Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Joyce Rock was terminated from her position as principal of a school in the Central Consolidated School District (the District) after she spoke at a public meeting in opposition to a proposal by the District’s administration to close her school. Rock brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against defendants the District’s Board of Education and Superintendent Don Levinski, alleging that they violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her for her speech. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not violate Rock’s First Amendment rights and that Levinksi was entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rock’s interest in publicly expressing her policy views did not overcome Defendants’ concern that those holding high-ranking policy positions speak publicly with a single voice on policy matters. View "Rock v. Levinski" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendant-appellant Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) argued the district court should have dismissed plaintiff-appellee Kathleen Arbogast's suit because: (1) KDOL lacks the capacity to sue and to be sued under Kansas law; and (2) even if KDOL was a proper defendant, it was immune from suit by operation of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Arbogast was employed in the Workers Compensation Division of KDOL. She suffered from asthma and, in April 2008, complained that perfumes and other strong fragrances in the workplace were impairing her ability to work. In September 2010, Arbogast was moved to a workspace in the basement of her office building in an attempt to alleviate the problem. But Arbogast continued to suffer asthma attacks when coworkers wearing fragrances would come speak with her, prompting Arbogast to make additional complaints to her supervisor. In 2011, Karin Brownlee, then-Secretary of Labor, terminated Arbogast's employment at KDOL. The Tenth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider KDOL's capacity argument, but the Court exercised jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and affirmed the district court's determination that KDOL was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Arbogast's claims. View "Arbogast v. Kansas Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Paul Levy filed suit, alleging that he was constructively discharged from the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) in retaliation for advocating for better accommodation for a disabled co-worker. He filed retaliation claims against SRS under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to SRS on both claims, concluding that SRS was entitled to sovereign immunity on Levy's ADA claim and that Levy's Rehabilitation Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Levy appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Levy v. Kansas Dept of SRS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Sabreen Gad filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Kansas State University, alleging she was discriminated against in her effort to obtain a tenure-track position. Despite the EEOC sending her a formal charge document to sign and verify, as both Title VII and EEOC regulations required, she never did so. The EEOC elected not to pursue her case; she brought a Title VII suit against KSU. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether Title VII's requirement that a claimant verify the charges against an employer was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit: if yes, then the district court correctly concluded that it lacked Article III subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint; if the verification requirement was a non-jurisdictional condition precedent to suit, it could be waived without defeating jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit concluded the verification requirement was non-jurisdictional and did not divest the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court reversed the district court's contrary decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gad v. Kansas State University" on Justia Law

Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., d.b.a. LegalShield, sued its former employee Todd Cahill, claiming Cahill had breached his contract, unlawfully misappropriated Pre-Paid’s trade secrets, and tortiously interfered with contract and business relations. Cahill removed the case from state to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, and moved to stay the district court proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) so the parties could pursue arbitration. Thereafter the district court stayed litigation pending arbitration. Cahill failed to pay his share of the arbitration fees, and the arbitrators terminated arbitration proceedings. Pre-Paid moved the district court to lift the stay and resume with litigation. The court granted the motion, adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Finding that the district court did not err in lifting the stay under 9 U.S.C. Section 3 of the FAA because the arbitration "ha[d] been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement” and Cahill was “in default in proceeding with such arbitration," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. View "Pre-Paid Legal Services v. Cahill" on Justia Law

Ricky Nixon was a Denver police officer. He was involved in two high-profile incidents in which claims of excessive force generated substantial negative publicity for the Denver Police Department: a traffic stop of Alex Landau in January 2009 and an incident outside the Denver Diner restaurant later that year. Nixon would later be fired from his position, and he sued, bringing claims against his former employer, the City & County of Denver. The district court dismissed Nixon’s First Amendment and due-process claims for failure to state a claim for relief. In this appeal, counsel for appellant Nixon told a "story of injustice" and argued against positions not adopted by the district court." But the Tenth Circuit found that "Nixon’s opening brief does almost nothing to advance his cause. The first 11 of its 18 pages are devoted to the procedural background of the case and allegations in his complaint, much of which is of no apparent relevance to the appeal. That left only seven pages of the opening brief to accomplish the essential task of showing how the district court had erred in the three rulings that underlay its dismissal of Nixon’s stigma-plus due-process claim . . .and his First Amendment retaliation claim." Finding that Nixon indeed failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Nixon v. City & County of Denver" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Sirius Computer Solutions, Inc. recruited plaintiff-appellant Diane David as a salesperson for the company's computer equipment. The Company promised that David could continue serving her existing customers after she worked for Sirius. After she agreed to work for Sirius on those terms, Sirius changed its mind and refused to allow David to conduct business with her outside clients. David sued, alleging that the Company's recruiting promises negligently misrepresented the actual terms of employment. A jury returned a verdict in David's favor, awarding her damages on David's negligent misrepresentation claim, but did not award damages for "noneconomic losses or injuries." After trial, David filed a motion under section 13-21-101 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which guaranteed prejudgment interest "[i]n all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries." Because the jury found David suffered only economic losses, the district court proceeded as if she suffered no "personal injur[y]" and denied her motion for prejudgment interest. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, David argued that her suit was brought to recover damages for a personal injury and that the district court was wrong to equate personal injuries with noneconomic losses. After review of the statute at issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "Ms. David may have a point. [. . .] In these circumstances it seems to us Ms. David’s interpretation has the better of it when it comes to taking in 'the broader context of the statute as a whole.'" The Court reversed the district court and remanded for an award of prejudgment interest. View "David v. Sirius Computer Solutions" on Justia Law

In 2012, plaintiff-appellant Sandra Ellis filed a lawsuit against her former employer, defendant-appellee J.R.'s Country Stores, Inc., bringing one claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Ellis began working as the manager of a J.R.'s store in Colorado in 2007. The Company classified her as an exempt, salaried employee and paid her $600 on a weekly basis (an amount that increased to $625 in February 2011), as well as a monthly bonus commensurate with her store's performance. While Ellis was employed in this capacity, she generally worked fifty-hour (and sometimes closer to sixty-hour) weeks, which was consistent with the terms of the Pay Plan. On April 3, 2012, Ellis received a paycheck in the amount of $593.80, instead of the $625 she customarily earned in a pay period. The Company had deducted $31.20 from that paycheck because for the work week of March 16 to March 22, 2012, Ellis reported having worked only 40.91 hours of the requisite fifty. This was the only instance during Ellis's tenure with the Company that she received less than her predetermined pay. Ellis resigned a few days later, and soon after that, she sent the Company a letter "claim[ing] that she [was] owed $42,187.50 in unpaid overtime wages." Ellis argued that she had "lost her exempt status under the [FLSA] . . . when J.R.'s made a one-time deduction from [her] pay for not working fifty hours during a workweek," which, in turn, entitled her to three years' worth of retroactive overtime pay. The district court awarded summary judgment to the Company and denied Ellis's motion for class certification as moot. Ellis timely appealed from the district court's judgment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Ellis v. J.R.'s Country Stores" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Max Seifert sued defendants Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (the Unified Government), Wyandotte County Sheriff Donald Ash, and Wyandotte County Undersheriff Larry Roland under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, and brought and state-law retaliation claims against defendants too. Plaintiff, a former reserve deputy for the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department (WCSD), alleged that defendants removed him from investigations and revoked his reserve commission because of his testimony supporting allegations by a former criminal defendant of mistreatment by federal law-enforcement officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was not legally protected speech, that defendants' actions were not unconstitutionally motivated, and that defendants would have taken the same actions regardless of his testimony. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law claims because federal law provided an adequate alternative remedy; and the Court affirmed the qualified-immunity dismissal of the 1983 claims against Sheriff Ash and Undersheriff Roland because at the time of the alleged retaliatory actions the law was not clearly established that the First Amendment protected Plaintiff's testimony. In all other respects the Court reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was constitutionally protected and a jury could have reasonably found that the explanations defendants gave for their actions were pretextual. View "Seifert v. Unified Government" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants represent a class of retirees formerly employed by Sprint-Nextel Corporation, Embarq Corporation (or a predecessor and/or subsidiary company of either Embarq or Sprint). Plaintiffs sued after Defendants altered or eliminated health and life insurance benefits for retirees. Plaintiffs asserted Defendants: (1) violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their contractual obligation to provide vested health and life insurance benefits; (2) breached their fiduciary duty by, inter alia, misrepresenting the terms of multiple welfare benefit plans; and (3) violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and applicable state laws by reducing or eliminating the same benefits. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the ADEA claims, the state-law age discrimination claims, and some of the contractual vesting claims. The district court granted Defendants’ motions in part and Plaintiffs obtained a Rule 54(b) certification. The Tenth Circuit concluded Defendants did not contractually agree to provide Plaintiffs with lifetime health or life insurance benefits and thus affirmed in part the grant of summary judgment as to the contractual vesting claims. To the extent the district court granted summary judgment against class members whose contractual vesting claims arise, in whole or in part, from summary plan descriptions (other than those identified in Defendants’ motion), the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment against those class members. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) and reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining breach of fiduciary duty claims to the extent those claims were premised on a fraud theory. Finally, because Defendants’ decision to reduce or terminate the group life insurance benefit was based on a reasonable factor other than age, their actions did not violate the ADEA, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on those claims. View "Fulghum v. Embarq Corporation" on Justia Law