Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Constantine Golicov, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order concluding that his Utah state conviction for failing to stop at a police officer’s command rendered him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The specific provision of the INA that served as grounds for removal provided that an alien is subject for removal if that person commits an "aggravated felony." The INA defined the term "aggravated felony" to include "crimes of violence." Petitioner argued to the Tenth Circuit that "crime of violence" was unconstitutionally vague. After review of the Supreme Court precedent of "Johnson v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)), and applying that case to the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit agreed with petitioner that the INA's term was indeed vague. The order of removal was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Golicov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Hugo Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for adjustment of status in reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in "Padilla-Caldera I" in the period it was valid law. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation in "Briones" yet before "Padilla-Caldera II" declared "Briones" controlling and "Padilla-Caldera I" effectively overruled. The BIA suggested this factual distinction made all the legal difference. "But we fail to see how. Indeed, the government’s position in this appeal seems to us clearly inconsistent with both the rule and reasoning of De Niz Robles." In 2009 the law expressly gave Gutierrez-Brizuela two options: he could seek an adjustment of status pursuant to "Padilla-Caldera I" or accept a ten-year waiting period outside the country. "Relying on binding circuit precedent, he chose the former path. Yet the BIA now seeks to apply a new law to block that path at a time when it’s too late for Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela to alter his conduct. Meaning that, if we allowed the BIA to apply Briones here, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela would lose the seven years he could’ve spent complying with the BIA’s ten year waiting period and instead have to start that waiting period now. The due process concerns are obvious: when Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela made his choice, he had no notice of the law the BIA now seeks to apply. And the equal protection problems are obvious too: if the agency were free to change the law retroactively based on shifting political winds, it could use that power to punish politically disfavored groups or individuals for conduct they can no longer alter." This case was remanded back to the BIA for reconsideration of Gutierrez-Brizuela's application based on the law in effect at the time of his application. View "Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Hiram Marceleno pleaded guilty to one count of reentry of a removed alien. In this direct appeal, Marceleno claimed the district court erred by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial. View "United States v. Marceleno" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kyaw Myat Htun was a citizen of Burma who has lived in the United States for several years and sought asylum and other forms of relief that would allow him to remain in the country. The immigration judge (IJ) initially granted Htun’s asylum application but later reopened the removal proceedings and denied the application. Based on newly discovered evidence, the IJ concluded Htun lacked credibility and the circumstances did not warrant an exercise of discretion in favor of Htun’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s ruling and dismissed Htun’s appeal. Htun petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the BIA’s decision. Finding "substantial evidence supporting the BIA's decision that Mr. Htun is not eligible for withholding of removal," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. View "Htun v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant Adan Humberto Dominguez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of illegally reentering the United States after having previously been deported. Prior to sentencing, the probation office recommended that the district court impose a sixteen-level enhancement to Dominguez-Rodriguez’s base offense level because Dominguez-Rodriguez was previously deported after having been convicted in federal court of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Dominguez-Rodriguez objected to the proposed sixteen-level enhancement. At sentencing, the district court sustained Dominguez-Rodriguez’s objection, imposed an eight-level enhancement, and sentenced Dominguez-Rodriguez to six months’ imprisonment. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to impose the sixteen-level enhancement. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal ,the Tenth Circuit agreed with the government and consequently remanded this case with instructions to vacate Dominguez-Rodriguez’s sentence and resentence. View "United States v. Dominguez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Fabian Rangel-Perez challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) characterization of his Utah misdemeanor conviction as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The BIA concluded that Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor fell within the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies that includes “sexual abuse of a minor” offenses. Rangel-Perez argued that his prior Utah conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under the INA because the INA’s generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense required proof of both mens rea and a four-year age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, yet neither was an element of the Utah statute under which he was convicted. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rangel-Perez that the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies for “sexual abuse of a minor” included only offenses that require proof of at least a “knowing” mens rea or scienter. Therefore, Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction was not a “sexual abuse of a minor” offense under the INA. Thus, the Court reversed the BIA’s decision to treat Rangel-Perez’s prior conviction as an “aggravated felony” and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rangel-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Octavio Gutierrez-Orozco (Gutierrez), a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States illegally. Gutierrez insisted he entered the United States in March 1996. He remembered that date because his wife, who remained in Mexico, was pregnant with the second of their four children, who was born in September 1996. He claimed to have lived in the United States continuously since then, except for a brief, two-month trip back to Mexico in mid-1999 when his wife was ill, after which border patrol twice hindered his reentry. His wife joined him here sometime in 2000. Gutierrez’s immigration troubles began in February 2008, when a domestic violence incident with his teenage son led to a simple assault conviction. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Gutierrez conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The IJ conducted a hearing and concluded Gutierrez was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he did not demonstrate a ten-year continuous physical presence in the United States from April 1, 1998, to April 1, 2008; good moral character for that time period; and an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also denied voluntary departure because Gutierrez failed to maintain good moral character during the relevant time frame and, alternatively, as an exercise of discretion. Gutierrez appealed to the BIA for relief from the IJ’s decision. The BIA denied relief, agreeing with the IJ. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cristian Eduardo Obregon de Leon (“Obregon”), native of Guatemala and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted under Oklahoma law of various offenses, including possession of stolen vehicles and receipt of stolen property. He was subsequently placed into removal proceedings and deemed removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that he was statutorily ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) because he had previously adjusted to lawful permanent residence status. Obregon challenged both of these determinations in his petition for review of the BIA’s decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination that Obregon was removable because his conviction for possession of stolen vehicles constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. However, Obregon was statutorily eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver under section 1182(h). The case was remanded back to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Obregon de Leon v. Holder" on Justia Law

Wilber Ernesto Castillo, a citizen of El Salvador, appeals his sentence for violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which prohibits reentry into the United States by a previously removed alien. In 2004, Castillo was convicted in California state court for second-degree robbery, a violation of California Penal Code section 211. He was removed from the United States in 2007. In July 2009, Castillo reentered the United States without inspection. Castillo was convicted in 2011 for shoplifting and in 2014 for disorderly conduct. After his 2014 arrest, agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement interviewed Castillo. Based on his admissions that he had been removed from the United States and then reentered without inspection, the government charged Castillo with a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Castillo argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that his sentence was miscalculated because the district court incorrectly considered the California robbery conviction to be a “crime of violence” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under section 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court correctly considered Castillo’s California robbery conviction to be a crime of violence, it affirmed. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff German Wilmer Saenz Mencia (Saenz), a Peruvian citizen, came to Utah to work for Phillip, Chance, Dustin and Preston Allreds’ sheep ranch. His work was authorized by an H-2A sheepherding visa, and he was paid the minimum wage for H-2A sheepherders: $750 per month plus food and lodging. He filed suit against the Allreds because he claimed this pay was inadequate because the work he performed did not qualify as sheepherding. Instead he argued he was entitled to the hourly wage for H-2A ranch hands, which he sought to recover in contract and quantum meruit. Additionally, he argued the work he performed did not qualify for the “range production of livestock” exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) minimum wage, and therefore asserted a minimum wage claim against the Allreds. The district court rejected these claims, denied Saenz’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Allreds. As grounds for its decision, the district court concluded Saenz’s claims were estopped because he did not object to his non-sheepherding work while the Allreds could have done something about it. Further, the court found that more than half of Saenz’s work qualified as “range production of livestock,” and Saenz was accordingly exempt from the FLSA minimum wage and the H-2A wage for ranch hands. Saenz appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to Saenz and the grant of summary judgment to the Allreds. "[N]either the FLSA exemption nor the Special Procedures are satisfied simply because most of an employee’s duties fall within a sheepherder’s job description. To assume they are, and to rule Mr. Saenz a sheepherder on that basis, is to misapply the relevant provisions in at least three ways. […] under the undisputed facts, Mr. Saenz spent a large majority of his time working away from the range, supervised by superiors who could have recorded his hours, performing duties that were often incidental to sheepherding but were not sheepherding themselves. He was a ranch hand, not a sheepherder, and the FLSA exemption and H-2A Special Procedures do not apply." Further, the Court concluded the Allreds were both actually and on constructive notice of Saenz's work conditions, and as such, concluded their grounds for affirming their summary judgment motion failed. View "Saenz Mencia v. Allred" on Justia Law