Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the first time this case came before the Tenth Circuit, the Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellant Microsoft Corporation on Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Wallace's breach-of-contract claim, but reversed and remanded her state-law tort claims of wrongful discharge and outrage. In this, the second time the case came before the Court, the issue on appeal was the district court's grant of summary judgment to Microsoft, which denied Plaintiff's motion to supplement her amended complaint and to add a wrongful death claim. Plaintiff's husband was a consultant for Microsoft when he fell and was injured on a sidewalk while walking to a company meeting. He was placed on leave for about one month. Microsoft could no longer accommodate his medical restrictions once he returned to work. Microsoft never offered Mr. Wallace alternative employment, and he was never able to provide Microsoft with a medical release allowing him to return to his previous job. After Mr. Wallace had been on medical leave for sixty weeks, Microsoft terminated his employment. Mr. Wallace filed the petition in state court that ultimately gave rise to this case. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of fact upon which she had the burden of proving Microsoft caused the torts she alleged. View "Wallace v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Dennis Cornwell brought a wrongful death action on behalf of his wife who died at a railroad grade crossing when the vehicle she was driving hit a locomotive owned and operated by Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment and also moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's four experts based on "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." (509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The district court granted the summary judgment motion in part and ruled that the testimony of three experts should be excluded. The case proceeded to a jury trial. At its conclusion, the jury entered a verdict in favor of Union Pacific. Plaintiff appealed seeking to overturn the pre-trial rulings. Finding that the district court's ruling was supported by Tenth Circuit precedent and case law from other circuits, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision: "[t]he district court determined that [Plaintiff's experts'] proffered evidence was unreliable under "Daubert" standards: their evidence was speculative and conclusory." The Court therefore affirmed the exclusion of the experts' testimony and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the railroad. View "Cornwell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Baker Hughes Inteq, Inc. appealed the district court's order that denied its motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff EEC, Inc. and Baker contracted for Baker to provide drilling equipment for use in EEC's horizontal oil and natural gas well in Oklahoma. The equipment was lost in the well. EEC filed suit in Oklahoma state court alleging that Baker’s negligence damaged its well. Baker removed the case to federal court, invoked diversity jurisdiction, and filed counterclaims for the value of its equipment. Baker also sought to compel arbitration. Baker prepared and EEC signed numerous documents containing arbitration clauses which were ultimately ruled as unenforceable by the district court. The court also denied Baker’s motion to reconsider. Further, the court enjoined Baker from proceeding with arbitration, and stayed further district court proceedings pending appeal of its orders. Upon review of the arbitration clauses at issue in this case, the Tenth Circuit found disagreed that because there were differences in the multiple clauses they were rendered unenforceable. The Court reversed the district court's judgment denying Baker's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case with directions to order the parties to pursue arbitration. View "EEC, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Oilfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Paul Brule appealed a district court's dismissal of his claims for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations and negligence. Plaitiff acted as a insurance broker for Henry Productions, Inc.'s health, dental, vision, and related insurance policies, which were all issued by Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Mexico (“CBS). Plaintiff received brokerage commissions, paid by Henry Productions, for his sales of BCBS policies. In 2008, Plaintiff and BCBS employee Albert Rhodes met with employees of Henry Productions to discuss the company’s annual health insurance renewal. The renewal documents prepared by Rhodes listed Plaintiff's commission rate at the top of every page, which BCBS had never done before. As a result, Plaintiff lost his longstanding account with Henry Productions. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against BCBS in state court. BCBS removed the case to federal court then moved to dismiss. The district court granted BCBS's motion. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaitiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claims and should have, at the least, granted him leave to amend. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that even if he were allowed to amend,Plaintiff would have been unable to establish a legal duty owed to him by BCBS under New Mexico law. Because granting him leave to amend would be futile, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

On its second trip to the Tenth Circuit, this case arose from a dispute over payment for trial transcripts. After the City ordered and paid for original hearing transcripts prepared by Ms. Bean, Mr. Livingston asked the special master to direct the City to file copies with the clerk so the plaintiffs could access them without having to obtain copies from Ms. Bean at higher cost. When the special master refused, Mr. Livingston ordered copies of the transcripts directly from the City through New Mexico’s Inspection of Public Records Act. After Ms. Bean complained to the district court, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay reasonable court reporter’s fees for any copies of transcripts, the district court also placed a lien on any future recovery by the plaintiffs to secure payment of the yet-to-be determined amount claimed by Ms. Bean. The case eventually settled, and a final judgment entered. After he failed to submit a motion for costs and fees, including any fees owed to Ms. Bean under the lien, the court found Mr. Livingston personally liable for Ms. Bean’s fees and held back a portion of the funds from his fee payment. Mr. Livingston appealed, arguing that Ms. Bean was not a party in the district court proceedings and had not asked to intervene. The Tenth Circuit concluded Ms. Bean did not have a proprietary interest in the contents of the transcripts, and reversed the decision releasing funds to her. Ms. Bean did not appeal to the state supreme court but instead filed a "special appearance to object to subject matter jurisdiction" to vacate the Tenth Circuit's prior order. In this second appeal before the Tenth Circuit, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Ms. Bean's appeal was not preserved because she did not appeal to the state supreme court.

Petitioner Compass Environmental, Inc. challenged a final order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission) which found a serious safety regulation violation and assessed a $5500 penalty against it. Specifically, the Commission held that Compass failed to train a now-deceased employee to recognize and avoid an electrocution hazard presented by a high-voltage overhead powerline at his worksite. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Compass argued that the Commission failed to apply the correct legal test and erred in concluding that a reasonably prudent employer would have anticipated this employee's potential exposure to the power line. "Although Compass might not have been able to predict the manner in which [the employee] would have been exposed to this hazard," the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in holding that Compass should have trained the employee on the fatal danger posed by the high-voltage lines located in the vicinity of his work area. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kelli Mike was an employee of Leisure Village Health Care Center. Leisure Village obtained a urine sample from Plaintiff and submitted it to Defendant-Appellee Professional Clinical Laboratory, Inc. (ProLab) for processing. Plaintiff's test results came back positive for marijuana. Leisure Village reported the results to the Oklahoma Board of Nursing (the Board). The Board placed Plaintiff's nursing license on probation and later revoked it. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court alleging that ProLab violated the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 sec. 551-565 (West 2011)), and committed gross negligence during the drug-testing process. The district court granted summary judgment to ProLab after concluding that the civil remedy provision in the Testing Act did not apply to testing facilities and that Plaintiff failed to establish that ProLab committed gross negligence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit found that a rational jury could conclude that ProLab was aware that Leisure Village previously disregarded the limits of its contract by requesting ProLab to perform an unauthorized employee drug screen, and also was aware that Leisure Village disregarded the collection procedures for forensic drug testing outlined in the Testing Act. The Court found that ProLab was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the question of causation because the foreseeability of any intervening causes was a question of fact for a jury to resolve. Because the district court resolved this claim on the causation element, which involved disputed issues of fact, summary judgment was improper. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of ProLab on the Testing Act claim, but reversed the district court's judgment on the gross negligence claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Okmulgee Inn Venture, LLC (Okmulgee) leased space to a nightclub-bar and was a named insured on a liquor liability insurance policy. Okmulgee’s insurer, Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company (Mt. Vernon), assumed a duty to defend Okmulgee against suits seeking damages for injuries covered by the policy. In 2006, three bar patrons sustained gunshot wounds during a fight at the nightclub and sued Okmulgee, alleging, among other things, that Okmulgee failed to ensure the safety of the bar’s patrons, properly train the bar's staff, or investigate the bar’s operator. The only specific allegations pertaining to alcohol were that two of the three victims were under-age but were admitted to the bar and served alcohol. Mt. Vernon refused to defend Okmulgee in these suits. Mt. Vernon asserted there was no coverage under the policy, and thus no duty to defend or indemnify, because the allegations did not indicate the injuries were caused by the selling, serving, or furnishing of alcoholic beverages. Mt. Vernon then initiated this declaratory judgment action to determine its obligations. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of Mt. Vernon. Okmulgee insisted Mt. Vernon owed it a duty to defend because the facts showed that coverage was provided by the policy. Because the victims had yet to establish Okmulgee’s liability for any claims, the Tenth Circuit concluded after its review that the question of Mt. Vernon’s duty of indemnification was not ripe for adjudication. Mt. Vernon is obligated to defend its insured, and Okmulgee was entitled to summary judgment on the duty-of-defense issue.

Plaintiff Joseph Zbegner appealed a district court order dismissing without prejudice his claims against Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Co. (Allied) as not ripe for adjudication. Plaintiff was in an automobile accident in Boulder, Colorado in 2007. At that time he had an automobile insurance policy with Allied, which included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. In his complaint against Allied, Plaintiff alleged that he suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident and sustained damages exceeding $150,000. He claimed the driver of the other car was the person at fault in the accident, but was underinsured. Allstate paid Plaintiff $351.74 for property damage and offered him $2,145.00 to settle his injury claim. Plaintiff did not accept Allstate’s offer and did not resolve his claim against the driver. After Allied declined his claim, Plaintiff filed this action. Allied moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claim, asserting it could not know the amount due Plaintiff for UIM benefits until he had resolved his claim against Allstate, the driver's insurer. Because his claims were contingent on a future event, Allied contended they were not ripe for adjudication. The district court granted Allied’s motion, and dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff contended the district court misconstrued Colorado law in its ripeness analysis. After careful review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court was correct in its analysis of Colorado law, and that Plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe for review.

Plaintiffs Osler and Georgia Childress appealed a district court's order that dismissed their 42 U.S.C 1983 medical-indifference case against Defendant Robert Harms. In 2006, Mr. Childress was staying at a hotel in Midvale, Utah when a motel clerk saw him staggering around his room and running into things. She called police and reported that an intoxicated guest was causing a commotion. Police arrived on the scene and arrested him. Upon Mr. Childress's arrival at the jail, nurses Robert Harms and Joel Smith examined him while he was handcuffed to a gurney. Mr. Childress denied drinking and answered questions about his military duties without difficulty, although his speech was slightly slurred. Authorities would later learn that Mr. Childress has suffered a cerebellar stroke while in custody which was originally dismissed as intoxication. The district court determined that Nurse Harms merely misdiagnosed Mr. Childress and dismissed his claims by summary judgment. On appeal, Mr. Childress argued that the district court "confuse[d] knowledge of harm with knowledge of the risk of harm." The Tenth Circuit concluded that Mr. Childress failed to establish the subjective component of "deliberate indifference," and as such, summary judgment was appropriately entered on his claim.