunction. With regard to the Supremacy Clause claim, the Court concluded Planned Parenthood could not establish a likelihood of success on the merits because there was no private cause of action for injunctive relief for the alleged violation of Title X. With regard to the First Amendment claim, the Court held that that Planned Parenthood could not establish a likelihood of success because the legislation does not restrict the rights of speech or association of subgrantees and the motives of individual lawmakers were irrelevant. View "Planned Parenthood KS & Mid-MO v. Brownback, et al" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service and several oil companies agreed to settle a tax dispute over a jointly-developed pipeline system in a closing agreement. After entering the agreement, Phillips Petroleum Company (now ConocoPhillips Company) acquired Arco Transportation (one of the original signatories to the agreement). In 2000 and 2001, Conoco revisited the tax implications of its acquisition and claimed "going-forward" and "basis-increase" deductions on its amended consolidated tax returns. The IRS refunded Conoco's 2000 going-forward deductions, but disputed the remaining deductions. The parties took the dispute to federal district court, where the district court decided the issue on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court rejected Conoco's position and granted summary judgment to the IRS. Conoco appealed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "going-forward" deductions were impermissible for interests that Arco Transportation did not own as of July 1, 1977, and "basis-increase" deductions were impermissible because the Closing Agreement did not fix the amount of a liability or exempt that liability from section 461(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the Court held that Conoco was not entitled to the going-forward or basis-increase deductions. View "United States v. ConocoPhillips Company" on Justia Law