Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A licensed physician operated pain clinics in Arizona and Wyoming, where he, with assistance from family members, employees, and certain patients, prescribed large quantities of oxycodone and other controlled substances. Many prescriptions were issued without adequate medical examinations and were routinely exchanged for cash or goods. Several individuals helped manage clinic operations, refer new patients, and facilitate prescription transactions, often receiving or providing payment for these activities. One patient, Jessica Burch, died after overdosing on oxycodone obtained through these prescriptions.The physician was initially convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming on multiple counts, including unlawful dispensing of controlled substances, conspiracy resulting in death, and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On his first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court, in light of *Ruan v. United States*, vacated his convictions due to a jury instruction error regarding the required mens rea for the offenses. The Tenth Circuit then remanded the case for a new trial. At retrial, the physician was convicted on seventeen of twenty-one counts. He moved for acquittal or a new trial, but the district court denied these motions and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the physician challenged the admission of expert testimony about the law governing prescriptions, the sufficiency of the evidence for the continuing criminal enterprise and death-resulting convictions, and the use of a regulation to define the scope of authorized prescriptions. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, found sufficient evidence supported the challenged convictions, and reaffirmed that a DEA-registered physician can be prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 if acting outside the usual course of professional practice. The court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Kahn" on Justia Law

A minor child suffering from a rare congenital condition required urgent medication, specifically Lupron Depot injections, to alleviate her symptoms. Her parents, after consulting with her physician, pursued this treatment and sought to fill the prescription through a specialty pharmacy owned by Walgreens. The process required prior authorization from the child’s health insurer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma. Walgreens investigated coverage, communicated the need for prior authorization to the physician, and placed the prescription on hold pending approval. Although the physician eventually obtained and sent the authorization, Walgreens closed the prescription file, and neither party followed up for nearly a month. The child was hospitalized twice during that period. After renewed urgency from the physician, Walgreens reopened the file, filled the prescription, and delivered the medication.The parents and child brought a negligence claim against Walgreens in Oklahoma state court, alleging Walgreens had promised to timely deliver the medication and breached a duty by not doing so. Walgreens removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, which applied Oklahoma law. Walgreens moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to fill the prescription until it had taken affirmative action after July 13, and citing state statutes and regulations that do not impose a general duty to fill prescriptions within a certain timeframe. The plaintiffs argued Walgreens owed a duty throughout the period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that, under Oklahoma law, Walgreens owed no duty to fill the prescription before July 13, 2020, either by statute, regulation, or common law, and found no evidence of a promise or undertaking by Walgreens to do so. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Walgreens. View "Scholl v. Walgreens Specialty Pharmacy" on Justia Law

The plaintiff participated in a clinical trial for an experimental COVID-19 vaccine manufactured by AstraZeneca in November 2020. Before receiving the vaccine, she signed an informed-consent form stating that AstraZeneca would compensate her for injuries caused by the vaccine, including providing medical care and reimbursement, and that the company had an insurance policy to cover such costs. The form also disclosed that federal law may limit her right to sue for vaccine-related injuries, referencing the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), which provides broad immunity to vaccine manufacturers during a public health emergency.After suffering debilitating medical injuries from the vaccine, the plaintiff requested compensation and care from AstraZeneca, which was denied. She then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging breach of contract and breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. AstraZeneca moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the PREP Act immunized it from liability. The district court denied the motion, holding that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies only to tort claims, not to contract-based claims. The court further reserved judgment on whether AstraZeneca had waived its statutory immunity in the informed-consent form.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies to “all claims for loss,” including those arising from breach of contract, provided they bear a causal relationship to the administration or use of a covered countermeasure like a vaccine. The court remanded the case for the district court to consider whether AstraZeneca waived immunity in the informed-consent form. View "Dressen v. AstraZeneca AB" on Justia Law

The defendant, a pharmacist and owner of a retail pharmacy, was implicated in a federal investigation after concerns arose about the prescribing patterns of a local physician whose patients often filled prescriptions at the defendant’s pharmacy. The government alleged that the defendant improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances and fraudulently billed Medicaid and Medicare by instituting a policy requiring customers to fill three non-controlled prescriptions for every controlled substance prescription (the “3:1 Policy”), thereby submitting claims for prescriptions that were not medically necessary.Following indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the defendant’s trial. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts related to the unlawful distribution of controlled substances and two counts of healthcare fraud. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. After the Supreme Court clarified the intent requirement for drug distribution offenses in Ruan v. United States, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to a jury instruction about the scienter requirement for distributing controlled substances. The district court vacated the distribution counts but denied relief on the healthcare fraud counts, finding no prejudice as to those.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the challenged jury instruction affected the convictions for healthcare fraud. The court held that the instruction at issue pertained only to the distribution counts and did not impact the fraud counts, which were based on separate conduct and legal standards. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the healthcare fraud counts, concluding that any error in the jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant regarding those convictions. View "United States v. Otuonye" on Justia Law

At a psychiatric hospital, employees were exposed to violent behavior from disturbed patients. Following a tip, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated and cited the hospital for failing to implement measures that could have protected staff from workplace violence. These measures included reconfiguring nurses’ stations, providing communication devices, fully implementing existing safety programs, maintaining adequate staffing, securing patient belongings, hiring specialized security staff, and investigating each incident of workplace violence. The hospital did not contest the necessity of some measures but challenged the citation overall.An administrative law judge with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission conducted a hearing, upheld the citation, and imposed a fine. The judge’s decision became the final decision of the Review Commission when it declined further review. The hospital then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for judicial review, arguing that another federal agency, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, had exclusive authority over hospital safety, that the Secretary of Labor should have deferred to other regulatory bodies, and that the Secretary’s methods and notice were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor had the authority to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause in this context, as the cited agency did not actually regulate employee safety regarding workplace violence. The court found that the Secretary provided fair notice, acted within statutory authority, and permissibly used adjudication rather than rulemaking. The court also concluded that the abatement measures were feasible, supported by substantial evidence, and that the imposed sanctions for failure to preserve video evidence were appropriate. The Tenth Circuit denied the hospital’s petition for review, upholding the citation and penalty. View "Cedar Springs Hospital v. Occupational Health and Safety" on Justia Law

Max and Peggy Lancaster transferred approximately $3.8 million in property to a family LLC owned by their adult children, receiving a promissory note and other loan-related documents in exchange. They subsequently applied for Medicaid benefits in Oklahoma but were found ineligible due to their financial resources exceeding Medicaid’s asset limit. The Lancasters challenged this determination in federal court, arguing that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the Oklahoma Health Care Authority violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act, which requires prompt provision of benefits to eligible individuals. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the Agencies’ asset calculation was erroneous and deprived them of a federally protected right.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the Agencies’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the promissory note received from the LLC was a countable resource under state law and not a bona fide loan. As a result, the court concluded the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits because their assets exceeded the threshold set by law. The Lancasters appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, which clarified the standard for determining whether provisions of the Medicaid Act confer individually enforceable rights under § 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Medina, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does not clearly and unambiguously confer a private right enforceable via § 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Lancasters’ claims, holding that there is no individually enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(8) for the purposes of this lawsuit. View "Lancaster v. Cartmell" on Justia Law

A physician employed jointly by a Kansas hospital and its parent health system alleged that he was fired and later reported to the state medical licensing board in retaliation for reporting another doctor’s alleged sexual harassment of nurses. The physician had served in various roles at the hospital, including as Chief Medical Officer, and had made a formal complaint about a colleague’s conduct. After an internal investigation into an unrelated anonymous complaint about the physician’s own conduct, the hospital terminated his employment and subsequently referred several of his cases for outside peer review, which led to reports being filed with the state licensing board.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment to the hospital and health system on the physician’s Title VII retaliation claims, finding that he could not show the reasons for his termination or the reports to the licensing board were pretextual. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. The physician appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the physician presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the hospital’s internal investigation and subsequent actions were motivated by retaliatory animus, particularly under a “cat’s paw” theory, where biased subordinates influenced the ultimate decisionmakers. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the stated reasons for termination and reporting were pretextual, including evidence of disparate treatment and an unfair investigation. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on both Title VII retaliation claims and remanded for further proceedings. It also directed the district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Byrnes v. St. Catherine Hospital" on Justia Law

An attorney based in Oklahoma developed a business model to help out-of-state clients enter the state’s medical marijuana industry, which is governed by strict residency and disclosure requirements. He created a two-entity structure: one company, with nominal Oklahoma-resident owners, obtained the necessary state licenses, while a second company, owned and operated by out-of-state clients, ran the actual marijuana operations. The attorney did not disclose the true ownership structure to state authorities, and in some cases, marijuana was grown before the required state registrations were obtained. State authorities began investigating after noticing irregularities, such as multiple licenses listing the same address and repeated use of the same Oklahoma residents as owners, many of whom had little or no involvement in the businesses.Oklahoma state prosecutors charged the attorney with multiple felonies related to his business practices, including conspiracy and submitting false documents. While those charges were pending, a federal grand jury indicted him for drug conspiracy and maintaining drug-involved premises, based on the same conduct. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the attorney moved to enjoin his federal prosecution, arguing that a congressional appropriations rider barred the Department of Justice from spending funds to prosecute individuals complying with state medical marijuana laws. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, finding that the attorney had not substantially complied with Oklahoma law, particularly due to nondisclosure of ownership interests and failure to obtain required registrations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the appropriations rider does bar the Department of Justice from spending funds to prosecute private individuals who comply with state medical marijuana laws. However, the court found that the attorney failed to substantially comply with Oklahoma’s requirements, so the rider did not protect him. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the injunction. View "United States v. Stacy" on Justia Law

Several minors diagnosed with gender dysphoria, their parents, and a physician challenged an Oklahoma law (SB 613) that prohibits healthcare providers from administering gender transition procedures—including puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones—to individuals under eighteen. The law defines these procedures as medical or surgical interventions intended to affirm a minor’s gender identity when it differs from their biological sex. The statute does not ban mental health counseling or certain other medical treatments. The plaintiffs, all affected by the law’s restrictions, argued that SB 613 violated their constitutional rights.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, finding they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. While the appeal was pending, the Tenth Circuit paused proceedings to await the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Skrmetti, which addressed a similar Tennessee law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that SB 613 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it classifies based on age and medical use, not sex or transgender status, and is subject to rational basis review. The court found Oklahoma’s interest in the health and welfare of minors provided a rational basis for the law. The court also rejected the substantive due process claim, concluding that there is no fundamental right for parents to access gender transition procedures for their children, and that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The court found no evidence of invidious discriminatory intent by the legislature. View "Poe v. Drummond" on Justia Law

The case involves Early Willard Woodmore, III, who was convicted for his role in a methamphetamine distribution enterprise in eastern Oklahoma. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began investigating the Woodmore organization in 2018 after receiving a tip about methamphetamine shipments. Early Woodmore, along with his siblings Calvin and Amber, led the organization. They received methamphetamine from Kimberly Noel in California, who shipped the drugs concealed in everyday objects. The organization distributed the drugs in smaller quantities throughout eastern Oklahoma. Early Woodmore was arrested in April 2019 and continued to communicate with his sister Amber, who took over operations. The DEA intercepted a significant methamphetamine shipment in August 2019, leading to further charges.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Early Woodmore on five counts, including conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and money laundering. He proceeded to a joint trial with his brother Calvin in April 2022. The jury convicted Early Woodmore on all counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the drug charges and 240 months for the money laundering charges, to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Early Woodmore raised three main challenges: judicial bias due to the district court's handling of a custody dispute during the trial, an erroneous jury instruction regarding the right of attorneys to interview witnesses, and the lack of a definitional instruction for "methamphetamine (actual)." The Tenth Circuit rejected all three challenges. The court found no judicial bias, upheld the jury instruction on attorney interviews, and determined that the term "methamphetamine (actual)" was sufficiently clear based on the evidence presented at trial. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Woodmore" on Justia Law