Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellee Elizabeth E. was a student in the Jefferson County, Colorado school system with substantial behavioral and emotional issues for which she required special education under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"). In November 2008, Elizabeth's parents, Roxanne B. and David E. enrolled her at Innercept, LLC, a residential treatment center in Idaho, and sought reimbursement from Plaintiff-Appellant Jefferson County School District R-1 (the "District"). An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) concluded Parents were entitled to reimbursement for the placement under the Act. That decision was affirmed by a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose decision was, in turn, affirmed by the Colorado federal district court. The District appealed, arguing Innercept was not a reimbursable placement under the IDEA and that Parents' conduct precluded reimbursement. Finding that Innercept was indeed a reimbursable placement, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Jefferson County School v. Elizabeth E." on Justia Law

During routine examinations, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) raised an issue with Frontier State Bank Oklahoma City's use of a "leverage strategy" whereby the bank funded long-term investments with short-term borrowing in order to generate profits from the "spread" between long-term and short-term interest rates. The FDIC's enforcement staff obtained a cease-and-desist order from the FDIC Board which required the Bank mitigate the risks associated with its leverage strategy. Frontier appealed the Board's mitigation order to the Tenth Circuit. The FDIC argued that the Court lacked authority to review the order's leverage capital requirements, and defended the order as a reasonable exercise of the FDIC Board's authority. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Board's order was not arbitrary or capricious, and denied its petition for review. View "Frontier State Bank Oklahoma v. FDIC" on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of a minor child, 23-month-old Brooklyn Coons (BIC) at the hands of her father's girlfriend. Plaintiffs-Appellants, Larry and Mary Crosetto and the Estate of BIC, filed an action alleging that a social worker, Defendant-Appellee Linda Gillen, created the danger that resulted in the death of their granddaughter and denied them their rights to familial association. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Gillen, and declined to hear a supplemental state law claim. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that qualified immunity was unwarranted on their state danger-creation and familial association claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that qualified immunity was not appropriate on the state danger-creation claim given genuine issues of material fact. Thus the Court reversed in part. The Court affirmed summary judgement on the familial association claims. View "The Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen" on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was the scope of the special relationship doctrine and whether it would apply to the facts alleged to expose two human services employees to potential individual liability for the death of a seven-year-old child in foster care. After their son Chandler died while in the care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler's biological parents, Christina Grafner and Joshua Norris, and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two county human services departments and two employees alleging, among other things, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for violation of Chandler's substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, appealed denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, showed Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler's substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Schwartz, et al v. Booker, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant Skoshi Farr was convicted by a jury of violating 26 U.S.C. 7201 for willfully failing to pay a trust fund recovery penalty that the Internal Revenue Service assessed against her after she, as the manager of an alternative medical clinic, failed to pay quarterly employment taxes owed by the clinic. Defendant appealed her conviction, contending she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by the district court's rulings which permitted the admission of certain Rule 404(b) evidence. She also contended the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal, which argued that the government's evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, and in denying her motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to charge the offense under the appropriate statute. Finally, Defendant contended her prosecution in this case was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a result of the government's prior unsuccessful prosecution. Upon review of the case and the applicable statutory authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendant's arguments lacked merit, and affirmed her conviction. View "United States v. Farr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, eight operators and a supervisor at the City of Albuquerque's 311 Citizen Contact Center (CCC), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees City of Albuquerque, Ed Adams, and Esther Tenenbaum, on claims arising from their termination. The City's Merit System governed Plaintiffs' employment; section 3-1-6 of the Merit System Ordinance (MSO) divides employees into classified and unclassified service, and defines unclassified employees as "employees at will." When the City created the 311 CCC, it designated all positions as unclassified. Upon joining the 311 CCC, each Plaintiff signed a form that listed their Employment or Position Status as "Unclassified." Between 2005 and 2009, Plaintiffs were terminated from the 311 CCC. Some Plaintiffs were subject to Progressive Disciplinary Action, while others faced Immediate Termination. In April 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court for (1) breach of employment contract, (2) denial of due process and equal protection, (3) wrongful termination, (4) violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and (5) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In a lengthy opinion, the district court found that summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs, as unclassified employees, were employed at will, and (1) had no protected property interest in continued employment; (2) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they had an implied employment contract; and (3) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they were terminated in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. With respect to the FMLA claim, the court found that whether treated as a claim for retaliation or interference, Plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the City's reason for termination was pretextual or that the City had interfered with Plaintiffs' right to FMLA leave. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because the court weighed the evidence and failed to construe the facts in Plaintiffs' favor when determining that they were at will employees and thus rightly terminated. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs' arguments lacked merit and affirmed the district court decision. View "Gonzales v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In 2007, employees of Richard Energy traveled to China and arranged with Chinese manufacturer RG Petro to purchase rigs that are used to repair oil wells. Richard Energy took possession of the rigs in China and exported them to the United States. The rigs were consigned to Eagle Well Service, Inc. ("EWS"), and delivered in Kansas. EWS later moved one of the rigs to Oklahoma, where Plaintiff Joel Monge, an EWS employee covered by workers' compensation, was seriously injured during an accident involving the rig. Plaintiff filed a diversity action against EWS under Oklahoma's intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy of Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act and against Richard Energy and RG Petro under Oklahoma's manufacturers' products liability laws. RG Petro moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and EWS filed a motion for summary judgment contending the intentional tort exception did not apply. The district court granted both motions. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the court's summary judgment order, which the district court denied except for a request to fix a date in the order. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to his claim against EWS; that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment; and that the district court erred in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over RG Petro. FInding no error in the district court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Monge v. RG Petro-Machinery, et al" on Justia Law

In August 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced "regular" removal proceedings against Petitioner Antonio Aguilar-Aguilar, a citizen of Mexico. In response to the Notice to Appear (NTA), Petitioner conceded his removal as "[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted." Petitioner informed the immigration judge (IJ), however, that he was in the process of seeking discretionary relief in the form of adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident as provided for in 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). Over Petitioner's objection, DHS then moved to dismiss the NTA as improvidently issued and to terminate Petitioner's proceedings without prejudice. As an alien without lawful residency who had been convicted of an aggravated felony, Petitioner was deportable and thus amenable to "expedited" removal proceedings. After the IJ granted DHS's motion, DHS commenced proceedings against Petitioner and issued a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) directing his removal to Mexico. The FARO found Petitioner "ineligible for any relief from removal that [DHS] may grant in an exercise of discretion." Petitioner now asks us to review a FARO he claims DHS issued in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. The Tenth Circuit denied review: "Petitioner simply 'has no liberty or property interest in obtaining purely discretionary relief." And that is all Petitioner [sought]" on appeal. View "Aguilar-Aguilar v. Holder" on Justia Law

This case concerned the construction of a new Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) rail/truck terminal outside Kansas City, Kansas. Because the preferred site contained streams and wetlands protected under federal law, several groups (collectively, "Hillsdale") brought challenges to a dredge and fill permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) under the Clean Water Act. The district court denied Hillsdale's motion for an injunction and granted summary judgment for the Corps and BNSF. On appeal, Hillsdale requested that the Tenth Circuit set aside the Corps's decision to grant the permit because the Corps inadequately considered alternatives to the selected site under the Clean Water Act and violated the National Environmental Policy Act by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment and failing to prepare a full environmental impact statement. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Corps's decision was supported by the record, and was not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of its approval powers under federal law. View "Hillside Environmental Loss, et al v. United States Army Corps, et al" on Justia Law

Pro se Appellant Charles Buchheit appealed a district court's sua sponte dismissal of his complaint against certain Defendant Kansas State officials. Clerk of the Kansas appellate courts Carol Green cross-appealed the district court's denial of her motion to review the magistrate judge's order granting Appellant in forma pauperis status (IFP). Appellant filed his "Petition for Injunctive Relief Under the Fourteenth Amendment, As Well As, the Equal Access to Justice Act" naming as defendants Ms. Green and Shawnee County Court Judge Daniel Mitchell. He alleged that the Kansas state appellate courts had denied his request to proceed IFP and had refused to docket his state appeals. Ms. Green objected on the grounds that the magistrate judge failed to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). The district court overruled the objection but dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Appellant sought retrospective relief against the state that was barred by sovereign immunity. Because he was seeking to address alleged past harms rather than prevent prospective violations of federal law, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the request did not fall into the "Ex Parte Young" exception to state sovereign immunity, and accordingly affirmed the district court's dismissal of Appellant's complaint. With regard to Ms. Green's cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed that "[t]hough screening might be a good practice and more efficient," the Court found that nothing in the language of 28 U.S.C. 1915 (e)(2) requires an assigned magistrate judge to screen a case for merit or to make a recommendation for dismissal to the district court before granting IFP status. "But the language of the present rule also provides needed flexibility, even if it sometimes requires defendants like Ms. Green and Judge Mitchell to respond to complaints that may soon be dismissed as without merit. It simply does not require district courts to review the merits of every claim that comes before them in an IFP motion, and we decline to read in such an extensive duty absent statutory language to that effect." View "Buchheit v. Green" on Justia Law