Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Amanda Addison and Melody St. Clair were tried for embezzling or converting funds from Northern Arapahoe Tribe’s Department of Social Services (DSS). On the third day of trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial as to St. Clair only and excluded her from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. Addison was convicted. She appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the exclusion of St. Clair violated Addison’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; and, (2) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate criminal intent. Because the district court had a substantial reason for excluding St. Clair, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The evidence was sufficient to prove her knowing and intentional taking of DSS funds. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Addison" on Justia Law

Gray Peterson, a resident of Washington, applied for a concealed handgun license (CHL) from the ex officio sheriff of Denver, Colorado. Peterson's application was accordingly denied, prompting him to file suit against the Denver sheriff and Colorado's executive director of the Department of Public Safety. Peterson claimed that Colorado's policy with respect to non-resident CHL applicants violates the Second Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and several other constitutional provisions. The district court concluded that the executive director of the Department of Public Safety was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because he had no connection to the enforcement of the challenged statute. Upon review of the district court order, the Tenth Circuit agreed with that conclusion. "In light of our nation's extensive practice of restricting citizens' freedom to carry firearms in a concealed manner, we hold that this activity does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment's protections. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Peterson's claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which is coterminous with his right to travel claim." View "Peterson v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Laura Conroy filed this Title VII lawsuit against her employer, the United States Forest Service, after it (among other things) filled an open position with a male employee, instead of her. The district court excluded the testimony of Petitioner's two experts and granted summary judgment to the Forest Service. Petitioner did not have a college degree. She applied for the INFRA Program Manager position in the administrative series. She was found to be qualified, and her name, along with that of one other qualified applicant, was passed on to Larry Larson, the head of the group where the new position would be located. Mr. Larson, however, decided to readvertise the position. He would later explain that his reason for doing so was to broaden the pool of applicants. A revised announcement was issued modifying the job requirement noted above, replacing the words "[c]omprehensive knowledge and skills in" with simply "[k]nowledge of." The new advertisement drew interest from a greater number of applicants, and four were certified as sufficiently qualified for the position. Petitioner was certified under the administrative announcement, and three others were certified under the professional announcement. Among the latter three candidates was Daniel Hager, who had not applied when the position was originally advertised. Petitioner filed a grievance when she did not receive the position. Mr. Hager left the INFRA Program Manager position, and the position was readvertised. The position was advertised solely in the professional series. Although Petitioner applied again, she was deemed not qualified, and management ultimately selected Andrea Gehrke. Petitioner filed a second formal grievance, alleging that the decision to advertise the position solely in the professional series was made in order to retaliate against her for filing the first grievance. After exhausting administrative remedies, Petitioner filed suit in federal district court pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. She asserted various individual and class claims arising out of the agency's hiring decisions. The district court ultimately ruled in the agency's favor. Upon review, finding no abuse of the district court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Petitioner's claims. View "Conroy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of Opal on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council issued several building permits to Plaintiff but shortly thereafter enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home that was older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). When the permits were about to lapse and Plaintiff requested an extension, the town council denied his request. It also rejected his applications for new permits because the proposed houses were more than 10 years old. Plaintiff then sued the town and town council asserting that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 as well as a variety of constitutional claims. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised claims based on preemption, equal protection, and substantive due process. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on these claims. The 10-Year Rule was not preempted and the rule was sufficiently rational to survive an equal-protection or substantive-due-process challenge. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of LaBarge on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council initially granted him a building permit for one property but revoked it about two weeks later and then enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). Both of Plaintiff's homes were more than 10 years old. The town council denied Plaintiff's applications for a building permit, a variance, and a conditional-use permit to enable him to install the homes despite the 10-Year Rule. Plaintiff thereafter sued, arguing a variety of constitutional claims as well as a claim that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised issues regarding the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, procedural due process, preemption, municipal authority to enact the 10-Year Rule, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Court held that the takings claim was unripe, the due-process claim failed because Plaintiff did not have a protected property interest, the 10-Year Rule was not preempted, the town had authority to enact the rule, and the attorney-fee issue was moot. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of La Barge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Allstate Sweeping, LLC (Allstate) is owned and operated by two white women: Martha Krueger and Barbara Hollis. In January 2006 it began performing pressure-washing services at Denver International Airport (DIA) under a contract with the City and County of Denver (Denver). Although the contract term was through July 2008, it was terminated by Denver July, 2007. Defendant Calvin Black, a contract-compliance technician at DIA, was assigned to monitor Allstate’s contract. Black is an African-American male. Allstate claimed that it was subjected to gender- and race-based discrimination and to retaliation for its complaints of discrimination. It filed suit in the federal district court in Colorado against Denver and four DIA employees, including Black, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (Title VI), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except Black, holding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether Black was motivated by racial and gender bias and whether Black created a hostile work environment in such a way as to make plaintiff’s contract "unprofitable and its owners miserable." It did not address Allstate’s retaliation claim. Black appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, contending that he was entitled to qualified immunity and that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s determinations because such sufficiency determinations are not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court did, however, have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of the claim that Black made Allstate’s owners "miserable" and to review the sufficiency of the evidence of the retaliation claim (which the district court did not consider). The Court reversed the denial of summary judgment on those claims. View "Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case concerned WildEarth Guardians’ challenge to the National Park Service’s (NPS) elk and vegetation management plan for Rocky Mountain National Park. WildEarth filed suit in federal district court challenging the plan and the final environmental impact statement the NPS prepared in conjunction with the plan. WildEarth contended the NPS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to include the reintroduction of a naturally reproducing wolf population as one of the alternatives considered in the environmental impact statement. WildEarth also challenged the agency’s proposal to allow volunteers to assist the agency in reducing the elk population. The district court affirmed the agency action, and WildEarth appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record supported the agency’s decision to exclude consideration of a natural wolf alternative from its environmental impact statement. The Court also found the agency’s interpretation of the National Parks Organic Act and Rocky Mountain National Park Enabling Act persuasive, and that its elk management plan did not violate those statutes. View "WildEarth Guardians v. National Park Service" on Justia Law

In a direct criminal appeal, Defendant-Appellant Enrique De La Cruz challenged the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence the United States obtained during an investigative seizure. ICE agents detained Petitioner while looking for another person they believed to be in the United States illegally. Upon review of his fake identification card, agents discovered that Petitioner was himself unlawfully in the United States after having been previously deported. On that basis, the agents arrested him. A federal grand jury indicted Petitioner for unlawfully reentering the United States after a previous deportation. Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence agents obtained from him arguing that, at the time the agents asked him for his identification, they were no longer justified in detaining him because the agents no longer had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was involved in criminal activity. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Petitioner's motion. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), reserving the right to appeal the district court’s suppression ruling. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Government failed to establish that an objective officer would have had reasonable suspicion to believe that Petitioner was involved in criminal activity once the agents determined that he was not the original person they were looking for and before Petitioner provided the agents with the false identification card. The Court reversed the district court’s decision denying Petitioner's suppression motion and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. De La Cruz" on Justia Law

Several environmental groups challenged decisions made by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) regarding the legality of thirty-nine oil and gas leases in Southern Utah, owned by Kirkwood Oil and Gas, LLC and William C. Kirkwood. In the 1980s, Kirkwood applied to have its oil and gas leases converted to combined hydrocarbon leases, which would allow Kirkwood to extract oil from tar sands. At the time, BLM never accepted or rejected Kirkwood's applications. Between 2006 and 2008, BLM and IBLA issued several decisions declaring that the underlying oil and gas leases were "suspended" pending review of the conversion applications. The groups alleged that the BLM and IBLA violated the Mineral Leasing Act and other federal laws by retroactively deeming the leases to be suspended, avoiding expiration of the leases according to their terms. The district court held the groups did not have standing to bring its claims and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the district court misapplied the law in important respects with regard to standing, the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that this case was not ripe for review. View "S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Campus Village Apartments, LLC appealed denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff-Appellee Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC. Regency's complaint alleged that Campus Village conspired with the University of Colorado at Denver to monopolize student housing in and around the university's campus. Regency moved to dismiss, averring that the Tenth Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the district court's denial of Campus Village's motion to dismiss was not a final order. In response, Campus Village argued that the Tenth Circuit indeed had jurisdiction over this case under the "collateral order doctrine." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not err in denying Campus Village's motion to dismiss; the court's order was not an appealable final order. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Campus Village's appeal. View "Auraria Student Housing v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law