Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Bridget Smith worked for Rail Link, Inc. (Rail Link) as a freight operator in Wyoming. She was injured on the job, and subsequently sued Rail Link and its corporate parent Genessee & Wyoming, Inc. (GWI) in federal district court, asserting that the companies were liable for her injuries under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they were not subject to FELA liability for Plaintiff's injuries because FELA only applies where a defendant is the injured worker's employer and is a common carrier. Rail Link argued it was a not a common carrier, and GWI argued it was neither a common carrier nor Plaintiff's Smith's employer. The district court agreed granted summary judgment for both Defendants. Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he concept of employment under FELA is a broad one, but to show an employment relationship a plaintiff still must offer some evidence that physical conduct was or could have been controlled by an alleged employer. The record here is lacking in [that] regard, compelling a ruling in GWI's favor." View "Smith v. Rail Link, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Clarice Sanchez, a long-time secretarial employee of the United States Forest Service, suffered irreversible brain damage after falling at work. As a result of her injury, Sanchez lost the left half of her field of vision. She requested a hardship transfer to Albuquerque where she could better access ongoing medical treatment. After the Forest Service declined to accommodate her request, she brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and held that Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding her disability. On appeal, the Forest Service urged the Court to affirm summary judgment on an alternative ground. However, the Court declined, concluding that transfer accommodations for the purpose of medical treatment or therapy were not unreasonable per se. View "Sanchez v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Pennie Keyes-Zachary appealed a district court order that affirmed the Commissioner's decision denying her applications for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits. Plaintiff alleged disability based on, among other things, neck, back, shoulder, elbow, wrist, hand, and knee problems, accompanied by pain; hearing loss; urinary frequency; anger-management problems; depression; and anxiety. The ALJ upheld the denial of her application for benefits. The Appeals Council denied her request for review of the ALJ's decision, and she then appealed to the district court. The district court remanded the case to the ALJ for further consideration. After the second hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained residual functional capacity to perform light work with certain restrictions, but that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council declined jurisdiction, and the ALJ's decision was then deemed the Commissioner's final decision. On appeal Plaintiff raised two issues: (1) that the ALJ "failed to properly consider, evaluate and discuss the medical source evidence;" and (2) the ALJ "failed to perform a proper credibility determination." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the ALJ's decision and affirmed the Commission's final determination in Plaintiff's case. View "Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the Americans with Disabilities Act created two separate-but-overlapping causes of action for employment discrimination. Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Elwell worked for Defendant-Appellee University of Oklahoma for years in an administrative role. She began to suffer from a degenerative spinal disc condition which did not prevent her from performing the essential functions of her job. Nevertheless, she sought certain accommodations from her employer. She alleged that the University refused to grant those accommodations and ultimately fired her, allegedly because of her disability. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, holding that Title II did not provide a cause of action for discrimination, and that Oklahoma did not waive its immunity from suit under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[i]n this case, those traditional tools of statutory construction - including a close examination of the text together with a careful review of the larger statutory structure . . . persuade us that Congress has spoken and spoken clearly to the question of employment discrimination claims and placed them exclusively in Title I. . . . Because Title II does not contain an independent cause of action for employment discrimination and because Ms. Elwell [could not] carry her burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity that might permit her to proceed with an OADA claim, the judgment of the district court [was] affirmed." View "Elwell v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Okla." on Justia Law

Avaya Inc. ("Avaya") appealed a district court's ruling compelling arbitration of its labor dispute with the Communication Workers of America ("CWA") over the legal status of a class of Avaya employees called "backbone engineers." The union viewed the backbone engineers as non-represented "occupational" employees and legitimate objects for its organizing campaigns, while Avaya saw them as managers outside the scope of the company's labor agreements. CWA contended the parties' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") required any dispute over the status of backbone engineers to be resolved in arbitration. Avaya maintained the parties did not consent to arbitrate the status of its backbone engineers and accused CWA of trying to unilaterally enlarge the CBA to encompass disputes over company management. Having reviewed the CBA and the evidence submitted to the district court, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Avaya's position and reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration. View "CWA v. Avaya, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Catherine Robert had worked as supervisor of released adult offenders for ten years when she developed sacroiliac joint dysfunction. After a lengthy leave of absence, including a period authorized by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Petitioner remained unable to perform all of her required duties, and she was terminated. She appealed her employer's, the Brown County, Kansas Board of Commissioners, decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Petitioner's discharge did not constitute discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, retaliation in violation of the FMLA, breach of contract, or abridgment of procedural due process. View "Robert v. Board of County Commissioners, et al" on Justia Law

Robert Madrid worked for Petitioner Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) as a bill collector. "Angered by a particularly obstinate customer," and without permission, Madrid drove to the customer's home and disconnected the customer's gas service. It would later be determined that the customer was not a customer of PNM. PNM fired Madrid. Madrid responded by filing a grievance against PNM with his union, arguing that Madrid's termination violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Company. In making its argument, the union hypothesized that PNM treated Madrid more harshly than other employees guilty of similar conduct. The union sent PNM three discovery requests for documents to prove its hypothesis. Those requests became the subject of the appeal before the Tenth Circuit, as PNM refused to comply. An ALJ determined that PNM had engaged in an unfair labor practice, and ordered the Company to comply with the discovery requests. The National Labor Relations board adopted the ALJ's decision. PNM appealed the Board's order, and the Board cross-petitioned to have its order enforced. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit was unpersuaded by PNM's arguments on appeal, and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Public Service CO of NM v. NLRB" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the Boeing Company’s 2005 sale, to Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. of facilities in Wichita, Kansas, and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma. Boeing terminated the Division's entire workforce of more than 10,000. The next day, Spirit rehired 8,354 employees, who had been selected by Boeing’s managers. Although older employees predominated in the workforce both before and after the sale, a lower percentage of older workers than younger ones were rehired. The plaintiffs sued, seeking to be declared a class of about 700 former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit. The Employees alleged, among other things, that Boeing, Onex, and Spirit violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In two separate orders, the district court granted summary judgment on the Employees’ Title VII and ADA claims, and their ERISA and ADEA claims. The court denied the Employees’ motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the Employees' claims on appeal, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's judgment and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Apsley v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Lisa McBride was an accountant who worked as Respondent Peak Wellness Center’s business manager for about nine years. Peak terminated her in 2009, citing job performance and morale issues. Petitioner claimed she was terminated in retaliation for bringing various accounting improprieties to the attention of Peak’s Board of Directors. Petitioner brought several federal and state-law claims against Peak: (1) whistleblower retaliation under the federal False Claims Act (FCA); (2) violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); (3) breach of employment contract; (4) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) defamation; and (6) a federal sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. After discovery, Peak moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district court granted the motion. Petitioner appealed, arguing that significant issues of material fact remained unresolved and that her claims should have proceeded to trial. She also appealed district court’s denial of an evidentiary motion. Finding no error in the district court’s decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed its grant of summary judgment in favor of Peak. View "McBride v. Peak Wellness Center Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Frances Leon Harvey's appeal before the Tenth Circuit stemmed from a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")lawsuit that he brought against the United States government for complications arising from an injury to his hand. Petitioner claimed that government employees injured him by: (1) misdiagnosing and delaying treatment of his hand fracture; and (2) performing negligent surgery on his hand. He argued that the district court erred in holding the misdiagnosis/delay-in treatment claim to be time-barred and in granting summary judgment on the negligent surgery claim for failure to produce expert evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner argued because Navajo law was the substantive law of this case, the district court failed to follow Navajo law when it dismissed his negligent surgery claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Petitioner's motion for default judgment. Although the Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the misdiagnosis claim was time-barred, the Court concluded that Petitioner's failure to provide expert evidence doomed both his misdiagnosis and surgical malpractice claims. Finally, although the parties disagreed about whether Arizona law or Navajo law applied, the Court did not reach the issue because the outcome would have been the same under both. View "Harvey v. United States" on Justia Law