Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Paul Levy filed suit, alleging that he was constructively discharged from the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) in retaliation for advocating for better accommodation for a disabled co-worker. He filed retaliation claims against SRS under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to SRS on both claims, concluding that SRS was entitled to sovereign immunity on Levy's ADA claim and that Levy's Rehabilitation Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Levy appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Levy v. Kansas Dept of SRS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Sabreen Gad filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Kansas State University, alleging she was discriminated against in her effort to obtain a tenure-track position. Despite the EEOC sending her a formal charge document to sign and verify, as both Title VII and EEOC regulations required, she never did so. The EEOC elected not to pursue her case; she brought a Title VII suit against KSU. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether Title VII's requirement that a claimant verify the charges against an employer was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit: if yes, then the district court correctly concluded that it lacked Article III subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint; if the verification requirement was a non-jurisdictional condition precedent to suit, it could be waived without defeating jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit concluded the verification requirement was non-jurisdictional and did not divest the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court reversed the district court's contrary decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gad v. Kansas State University" on Justia Law

Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., d.b.a. LegalShield, sued its former employee Todd Cahill, claiming Cahill had breached his contract, unlawfully misappropriated Pre-Paid’s trade secrets, and tortiously interfered with contract and business relations. Cahill removed the case from state to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, and moved to stay the district court proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) so the parties could pursue arbitration. Thereafter the district court stayed litigation pending arbitration. Cahill failed to pay his share of the arbitration fees, and the arbitrators terminated arbitration proceedings. Pre-Paid moved the district court to lift the stay and resume with litigation. The court granted the motion, adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Finding that the district court did not err in lifting the stay under 9 U.S.C. Section 3 of the FAA because the arbitration "ha[d] been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement” and Cahill was “in default in proceeding with such arbitration," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. View "Pre-Paid Legal Services v. Cahill" on Justia Law

Ricky Nixon was a Denver police officer. He was involved in two high-profile incidents in which claims of excessive force generated substantial negative publicity for the Denver Police Department: a traffic stop of Alex Landau in January 2009 and an incident outside the Denver Diner restaurant later that year. Nixon would later be fired from his position, and he sued, bringing claims against his former employer, the City & County of Denver. The district court dismissed Nixon’s First Amendment and due-process claims for failure to state a claim for relief. In this appeal, counsel for appellant Nixon told a "story of injustice" and argued against positions not adopted by the district court." But the Tenth Circuit found that "Nixon’s opening brief does almost nothing to advance his cause. The first 11 of its 18 pages are devoted to the procedural background of the case and allegations in his complaint, much of which is of no apparent relevance to the appeal. That left only seven pages of the opening brief to accomplish the essential task of showing how the district court had erred in the three rulings that underlay its dismissal of Nixon’s stigma-plus due-process claim . . .and his First Amendment retaliation claim." Finding that Nixon indeed failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Nixon v. City & County of Denver" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Sirius Computer Solutions, Inc. recruited plaintiff-appellant Diane David as a salesperson for the company's computer equipment. The Company promised that David could continue serving her existing customers after she worked for Sirius. After she agreed to work for Sirius on those terms, Sirius changed its mind and refused to allow David to conduct business with her outside clients. David sued, alleging that the Company's recruiting promises negligently misrepresented the actual terms of employment. A jury returned a verdict in David's favor, awarding her damages on David's negligent misrepresentation claim, but did not award damages for "noneconomic losses or injuries." After trial, David filed a motion under section 13-21-101 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which guaranteed prejudgment interest "[i]n all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries." Because the jury found David suffered only economic losses, the district court proceeded as if she suffered no "personal injur[y]" and denied her motion for prejudgment interest. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, David argued that her suit was brought to recover damages for a personal injury and that the district court was wrong to equate personal injuries with noneconomic losses. After review of the statute at issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "Ms. David may have a point. [. . .] In these circumstances it seems to us Ms. David’s interpretation has the better of it when it comes to taking in 'the broader context of the statute as a whole.'" The Court reversed the district court and remanded for an award of prejudgment interest. View "David v. Sirius Computer Solutions" on Justia Law

In 2012, plaintiff-appellant Sandra Ellis filed a lawsuit against her former employer, defendant-appellee J.R.'s Country Stores, Inc., bringing one claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Ellis began working as the manager of a J.R.'s store in Colorado in 2007. The Company classified her as an exempt, salaried employee and paid her $600 on a weekly basis (an amount that increased to $625 in February 2011), as well as a monthly bonus commensurate with her store's performance. While Ellis was employed in this capacity, she generally worked fifty-hour (and sometimes closer to sixty-hour) weeks, which was consistent with the terms of the Pay Plan. On April 3, 2012, Ellis received a paycheck in the amount of $593.80, instead of the $625 she customarily earned in a pay period. The Company had deducted $31.20 from that paycheck because for the work week of March 16 to March 22, 2012, Ellis reported having worked only 40.91 hours of the requisite fifty. This was the only instance during Ellis's tenure with the Company that she received less than her predetermined pay. Ellis resigned a few days later, and soon after that, she sent the Company a letter "claim[ing] that she [was] owed $42,187.50 in unpaid overtime wages." Ellis argued that she had "lost her exempt status under the [FLSA] . . . when J.R.'s made a one-time deduction from [her] pay for not working fifty hours during a workweek," which, in turn, entitled her to three years' worth of retroactive overtime pay. The district court awarded summary judgment to the Company and denied Ellis's motion for class certification as moot. Ellis timely appealed from the district court's judgment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Ellis v. J.R.'s Country Stores" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Max Seifert sued defendants Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (the Unified Government), Wyandotte County Sheriff Donald Ash, and Wyandotte County Undersheriff Larry Roland under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, and brought and state-law retaliation claims against defendants too. Plaintiff, a former reserve deputy for the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department (WCSD), alleged that defendants removed him from investigations and revoked his reserve commission because of his testimony supporting allegations by a former criminal defendant of mistreatment by federal law-enforcement officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was not legally protected speech, that defendants' actions were not unconstitutionally motivated, and that defendants would have taken the same actions regardless of his testimony. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law claims because federal law provided an adequate alternative remedy; and the Court affirmed the qualified-immunity dismissal of the 1983 claims against Sheriff Ash and Undersheriff Roland because at the time of the alleged retaliatory actions the law was not clearly established that the First Amendment protected Plaintiff's testimony. In all other respects the Court reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was constitutionally protected and a jury could have reasonably found that the explanations defendants gave for their actions were pretextual. View "Seifert v. Unified Government" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants represent a class of retirees formerly employed by Sprint-Nextel Corporation, Embarq Corporation (or a predecessor and/or subsidiary company of either Embarq or Sprint). Plaintiffs sued after Defendants altered or eliminated health and life insurance benefits for retirees. Plaintiffs asserted Defendants: (1) violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their contractual obligation to provide vested health and life insurance benefits; (2) breached their fiduciary duty by, inter alia, misrepresenting the terms of multiple welfare benefit plans; and (3) violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and applicable state laws by reducing or eliminating the same benefits. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the ADEA claims, the state-law age discrimination claims, and some of the contractual vesting claims. The district court granted Defendants’ motions in part and Plaintiffs obtained a Rule 54(b) certification. The Tenth Circuit concluded Defendants did not contractually agree to provide Plaintiffs with lifetime health or life insurance benefits and thus affirmed in part the grant of summary judgment as to the contractual vesting claims. To the extent the district court granted summary judgment against class members whose contractual vesting claims arise, in whole or in part, from summary plan descriptions (other than those identified in Defendants’ motion), the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment against those class members. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) and reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining breach of fiduciary duty claims to the extent those claims were premised on a fraud theory. Finally, because Defendants’ decision to reduce or terminate the group life insurance benefit was based on a reasonable factor other than age, their actions did not violate the ADEA, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on those claims. View "Fulghum v. Embarq Corporation" on Justia Law

David Hawkins filed claims against his former employer, Schwan's Home Service, Inc. ("SHS"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Oklahoma law. Hawkins has described his chief responsibilities as "ordering products to be delivered by [SHS's] delivery drivers, scheduling, and loading trucks with products." According to a Mr. Hillaker, who supervised truck operations as part of his leadership duties, fleet management often included driving company trucks to service appointments or otherwise "[s]huttling trucks to salespeople" to ensure product delivery. Hillaker's observation that the facility-supervisor position involved driving was bolstered by the "Qualifications" section of SHS's facility-supervisor job description, which indicates that an "excellent driving record" was required. The job description further specified that "meet[ing] the Federal Department of Transportation eligibility requirements, including appropriate driver's license and corresponding medical certification," was a "condition of employment for this position" Hawkins suffered from several health conditions that came to a head in 2010: he was "in and out of the hospital . . . with heart problems and fainting spells and very high blood pressure." Hawkins experienced a minor stroke in June of 2010, but he resumed working soon afterward. On June 14, 2010, Hawkins emailed a human-resources manager that Hillaker wanted him "to drive trucks back and [forth] to" Enid and Woodward. Hawkins explained that these requests had taken place in May and June of 2010 just as his health issues were escalating, and that Hillaker was "telling everyone in Enid" that Hawkins was "a liability." He further suggested Hillaker had begun asking him to drive the trucks to Enid and Woodward in order to "force[ ] [him] to quit." Another co-worker offered similar testimony, maintaining that Hillaker expressed that Hillaker was "very upset about [Hawkins] being in the hospital . . . [and] wanted him gone." On June 21, 2010, Hawkins failed a routine DOT medical evaluation. The next day, SHS gave Hawkins a letter notifying him that he had been placed on a 30 day company requested unpaid leave, and that he had thirty days to obtain certification or "to find a non-DOT position." Hawkins testified that he perused job listings on SHS's public website. However, he "did not apply for any jobs." On June 23, 2010, Hawkins signed a termination form. Despite the language on the form indicating that his resignation was voluntary, Hawkins wrote on the form that the reason for his action was: "Force[d] to quit for medical reason." Before his separation from SHS, Mr. Hawkins began the process of seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The SSA denied Hawkins's claim after reconsideration. An administrative law judge determined at a 2011 hearing that Hawkins was not disabled. Hawkins filed his ADA and Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act ("OADA") claims. The district court ruled in SHS's favor on May 28, 2013, and Hawkins appealed. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's "principled analysis" of the district court record, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of SHS. View "Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law

This case grew out of Donna Meyers's employment at the Eastern Oklahoma County Technology Center. During her employment, Meyers had a disagreement with a subordinate who taught at the school. When the school superintendent learned of the situation, he instructed Meyers to consult another supervisor before taking any action against the subordinate. Four days later, Meyers violated this instruction by taking away two of the subordinate's classes. The school superintendent viewed this as insubordination and recommended Meyers be fired. Meyers then sued the school and the superintendent, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected speech and deprivation of procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Meyers appealed. The appeal raised two questions for the Tenth Circuit's review: (1) could a reasonable trier of fact conclude that school administrators retaliated against the plaintiff when she directly disobeyed instructions?; and (2) could a reasonable trier of fact infer denial of due process, in the absence of a liberty or property interest, based on inadmissible hearsay? The Court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find retaliation or denial of due process. As a result, the Court affirmed. View "Meyers v. Eastern OK County Tech Center" on Justia Law