Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Shawron Lounds appealed a district court's order granting summary judgment to her former employer Lincare, Inc. on her claims of a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lounds began working at that office as a customer-service representative in September 2011. She is African-American and, throughout the duration of her employment with Lincare, was the Wichita office’s only African-American employee. The record reflects Lounds recounting specific discussions with her co-workers and direct supervisors that Lounds alleged were racially and culturally insensitive, to the extent that she felt "bombarded" by them. Lounds notified her human resources department. Twenty days after she sent notice of her grievances to HR, she was disciplined for "excessive absenteeism." Lounds believed the discipline was in retaliation for her complaints regarding her co-workers. She would ultimately be fired a little over a year after she was hired. Lincare cited absenteeism as its grounds for termination. After the close of discovery and a full round of briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincare. The court first determined that no reasonable jury could have found the alleged race-based harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim under section 1981. It then opined, concerning the retaliation claim that “the alleged retaliatory actions against [Ms. Lounds] either were not ‘materially adverse’ or were not caused by [her] protected activity.” The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, finding Lounds carried her burden on summary judgment to create a jury question relating to whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe. Further, the Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the hostile work environment claim. The Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the retaliation issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lounds v. Lincare" on Justia Law

Plaintiff German Wilmer Saenz Mencia (Saenz), a Peruvian citizen, came to Utah to work for Phillip, Chance, Dustin and Preston Allreds’ sheep ranch. His work was authorized by an H-2A sheepherding visa, and he was paid the minimum wage for H-2A sheepherders: $750 per month plus food and lodging. He filed suit against the Allreds because he claimed this pay was inadequate because the work he performed did not qualify as sheepherding. Instead he argued he was entitled to the hourly wage for H-2A ranch hands, which he sought to recover in contract and quantum meruit. Additionally, he argued the work he performed did not qualify for the “range production of livestock” exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) minimum wage, and therefore asserted a minimum wage claim against the Allreds. The district court rejected these claims, denied Saenz’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Allreds. As grounds for its decision, the district court concluded Saenz’s claims were estopped because he did not object to his non-sheepherding work while the Allreds could have done something about it. Further, the court found that more than half of Saenz’s work qualified as “range production of livestock,” and Saenz was accordingly exempt from the FLSA minimum wage and the H-2A wage for ranch hands. Saenz appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to Saenz and the grant of summary judgment to the Allreds. "[N]either the FLSA exemption nor the Special Procedures are satisfied simply because most of an employee’s duties fall within a sheepherder’s job description. To assume they are, and to rule Mr. Saenz a sheepherder on that basis, is to misapply the relevant provisions in at least three ways. […] under the undisputed facts, Mr. Saenz spent a large majority of his time working away from the range, supervised by superiors who could have recorded his hours, performing duties that were often incidental to sheepherding but were not sheepherding themselves. He was a ranch hand, not a sheepherder, and the FLSA exemption and H-2A Special Procedures do not apply." Further, the Court concluded the Allreds were both actually and on constructive notice of Saenz's work conditions, and as such, concluded their grounds for affirming their summary judgment motion failed. View "Saenz Mencia v. Allred" on Justia Law

Blue Mountain Energy appealed a Benefits Review Board decision affirming an award of black lung benefits to Terry Gunderson. An administrative law judge (ALJ) originally denied benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), and Gunderson appealed to the Board and then to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit remanded for further proceedings because the ALJ did not sufficiently explain the basis for the denial. The ALJ again denied benefits, and the Board vacated and remanded the ALJ’s decision because it did not comply with the Tenth Circuit’s remand. On the second remand, the ALJ awarded benefits, and the Board affirmed. Blue Mountain petitions for review, arguing that the ALJ violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Specifically, Blue Mountain contended the ALJ gave the preamble to the regulations redefining compensable pneumoconiosis in 20 C.F.R. 718.201 the force and effect of law, even though the preamble had not been subject to APA notice and comment. Blue Mountain also contended its rights under the APA were violated when the ALJ refused to reopen the proceedings to allow it to submit evidence challenging the medical literature cited in the preamble. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error as Blue Mountain argued, and affirmed. View "Blue Mountain Energy v. Director OWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Weinman was the Chapter 7 Trustee for Adam Aircraft Industries (“AAI”). Defendant Joseph Walker was an officer of AAI and served as its president and as a member of its Board of Directors. Throughout his employment, Walker had neither a written employment contract nor a severance agreement with AAI. In February 2007, the Board decided it wanted to replace Walker as both president and as a board member. Since AAI did not want Walker’s termination to disrupt its ongoing negotiations for debt financing, AAI suggested that Walker could voluntarily “resign” in lieu of termination and could also continue to support the company publicly. Subsequently, Walker agreed, and the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) outlining the terms of Walker’s separation, and they also embodied these terms in two Separation Agreements and Releases. About a year after terminating Walker, AAI declared bankruptcy. It then sued in bankruptcy court to avoid further transfers to Walker, to recover some transfers previously made to Walker, and to disallow Walker’s claim on AAI’s bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court denied AAI’s claims. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirmed this ruling in its entirety. AAI appealed part of the ruling, arguing that its obligations and transfers to Walker were avoidable under the Code on two alternative bases. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. View "Weinman v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Karry Thomas worked for Defendant-Appellee Berry Plastics Corporation from 2003 to 2010. Over the course of Thomas’s seven-year employment, eight different Berry supervisors initiated at least thirteen disciplinary actions against him. These actions ranged in severity from verbal coaching and written warnings to suspensions and final warnings. Thomas initially challenged his termination through Berry’s Termination Review Process, arguing that his termination was not warranted because he was not at fault for the reason given, a print-quality issue. After meeting with Thomas and reviewing his full disciplinary history, the Termination Review Panel (comprised of two independent Berry managers) affirmed the termination decision. Thomas thereafter filed suit for wrongful discharge, alleging, inter alia, that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing race discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Berry moved for summary judgment. Although Thomas initially argued his Printing Manager possessed retaliatory animus that infected his termination decision, Thomas eventually invoked the “cat’s-paw” theory of recovery, arguing that it was an intermediate supervisor who reported to the Printing Manager, who possessed the retaliatory animus that infected the termination decision. The district court ultimately granted Berry’s motion for summary judgment, and Thomas appealed. Finding that Thomas failed to meet his burden of proof, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Berry. View "Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corporation" on Justia Law

Adams 12 Five Star Schools terminated Gina Holub’s employment as an internal auditor for the School District. She brought an action against the District and two of its officials, Superintendent Chris Gdowski and Chief Financial Officer Shelley Becker. Holub raised First Amendment and state law claims, alleging defendants terminated her employment in retaliation for her attempts to uncover and report fraudulent budgeting practices. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all of Holub’s claims. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Holub argued the district court erred in concluding that when she discussed her concerns with two School District board members, she spoke as an employee rather than a citizen and thus her speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The Tenth Circuit concluded that because Holub’s responsibilities as an internal auditor for the District included discovering and reporting accounting and budgeting issues, her comments to the Board members concerning her budget findings were made pursuant to her official duties and were not protected. Furthermore, the Court found the record contained no controverted material facts to support Holub’s claim that her termination resulted from an ongoing effort to conceal her budget findings. View "Holub v. Gdowski" on Justia Law

Within a month after plaintiff-appellant Raymond Zisumbo complained to his supervisor at Ogden Regional Medical Center (ORMC) about alleged race discrimination in the workplace, ORMC investigated Zisumbo for submitting apparently fraudulent letters to his supervisor months earlier. After confirming that at least one of the letters was falsified, ORMC terminated Zisumbo’s employment. Zisumbo sued ORMC for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law. After years of litigation, procedural wrangling, and a previous appeal to the Tenth Circuit, only Zisumbo’s Title VII claims for unlawful termination remained to be tried to a jury. The jury found in favor of ORMC on Zisumbo’s discrimination claim but in favor of Zisumbo on his retaliation claim. In cross-appeals and a third parallel appeal, the parties raised numerous issues: Zisumbo challenged the district court’s decisions denying his request to amend his complaint, the granting of summary judgment to ORMC on his good faith and fair dealing claim, and denying in part his request for reinstatement, front pay, and back pay, as well as his request for attorneys’ fees. ORMC appealed the denial of its renewed, post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the denial of its request to further reduce Zisumbo’s Title VII remedies. Finding no reversible error as any party alleged, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Zisumbo v. Ogden Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Kelly Osborne applied to work as a plasma center technician (PCT) at BioLife Plasma Services. After two interviews, Osborne (who is deaf) was conditionally offered the PCT position pending final tests and paperwork. When BioLife’s human resources department received Osborne’s medical information, it determined Osborne could not safely monitor the donor area of the facility because she could not hear the alarms on the plasmapheresis machines, which audibly sound when something goes wrong or requires attention. When Osborne reported to the facility for her first day of work, Joe Elder, the manager, informed her BioLife had rescinded her offer of employment. Osborne filed a lawsuit alleging that BioLife’s revocation of her job offer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court determined Osborne failed to identify accommodations that would allow her to perform essential functions of the PCT position, and granted summary judgment to BioLife and instructed each party to bear its own costs. Both parties appealed: Osborne, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BioLife; BioLife, seeking reversal of the district court’s determination that each party should bear its own costs. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Osborne identified a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her ability to perform essential functions of the PCT position with reasonable accommodation, making summary judgment premature. BioLife’s cross-appeal for costs was deemed moot. View "Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Joseph Martinez was a participant in the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Plan, (governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)). Following some health problems, Martinez retired from plumbing in 2004 at age 56 and took advantage of the Plan’s early retirement pension. After a few years in retirement, he felt well enough to resume working, and his pension was suspended during that time according to rules that prohibit retirement benefits during disqualifying employment. When he retired again in 2009, he asked the National Pension Fund to allow him to convert the pension benefits he previously elected from an early retirement pension to a disability pension (a change that would have entitled him to higher monthly payments). The Fund denied the conversion and the district court upheld the denial. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Plan language was unambiguous and allowed Plan participants to apply for and receive only one type of pension benefit for life absent several clearly delineated exceptions, none of which applied to Martinez. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Fund’s denial of Martinez’s claim for disability benefits. View "Martinez v. Plumbers & Pipefitters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Bennett appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, defendant-appellee Windstream Communications, Inc. Windstream acquired the company that had employed Bennett for twelve years, Paetec Communications, Inc. At the time of the acquisition, Bennett was a Fiber Optic Tech III, responsible for locating fiber optic cable, repairing, splicing, and testing it, and performing routine weekly and monthly maintenance at various sites. After the acquisition, Bennett’s pay and benefits remained the same. A few months after Windstream assumed Paetec’s operations, Todd Moore became Bennett’s supervisor. Moore instituted a policy requiring all technicians, including Bennett, to check in to an assigned manned office each morning at 8 a.m. unless they had tasks to perform at other worksites. Bennett was assigned to check in at the Tulsa office, which was the closest manned office to her home in Gore, Oklahoma. Given the distance between Gore and Tulsa, Bennett was required to commute a total of almost four hours each day. A Human Resources specialist, testified that the check-in policy, though not written, was standard Windstream practice. Bennett understood that she was required to report to the Tulsa office each morning at 8 a.m., yet she often arrived at the Tulsa office more than two hours late. On a number of occasions, she did not report to the Tulsa office at all or left several hours early to drive home, rather than working until 5 p.m. as required. Bennett was disciplined for her tardiness and absences. Concurrently with the discipline, Bennett complained of chest pains and made a workers' compensation claim for "work related stress." Bennett failed to return to work following her medical leave, and she was "separated" from the company. Bennett brought several claims alleging gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), violation of the Oklahoma Antidiscrimination Act (OADA), and constructive discharge in violation of Oklahoma public policy and federal law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Bennett v. Windstream Communications" on Justia Law