Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

David Hawkins filed claims against his former employer, Schwan's Home Service, Inc. ("SHS"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Oklahoma law. Hawkins has described his chief responsibilities as "ordering products to be delivered by [SHS's] delivery drivers, scheduling, and loading trucks with products." According to a Mr. Hillaker, who supervised truck operations as part of his leadership duties, fleet management often included driving company trucks to service appointments or otherwise "[s]huttling trucks to salespeople" to ensure product delivery. Hillaker's observation that the facility-supervisor position involved driving was bolstered by the "Qualifications" section of SHS's facility-supervisor job description, which indicates that an "excellent driving record" was required. The job description further specified that "meet[ing] the Federal Department of Transportation eligibility requirements, including appropriate driver's license and corresponding medical certification," was a "condition of employment for this position" Hawkins suffered from several health conditions that came to a head in 2010: he was "in and out of the hospital . . . with heart problems and fainting spells and very high blood pressure." Hawkins experienced a minor stroke in June of 2010, but he resumed working soon afterward. On June 14, 2010, Hawkins emailed a human-resources manager that Hillaker wanted him "to drive trucks back and [forth] to" Enid and Woodward. Hawkins explained that these requests had taken place in May and June of 2010 just as his health issues were escalating, and that Hillaker was "telling everyone in Enid" that Hawkins was "a liability." He further suggested Hillaker had begun asking him to drive the trucks to Enid and Woodward in order to "force[ ] [him] to quit." Another co-worker offered similar testimony, maintaining that Hillaker expressed that Hillaker was "very upset about [Hawkins] being in the hospital . . . [and] wanted him gone." On June 21, 2010, Hawkins failed a routine DOT medical evaluation. The next day, SHS gave Hawkins a letter notifying him that he had been placed on a 30 day company requested unpaid leave, and that he had thirty days to obtain certification or "to find a non-DOT position." Hawkins testified that he perused job listings on SHS's public website. However, he "did not apply for any jobs." On June 23, 2010, Hawkins signed a termination form. Despite the language on the form indicating that his resignation was voluntary, Hawkins wrote on the form that the reason for his action was: "Force[d] to quit for medical reason." Before his separation from SHS, Mr. Hawkins began the process of seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The SSA denied Hawkins's claim after reconsideration. An administrative law judge determined at a 2011 hearing that Hawkins was not disabled. Hawkins filed his ADA and Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act ("OADA") claims. The district court ruled in SHS's favor on May 28, 2013, and Hawkins appealed. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's "principled analysis" of the district court record, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of SHS. View "Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law

This case grew out of Donna Meyers's employment at the Eastern Oklahoma County Technology Center. During her employment, Meyers had a disagreement with a subordinate who taught at the school. When the school superintendent learned of the situation, he instructed Meyers to consult another supervisor before taking any action against the subordinate. Four days later, Meyers violated this instruction by taking away two of the subordinate's classes. The school superintendent viewed this as insubordination and recommended Meyers be fired. Meyers then sued the school and the superintendent, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected speech and deprivation of procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Meyers appealed. The appeal raised two questions for the Tenth Circuit's review: (1) could a reasonable trier of fact conclude that school administrators retaliated against the plaintiff when she directly disobeyed instructions?; and (2) could a reasonable trier of fact infer denial of due process, in the absence of a liberty or property interest, based on inadmissible hearsay? The Court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find retaliation or denial of due process. As a result, the Court affirmed. View "Meyers v. Eastern OK County Tech Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathy Riser brought suit in federal district court alleging that Defendant-Appellee QEP Energy Company (QEP) discriminated against her on the basis of gender and age in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to QEP on all claims. After review of Riser's arguments on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court could not "say that QEP has 'prove[n] at least one affirmative defense so clearly that no rational jury could find to the contrary.'" The Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's EPA claim. The Court also found that Riser established a prima facie case of pay discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. The Court again reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's Title VII and ADEA pay discrimination claims. The district court dismissed Riser's discriminatory discharge claims on the grounds that she had not established a prima facie case, and that even if she had, QEP had supplied a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge that Riser did not show to be pretextual. The Tenth Circuit found that in her opening brief, Riser did not argue that she satisfied her prima facie case, but simply asserted a prima facie case existed and proceeded to argue that QEP's reasons for discharging her were pretextual. "Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived;" the district court was affirmed with regard to summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claims under Title VII and the ADEA. View "Riser v. QEP Energy" on Justia Law

In 2007, Carlos Bassatt was accused by a school district employee of masturbating in the parking lot of a Denver high school during school hours. Bassatt was terminated from his student teaching placement with School District No. 1 of the City and County of Denver for misconduct. Although the Denver District Attorney’s Office chose not to prosecute Bassatt, West’s principal terminated him from his student teaching placement with the District out of concern for student safety. Bassatt filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Bassatt later filed a lawsuit alleging retaliatory discharge in the federal district court. Bassatt died while district court proceedings were still pending, and his estate was substituted as the plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment for the District, finding that the Estate failed to show that the principal’s reason for firing Bassatt was pretextual. The Estate appealed the district court’s finding (required in a Title VII retaliation claim), arguing that there were sufficient facts on the issue of pretext to create a triable issue of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Estate of Bassatt v. School District No. 1" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Alphonso Myers was injured on the job. He received social security benefits due to his inability to work. While claiming benefits, he applied for a job as an armed guard with defendant-appellee Knight Protective Service. On his job application, plaintiff made no mention of his prior injury. Supervisors at Knight noticed that plaintiff appeared to be in pain. Plaintiff then admitted that he had undergone a series of surgeries from the prior workplace injury. Concerned that this pain might interfere with his duties as an armed guard, Knight required plaintiff to submit to a physical exam before resuming his duties as a guard. Plaintiff waited months for the exam - long enough that plaintiff considered the delay as an effective termination from his job. Plaintiff then filed suit, arguing that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his race and disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Knight, and plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Myers v. Knight Protective Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cynthia Felkins, formerly an emergency dispatcher for the City of Lakewood, alleged she suffered from a condition called avascular necrosis that qualified as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She claimed the City refused to accommodate that disability. She brought suit against the City under the Act, but the district court granted the City summary judgment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: Felkins’s claim failed because she presented no expert medical evidence that any of her major life activities have been substantially limited by avascular necrosis. View "Felkins v. City of Lakewood" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Public Service Company of Colorado entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local #111, a union that represented some of the Company’s employees. About two years later, the Company unilaterally modified its retired workers’ healthcare benefits by increasing their copayment obligations for prescription drugs. The Union claimed that the Company had violated the collective-bargaining agreement by doing so and demanded arbitration. The Company refused to arbitrate, and the Union sued and asked the district court to stay the case and compel arbitration. When the district court denied that motion, the Union filed an interlocutory appeal. The issues this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review were: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit ha jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) whether the district court should have sent the case to arbitration. The Court concluded that appellate jurisdiction existed under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that the district court properly denied compelling arbitration because the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision was not susceptible to an interpretation that covers disputes over retired workers’ healthcare benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "IBEW Local #111 v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Mike Ward was an employee of the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. Ward once held a supervisory position; but during a department reorganization in 2005, he was demoted and given only technical duties. When the department began a second reorganization in 2008, Ward asked for a position with his old supervisory responsibilities. But those responsibilities were then being handled by another employee. Without a vacancy, Ward had to remain in his nonsupervisory job. In 2010, Ward applied for a managerial position in Provo, Utah. The application process included interviews with a panel and the person who would ultimately make the hiring decision. After interviewing with the panel and the decision-maker, however, Ward did not get the job. He blamed his employer (the Department of Interior), invoking Title VII and claiming retaliation for the refusal (1) to reinstate him in his old job and (2) to promote him to the Provo managerial position. The Tenth Circuit concluded no reasonable fact-finder could infer retaliation; thus, the Court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the Department of Interior. View "Ward v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Current and former employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (County) brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging they were paid overtime at a lower rate than required by the statute during 2010, 2011, and 2012. The district court dismissed the Employees' Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held the Employees had failed to allege their "regular rates" of pay were the Promised Rates and therefore, they had not stated a claim for unpaid overtime. The district court also concluded the Employees' argument, that "regular rates" for the purposes of the FLSA could be established by mutual agreement) failed because by continuing to work for years at the lower Actual Rates, the Employees had modified any alleged agreement concerning the Promised Rates. The Employees appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sivetts v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brett Woods and Kathleen Valdes were state employees and representatives of a class of New Mexico state and local government employees who alleged they paid for insurance coverage through payroll deductions and premiums pursuant to a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company (Standard), but did not receive the coverage for which they paid and, in some cases, were denied coverage entirely. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court against three defendants: Standard, an Oregon company that agreed to provide the subject insurance coverage; the Risk Management Division of the New Mexico General Services Department (the Division), the state agency that contracted with Standard and was responsible for administering benefits under the policy; and Standard employee Martha Quintana, who Plaintiffs allege was responsible for managing the Division’s account with Standard and for providing account management and customer service to the Division and state employees. Plaintiffs' ninety-one-paragraph complaint, stated causes of action against Standard and the Division for breach of contract and unjust enrichment; against Standard for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Unfair Practices Act violations; and against Standard and Ms. Quintana for breach of the New Mexico Trade Practices and Fraud Act. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether remand to the state court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was required under either of two CAFA provisions: the state action provision, which excludes from federal jurisdiction cases in which the primary defendants are states; or the local controversy exception, which requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction where, among other things, there is a local defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by plaintiffs and from whom plaintiffs seek significant relief. The Court concluded that neither provision provided a basis for remand, and therefore reversed the decision of the magistrate judge remanding the case to state court. But because the Tenth Circuit could not determine whether Defendants have established the amount in controversy required to confer federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the district court for the resolution of that issue. View "Woods v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law