Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mid-Continent Casualty Company brought a declaratory judgment action to settle an issue with its commercial commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued to Pennant Service Company. In 2001, True Oil Company, an owner and operator of oil and gas wells, entered into a master service contract (MSC) with Pennant for work on a well in Wyoming. The MSC included a provision whereby Pennant agreed to indemnify True Oil resulting from either Pennant or True Oil's negligence. In July 2001, Christopher Van Norman, a Pennant employee, was injured in an accident at True Oil's well. Van Norman sued True Oil in Wyoming state court for negligence. In accordance with the MSC's indemnity provision, counsel for True Oil wrote to Pennant requesting indemnification for its defense costs, attorney fees, and any award that Van Norman might recover against it. Mid-Continent refused to defend or indemnify True Oil based on Wyoming's Anti-Indemnity Statute, which invalidates agreements related to oil or gas wells that "indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages for . . . bodily injury to persons." In May 2002, True Oil brought a federal action against Mid-Continent for declaratory relief, breach of contract (CGL policy), and other related claims. In February 2005, the district court granted Mid-Continent summary judgment, determining that the MSC's indemnity provision, when invoked with respect to claims of the indemnitee's own negligence was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. The court held that Mid-Continent was not required to defend or indemnify True Oil in the underlying suit as it then existed because "where an indemnification provision in a MSC is void and unenforceable, the insurer never actually assumed any of the indemnitee's liabilities under the policy." The district court granted summary judgment to True Oil, determining Mid-Continent breached its duty to defend and indemnify True Oil. As damages, the court awarded True Oil the amount it paid to settle the underlying suit and the attorney fees and costs incurred in defending itself. Mid-Continent appealed the district court's judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mid-Continent v. True Oil Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Richard Salzer received medical care at an SSM Healthcare of Oklahoma (SSM) facility for injuries he sustained in an accident. At the time of his treatment, he had a health insurance plan (the "Plan"). Salzer entered into a contract with SSM to receive its services (the "Hospital Services Agreement"), under which he "authorized disclosure of [his] medical information for billing purposes and authorized [his] health insurance company to pay." SSM had an existing contract with Salzer's health insurance company (the "Provider Agreement") which required SSM to submit covered medical charges to Salzer's insurance company and accept discounted payment from the insurer. Although the Provider Agreement prohibited SSM from seeking payment for a covered charge from Salzer, SSM sought the non-discounted amount directly from him. Salzer sued SSM alleging breach of contract and other state law claims based on SSM's attempt to collect payment for medical care from Salzer instead of his health insurance company. SSM removed the case to federal district court. Salzer challenged the district court's denial of his motion to remand based on its determination that his claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Alan Christoffersen drove a truck for United Parcel Service (UPS) until he was struck and killed by an underinsured motorist. After the accident, Christoffersen's heirs sued UPS and its automobile insurer (Liberty Mutual Insurance Group), asserting claims for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits. All parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted UPS's motion on the ground that Utah's Worker's Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy. On the claim against Liberty Mutual, the court granted judgment to the heirs for $10,000. The heirs and Liberty Mutual appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Liberty Mutual did not incur liability because UPS validly rejected UIM coverage; therefore, with regard to the claim against Liberty Mutual, the Court reversed the judgment of $10,000 for the heirs and remanded the case with instructions to grant summary judgment to Liberty Mutual on the entire claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to UPS because it was not considered a "self insurer" for purposes of Utah's UIM statute. View "Christoffersen v. United Parcel Service, et al" on Justia Law

A bank purchased insurance on a commercial property mortgaged to it by a borrower. The policy prohibited an assignment "of this Policy" without the insurer's consent. After the property was damaged, the bank assigned its loss claim to the borrower. The insurer refused to pay the borrower's claim because of the nonassignment provision, and the borrower sued. The district court held that the suit was barred and awarded judgment for the insurer. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the nonassignment provision was enforceable. The Court concluded, after review of the provision in question, that the provision did not apply to the assignment of a postloss claim, so the Court did not determine the enforceability of a provision prohibiting such assignments. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "City Center West v. American Modern Home Insurance" on Justia Law

In November 2004, Dr. Ashard Yousuf sued Dr. George Cohlmia and Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists Corporation (CVSS) in Oklahoma state court for defamation, tortious interference with business relations/contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage, negligence, and breach of contract. Dr. Yousuf alleged that Dr. Cohlmia made a series of false statements to local media disparaging Dr. Yousuf's professional reputation. Dr. Cohlmia denied that the statements he made were false. CVSS held a professional liability policy with Physicians Liability Insurance Company (PLICO) and two identical general commercial liability policies with American National Property and Casualty Company (ANPAC, one for each business location), each of which covered Dr. Cohlmia as an additional insured. Dr. Cohlmia demanded that both insurers provide for his defense, pursuant to their respective policies. PLICO agreed to defend the lawsuit under a reservation of rights and requested ANPAC to share in the defense. ANPAC refused, contending its policy did not cover the alleged wrongdoing and that it owed no duty to defend. ANPAC further claimed that even if it erred in refusing to defend Dr. Cohlmia, PLICO had no right to indemnification or contribution for the defense costs it incurred. ANPAC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PLICO in a dispute regarding ANPAC's breach of its duty to defend a co-insured. PLICO cross-appealed the district court's denial of its motion for prejudgment interest. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Yousuf v. Cohlmia" on Justia Law

Appellants are five farmers who planted corn on newly broken, non-irrigated acreage in Baca County, Colorado, in the spring of 2008. Appellee Federal Crop Insurance Corporation denied federal crop insurance coverage for corn that Appellants planted, determining that coverage should have been denied because Appellants failed to follow good farming practices by planting on this newly broken land without first allowing a fallow period. After they each received an unfavorable good farming practices determination, Appellants filed suit, arguing the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying federal crop insurance coverage. Finding that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and agency's decision. View "Jagers v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp" on Justia Law

The issue before the Court in this matter concerned interpretation of an errors-and-omissions policy. The policy excluded coverage for claims "arising out of" bankruptcy or insolvency. The dispute grew from a stop-loss policy issued by United Re to a company that had hired Plaintiff-Appellee C.L. Frates as a broker. After the policy was issued, United filed for bankruptcy protection. When Frates learned of the bankruptcy, it learned that United had been sued in Ohio, and filed for bankruptcy to stall the litigation. Ultimately, Frates recommended to its client that it move the stop-loss insurance to another insurer. The client agreed. However, Frates had to reimburse the client for what it lost through higher deductibles. Frates then sued Westchester Fire Insurance Company under its errors-and-omissions policy. In cross-motions for summary judgment, Westchester contended that Frates's claim "arose out of" United's bankruptcy or insolvency. Frates contended that the claim "arose out of" United's deception. The district court agreed with Frates and granted its motion for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court. It held that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that Frates's claim arose out of United's bankruptcy or insolvency. Accordingly the Court reversed the award of summary judgment to Frates. View "CL Frates v. Westchester Fire" on Justia Law

The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC), acting as receiver of the New Frontier Bank, used proceeds from the sale of cattle belonging to a limited liability company (LLC) to pay down a loan of one of the two LLC members. According to the complaint, the FDIC had no authority to do so because the payment was contrary to the members' agreement. Ignoring the separate entity status of an LLC, the other LLC member brought suit in its own name against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for what it claimed to be the FDIC's wrongful disbursement of the proceeds. The LLC sued the government under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The district judge dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Tenth Circuit agreed dismissal was appropriate, the Appellate Court concluded dismissal should have been for lack of jurisdiction as to the member's claims and as to the LLC's claim because the United States Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. View "ECCO Plains, LLC., et al v. United States" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized a new tort called "malicious abuse of process," which subsumed causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Nanodetex Corporation and two of its principals (the Insureds) were successfully sued for malicious abuse of process. They then sought indemnification from Carolina CasualtyInsurance Company, which covered the Insureds under a management liability policy (the Carolina Policy). Carolina denied the claim, relying on an exclusion in the policy for losses arising from claims for "malicious prosecution." It sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the damages arising from the malicious-abuse-of-process judgment. On Carolina's motion for summary judgment, the district court agreed with Carolina and also rejected the Insureds' counterclaims. The Insureds appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that the term "malicious prosecution" in the exclusion does not encompass all claims of malicious abuse of process, but only claims whose elements are essentially those of the common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution. Because the judgment against the Insureds in the tort case was affirmed on appeal on a claim that was not substantially the same as common-law malicious prosecution, the exclusion in the Carolina Policy did not apply. View "Carolina Casualty Insurance v. Nanodetex Corporation, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cynthia Pfeifer filed suit against Defendant-Appellee Federal Express Corporation in the District of Kansas, alleging that the company fired her in retaliation for receiving workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff filed suit fifteen months following the termination within the applicable state statute of limitations, but outside the limit of six months enumerated in her employment agreement. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract clause was reasonable and was not a violation of public policy. Because no Kansas law appeared to control the outcome of the case, the Tenth Circuit certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the ability of parties to shorten the applicable statute of limitations by contract, and if not, then was the six-month limitation unreasonable in this case? The Kansas Court responded that the contract clause in question here did violate public policy. Because of that answer, the Court did not respond to the Tenth Circuit's second question. In light of these answers, the federal district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation" on Justia Law