Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Danijela and Aleksandar Mojsilovic appealed the dismissal of their damages claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The Mojsilovics are Serbian scientists recruited and hired by the University of Oklahoma to serve as research assistants at the University’s Health Sciences Center. In that capacity, Aleksandar was hired to conduct DNA sequencing and tissue typing for research and clinical studies; Danijela was hired to make transfectants and tissue cultures. The Mojsilovics were retained by the University through the H-1B visa program, and they were supervised by Dr. William Hildebrand, the director of the medical research laboratory at the Health Sciences Center. Dr. Hildebrand also owned a biotechnology company called Pure Protein, which, through a contractual arrangement, shares the University’s facilities to perform similar work. According to the Mojsilovics, shortly after they were hired, Dr. Hildebrand demanded that they also work for Pure Protein. He allegedly required them to work longer hours than permitted by their visa applications, without pay, and threatened to have their visas revoked if they objected. Dr. Hildebrand became verbally abusive at times, and because he was authorized to make hiring and firing decisions, the Mojsilovics claimed they feared he would take action against their immigration status if they did not comply with his demands. The Mojsilovics eventually filed suit, naming the University, Dr. Hildebrand, and Pure Protein as defendants. With respect to claims against the University, the district court dismissed the Mojsilovic’s claims as barred by sovereign immunity. Finding no error in that decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mojsilovic v. Board of Regents University of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Brayan Alexis Osuna-Gutierrez was arrested in Kansas. He was a passenger in a rental vehicle on a cross-country trip. The police found approximately seven grams of marijuana belonging to Gutierrez that he had legally purchased in Colorado. Police also found approximately three kilograms of methamphetamine in the rear portion of the car. The government charged Gutierrez and his co-defendants with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gutierrez ultimately pled guilty to “Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute" (the government dropped the methamphetamine charges). The district court sentenced him to time served, approximately seven months. After leaving jail, Gutierrez was immediately transferred to immigration custody and served with Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order (the expedited removal process). During the removal process, an officer within DHS concluded that Gutierrez was not a legal permanent resident, having come to the United States from Mexico with his mother when he was one year old without being legally admitted. Further, Gutierrez had pled guilty to an aggravated felony. Gutierrez timely petitioned for review of his removal and was deported back to Mexico. Gutierrez argued his deportation was improper because: (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) expedited removal process is illegal; and (2) in any event, it was improper for DHS to use the expedited removal process on Gutierrez because he pled guilty to a misdemeanor, not a felony. The Tenth Circuit found Gutierrez was wrong on both counts, and denied Gutierrez's petition for review. View "Osuna-Gutierrez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Constantine Golicov, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order concluding that his Utah state conviction for failing to stop at a police officer’s command rendered him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The specific provision of the INA that served as grounds for removal provided that an alien is subject for removal if that person commits an "aggravated felony." The INA defined the term "aggravated felony" to include "crimes of violence." Petitioner argued to the Tenth Circuit that "crime of violence" was unconstitutionally vague. After review of the Supreme Court precedent of "Johnson v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)), and applying that case to the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit agreed with petitioner that the INA's term was indeed vague. The order of removal was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Golicov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Hugo Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for adjustment of status in reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in "Padilla-Caldera I" in the period it was valid law. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation in "Briones" yet before "Padilla-Caldera II" declared "Briones" controlling and "Padilla-Caldera I" effectively overruled. The BIA suggested this factual distinction made all the legal difference. "But we fail to see how. Indeed, the government’s position in this appeal seems to us clearly inconsistent with both the rule and reasoning of De Niz Robles." In 2009 the law expressly gave Gutierrez-Brizuela two options: he could seek an adjustment of status pursuant to "Padilla-Caldera I" or accept a ten-year waiting period outside the country. "Relying on binding circuit precedent, he chose the former path. Yet the BIA now seeks to apply a new law to block that path at a time when it’s too late for Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela to alter his conduct. Meaning that, if we allowed the BIA to apply Briones here, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela would lose the seven years he could’ve spent complying with the BIA’s ten year waiting period and instead have to start that waiting period now. The due process concerns are obvious: when Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela made his choice, he had no notice of the law the BIA now seeks to apply. And the equal protection problems are obvious too: if the agency were free to change the law retroactively based on shifting political winds, it could use that power to punish politically disfavored groups or individuals for conduct they can no longer alter." This case was remanded back to the BIA for reconsideration of Gutierrez-Brizuela's application based on the law in effect at the time of his application. View "Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Hiram Marceleno pleaded guilty to one count of reentry of a removed alien. In this direct appeal, Marceleno claimed the district court erred by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial. View "United States v. Marceleno" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kyaw Myat Htun was a citizen of Burma who has lived in the United States for several years and sought asylum and other forms of relief that would allow him to remain in the country. The immigration judge (IJ) initially granted Htun’s asylum application but later reopened the removal proceedings and denied the application. Based on newly discovered evidence, the IJ concluded Htun lacked credibility and the circumstances did not warrant an exercise of discretion in favor of Htun’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s ruling and dismissed Htun’s appeal. Htun petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the BIA’s decision. Finding "substantial evidence supporting the BIA's decision that Mr. Htun is not eligible for withholding of removal," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. View "Htun v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant Adan Humberto Dominguez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of illegally reentering the United States after having previously been deported. Prior to sentencing, the probation office recommended that the district court impose a sixteen-level enhancement to Dominguez-Rodriguez’s base offense level because Dominguez-Rodriguez was previously deported after having been convicted in federal court of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Dominguez-Rodriguez objected to the proposed sixteen-level enhancement. At sentencing, the district court sustained Dominguez-Rodriguez’s objection, imposed an eight-level enhancement, and sentenced Dominguez-Rodriguez to six months’ imprisonment. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to impose the sixteen-level enhancement. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal ,the Tenth Circuit agreed with the government and consequently remanded this case with instructions to vacate Dominguez-Rodriguez’s sentence and resentence. View "United States v. Dominguez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Fabian Rangel-Perez challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) characterization of his Utah misdemeanor conviction as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The BIA concluded that Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor fell within the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies that includes “sexual abuse of a minor” offenses. Rangel-Perez argued that his prior Utah conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under the INA because the INA’s generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense required proof of both mens rea and a four-year age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, yet neither was an element of the Utah statute under which he was convicted. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rangel-Perez that the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies for “sexual abuse of a minor” included only offenses that require proof of at least a “knowing” mens rea or scienter. Therefore, Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction was not a “sexual abuse of a minor” offense under the INA. Thus, the Court reversed the BIA’s decision to treat Rangel-Perez’s prior conviction as an “aggravated felony” and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rangel-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Octavio Gutierrez-Orozco (Gutierrez), a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States illegally. Gutierrez insisted he entered the United States in March 1996. He remembered that date because his wife, who remained in Mexico, was pregnant with the second of their four children, who was born in September 1996. He claimed to have lived in the United States continuously since then, except for a brief, two-month trip back to Mexico in mid-1999 when his wife was ill, after which border patrol twice hindered his reentry. His wife joined him here sometime in 2000. Gutierrez’s immigration troubles began in February 2008, when a domestic violence incident with his teenage son led to a simple assault conviction. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Gutierrez conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The IJ conducted a hearing and concluded Gutierrez was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he did not demonstrate a ten-year continuous physical presence in the United States from April 1, 1998, to April 1, 2008; good moral character for that time period; and an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also denied voluntary departure because Gutierrez failed to maintain good moral character during the relevant time frame and, alternatively, as an exercise of discretion. Gutierrez appealed to the BIA for relief from the IJ’s decision. The BIA denied relief, agreeing with the IJ. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cristian Eduardo Obregon de Leon (“Obregon”), native of Guatemala and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted under Oklahoma law of various offenses, including possession of stolen vehicles and receipt of stolen property. He was subsequently placed into removal proceedings and deemed removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that he was statutorily ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) because he had previously adjusted to lawful permanent residence status. Obregon challenged both of these determinations in his petition for review of the BIA’s decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination that Obregon was removable because his conviction for possession of stolen vehicles constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. However, Obregon was statutorily eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver under section 1182(h). The case was remanded back to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Obregon de Leon v. Holder" on Justia Law