Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Richard and Susan Queen sued Defendant TA Operating, LLC for an injury Mr. Queen sustained when he slipped and fell in a parking lot operated by TA. During the court of the proceedings, the Queens filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, but did not disclose this case in its bankruptcy pleadings. TA learned of the omission and brought it to the attention of the bankruptcy trustee. The Queens amended their bankruptcy petition, providing an estimate of the value of its litigation with TA for the slip and fall. The Queens were ultimately granted a no-asset discharge in bankruptcy. TA then moved the district court to dismiss on the grounds of judicial estoppel because the Queens did not disclose the lawsuit in their bankruptcy proceedings. The district court granted TA summary judgment, and the Queens appealed, arguing the district court erred in applying judicial estoppel. Because the Queens adopted an inconsistent position that was accepted by the bankruptcy court, and because the Queens would receive an unfair advantage if not estopped from pursuing the district court action, the Tenth Circuit concluded it was not an abuse of discretion to grant TA summary judgment. View "Queen, et al v. TA Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized a new tort called "malicious abuse of process," which subsumed causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Nanodetex Corporation and two of its principals (the Insureds) were successfully sued for malicious abuse of process. They then sought indemnification from Carolina CasualtyInsurance Company, which covered the Insureds under a management liability policy (the Carolina Policy). Carolina denied the claim, relying on an exclusion in the policy for losses arising from claims for "malicious prosecution." It sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the damages arising from the malicious-abuse-of-process judgment. On Carolina's motion for summary judgment, the district court agreed with Carolina and also rejected the Insureds' counterclaims. The Insureds appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that the term "malicious prosecution" in the exclusion does not encompass all claims of malicious abuse of process, but only claims whose elements are essentially those of the common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution. Because the judgment against the Insureds in the tort case was affirmed on appeal on a claim that was not substantially the same as common-law malicious prosecution, the exclusion in the Carolina Policy did not apply. View "Carolina Casualty Insurance v. Nanodetex Corporation, et al" on Justia Law

In a social security disability or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) must evaluate the effect of a claimant's mental impairments on her ability to work using a "special technique" prescribed by the Commissioner's regulations. At the second step of a five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the mental impairment is "severe" or "not severe." If "not," then the ALJ must determine and discuss them as part of his residual functional capacity (RFC) analysis at step four. A question that is frequently encountered in social security disability appeals cases is how much further discussion of a non-severe impairment is required at step four? The Tenth Circuit found that in assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments; the Commissioner's procedures do not permit the ALJ to simply rely on his finding of non-severity as a substitute for a proper RFC analysis. In this case, the ALJ found that Petitioner's alleged mental impairments were medically determinable but non-severe. He then used language suggesting he had excluded them from consideration as part of his RFC assessment, based on his determination of non-severity. Under the regulations, however, a finding of non-severity alone would not support a decision to prepare an RFC assessment omitting any mental restriction. The ALJ's specific conclusions he reached in this portion of his analysis were unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's affirmance of the ALJ's decision and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings at step four. View "Wells v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carmen Talavera suffered a stroke while visiting a store, incurring permanent disabilities that she attributed to the medical malpractice of personnel at the Southwest Medical Center (SWMC). Plaintiff brought claims against a number of the medical personnel defendants alleging that they should have diagnosed and immediately treated her stroke symptoms with blood-clotting therapy or proceeded with early surgical intervention to prevent damage caused by swelling in her brain. The district court granted summary judgment finding Plaintiff failed to demonstrate their negligence caused her injuries. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err. Plaintiff failed to: establish a dispute of fact that she would have qualified for blood-clotting therapy, or show that any doctor owed her a duty of care when this therapy was still a viable treatment option. View "Talavera v. Wiley, et al" on Justia Law

During a seventy-two-hour involuntary mental health hold, Ian Wittner was injected with Haldol. He died following the injection. His parents sued defendants the medical center and the treating doctor under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and the parents appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that defendants were not state actors for the purposes of section 1983, and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment. The Court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, affirmed the denial of the parents' Rule 59(e) motion, and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. View "Wittner, et al v. Banner Health, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Shannon Cavanaugh suffered a serious head injury after she was tasered by a Woods Cross City police officer. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found for the City and the officer who tasered her. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff argued the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude certain testimony from the officer concerning his beliefs prior to using the taser; (2) in refusing to grant Plaintiff a new trial due to insufficient evidence she was an immediate threat; (2) in refusing to instruct the jury on what constitutes "resisting arrest;" and (4) refusing to submit Plaintiff's excessive force question to the jury. Rejecting all of Plaintiff's ground for appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court. View "Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, et al" on Justia Law

Glenn Coyne, a Grand Junction Police Department (GJPD) officer, answered Plaintiff Misti Lee Schneider 's 911 call about an altercation with her teenage son and, during a visit to her home late the next night, raped her. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coyne was arrested and fired, and a few days later committed suicide. Plaintiff sued the GJPD under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. She alleged that inadequate hiring and training of Officer Coyne, inadequate investigation of a prior sexual assault complaint against him, and inadequate discipline and supervision of him caused her to be raped. In district court, the defendants did not contest Plaintiff's allegations about Officer Coyne's conduct. They moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Officer Coyne did not act under color of state law and that Plaintiff could not prove that they caused the rape or were deliberately indifferent to the risk that it would happen. The district court denied summary judgment on the first ground, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Coyne acted under color of state law. It granted summary judgment on the second ground, concluding that Plaintiff could not prove essential facts to establish 1983 liability. Plaintiff appealed that ruling; defendants cross-appealed the color of state law ruling. "The events alleged in this case are tragic, and Officer Coyne's alleged conduct was a terrible crime. The state cannot prosecute Officer Coyne because he is dead, and Ms. Schneider is left with suing his supervisors and employer. . . . to hold [defendants] liable for Officer Coyne's actions, she faces stringent proof requirements under 1983 law, proof she is unable to muster." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Court dismissed defendants' cross-appeal as moot. View "Schneider v. City of Grand Junction" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Squires filed an action against Defendant Breckenridge Outdoor Education Center asserting claims for negligence and gross negligence following a ski accident in which she was injured. The magistrate judge granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that Plaintiff's mother, Sara Squires, had validly released any claim for negligence against Defendant by signing an acknowledgment of risk and release of liability. Plaintiff appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate because the Release was unenforceable for three reasons: (1) the Release was as an invalid exculpatory agreement; (2) Mrs. Squires's decision to sign the Release was not voluntary and informed, as required by Colorado Revised Statute Section 13-22-107; and (3) to the extent the Release was otherwise enforceable, it was voidable because it was procured through fraud. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to grant partial summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Squires v. Breckenridge Outdoor Educ Cntr" on Justia Law

Richard Bensinger produced and screened a film about Spacecon Specialty Contractors, LLC. Claiming the film conveyed several defamatory statements, Spacecon filed suit against Bensinger in federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction, and asserting a state-law claim for defamation per se. The district court granted Bensinger's motion for summary judgment, concluding the messages conveyed by the film involved matters of public concern and Spacecon did not show Bensinger published the film with actual malice. Finding no abuse of the district court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Spacecon Specialty Contractors v. Bensinger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Glen Llewellyn filed this action asserting a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim, a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, and a state law outrageous conduct claim against Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC and Nomura Credit and Capital, Inc. (collectively, the Ocwen Defendants) based on their alleged credit reporting inaccuracies, and asserting an FDCPA and an outrageous conduct claim against Castle Meinhold & Stawiarski, LLC in connection with foreclosure actions CMS took against Plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants on each of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate on his FCRA and FDCPA claims. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit reversed the portion of the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Ocwen Defendants on Plaintiff's FCRA claim based on his alleged emotional damages and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court's order was otherwise affirmed. View "Llewellyn v. Allstate Home Loans" on Justia Law