Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Cynthia Anderson appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Cato Corporation on her claim of discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. A month or two after Cato terminated her employment, Plaintiff asked for a letter stating the reasons for her termination so that she could apply for public health benefits. A Cato supervisor wrote that Plaintiff "was terminated due to pregnancy related illnesses. [Plaintiff] needed off three weeks for bed rest required by a doctor. However, according to Cato policy a part time sales associate has to be release[d] if she/he needs off for longer than seven days unless she/he has been employed for 365 days. [Plaintiff] did not apply to the guidelines; therefore she was forced to be terminated." The supervisor's undisputed testimony was that Plaintiff "told me that she needed me to put on [the letter] it was because of her pregnancy." After Plaintiff filed suit, Cato moved for summary judgment. The district court determined that the letter was not direct evidence of discrimination. The court considered it "significant" that Plaintiff asked for the letter and told her supervisors what the letter should state as reasons for her termination. The court concluded that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case for discrimination but that the evidence did not raise a disputed issue of material fact. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the letter was indeed not direct evidence of discrimination, and agreed with the district court's reasoning that Plaintiff could make a prima facie case but that summary judgment was appropriate.

Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) appealed a jury verdict that awarded Plaintiff Keith Jones $2.5 million in actual and punitive damages based on UPS's retaliatory discharge in violation of Kansas common law. Plaintiff alleged, and the jury found, that UPS terminated Jones in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. UPS alleged on appeal that (1) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones's retaliation claim; (2) the district court erred in giving two improper jury instructions; (3) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones's claim for punitive damages; (4) the district court erred in allowing the jury to decide the amount of punitive damages; and (5) the jury's award of $2 million in punitive damages violated its federal due process rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that the evidence presented supported a reasonable inference in support of Plaintiff's retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that UPS was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The Court also concluded that the jury instructions in this case, "although not a model of clarity," were not improper and that UPS, based on the evidence presented, was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The Court ultimately concluded the district court did not err in instructing the jury to determine the proper amount of punitive damages in this case. Finally, the Court concluded that the jury's $2 million punitive damage award was excessive and violated UPS's federal due process rights. The Court reversed and remanded on this limited issue to permit Plaintiff to choose between a new trial solely to determine punitive damages or acceptance of a remittitur to be determined by the district court.

Petitioner Theresa Freeman appealed the denial of her applications for social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. Petitioner applied for benefits in June 2007, alleging she was unable to work as the result of obesity and an on-the-job back injury that had occurred in February 2007. Her applications were denied at the administrative level, on reconsideration, and after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Petitioner's degenerative disk disease and obesity were severe impairments, but that none of her impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled one of the listings. Furthermore, the ALJ found that Petitioner had "the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work." After the Appeals Council denied her request for review, Petitioner filed her complaint in district court, and a magistrate judge affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Petitioner wanted the Court to "reweigh the evidence or substitute [the Court's] judgment for that of the Commissioner" which the Court declined to do. Accordingly the Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision to deny Petitioner's benefits.

Plaintiff Steven Lucas filed suit against Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston (Liberty Life), asserting that the company violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) when it denied his claim for long term disability benefits. Finding that the denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, the district court entered judgment in favor of Liberty Life. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision. Plaintiff was an employee of the Coca-Cola Company. Liberty Life both administered and insured Coca-Cola's long-term disability benefits plan. Under the plan, it has discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury requiring spinal surgery and, after a short period back on the job, stopped working. He filed a claim for long-term disability benefits in August 2005. In September 2007, Liberty Life terminated Plaintiff's benefits after determining that he was not eligible for continued benefits under the "any occupation" provision: while he might not be capable of performing his own occupation, he was capable of performing some occupation comparable to his former position. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with Liberty Life, but the company upheld the denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Liberty Life's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and that Plaintiff failed to show that it was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Denice Twigg appealed a district court’s order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC) on Plaintiff's claims for (1) retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981; (2) retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and (3) interference under the FMLA. Upon its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that HBC terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about race discrimination or her taking FMLA leave. Therefore, her retaliation claims under Sec.1981 and the FMLA failed as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to HBC on Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim because HBC met its burden of demonstrating that it terminated Plaintiff for a reason unrelated to her FMLA leave, namely, her failure to comply with the company’s notice-of-absence policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiffs Ginger James and Deborah Tennison brought suit under 42 U.S.C.1983 alleging Defendant Prue Public Schools’ (the District) termination of their employment violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They appealed a summary judgment that rejected their claims, in which the district court determined (1) their pre-termination hearing satisfied their due-process rights, and (2) they failed to show their speech was a motivating factor for the termination. The School Board became concerned about the District’s finances. It initiated a financial investigation by retaining a financial consultant and terminated the treasurer’s employment. Without recommending any particular positions to be cut, Jones further opined there would have to be some reduction in personnel and it appeared the District had too many administrators. Eliminating the positions of an elementary and a high-school principal, it decided, would have the least impact on the students and was in the District’s best interest. Accordingly, the Board voted to eliminate the positions due to lack of funds and to dismiss Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issues Plaintiffs raised in their appeal did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding a denial of due process. Furthermore, they did not establish the occurrence and/or the content of the speech sufficiently for the district court to hold in their favor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision.

In January 2011, Daniel Bagwell filed a pro se complaint against his former employer, Safeway Denver Milk Plant (“Safeway”). In his complaint, Mr. Bagwell asserted claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mr. Bagwell included only two factual assertions in his complaint—that (1) his "hours changed," and (2) he experienced "career-ending performance evaluations." Safeway filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Bagwell’s complaint did not comply with Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Bagwell did not respond to the motion. The district court dismissed his complaint, noting that Mr. Bagwell’s complaint was "entirely devoid of sufficient facts to state a claim for retaliation." Mr. Bagwell did not object to any of the magistrate judge’s specific findings or recommendations. Instead, he requested that his "case be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States of America on the grounds that Title VII is unconstitutional and violate[d his] civil rights." Upon review of Mr. Bagwell's appeal of the district court's findings in his case, the Tenth Circuit found that Mr. Bagwell waived appellate review by failing to file specific objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and dismissed this matter.

Plaintiff-appellant Darlene Low, an employee of the Southwestern Power Administration, filed a complaint against the Secretary of the Department of Energy asserting five claims: three retaliation claims and one hostile work environment claim, all pursuant to Title VII, and one claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court dealt with the merits of Low’s case in separate orders: (1) the court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss certain claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that any claims arising from actions in 2000 were unexhausted because Low had failed to timely contact an EEO counselor about them; (2) except for the hostile work environment claim, the balance of Low’s claims were also unexhausted. Plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to add two additional retaliation claims based on meetings held in August 2008. The court denied the motion. The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment. At issue on the cross motions for summary judgment were two remaining claims: one for hostile work environment based on gender, and a second claim of discrimination based on gender or retaliation. The district court held that no reasonable jury could infer discrimination based on either claim. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded after thorough review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law that Plaintiff did not show any reversible error in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff-Appellant Dawn Bunch brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that Defendant Independent School District No. I-050 of Osage County (Prue Public Schools) violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District in which the court concluded Plaintiff had no protected property interest in her employment and failed to show her speech was a motivating factor for her termination. An internal investigation found that Plaintiff “either [. . .] wasn’t properly trained or she was not doing her job as required.” The School Board in an open session, but without holding a due-process hearing, terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's complaint claimed a property interest in her employment contract entitled her to a hearing before her employment was terminated. She also alleged the termination was in retaliation for her exercise of free speech rights because, earlier that fall, she had signed a state-court petition calling for a grand jury investigation into the activities of Board members, and she had complained to friends and family about the Board. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's proffered evidence of discrimination did not amount to the requisite proof that her civil and constitutional rights were violated. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgement in favor of the District.

Plaintiff-Appellant Louanne Cypert brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and several anti-discrimination statutes alleging that Defendant Independent School District No. I-050 of Osage County's (Prue Public Schools) failure to renew her employment contract violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the District discriminated against her because of her age. The district court granted the District summary judgment, finding that Plaintiff's non-renewal hearing satisfied her Fourteenth Amendment claim to due process, and that she failed to show her speech was the motivating factor that led to the District's non-renewal, and that she failed to show the District's non-renewal resulted from discrimination. In the fall of 2008, the local School Board became concerned about the District’s finances. It initiated an investigation and began terminating employment contracts. Plaintiff's contract was one of the terminated contracts. On appeal, Plaintiff proffered evidence of the Board's keeping younger, lesser-qualified personnel on staff at the time of her termination. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's proffered evidence of discrimination did not amount to the requisite proof that her civil and constitutional rights were violated. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgement in favor of the District.