Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellee Sirius Computer Solutions, Inc. recruited plaintiff-appellant Diane David as a salesperson for the company's computer equipment. The Company promised that David could continue serving her existing customers after she worked for Sirius. After she agreed to work for Sirius on those terms, Sirius changed its mind and refused to allow David to conduct business with her outside clients. David sued, alleging that the Company's recruiting promises negligently misrepresented the actual terms of employment. A jury returned a verdict in David's favor, awarding her damages on David's negligent misrepresentation claim, but did not award damages for "noneconomic losses or injuries." After trial, David filed a motion under section 13-21-101 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which guaranteed prejudgment interest "[i]n all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries." Because the jury found David suffered only economic losses, the district court proceeded as if she suffered no "personal injur[y]" and denied her motion for prejudgment interest. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, David argued that her suit was brought to recover damages for a personal injury and that the district court was wrong to equate personal injuries with noneconomic losses. After review of the statute at issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "Ms. David may have a point. [. . .] In these circumstances it seems to us Ms. David’s interpretation has the better of it when it comes to taking in 'the broader context of the statute as a whole.'" The Court reversed the district court and remanded for an award of prejudgment interest. View "David v. Sirius Computer Solutions" on Justia Law

In 2012, plaintiff-appellant Sandra Ellis filed a lawsuit against her former employer, defendant-appellee J.R.'s Country Stores, Inc., bringing one claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Ellis began working as the manager of a J.R.'s store in Colorado in 2007. The Company classified her as an exempt, salaried employee and paid her $600 on a weekly basis (an amount that increased to $625 in February 2011), as well as a monthly bonus commensurate with her store's performance. While Ellis was employed in this capacity, she generally worked fifty-hour (and sometimes closer to sixty-hour) weeks, which was consistent with the terms of the Pay Plan. On April 3, 2012, Ellis received a paycheck in the amount of $593.80, instead of the $625 she customarily earned in a pay period. The Company had deducted $31.20 from that paycheck because for the work week of March 16 to March 22, 2012, Ellis reported having worked only 40.91 hours of the requisite fifty. This was the only instance during Ellis's tenure with the Company that she received less than her predetermined pay. Ellis resigned a few days later, and soon after that, she sent the Company a letter "claim[ing] that she [was] owed $42,187.50 in unpaid overtime wages." Ellis argued that she had "lost her exempt status under the [FLSA] . . . when J.R.'s made a one-time deduction from [her] pay for not working fifty hours during a workweek," which, in turn, entitled her to three years' worth of retroactive overtime pay. The district court awarded summary judgment to the Company and denied Ellis's motion for class certification as moot. Ellis timely appealed from the district court's judgment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Ellis v. J.R.'s Country Stores" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Max Seifert sued defendants Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (the Unified Government), Wyandotte County Sheriff Donald Ash, and Wyandotte County Undersheriff Larry Roland under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, and brought and state-law retaliation claims against defendants too. Plaintiff, a former reserve deputy for the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department (WCSD), alleged that defendants removed him from investigations and revoked his reserve commission because of his testimony supporting allegations by a former criminal defendant of mistreatment by federal law-enforcement officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was not legally protected speech, that defendants' actions were not unconstitutionally motivated, and that defendants would have taken the same actions regardless of his testimony. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law claims because federal law provided an adequate alternative remedy; and the Court affirmed the qualified-immunity dismissal of the 1983 claims against Sheriff Ash and Undersheriff Roland because at the time of the alleged retaliatory actions the law was not clearly established that the First Amendment protected Plaintiff's testimony. In all other respects the Court reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was constitutionally protected and a jury could have reasonably found that the explanations defendants gave for their actions were pretextual. View "Seifert v. Unified Government" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants represent a class of retirees formerly employed by Sprint-Nextel Corporation, Embarq Corporation (or a predecessor and/or subsidiary company of either Embarq or Sprint). Plaintiffs sued after Defendants altered or eliminated health and life insurance benefits for retirees. Plaintiffs asserted Defendants: (1) violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their contractual obligation to provide vested health and life insurance benefits; (2) breached their fiduciary duty by, inter alia, misrepresenting the terms of multiple welfare benefit plans; and (3) violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and applicable state laws by reducing or eliminating the same benefits. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the ADEA claims, the state-law age discrimination claims, and some of the contractual vesting claims. The district court granted Defendants’ motions in part and Plaintiffs obtained a Rule 54(b) certification. The Tenth Circuit concluded Defendants did not contractually agree to provide Plaintiffs with lifetime health or life insurance benefits and thus affirmed in part the grant of summary judgment as to the contractual vesting claims. To the extent the district court granted summary judgment against class members whose contractual vesting claims arise, in whole or in part, from summary plan descriptions (other than those identified in Defendants’ motion), the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment against those class members. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) and reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining breach of fiduciary duty claims to the extent those claims were premised on a fraud theory. Finally, because Defendants’ decision to reduce or terminate the group life insurance benefit was based on a reasonable factor other than age, their actions did not violate the ADEA, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on those claims. View "Fulghum v. Embarq Corporation" on Justia Law

David Hawkins filed claims against his former employer, Schwan's Home Service, Inc. ("SHS"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Oklahoma law. Hawkins has described his chief responsibilities as "ordering products to be delivered by [SHS's] delivery drivers, scheduling, and loading trucks with products." According to a Mr. Hillaker, who supervised truck operations as part of his leadership duties, fleet management often included driving company trucks to service appointments or otherwise "[s]huttling trucks to salespeople" to ensure product delivery. Hillaker's observation that the facility-supervisor position involved driving was bolstered by the "Qualifications" section of SHS's facility-supervisor job description, which indicates that an "excellent driving record" was required. The job description further specified that "meet[ing] the Federal Department of Transportation eligibility requirements, including appropriate driver's license and corresponding medical certification," was a "condition of employment for this position" Hawkins suffered from several health conditions that came to a head in 2010: he was "in and out of the hospital . . . with heart problems and fainting spells and very high blood pressure." Hawkins experienced a minor stroke in June of 2010, but he resumed working soon afterward. On June 14, 2010, Hawkins emailed a human-resources manager that Hillaker wanted him "to drive trucks back and [forth] to" Enid and Woodward. Hawkins explained that these requests had taken place in May and June of 2010 just as his health issues were escalating, and that Hillaker was "telling everyone in Enid" that Hawkins was "a liability." He further suggested Hillaker had begun asking him to drive the trucks to Enid and Woodward in order to "force[ ] [him] to quit." Another co-worker offered similar testimony, maintaining that Hillaker expressed that Hillaker was "very upset about [Hawkins] being in the hospital . . . [and] wanted him gone." On June 21, 2010, Hawkins failed a routine DOT medical evaluation. The next day, SHS gave Hawkins a letter notifying him that he had been placed on a 30 day company requested unpaid leave, and that he had thirty days to obtain certification or "to find a non-DOT position." Hawkins testified that he perused job listings on SHS's public website. However, he "did not apply for any jobs." On June 23, 2010, Hawkins signed a termination form. Despite the language on the form indicating that his resignation was voluntary, Hawkins wrote on the form that the reason for his action was: "Force[d] to quit for medical reason." Before his separation from SHS, Mr. Hawkins began the process of seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The SSA denied Hawkins's claim after reconsideration. An administrative law judge determined at a 2011 hearing that Hawkins was not disabled. Hawkins filed his ADA and Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act ("OADA") claims. The district court ruled in SHS's favor on May 28, 2013, and Hawkins appealed. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's "principled analysis" of the district court record, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of SHS. View "Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law

This case grew out of Donna Meyers's employment at the Eastern Oklahoma County Technology Center. During her employment, Meyers had a disagreement with a subordinate who taught at the school. When the school superintendent learned of the situation, he instructed Meyers to consult another supervisor before taking any action against the subordinate. Four days later, Meyers violated this instruction by taking away two of the subordinate's classes. The school superintendent viewed this as insubordination and recommended Meyers be fired. Meyers then sued the school and the superintendent, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected speech and deprivation of procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Meyers appealed. The appeal raised two questions for the Tenth Circuit's review: (1) could a reasonable trier of fact conclude that school administrators retaliated against the plaintiff when she directly disobeyed instructions?; and (2) could a reasonable trier of fact infer denial of due process, in the absence of a liberty or property interest, based on inadmissible hearsay? The Court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find retaliation or denial of due process. As a result, the Court affirmed. View "Meyers v. Eastern OK County Tech Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathy Riser brought suit in federal district court alleging that Defendant-Appellee QEP Energy Company (QEP) discriminated against her on the basis of gender and age in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to QEP on all claims. After review of Riser's arguments on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court could not "say that QEP has 'prove[n] at least one affirmative defense so clearly that no rational jury could find to the contrary.'" The Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's EPA claim. The Court also found that Riser established a prima facie case of pay discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. The Court again reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's Title VII and ADEA pay discrimination claims. The district court dismissed Riser's discriminatory discharge claims on the grounds that she had not established a prima facie case, and that even if she had, QEP had supplied a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge that Riser did not show to be pretextual. The Tenth Circuit found that in her opening brief, Riser did not argue that she satisfied her prima facie case, but simply asserted a prima facie case existed and proceeded to argue that QEP's reasons for discharging her were pretextual. "Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived;" the district court was affirmed with regard to summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claims under Title VII and the ADEA. View "Riser v. QEP Energy" on Justia Law

In 2007, Carlos Bassatt was accused by a school district employee of masturbating in the parking lot of a Denver high school during school hours. Bassatt was terminated from his student teaching placement with School District No. 1 of the City and County of Denver for misconduct. Although the Denver District Attorney’s Office chose not to prosecute Bassatt, West’s principal terminated him from his student teaching placement with the District out of concern for student safety. Bassatt filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Bassatt later filed a lawsuit alleging retaliatory discharge in the federal district court. Bassatt died while district court proceedings were still pending, and his estate was substituted as the plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment for the District, finding that the Estate failed to show that the principal’s reason for firing Bassatt was pretextual. The Estate appealed the district court’s finding (required in a Title VII retaliation claim), arguing that there were sufficient facts on the issue of pretext to create a triable issue of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Estate of Bassatt v. School District No. 1" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Alphonso Myers was injured on the job. He received social security benefits due to his inability to work. While claiming benefits, he applied for a job as an armed guard with defendant-appellee Knight Protective Service. On his job application, plaintiff made no mention of his prior injury. Supervisors at Knight noticed that plaintiff appeared to be in pain. Plaintiff then admitted that he had undergone a series of surgeries from the prior workplace injury. Concerned that this pain might interfere with his duties as an armed guard, Knight required plaintiff to submit to a physical exam before resuming his duties as a guard. Plaintiff waited months for the exam - long enough that plaintiff considered the delay as an effective termination from his job. Plaintiff then filed suit, arguing that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his race and disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Knight, and plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Myers v. Knight Protective Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cynthia Felkins, formerly an emergency dispatcher for the City of Lakewood, alleged she suffered from a condition called avascular necrosis that qualified as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She claimed the City refused to accommodate that disability. She brought suit against the City under the Act, but the district court granted the City summary judgment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: Felkins’s claim failed because she presented no expert medical evidence that any of her major life activities have been substantially limited by avascular necrosis. View "Felkins v. City of Lakewood" on Justia Law