Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the Public Service Company of Colorado entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local #111, a union that represented some of the Company’s employees. About two years later, the Company unilaterally modified its retired workers’ healthcare benefits by increasing their copayment obligations for prescription drugs. The Union claimed that the Company had violated the collective-bargaining agreement by doing so and demanded arbitration. The Company refused to arbitrate, and the Union sued and asked the district court to stay the case and compel arbitration. When the district court denied that motion, the Union filed an interlocutory appeal. The issues this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review were: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit ha jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) whether the district court should have sent the case to arbitration. The Court concluded that appellate jurisdiction existed under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that the district court properly denied compelling arbitration because the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision was not susceptible to an interpretation that covers disputes over retired workers’ healthcare benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "IBEW Local #111 v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Mike Ward was an employee of the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. Ward once held a supervisory position; but during a department reorganization in 2005, he was demoted and given only technical duties. When the department began a second reorganization in 2008, Ward asked for a position with his old supervisory responsibilities. But those responsibilities were then being handled by another employee. Without a vacancy, Ward had to remain in his nonsupervisory job. In 2010, Ward applied for a managerial position in Provo, Utah. The application process included interviews with a panel and the person who would ultimately make the hiring decision. After interviewing with the panel and the decision-maker, however, Ward did not get the job. He blamed his employer (the Department of Interior), invoking Title VII and claiming retaliation for the refusal (1) to reinstate him in his old job and (2) to promote him to the Provo managerial position. The Tenth Circuit concluded no reasonable fact-finder could infer retaliation; thus, the Court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the Department of Interior. View "Ward v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Current and former employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (County) brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging they were paid overtime at a lower rate than required by the statute during 2010, 2011, and 2012. The district court dismissed the Employees' Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held the Employees had failed to allege their "regular rates" of pay were the Promised Rates and therefore, they had not stated a claim for unpaid overtime. The district court also concluded the Employees' argument, that "regular rates" for the purposes of the FLSA could be established by mutual agreement) failed because by continuing to work for years at the lower Actual Rates, the Employees had modified any alleged agreement concerning the Promised Rates. The Employees appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sivetts v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brett Woods and Kathleen Valdes were state employees and representatives of a class of New Mexico state and local government employees who alleged they paid for insurance coverage through payroll deductions and premiums pursuant to a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company (Standard), but did not receive the coverage for which they paid and, in some cases, were denied coverage entirely. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court against three defendants: Standard, an Oregon company that agreed to provide the subject insurance coverage; the Risk Management Division of the New Mexico General Services Department (the Division), the state agency that contracted with Standard and was responsible for administering benefits under the policy; and Standard employee Martha Quintana, who Plaintiffs allege was responsible for managing the Division’s account with Standard and for providing account management and customer service to the Division and state employees. Plaintiffs' ninety-one-paragraph complaint, stated causes of action against Standard and the Division for breach of contract and unjust enrichment; against Standard for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Unfair Practices Act violations; and against Standard and Ms. Quintana for breach of the New Mexico Trade Practices and Fraud Act. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether remand to the state court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was required under either of two CAFA provisions: the state action provision, which excludes from federal jurisdiction cases in which the primary defendants are states; or the local controversy exception, which requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction where, among other things, there is a local defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by plaintiffs and from whom plaintiffs seek significant relief. The Court concluded that neither provision provided a basis for remand, and therefore reversed the decision of the magistrate judge remanding the case to state court. But because the Tenth Circuit could not determine whether Defendants have established the amount in controversy required to confer federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the district court for the resolution of that issue. View "Woods v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Former mayoral appointee, Wayne McDonald, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Colorado state law after he was terminated from his position with the City of Denver based on a complaint by Officer Leslie Wise that he had sexually harassed her. He sued the Mayor of Denver, the Mayor’s press secretary, and the City and County of Denver for due process violations, breach of contract, and unlawful disclosure of confidential information under the Colorado Open Records Act. He sued Wise for defamation. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. McDonald was an at-will employee serving at the pleasure of the Mayor and had no property interest in his continued employment, thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections were not therefore implicated when he was terminated, and the district court was correct in dismissing this claim. The district court concluded that McDonald failed to plead facts sufficient to satisfy "Workman’s" falsity prong: "[e]ven if the Mayor only stated that Mr. McDonald was fired because of allegations of serious misconduct, his termination of Mr. McDonald due to the allegations gives the false impression that Mr. McDonald did in fact commit serious misconduct. Mr. McDonald has been unable to find employment because of the media reports of his misconduct. Given that the statements here were made publically, Mr. McDonald has sufficiently pled a deprivation of his liberty interest." The Court found that that the unemployment compensation hearing McDonald received was not an adequate substitute for the process the City owed him: McDonald was able to explain himself at the unemployment compensation hearing, that fact alone did not establish it was a name-clearing hearing. McDonald pled sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his good name and reputation without due process when the City made public the fact that he was terminated for serious misconduct. Thus, the Mayor was not entitled to qualified immunity. The City is therefore liable if the Mayor deprived McDonald of his liberty interest without due process. There was a reasonable inference from Wise’s behavior following the alleged sexual harassment that she did not believe McDonald had sexually harassed her. An inference and alleged awareness of falsity, coupled with the fact that Wise made the statement to their employer, were sufficient to provide a reasonable inference that Wise acted with reckless disregard of the consequences of her conduct. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred when it held that Wise was immune from liability at this early stage of the proceedings and that McDonald failed to state a viable claim for defamation. The Court reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case against Wise and remanded for further proceedings. View "McDonald v. Wise" on Justia Law

Lynn Becker contracted with the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (Tribe) to provide services related to the Tribe's development of its energy and mineral resources. Following a dispute concerning Becker's compensation under the contract, Becker brought breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and accounting claims against the Tribe in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. All of Becker's claims were state law claims. Nevertheless, Becker's complaint asserted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction because the case raised substantial issues of federal law. Becker appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah" on Justia Law

Marvin Green, a former postmaster, claimed the U.S. Postal Service retaliated against him after he made employment-discrimination claims. He was investigated, threatened with criminal prosecution, and put on unpaid leave. Shortly after being put on leave, he signed a settlement agreement with the Postal Service that provided him paid leave for three and a half months, after which he could choose either to retire or to work in a position that paid much less and was about 300 miles away. Ultimately, he decided to retire. He then filed a complaint against the Postmaster General alleging five retaliatory acts in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: (1) a letter notifying him to attend an investigative interview; (2) the investigative interview; (3) a threat of criminal charges against him; (4) his constructive discharge; and (5) his placement on unpaid leave (also known as emergency placement). The district court dismissed the first three claims for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. On the two remaining claims it granted summary judgment for the Postmaster, holding that the constructive-discharge claim was untimely and that emergency placement was not a materially adverse action. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects save one: the Court agreed with Green that the emergency placement was a materially adverse action (being put on unpaid leave would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity). The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Green v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

In September 2009, Plaintiff Bridget Dalpiaz was terminated from her position as the benefits administrator for Carbon County, Utah. She sued, raising several claims against the county and various county officials, including one claim of "Violation of the [Family and Medical Leave Act] – Interference with FMLA Rights" against the county. The district court granted summary judgment to all Defendants on all claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged only the denial of her FMLA claim against Carbon County. Based on all of the evidence in the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, was sufficient to meet the county’s burden of establishing that Plaintiff would have been dismissed regardless of her request for FMLA leave. Plaintiff’s interference claim therefore failed as a matter of law. View "Dalpiaz v. Carbon County, Utah, et al" on Justia Law

Lisa Knitter worked as a "handyman" for Lewis General Contracting, Inc. (LGC) from March to October 2010. During this time, LGC's sole client was Picerne Military Housing, LLC (Picerne), now known as Corvias Military Living, LLC. Knitter performed handyman services exclusively on Picerne properties. She sued Picerne under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging: (1) she was paid lower wages than her male counterparts; (2) Picerne effectively fired her in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment and wage discrimination; and (3) after she was fired, Picerne denied her application for vendor status in retaliation for her prior complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Picerne, dismissing Knitter's Title VII action because Picerne was not her employer. The district court also dismissed her claim for retaliatory denial of vendor status because Knitter did not apply for employment with Picerne when she applied to be a vendor. Knitter appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Knitter v. Picerne Military Housing" on Justia Law

Salt Lake County employee Michael Barrett helped a colleague pursue a sexual harassment complaint against her boss. According to Barrett, his superiors began a campaign to have him discharged or demoted. After he was demoted Barrett filed suit alleging that the county violated Title VII by retaliating against him for helping a coworker vindicate her civil rights. The jury found for Barrett. At trial the county argued that it disciplined Barrett because he was a poor worker. But the evidence showed that Barrett's fourteen years working for the county were marked only by promotions and positive reviews until he helped draw attention to his colleague's plight. On appeal, the county asks the Tenth Circuit to reverse the jury's verdict, but finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment. View "Barrett v. Salt Lake County" on Justia Law