Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Becky Jean Willig appealed an opinion and order entered by a United States Magistrate Judge that affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her application for supplemental security income benefits. In this appeal, Petitioner raised the same issues she raised in the district court: (1) whether the ALJ failed to perform a proper evaluation of the opinion of her treating physician; (2) whether the ALJ failed to propound a proper hypothetical to the vocational expert; and (3) whether the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the magistrate judge’s opinion and order was "thorough, well-reasoned and persuasive on each point argued again by Ms. Willig in this court. We see no reason to repeat the same analysis, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth in the opinion and order dated September 28, 2010."

The City of Hugo, Oklahoma, and the Hugo Municipal Authority, a public water trust, (collectively "Hugo") contracted with the City of Irving, Texas, ("Irving") for the sale of water Hugo has been allocated or sought to be allocated under permits issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("Board"). Hugo and Irving brought suit against the nine members of the Board for a declaration that certain Oklahoma laws governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and an injunction prohibiting their enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, and Hugo and Irving appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Hugo, as a political subdivision of Oklahoma, lacked standing to sue the Board under the dormant Commerce Clause. Irving, whose injury was solely premised on a contract it entered into with Hugo, likewise could not demonstrate standing because any injury to Irving cannot be redressed. Concluding no plaintiff had the necessary standing, the Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case back the district court to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff-Appellant Christie Helm appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Kansas (the State) on her claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Helm sued the State after she was allegedly sexually harassed over a period of almost ten years by Judge Frederick Stewart, a State district judge for whom Helm served as an administrative assistant. The district court determined that the State was entitled to summary judgment because Helm fell within the "personal staff" exemption to Title VII’s definition of "employee" and thus did not qualify for the protections afforded by the statute. Alternatively, the court ruled that summary judgment for the State was proper on the basis of the "Faragher/Ellerth" affirmative defense to employer liability for a supervisor’s sexual harassment of a subordinate. In September 1998, Helm was hired to fill an administrative-assistant position. Judge Stewart began sexually harassing Helm shortly after she was hired. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit held that the "Faragher/Ellerth" defense precluded vicarious liability against the State of Kansas for Judge Stewart’s alleged actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court without reaching the question whether the "personal staff" exemption removed Helm from the purview of Title VII.

Minta del Carmen Rivera Barrientos suffered an attack at the hands of gang members in her native country of El Salvador. She escaped to the United States and sought asylum. She contended she was eligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158 because she faced past persecution on account of her political opinion (opposition to gangs) and her membership in a particular social group (young females) who have resisted gang recruitment. The BIA argued that the attack was not on account of her political opinion and that she was not a member of a cognizable social group. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded the BIA’s interpretation of the applicable statute was not unreasonable, the Court concluded the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rivera-Barrientos was ineligible for asylum.

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), a Texas state agency, applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("the OWRB") for permits to appropriate water at three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas. Just before filing its applications, Tarrant sued the nine members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in the district court for the Western District of Oklahoma and sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate certain Oklahoma statutes that govern the appropriation and use of water and an injunction preventing OWRB from enforcing them. Tarrant alleged that the Oklahoma statutes restricted interstate commerce in water and thereby violated the dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory or unduly burdensome. Tarrant further alleged that Congress did not authorize Oklahoma through the Red River Compact ("Compact") to enact such laws. OWRB responded that Congress did authorize Oklahoma to adopt these statutes by consenting to the Compact. Tarrant also claimed that the Compact preempted the Oklahoma statutes insofar as the Compact applied to Tarrant’s application to appropriate water located in the Red River Basin. The district court granted summary judgment for OWRB on both the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. After that decision, Tarrant took steps to export to Texas Oklahoma water that was not subject to the Compact. Tarrant negotiated a contract with property owners in Stephens County, Oklahoma to export groundwater to Texas and also entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Apache Tribe concerning the Tribe’s potential water rights. In court Tarrant then reasserted its dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on these transactions. The district court dismissed the Stephens County matter for lack of standing and the Apache Tribe matter as not ripe. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grants of summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption issues, and the dismissals based on standing and ripeness: [w]e hold that the Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes from dormant Commerce Clause challenge insofar as they apply to surface water subject to the Compact."

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case pertained to a "class-of-one" equal protection lawsuit against a county government based on its demand that a property owner correct a nuisance. Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC alleged that after it and Cherokee County became involved in litigation concerning a casino development agreement, the County health department targeted Kansas Penn for a regulatory enforcement action. In particular, the County sent Kansas Penn a notice stating that the unkempt condition of its property violated state and local nuisance laws and regulations and warning that failure to clean up the property would lead to an enforcement action. Although the County never brought an enforcement action against Kansas Penn, Kansas Penn sued the County and some of its officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In its complaint, Kansas Penn alleged the notice of nuisance violated its right to equal protection by arbitrarily and maliciously singling it out for selective enforcement. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Kansas Penn failed to state a claim for relief under the standard set forth by "Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly," the Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint.

Plaintiffs Mary Hull, Nelson Phelps, and the Association of US West Retirees appealed a district court’s order that rejected their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) claim against Defendant Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The issue central to Plaintiffs’ appeal focused primarily on whether the request on its face sought only a third party’s return information to which they were not entitled without the authorization of that third party. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded it did, and therefore the IRS properly withheld the requested information in the absence of US West’s consent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the IRS.

The Tenth Circuit considered whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) properly exercised its discretion to reject a gift of property by a member of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to the tribe. The Court noted that this appeal also raised a novel jurisdictional question regarding its review of administrative decisions following a remand from district court. James Smith wanted to transfer to the tribe a portion of his property interest in the Maria Christiana Reserve No. 35 (southwest of Kansas City) where the tribe had plans to develop gaming facilities. Federal law and restrictions on Smith’s fee interest required the BIA to approve any transfer. Citing concerns regarding fractional land interests in the Reserve as well as the long-range best interests of Reserve landowners, the BIA denied Smith’s application to transfer the land. The Tribe challenged that decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held the BIA properly exercised its discretion in denying the application. With regard to the jurisdictional question raised, the Court concluded that the government has not abandoned its right to challenge the district court’s remand order, even though the government substantially prevailed in the district court’s final judgment. The Court found the district court erred in its remand order reversing the BIA’s denial of Smith’s application. Therefore the Court vacated the district court’s final judgment and its order reversing the BIA, and remanded the case for further consideration of Smith’s application consistent with this opinion.

Eric Walters was a federal employee covered by a Standard Option health insurance plan (the Plan) administered by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City (Blue Cross). In November 2007 he went to Weight Loss Healthcare Centers of America, Inc. (Weight Loss) to inquire about surgical treatment for obesity. Because Weight Loss had no contractual arrangement with Blue Cross as either a preferred provider or a participating provider, Walters would expect to pay more than if he used a provider that had a contract. Nevertheless, Walters had outpatient laparoscopic surgery at Weight Loss to help him better control his weight. Although Walters obtained preauthorization from Blue Cross for the surgery, there was no indication in the record that he requested or received information about his out-of-pocket costs. Weight Loss billed Blue Cross for the procedure. The Blue Cross Plan paid $2,300 according to the Plan’s benefit for out-of-network providers. Weight Loss appealed the payment to the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which held that Blue Cross’s interpretation of Walters’s Plan was correct and it had paid the proper amount. The district court affirmed OPM’s decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit determined that OPM reasonably interpreted the Plan language. However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision because OPM neither (1) reviewed the evidence that would show whether Blue Cross had correctly calculated the Plan allowance, nor (2) explained why such review was unnecessary.

Plaintiff-Appellant Larry Lauer filed a complaint against the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation and three of its employees alleging Defendants discriminated against him for being disabled. Plaintiff did not explain the nature of the alleged discrimination or how the Defendants were involved. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice, allowing him an opportunity to submit an amended complaint. Rather than submitting an amended complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend and for injunctive relief along with a supporting brief. Like the original complaint, these filings lacked any factual allegations relating to the claimed discrimination. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion to amend and closed the case. Plaintiff timely appealed to the Tenth Circuit who, upon review, affirmed the district court’s order: “even liberally construing [Plaintiff’s] subsequent pro se submittals as a form of amended complaint, they do not allege any facts that might give rise to a claim for relief.”