Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CTFC) and the Oklahoma Department of Securities brought suit against multiple corporate defendants (including Prestige Ventures Corporation) and several individuals, Kenneth Lee and his wife and two sons, Simon Yang. The Lees and Mr. Yang appealed pro se a district court's order entered in favor of CTFC. In their complaint, the CTFC alleged that defendants operated a Ponzi scheme that bilked at least 140 investors out of millions of dollars, in violation of a number of provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Oklahoma Uniform Securities Act of 2004. Plaintiffs also alleged that millions of dollars were funneled to Defendants from Prestige by Mr. Lee, in cash and in the form of houses, cars, and boats. The court authorized a receiver to take possession of and sell the houses and boats. further, the court entered a broad array of permanent injunctive orders prohibiting defendants from further dealings in commodity futures and transacting investment-related business in Oklahoma. The court further ordered Defendants to pay over $5 million in restitution and a number of penalties, and ordered Defendants to disgorge large sums of cash. Each of the Lees filed a substantively identical motion for reconsideration of the Order. Having considered these issues and having reviewed the briefs, the record,and the applicable law in light of the applicable review standards, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s order of summary judgment and its Order.

Plaintiff John Ensey was employed by both Defendant Ozzie’s Pipeline Padder, Inc. (Ozzie’s) and Rockford Corporation when he was severely injured. He sued Ozzie’s but was denied relief on the ground that Ozzie’s was protected by the exclusive-remedy provision of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiff appealed, contending that Ozzie’s could not invoke the exclusivity provision because it failed to show that it contributed to paying for the workers’ compensation policy obtained by co-employer Rockford. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under New Mexico law Ozzie’s was protected by the exclusivity provision because its contract with Rockford required Rockford to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff failed to produce evidence to overcome the inference that Ozzie’s therefore contributed to paying the insurance premium. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment that denied him relief.

This appeal stemmed from an explosion that severely injured Robbie Griffin at a worksite in Stephens County, Oklahoma. At the time of the explosion, Mr. Griffin was working as an independent contractor for S&W Transports, Inc. Through a settlement agreement, S&W agreed to pay Mr. Griffin for his injuries. The issue before the Court was which of S&W’s insurers had a duty provide coverage for that payment. Mid-Continent Casualty Company covered S&W under a general commercial insurance policy. Union Insurance Company covered S&W under a commercial umbrella insurance policy. Mid-Continent and Union agreed that if Mr. Griffin caused, in whole or in part, his injuries, Mid-Continent must provide coverage. If not, Union provided coverage. Both companies moved for summary judgment in the district court. The court held that Mr. Griffin caused his injuries under Oklahoma insurance law and granted summary judgment for Union. Mid-Continent appealed. Because, after its review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that Mr. Griffin caused, at least in part, his injuries, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Union.

Pro se Petitioner Katherine Slocum appealed the district court's dismissal with prejudice her claims against Corporate Express U.S., Inc., Corporate Express Office Products, Inc., (Corporate Express), Cox Communications Central II, Inc., Cox Oklahoma Telcom, LLC, Coxcom, Inc., (Cox), Journal Broadcast Group, Inc., and Journal Broadcast Group of Kansas, Inc., (Journal Broadcast). Petitioner's suit revolved around allegations that Defendants engaged in illegal surveillance, harassment and discrimination. The complaint, which sought $40 million in actual damages and $20 million in punitive damages, also asserted claims of (among other things) trespass, computer crime, slander, aggravated assault, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, insurance fraud, contributory negligence, and wrongful termination. The district court concluded that Petitioner's allegations failed to survive motions to dismiss. On appeal in a 63-page brief, Petitioner mainly re-alleged the claims made at the district court and contends that they were improperly dismissed, in addition to making other procedural and substantive arguments. The Tenth Circuit reviewed other contentions raised by Petitioner in this appeal and found them to be without merit. Some of these arguments, along with new factual assertions, were first made in her reply brief, which the Court declined to consider. Accordingly the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal.

Plaintiff Steven Lucas filed suit against Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston (Liberty Life), asserting that the company violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) when it denied his claim for long term disability benefits. Finding that the denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, the district court entered judgment in favor of Liberty Life. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision. Plaintiff was an employee of the Coca-Cola Company. Liberty Life both administered and insured Coca-Cola's long-term disability benefits plan. Under the plan, it has discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury requiring spinal surgery and, after a short period back on the job, stopped working. He filed a claim for long-term disability benefits in August 2005. In September 2007, Liberty Life terminated Plaintiff's benefits after determining that he was not eligible for continued benefits under the "any occupation" provision: while he might not be capable of performing his own occupation, he was capable of performing some occupation comparable to his former position. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with Liberty Life, but the company upheld the denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Liberty Life's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and that Plaintiff failed to show that it was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

Payne County Jail Administrator Brandon Myers appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for summary judgment that asked for qualified immunity. While held as a pretrial detainee at the Payne County Jail, Plaintiff John David Palmer suffered from an infection of the flesh-eating methicillin-resistent staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The jail's medical transport officer took Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Hill who did not diagnose Plaintiff as having MRSA, but drained the boils Plaintiff had developed, administered an injection of an antibiotic, and prescribed two more antibiotics for oral use at the jail. Dr. Hill advised that Plaintiff should return in two days for a follow-up visit, but warned that if Plaintiff developed a fever, he should be taken to the hospital. Ultimately, Plaintiff developed a fever, his condition worsened, and he alleged in his complaint against prison officials that their inattention or delay in taking him to the hospital caused him tremendous suffering and caused him to accumulate $24,000 in medical bills. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Mr. Myers qualified immunity.

The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act provides that individuals adjudged to be sexually violent predators due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder shall be committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large. Appellant Timothy Burch was a sexually violent predator committed to the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) at Larned State Hospital. He and other Larned residents initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to challenge the adequacy of the SPTP provided at Larned. The other residents voluntarily dismissed their claims, but Appellant filed an amended complaint, insisting the SPTP is inadequate to treat his condition and provide a realistic opportunity for his release. In addition, Appellant alleged that Defendants improperly punished him by, among other things, interfering with his educational endeavors, revoking his work privileges, and reducing his treatment classification level through manipulation of his treatment progress scores. In a fifty-two page opinion, the court analyzed Appellant's allegations, distilled his claims, and concluded he was not entitled to relief. As is relevant to this appeal, the court determined that most of Appellant's claims failed to adequately allege Defendants' personal participation in the claimed misconduct. As for the rest of his claims, the court discussed the unique principles and standards governing the KSVPA and concluded that Appellant failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Regarding the claims of inadequate treatment, the court ruled that Appellant enjoyed no substantive due process right to treatment culminating in his release. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's "thorough and well-reasoned order. The court accurately analyzed Mr. Burch's claims and correctly determined that he was not entitled to relief."

Plaintiff-Appellant Christie Helm appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Kansas (the State) on her claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Helm sued the State after she was allegedly sexually harassed over a period of almost ten years by Judge Frederick Stewart, a State district judge for whom Helm served as an administrative assistant. The district court determined that the State was entitled to summary judgment because Helm fell within the "personal staff" exemption to Title VII’s definition of "employee" and thus did not qualify for the protections afforded by the statute. Alternatively, the court ruled that summary judgment for the State was proper on the basis of the "Faragher/Ellerth" affirmative defense to employer liability for a supervisor’s sexual harassment of a subordinate. In September 1998, Helm was hired to fill an administrative-assistant position. Judge Stewart began sexually harassing Helm shortly after she was hired. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit held that the "Faragher/Ellerth" defense precluded vicarious liability against the State of Kansas for Judge Stewart’s alleged actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court without reaching the question whether the "personal staff" exemption removed Helm from the purview of Title VII.

Plaintiffs Russell and Jennifer Johnson blamed Liberty Mutual for failing to hold onto a pair of tail lights that they said would have helped them win a personal injury lawsuit they wanted to bring. Plaintiffs never asked Liberty Mutual to keep the tail lights, never mentioned their intent to sue, and allowed years to pass without a word. In their case against Liberty Mutual, they faulted the company for failing "to divine their hidden (and perhaps not yet formed) intentions." Upon review of the record by the Tenth Circuit, the Court concluded that because Plaintiffs could not identify a statutory or contractual basis for their claim, "they ask[ed the Tenth Circuit] to create one for them in the common law of tort." But the Court held the common law doesn’t require such "uncommon foresight," and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss their case.

Shortly after Plaintiff Mark Rimbert's father began taking Prozac, he killed his wife and himself. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Defendant Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Prozac. Defendant moved for summary judgment on various grounds and to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's sole expert witness on the question of causation. The motions were denied by the district judge initially assigned the case. Once the case was reassigned, Defendant moved for reconsideration. The second district judge granted Defendant's motion to exclude Plaintiff's expert witness. The court then entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that without the expert's testimony, Plaintiff had no case. Plaintiff brought this appeal to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of his expert. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order excluding the testimony, but reversed the order granting summary judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.