Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

"Haunted houses may be full of ghosts, goblins, and guillotines, but it’s their more prosaic features that pose the real danger." When the flashlight Tyler Hodges used in connection with taking tickets at an Oklahoma City haunted house began flickering and then died, he ventured inside the house in search of a replacement. To navigate, Mr. Hodges used the light of his cell phone. An actor complained that the light dampened the "otherworldly atmosphere" of the house, Mr. Hodges turned it off and made his way to the freight elevator, where the spare flashlights were stored. When he reached the elevator, Mr. Hodges lifted the wooden gate across the entrance and stepped in, not seeing that the elevator car was not there. Mr. Hodges sued Brewer Entertainment, the haunted house’s operator, for various torts. Brewer held two insurance polities, one with Western World Insurance Company, and the other with Markel American Insurance Company. Brewer quickly looked to them to defend the lawsuit and ultimately pay any award. For its part, Western World had excluded from its haunted house coverage “any claim arising from chutes, ladders, . . . naked hangman nooses, . . . trap doors . . . [or] electric shocks.” Because the policy did not specifically exclude "blind falls down elevator shafts," the company admitted coverage and proceeded to defend Mr. Hodges’s suit. Markel however, balked, refusing to defend or pay any claim. Western World sued to have Markel contribute to the costs of defending Mr. Hodges' suit. The district court agreed with Markel, and entered summary judgment in its favor. Upon review of the record, the Tenth Circuit found that Markel's escape clause was not enough for it to avoid contributing to defending Mr. Hodges' suit. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in Markel's favor and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Western World Ins. Company v. Markel American Ins. Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Robert Newton alleged Major John R. Teter and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne E. Lee of the Utah Air National Guard violated his due process rights when they suspended and subsequently withdrew his Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) certificate, and when they suspended his employment as an Air Traffic Control Supervisor at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the suspension of his employment. It denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the withdrawal of his ATCS certificate, holding this claim was not barred by qualified immunity or by intramilitary immunity under the "Feres" doctrine. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendants challenged the denial of qualified immunity and intramilitary immunity on Plaintiff's ATCS certificate claim. Plaintiff cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on his employment claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's ATCS certificate was not barred by the "Feres" doctrine, and that the Court had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cross-appeal. View "Newton v. Lee, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Sabourin sued the University of Utah in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, claiming, among other things, that it had violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by deciding to eliminate his position and then fire him for cause while he was on leave for childcare in 2006. The district court granted the University summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his FMLA claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: all of Plaintiff’s claims failed because the undisputed facts showed that the University’s adverse decisions were not based on Plaintiff’s taking FMLA leave. The decision to eliminate his position was made before he sought FMLA leave; and he was fired for engaging in a course of insubordination. View "Sabourin v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

San Juan Coal Company and the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 953 entered into binding arbitration to determine whether union members on a certain schedule were entitled to holdover pay. The arbitrator concluded that the union members were entitled to the extra pay, but on review, the district court overturned the arbitral award. Because the arbitrator’s interpretation was colorable, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court improperly substituted its interpretation of the agreement: "[a]n arbitrator's interpretation of an agreement, even one that is flawed or based on questionable findings of fact, is due the utmost judicial deference. It matters not that a reviewing court might offer a more cogent reading of the agreement; the arbitrator's interpretation must be upheld wholly unless it is without any textual basis." View "San Juan Coal Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 953" on Justia Law

In 2005, pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act's administrative provisions, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded lifetime benefits to Merrill Lambright and survivor benefits to his widow, Delores Ashmore. Lambright's claims arose out of his employment with Petitioner Bridger Coal Company. In 2006, a three-member panel of the U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded to the ALJ for reconsideration. In 2008, the ALJ denied benefits on both the lifetime and survivor claims. In 2009, a three-member panel of the Board reversed this decision and reinstated the 2005 award of benefits. The issue on appeal was the characterization of Ms. Ashmore's 2002 request for a modification in her survivor benefits: "it appears the director interpreted Ashmore's motion as a motion for modification based on change in conditions, but only to the extent Ashmore alleged she was entitled to additional (survivor) benefits due to Lambright's death. To the extent the order granting modification was based on a change in conditions, the ruling only implicated the claim for survivor benefits, not Lambright's original claim for lifetime benefits." On reconsideration en banc, the full five-member Board was unable to reach a disposition in which at least three permanent members concurred. As a result, the 2009 panel decision stood. Petitioner appealed, challenging the scope of the 2009 panel's authority to review the 2008 ALJ decision, the standard used in determining whether to award benefits, and the onset-date determination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the 2009 panel decision. View "Bridger Coal Company v. United States Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) appealed a judgment of the district court that declined to enforce an administrative subpoena against Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF). On appeal, the EEOC argued the district court abused its discretion because it "applied erroneous legal principles and ignored record evidence." This case arose from an ADA discrimination claim filed by Gregory Graves and Thomas Palizzi. Each alleged they were not hired as conductors or conductor trainees based on a perceived disability. The EEOC launched an investigation and issued a subpoena to BNSF. During the course of its investigation, the EEOC expanded the parameters of its investigation without notice or explanation. BNSF did not comply with the administrative subpoena, and the EEOC applied to the district court for enforcement. Finding no abuse of discretion or a misapplication of the law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court: "Nothing prevent[ed] the EEOC from investigating the charges filed by Mr. Graves and Mr. Palizzi, and then . . . expanding its search. Alternatively, nothing prevent[ed] the EEOC from aggregating the information it possesses in the form of a Commissioner's Charge. . . . But nationwide recordkeeping data is not 'relevant to' charges of individual disability discrimination filed by two men who applied for the same type of job in the same state, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion." View "EEOC v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Fedwa Khalik appealed the district court's decision that dismissed her Title VII employment discrimination case for failing to state a claim. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant United Air Lines in 1995, rising to the position as "Business Services Representative" before she was terminated in 2009. She claimed she was terminated because of her race, religion, national origin and ethnic heritage. She also brought a retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act. More than two months after Defendant filed its motion to dismiss and three weeks after the deadline to amend pleadings had passed, Plaintiff sought to amend her complaint. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend as futile and untimely and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the federal claims for failure to state a claim. The district court also exercised pendent jurisdiction and dismissed the state law discrimination and retaliation claims as similarly not plausible. Upon appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court used a "heightened" standard of proof in making its determination that she had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that "While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim." The Court found that Plaintiff's general assertions of discrimination and retaliation, "without any details whatsoever of events leading up to her termination, are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. View "Khalik v. United Air Lines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Sonja Morris appealed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings on her First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and grant of summary judgment on her claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in favor of Defendant Memorial Health System. Plaintiff worked as a registered nurse for Memorial and in 2007 joined the "Heart Team" which was performed all heart surgeries at the hospital. During her time with the Team, Plaintiff contended that the lead surgeon harassed her on multiple occasions. Despite participation in a teambuilding program, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Claim on Memorial in 2008. The hospital removed Plaintiff from the Heart Team and into a more "comfortable" work environment. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Memorial claiming her First Amendment rights were violated when she was removed from the Heart Team because she submitted her Notice of Claim. The district court granted Memorial's motion on the First Amendment claim on the ground that the notice did not contain "speech" as determined by case law. Furthermore, the court held that Plaintiff could not establish that the alleged harassment was based on her gender or pervasive enough to affect her work environment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in affirming the district court. View "Morris v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

In the first time this case came before the Tenth Circuit, the Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellant Microsoft Corporation on Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Wallace's breach-of-contract claim, but reversed and remanded her state-law tort claims of wrongful discharge and outrage. In this, the second time the case came before the Court, the issue on appeal was the district court's grant of summary judgment to Microsoft, which denied Plaintiff's motion to supplement her amended complaint and to add a wrongful death claim. Plaintiff's husband was a consultant for Microsoft when he fell and was injured on a sidewalk while walking to a company meeting. He was placed on leave for about one month. Microsoft could no longer accommodate his medical restrictions once he returned to work. Microsoft never offered Mr. Wallace alternative employment, and he was never able to provide Microsoft with a medical release allowing him to return to his previous job. After Mr. Wallace had been on medical leave for sixty weeks, Microsoft terminated his employment. Mr. Wallace filed the petition in state court that ultimately gave rise to this case. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of fact upon which she had the burden of proving Microsoft caused the torts she alleged. View "Wallace v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Maestas, Thomas May, Juanito Marquez and Jahmaal Gregory were all officers in a private security force that protects Los Alamos National Laboratory. They contended that their employer, Day & Zimmerman, LLC and SOC, LLC, (collectively, SOC) improperly classified them as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The district court found that Plaintiffs were exempt executive employees and granted summary judgment to SOC. The parties disagreed over which of Plaintiffs' job duties was "primary." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that such a dispute presented a question of fact rather than an issue of law. Furthermore, the Court held that an employee who supervises subordinates while also conducting front-line law enforcement work performs a non-managerial task. Because there remained a genuine dispute as to whether three of the Plaintiffs had this task as their primary duty, summary judgment was proper only against Plaintiff Thomas May and improper as to the others. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maestas v. Day & Zimmerman, LLC" on Justia Law