Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Glenn Coyne, a Grand Junction Police Department (GJPD) officer, answered Plaintiff Misti Lee Schneider 's 911 call about an altercation with her teenage son and, during a visit to her home late the next night, raped her. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coyne was arrested and fired, and a few days later committed suicide. Plaintiff sued the GJPD under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. She alleged that inadequate hiring and training of Officer Coyne, inadequate investigation of a prior sexual assault complaint against him, and inadequate discipline and supervision of him caused her to be raped. In district court, the defendants did not contest Plaintiff's allegations about Officer Coyne's conduct. They moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Officer Coyne did not act under color of state law and that Plaintiff could not prove that they caused the rape or were deliberately indifferent to the risk that it would happen. The district court denied summary judgment on the first ground, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Coyne acted under color of state law. It granted summary judgment on the second ground, concluding that Plaintiff could not prove essential facts to establish 1983 liability. Plaintiff appealed that ruling; defendants cross-appealed the color of state law ruling. "The events alleged in this case are tragic, and Officer Coyne's alleged conduct was a terrible crime. The state cannot prosecute Officer Coyne because he is dead, and Ms. Schneider is left with suing his supervisors and employer. . . . to hold [defendants] liable for Officer Coyne's actions, she faces stringent proof requirements under 1983 law, proof she is unable to muster." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Court dismissed defendants' cross-appeal as moot. View "Schneider v. City of Grand Junction" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin Koessel was terminated from his position as a deputy sheriff in Sublette County, Wyoming, due to concerns about the lingering effects of a stroke he suffered. In response, petitioner brought suit in district court against the Sheriff and the County alleging they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), breached his employment contract, and violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact for a jury. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred in granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, claiming fact disputes existed on all of his claims. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court that the Defendants' were entitled to summary judgment on all of petitioner's claims. View "Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the federal district court found that Appellant Maggie Chapman violated the "assisting and facilitating" provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310.3(b). A consumer protection action was brought by the Federal Trade Commission and four states against several individual and corporate defendants who marketed and sold to consumers grant-related goods and services with false representations that the consumers were guaranteed or likely to receive grants. After the claims against the other defendants were settled or adjudicated by entry of summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial on the remaining claim against Ms. Chapman. Following the trial, the court found that Ms. Chapman violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule by providing substantial assistance to telemarketing defendants while knowing or consciously avoiding knowing of their deceptive telemarketing practices. The court accordingly ordered a permanent injunction and $1,682,950 in monetary damages against Ms. Chapman. The court also denied Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment or, alternatively, for remittitur. Ms. Chapman appealed both the finding she violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule and the denial of her post-judgment motion. Not persuaded that the district court's underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous, and concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Chapman" on Justia Law

The Government filed an interlocutory appeal in an action brought against Defendants Kelly Armstrong, Debbie Cantrup, Richard Cook, Shirley Cook and Copar Pumice Company, Inc. for trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The claims were based on allegations that the Cooks and Copar removed and used undersized pumice from their mine in violation of their settlement agreement with the United States, the Jemez National Recreation Area Act ("JNRAA"), and other applicable regulations. Although the case was pending in district court, the Cooks and Copar filed an interlocutory appeal from discovery orders requiring their former and present law firms to produce documents containing legal advice counsel gave to them regarding the legality of mining, transporting, processing, and marketing pumice from their mine. Specifically, the Cooks and Copar appealed the denial of their motion for protective order and their motion to quash subpoenas, contending that the Tenth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order, "Perlman," and "pragmatic finality" doctrines. The United States filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Finding that jurisdiction did not arise under any of the cited doctrines, the Tenth Circuit granted the Government's motion to dismiss. View "United States v. Copar Pumice Company, et al" on Justia Law

Nepalese native and citizen petitioner Narendra Raj Karki petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an order of an immigration judge (IJ) that denied his application for asylum and restriction on removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner entered the United States in 2007 in order to present a paper at a forestry conference in Oregon. His visitor's visa authorized him to remain in the country for approximately one month. A few days after the visa expired, Petitioner filed an asylum application, which was denied by an asylum officer and referred to an immigration judge. Removal proceedings were initiated against him in early 2008. At the removal proceedings, Petitioner renewed his application for asylum and sought restriction on removal under the INA and protection under the CAT, claiming that he had suffered past persecution and feared future persecution based on his political opinion and membership in a particular social group. The IJ concluded that Petitioner had failed to establish a nexus between his alleged fear of persecution and a statutorily protected ground. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ's conclusion that the incidents described by Petitioner did not rise to the level of past persecution thus concluding that Petitioner was not eligible for asylum or restriction on removal because he had not shown past persecution or a fear of future persecution based on his political opinion. Furthermore, the BIA concluded that Petitioner was not eligible for relief under the CAT because he had not shown that the government of Nepal was likely to torture him or acquiesce in his torture if he returned. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the record as a whole did not support the BIA's conclusion that Petitioner failed to show that public officials in Nepal would likely acquiesce in his torture by Maoists if he returned to Nepal. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for review as to Petitioner's CAT claim. The Court noted that there was no agency factfinding on the likelihood that Petitioner will be tortured if he returned to Nepal, and on remand the agency could consider whether Petitioner had shown a sufficient likelihood of torture to be entitled to CAT relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Karki v. Holder" on Justia Law

Pro se petitioner Lucio Salgado-Toribio sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Petitioner had been using the federal courts' procedures to put off removal for more than three years since an immigration judge found him removable. This appeal was his third time seeking the Tenth Circuit's review of an administrative decision over which the Court found it had no jurisdiction. "Enough is enough. We deny Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss the petition for review, and recommend that the Department of Homeland Security enforce the order of removal immediately." View "Salgado-Toribio v. Holder" on Justia Law

Pro se appellant John Schoppe petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of a Tax Court decision that found him liable for tax deficiencies for the years 2002-2007. While the case was proceeding before the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. That filing prompted the Court to request a supplemental briefing from the parties on whether the automatic bankruptcy stay would apply to appellant's appeal before the Tenth Circuit. Finding that 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code did not stay this appeal, the Court reviewed the Tax Court decision and affirmed it. View "Schoppe v. CIR" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), as amended by the Reform Act of 1987, required the Secretary of the Interior to issue leases for parcels of land to the highest bidding energy company within sixty days of payment to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Appellants (collectively, "Energy Companies") sued to compel the Secretary to issue pending leases on which they were the high bidders and more than sixty days had passed since they had paid the BLM in full. The district court construed the MLA to impose a mandate on the Secretary to decide whether to issue the leases, and ordered BLM to make such decisions regarding the still pending leases of Energy Companies within thirty days. Energy Companies appealed the district court's order and asserted that the MLA required the Secretary to issue the pending leases within sixty days rather than merely make a decision on whether the leases will be issued. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a "final decision," and as such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Energy Companies' appeal. View "Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant David Becker was pulled over by Defendant-Appellee Officer Jason Bateman in a parking lot in Heber City, Utah. A confrontation ensued which ended in Plaintiff being thrown to the ground and suffering a severe traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff brought suit against Officer Bateman, the Heber City Chief of Police in his official capacity, and Heber City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Officer Bateman used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding Officer Bateman did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Because the violation of constitutional rights Plaintiff asserted was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Bateman. However, the district court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore reversed. On remand, the district court must determine whether Plaintiff can withstand summary judgment as to the second element of his municipal liability claim. Similarly, the district court must determine whether Mrs. Becker could maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium against the City in light of the Court's ruling that a reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. View "Becker v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Full Life Hospice participates in the federal Medicare program. It sought reimbursement for hospice services provided to Medicare recipients from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). A fiscal intermediary, acting on behalf of HHS, later contested some of these reimbursements and demanded repayment of funds that it claimed were distributed in excess of a spending cap. Full Life unsuccessfully challenged HHS intermediary’s determination through an administrative appeal, which was denied as untimely. On appeal to the district court, the court found no basis to excuse Full Life's untimely challenge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of Full Life's failure to file a timely administrative appeal. View "Full Life Hospice v. Sebelius" on Justia Law