Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Aviva Life & Annuity Company and American Investors Life Insurance Company (collectively, "Aviva") contended the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in rendering insurance determinations concerning certain of Plaintiffs’ bank deposit accounts. They appealed a district court’s order upholding the FDIC’s determinations. In 2008, the Kansas Bank Commissioner closed Columbian Bank & Trust Company and appointed the FDIC as receiver. At that time, Plaintiffs maintained twelve deposit accounts at Columbian. The bulk of those funds were held in two accounts (the “Challenged Accounts”). The remaining accounts bore a variety of titles. Shortly after its appointment as receiver, the FDIC determined that each Plaintiffs’ respective accounts identified as “operating” accounts, which included the Challenged Accounts, would be aggregated as corporate accounts. The FDIC further determined that the accounts designated as “benefits” accounts would be separately insured as annuity contract accounts. Upon review of the FDIC's determination and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that the FDIC ultimately concluded the deposit account records clearly and unambiguously indicated the Challenged Accounts were owned in the manner of “corporate accounts.” Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence was not, therefore, “relevant data” for purposes of the FDIC’s final insurance determination: "[t]he absence of any discussion pertaining to this evidence in the FDIC’s final determination is therefore unsurprising, and in no way arbitrary or capricious." The Court affirmed the FDIC's determination.

Plaintiff-Appellant Louanne Cypert brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and several anti-discrimination statutes alleging that Defendant Independent School District No. I-050 of Osage County's (Prue Public Schools) failure to renew her employment contract violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the District discriminated against her because of her age. The district court granted the District summary judgment, finding that Plaintiff's non-renewal hearing satisfied her Fourteenth Amendment claim to due process, and that she failed to show her speech was the motivating factor that led to the District's non-renewal, and that she failed to show the District's non-renewal resulted from discrimination. In the fall of 2008, the local School Board became concerned about the District’s finances. It initiated an investigation and began terminating employment contracts. Plaintiff's contract was one of the terminated contracts. On appeal, Plaintiff proffered evidence of the Board's keeping younger, lesser-qualified personnel on staff at the time of her termination. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's proffered evidence of discrimination did not amount to the requisite proof that her civil and constitutional rights were violated. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgement in favor of the District.

Plaintiff-Appellant Terry Winne appealed a district court's order that dismissed his complaint for failing to state a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In 1999, Winne began working for the City of Lakewood, Colorado as an emergency dispatcher. In 2005, he was injured in an automobile accident, requiring that he take medication for headaches. A change in his medication in January 2008 caused him to “suffer cognitive problems,” and he was placed on intermittent FMLA leave throughout “the spring and summer.” On August 11, 2008, the City transferred Winne to the police department’s records section after a psychiatrist found him unfit for his dispatcher duties. Roughly two weeks later, the City fired Winne, “even though he still had available FMLA leave.” The City stated “that the termination was because of his attendance.” Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's complaint failed to allege the material elements necessary for his FMLA claim. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his case.

Plaintiffs Kansas Judicial Review, the Honorable Charles Hard and Robb Rumsey appealed a district court order that denied their motion for attorney's fees. The Tenth Circuit was asked to decide whether Plaintiffs qualified as "prevailing parties" when they secured a preliminary injunction that afforded some of the relief sought in their complaint. The court granted the injunction after finding Plaintiffs were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The actions of third parties mooted the case before the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to determine the validity of the preliminary injunction on appeal. Upon review of the trial record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the preliminary injunction conferred prevailing-party status on Plaintiffs, and reversed the judgment of the lower court that held otherwise. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs David Scherer, John Licht, Mike Lopez, Barbara Brickley and Aaron Johnson brought suit to challenge the U.S. Forest Service's "amenity fee" through which it charges visitors to Mount Evans national park in Colorado. Plaintiffs asked the Tenth Circuit to strike down the Forrest Service's fee policy as facially inconsistent with Congress's directions and to hold it null and void in all applications. Upon review, the Court found it cannot strike the fee: "for better or worse, the Legislature has said that the Service may - sometimes - charge visitors. . . so some lawful applications of the policy do exist. . . [the fee] might well be susceptible to a winning challenge as applied to certain particular visitors, perhaps even the plaintiffs themselves. But that's a path the plaintiffs haven't asked us to explore and so one we leave for another day." The Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.

The primary issue in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was whether the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review on "order for relief" entered by a bankruptcy judge for the District of Delaware. The Delaware judge entered the order after venue was transferred to the District of Colorado. The parties agreed that the order should be vacated on the ground that it is void because it was issued after the transfer was complete. However, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that it did not have jurisdiction because the governing statute provides that an appeal of a decision by a bankruptcy judge "shall only be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and affirmed its decision.

Pro se prisoner Albert Cramer petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal a district court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief. The lower court denied the application on the ground that his claims were procedurally defaulted because Petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies and his claims would now be procedurally barred if pursued in state court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that "no reasonable jurist could debate the correctness of the district court's decision." Accordingly, the Court denied Petitioner's request for a COA and dismissed his appeal.

The City of Newkirk and Kay Electric Cooperative both provide electricity to Oklahoma consumers. "When a city acts as a market participant it generally has to play by the same rules as everyone else. It can't abuse its monopoly power or conspire to suppress competition. Except sometimes it can. If the city can show that its parent state authorized it to upend normal competition [. . . ] the city enjoys immunity from federal antitrust liability. The problem for the City of Newkirk in this case is that the state has done no such thing." Kay sued Newkirk alleging that the City engaged in unlawful tying and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,2. The district court refused to allow the case to proceed, granting Newkirk's motion to dismiss after it found the City "immune" from liability as a matter of law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the state did not authorize Newkirk to enter the local electricity market as it did in this case. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Duane Barber (Barber) appealed the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of benefits claiming that an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to properly consider the evidence he presented in support of his claim. Plaintiff claimed he was disabled by schizophrenia, anti-social personality disorder, depression, anxiety and bipolar disorder. Barber eventually applied for Supplemental Security Income but the ALJ concluded at step five of the five-step evaluation process that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, and a magistrate judge, acting on the parties' consent, affirmed. Plaintiff then brought his appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review of the administrative record, the Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ properly explained his findings throughout. Because the record supported the ALJ's decision in this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ALJ's decision to deny Plaintiff's application for benefits.

Plaintiff Billy Merrifield brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against his former employer Defendant Board of Commissioners for Santa Fe. In his suit, he alleged he had been denied procedural due process with respect to the County's pre termination hearing process when he was fired from his position as a Youth Services Administrator. His complaint also alleged that he was fired in retaliation for retaining an attorney. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, and set aside a state administrative decision to award him back pay. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to show that the County's pre termination process was constitutionally inadequate and that his association with an attorney lead to his termination.