Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After developing pain in his neck and shoulders, Petitioner Gordon George was diagnosed with cancer in 2003 and underwent surgery and radiotherapy. During his recovery, he continued to experience pain spanning from his neck to his shoulder and arm. Petitioner applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits. After many and various hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that for the period June 1, 2003 through July 31, 2005, Petitioner was disabled during that period. But the ALJ further found that Petitioner's condition improved dramatically over time and that by August 1, 2005, he no longer met any disability listing. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner raised several challenges to the ALJ's determination that he suffered no legally cognizable disability after August 2005. Upon review, the Court rejected all those challenges, and affirmed for substantially the reasons given by the district court, with one exception. The Court found that the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether, after August 1, 2005, Petitioner suffered from a mental disability. In our case, by contrast, the ALJ has not made any factual findings "one way or the other" about the existence, severity, or functional limitations, if any, imposed by Petitioner's mental condition: "[i]t's entirely possible the ALJ on remand will find Mr. George's mental health issues have no impact on his ability to work." The Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Donna Saterlee appealed a district court order that affirmed the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny social security disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly rejecting her hand impairment as medically nondeterminable at step two and consequently not including it in the RFC that formed the basis of the dispositive hypothetical to the Vocational Expert; and (2) failing to perform a proper credibility analysis in determining that complaints of limitations other than, or in excess of, those later included in the RFC were not credible. The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ was "undeniably wrong" about the lack of documented medical evidence of Plaintiff's condition that gave rise to the alleged numbness, "undercutting the categorical rejection of such an impairment on this threshold basis." The Court remanded the case for an administrative decision that properly accounted for all of the evidence of record.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kelli Mike was an employee of Leisure Village Health Care Center. Leisure Village obtained a urine sample from Plaintiff and submitted it to Defendant-Appellee Professional Clinical Laboratory, Inc. (ProLab) for processing. Plaintiff's test results came back positive for marijuana. Leisure Village reported the results to the Oklahoma Board of Nursing (the Board). The Board placed Plaintiff's nursing license on probation and later revoked it. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court alleging that ProLab violated the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 sec. 551-565 (West 2011)), and committed gross negligence during the drug-testing process. The district court granted summary judgment to ProLab after concluding that the civil remedy provision in the Testing Act did not apply to testing facilities and that Plaintiff failed to establish that ProLab committed gross negligence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit found that a rational jury could conclude that ProLab was aware that Leisure Village previously disregarded the limits of its contract by requesting ProLab to perform an unauthorized employee drug screen, and also was aware that Leisure Village disregarded the collection procedures for forensic drug testing outlined in the Testing Act. The Court found that ProLab was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the question of causation because the foreseeability of any intervening causes was a question of fact for a jury to resolve. Because the district court resolved this claim on the causation element, which involved disputed issues of fact, summary judgment was improper. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of ProLab on the Testing Act claim, but reversed the district court's judgment on the gross negligence claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Mayra Carrera was a trimmer in a Tyson meat processing plant in Kansas. One day, four of her co-workers made sexual gestures toward her by "moving and shaking their hips." When Plaintiff complained, a manager immediately spoke to the co-workers. No further incidents occurred, but Plaintiff felt ostracized by employees keeping their distance. Plaintiff asked for a transfer to another plant. Despite the transfer, Plaintiff filed suit alleging a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to Tyson. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by focusing only on the gesturing incident and ignoring the fact that afterward her co-workers ostracized her. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did consider this aspect of Plaintiff's claim "correctly observing that standoffish, unfriendly, and unapproachable behavior" was insufficient to establish an objectively hostile work environment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Anita Luster, an employee of the United States Forest Service, appealed a district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture on her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff, a full-time Visitor Information Specialist (VIS) with the Forest Service, claimed that: (1) she was not selected for a Forestry Technician position because of her gender; (2) she suffered disparate work conditions because of her gender and in retaliation for her Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaint; and (3) a Forest Service attorney inappropriately disclosed her EEO complaint information in violation of the Privacy Act. The Tenth Circuit "commend[ed] the district court for its thorough and well-reasoned order granting the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment" and affirmed, finding no error in the court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff Timothy J. Smith appealed a district court order that granted summary judgment for his employer, Defendant Morton International, Inc., (Morton), on his claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court held Smith’s claim failed at the prima facie case stage for two distinct reasons: he had not shown either that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA or that Morton had discriminated against him on the basis of his alleged disability. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of his alleged disability, and affirmed on that basis without reaching the discrimination issue.

Two former employees of the Kansas Unified School District #501 filed administrative charges against the District following claims of wage discrimination. Dwight Almond, III and Kevin Weems were both offered and accepted new positions with lesser pay within the District rather than be fired from a District-wide downsizing effort. Both filed their claims in 2006, several years after the alleged pay discrimination took place. The district court held that the men had waited too long to seek administrative review, and that delay had the effect of barring their lawsuits altogether. In the pendency of the employees' appeal of the district court's dismissal, Congress enacted the "Ledbetter Act" specifically aimed at addressing "discrimination in compensation" claims in which members of a protected class receive less pay than similarly situated colleagues. The employees raised multiple claims on appeal, including a violation of the Ledbetter Act. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that because the employees in this case didn't raise an unequal pay for equal work claim, they did not benefit from the Act’s comparatively generous deadlines, so preexisting accrual rules applied. Under those rules, the employees' claims were untimely and accordingly dismissed.

Plaintiff-Appellant Cherie Lopez-Fisher claimed Defendant-Appellee Abbott Laboratories fired her because of her gender, race, color and national origin. After receiving extensive briefing and hearing oral argument in this Title VII case, a magistrate judge entered an order granting summary judgment to Abbott Labs. In her appellate brief, Plaintiff insisted that because she successfully passed a "Performance Improvement Plan" conducted by Abbott Labs, her termination a week later raised an inference of discrimination. The magistrate judge found no evidence in the record that Plaintiff passed the Plan. Furthermore, the magistrate concluded that Plaintiff did not overcome her burden of proof that Abbott Labs' proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff (poor performance) was pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit adopted the magistrate judge's ruling in affirming dismissal of Plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lawrence Harris filed a pro se complaint naming the "Tulsa 66ers" NBA Development League basketball team and two individual employees of the team as defendants. Harris sought damages from the defendants for "herresment" and "false adveretisement" due to the fact that he was not selected to play for the team after attending an open tryout in October 2010. From Plaintiff's filings, the court could not determine whether it had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court was correct in concluding it did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, and affirmed the court's ruling and dismissed Plaintiff's case.

Boston Scientific Corporation and Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corporation (Boston Scientific) filed suit to enforce a non-compete agreement against Mikelle Mabey, a former employee, and St. Jude Medical Neuromodulation Division (St. Jude), her new employer. The district court held in favor of Mabey and St. Jude, and Boston Scientific appealed. In 2009, after Mabey had worked for Boston Scientific for three years, the company asked her to sign a non-compete agreement. If she signed, she would remain eligible for a quarterly bonus that had been offered the year before. If she did not sign, Boston Scientific would reduce her bonus eligibility by $1,000 for each of the final three quarters of 2009; however, she would remain employed at-will and would continue to receive the same base salary. Mabey signed the agreement in March. As a result, she earned $3,000 more in bonus pay than if she had not signed the agreement. In May 2010, Mabey left Boston Scientific to work for its competitor, St.Jude. Boston Scientific filed suit in Utah federal district court to enforce the non-compete agreement. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the non-compete was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration because Boston Scientific "merely kept Mabey’s compensation the same" in exchange for her signing the agreement, and that "no more constituted a 'clear additional benefit' than continuing a person’s employment does in an at-will employment situation." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit was unpersuaded by Mabey's "failure of consideration" argument: in exchange for signing the non-compete, Mabey received a benefit to which, as an at-will employee, she had no legal right. This was sufficient to form a valid agreement. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.