Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathy Riser brought suit in federal district court alleging that Defendant-Appellee QEP Energy Company (QEP) discriminated against her on the basis of gender and age in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to QEP on all claims. After review of Riser's arguments on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court could not "say that QEP has 'prove[n] at least one affirmative defense so clearly that no rational jury could find to the contrary.'" The Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's EPA claim. The Court also found that Riser established a prima facie case of pay discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. The Court again reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's Title VII and ADEA pay discrimination claims. The district court dismissed Riser's discriminatory discharge claims on the grounds that she had not established a prima facie case, and that even if she had, QEP had supplied a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge that Riser did not show to be pretextual. The Tenth Circuit found that in her opening brief, Riser did not argue that she satisfied her prima facie case, but simply asserted a prima facie case existed and proceeded to argue that QEP's reasons for discharging her were pretextual. "Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived;" the district court was affirmed with regard to summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claims under Title VII and the ADEA. View "Riser v. QEP Energy" on Justia Law

In 2007, Carlos Bassatt was accused by a school district employee of masturbating in the parking lot of a Denver high school during school hours. Bassatt was terminated from his student teaching placement with School District No. 1 of the City and County of Denver for misconduct. Although the Denver District Attorney’s Office chose not to prosecute Bassatt, West’s principal terminated him from his student teaching placement with the District out of concern for student safety. Bassatt filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Bassatt later filed a lawsuit alleging retaliatory discharge in the federal district court. Bassatt died while district court proceedings were still pending, and his estate was substituted as the plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment for the District, finding that the Estate failed to show that the principal’s reason for firing Bassatt was pretextual. The Estate appealed the district court’s finding (required in a Title VII retaliation claim), arguing that there were sufficient facts on the issue of pretext to create a triable issue of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Estate of Bassatt v. School District No. 1" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Alphonso Myers was injured on the job. He received social security benefits due to his inability to work. While claiming benefits, he applied for a job as an armed guard with defendant-appellee Knight Protective Service. On his job application, plaintiff made no mention of his prior injury. Supervisors at Knight noticed that plaintiff appeared to be in pain. Plaintiff then admitted that he had undergone a series of surgeries from the prior workplace injury. Concerned that this pain might interfere with his duties as an armed guard, Knight required plaintiff to submit to a physical exam before resuming his duties as a guard. Plaintiff waited months for the exam - long enough that plaintiff considered the delay as an effective termination from his job. Plaintiff then filed suit, arguing that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his race and disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Knight, and plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Myers v. Knight Protective Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cynthia Felkins, formerly an emergency dispatcher for the City of Lakewood, alleged she suffered from a condition called avascular necrosis that qualified as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She claimed the City refused to accommodate that disability. She brought suit against the City under the Act, but the district court granted the City summary judgment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: Felkins’s claim failed because she presented no expert medical evidence that any of her major life activities have been substantially limited by avascular necrosis. View "Felkins v. City of Lakewood" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Public Service Company of Colorado entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local #111, a union that represented some of the Company’s employees. About two years later, the Company unilaterally modified its retired workers’ healthcare benefits by increasing their copayment obligations for prescription drugs. The Union claimed that the Company had violated the collective-bargaining agreement by doing so and demanded arbitration. The Company refused to arbitrate, and the Union sued and asked the district court to stay the case and compel arbitration. When the district court denied that motion, the Union filed an interlocutory appeal. The issues this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review were: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit ha jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) whether the district court should have sent the case to arbitration. The Court concluded that appellate jurisdiction existed under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that the district court properly denied compelling arbitration because the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision was not susceptible to an interpretation that covers disputes over retired workers’ healthcare benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "IBEW Local #111 v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Mike Ward was an employee of the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. Ward once held a supervisory position; but during a department reorganization in 2005, he was demoted and given only technical duties. When the department began a second reorganization in 2008, Ward asked for a position with his old supervisory responsibilities. But those responsibilities were then being handled by another employee. Without a vacancy, Ward had to remain in his nonsupervisory job. In 2010, Ward applied for a managerial position in Provo, Utah. The application process included interviews with a panel and the person who would ultimately make the hiring decision. After interviewing with the panel and the decision-maker, however, Ward did not get the job. He blamed his employer (the Department of Interior), invoking Title VII and claiming retaliation for the refusal (1) to reinstate him in his old job and (2) to promote him to the Provo managerial position. The Tenth Circuit concluded no reasonable fact-finder could infer retaliation; thus, the Court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the Department of Interior. View "Ward v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Current and former employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (County) brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging they were paid overtime at a lower rate than required by the statute during 2010, 2011, and 2012. The district court dismissed the Employees' Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held the Employees had failed to allege their "regular rates" of pay were the Promised Rates and therefore, they had not stated a claim for unpaid overtime. The district court also concluded the Employees' argument, that "regular rates" for the purposes of the FLSA could be established by mutual agreement) failed because by continuing to work for years at the lower Actual Rates, the Employees had modified any alleged agreement concerning the Promised Rates. The Employees appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sivetts v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brett Woods and Kathleen Valdes were state employees and representatives of a class of New Mexico state and local government employees who alleged they paid for insurance coverage through payroll deductions and premiums pursuant to a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company (Standard), but did not receive the coverage for which they paid and, in some cases, were denied coverage entirely. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court against three defendants: Standard, an Oregon company that agreed to provide the subject insurance coverage; the Risk Management Division of the New Mexico General Services Department (the Division), the state agency that contracted with Standard and was responsible for administering benefits under the policy; and Standard employee Martha Quintana, who Plaintiffs allege was responsible for managing the Division’s account with Standard and for providing account management and customer service to the Division and state employees. Plaintiffs' ninety-one-paragraph complaint, stated causes of action against Standard and the Division for breach of contract and unjust enrichment; against Standard for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Unfair Practices Act violations; and against Standard and Ms. Quintana for breach of the New Mexico Trade Practices and Fraud Act. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether remand to the state court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was required under either of two CAFA provisions: the state action provision, which excludes from federal jurisdiction cases in which the primary defendants are states; or the local controversy exception, which requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction where, among other things, there is a local defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by plaintiffs and from whom plaintiffs seek significant relief. The Court concluded that neither provision provided a basis for remand, and therefore reversed the decision of the magistrate judge remanding the case to state court. But because the Tenth Circuit could not determine whether Defendants have established the amount in controversy required to confer federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the district court for the resolution of that issue. View "Woods v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Former mayoral appointee, Wayne McDonald, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Colorado state law after he was terminated from his position with the City of Denver based on a complaint by Officer Leslie Wise that he had sexually harassed her. He sued the Mayor of Denver, the Mayor’s press secretary, and the City and County of Denver for due process violations, breach of contract, and unlawful disclosure of confidential information under the Colorado Open Records Act. He sued Wise for defamation. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. McDonald was an at-will employee serving at the pleasure of the Mayor and had no property interest in his continued employment, thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections were not therefore implicated when he was terminated, and the district court was correct in dismissing this claim. The district court concluded that McDonald failed to plead facts sufficient to satisfy "Workman’s" falsity prong: "[e]ven if the Mayor only stated that Mr. McDonald was fired because of allegations of serious misconduct, his termination of Mr. McDonald due to the allegations gives the false impression that Mr. McDonald did in fact commit serious misconduct. Mr. McDonald has been unable to find employment because of the media reports of his misconduct. Given that the statements here were made publically, Mr. McDonald has sufficiently pled a deprivation of his liberty interest." The Court found that that the unemployment compensation hearing McDonald received was not an adequate substitute for the process the City owed him: McDonald was able to explain himself at the unemployment compensation hearing, that fact alone did not establish it was a name-clearing hearing. McDonald pled sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his good name and reputation without due process when the City made public the fact that he was terminated for serious misconduct. Thus, the Mayor was not entitled to qualified immunity. The City is therefore liable if the Mayor deprived McDonald of his liberty interest without due process. There was a reasonable inference from Wise’s behavior following the alleged sexual harassment that she did not believe McDonald had sexually harassed her. An inference and alleged awareness of falsity, coupled with the fact that Wise made the statement to their employer, were sufficient to provide a reasonable inference that Wise acted with reckless disregard of the consequences of her conduct. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred when it held that Wise was immune from liability at this early stage of the proceedings and that McDonald failed to state a viable claim for defamation. The Court reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case against Wise and remanded for further proceedings. View "McDonald v. Wise" on Justia Law

Lynn Becker contracted with the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (Tribe) to provide services related to the Tribe's development of its energy and mineral resources. Following a dispute concerning Becker's compensation under the contract, Becker brought breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and accounting claims against the Tribe in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. All of Becker's claims were state law claims. Nevertheless, Becker's complaint asserted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction because the case raised substantial issues of federal law. Becker appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah" on Justia Law