Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Simmons appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Sykes Enterprises, Incorporated. Ms. Simmons claimed Sykes terminated her on the basis of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court concluded that Ms. Simmons failed to establish that Sykes' reason for terminating her was pretextual, and dismissed her case. In early 2007, Ms. Simmons claimed that the workplace environment got decidedly hostile towards her. Later that year, an aggrieved employee complained to Sykes management that someone within the company had improperly disclosed the employee's confidential medical information. Ms. Simmons was implicated as the source of the confidential information. After her termination, Ms. Simmons filed a complaint with the EEOC, which in turn, resulted in a formal complaint before the district court. The Tenth Circuit found that the undisputed facts in this case permitted only one inference: "absent the alleged discriminatory bias, Sykes would still have fired Ms. Simmons because from Sykes' perspective, she violated company policy and could not be trusted with confidential information." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Sykes Enterprises.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Matthews appealed the district courtâs decision that granted summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP. Plaintiff worked for the Agency under a collective bargaining agreement as a unit supervisor. A female employee under Plaintiffâs supervision told the union steward that Plaintiff allegedly made inappropriate comments to her. The union investigated and recommended that Plaintiff be demoted from his supervisory position. Coincidentally, Plaintiff left work under a doctorâs certification that he could not return to work for medical reasons. Though âcertain statutory employment discrimination claimsâ had previously been arbitrated between the parties, Plaintiff filed suit against the Agency in the district court, alleging his demotion was discriminatory and retaliatory. The Agency pointed to those previously arbitrated claims, and moved to have Plaintiffâs case dismissed. Believing the U.S. Supreme Court had already decided a case similar to Plaintiffâs, the district court used that Supreme Court case as the basis for its decision to dismiss Plaintiffâs case. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court relied on the wrong precedent. The Court held that the prior arbitration should not have precluded the entire case. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff could not establish his case of discrimination. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn McDonald-Cuba sued her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Santa Fe Protective Services, Inc.(SFPS), and sought damages for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17, and New Mexico state law. SFPS counter-sued Plaintiff on breach of contract, interference with their economic advantage and breach of loyalty. SFPS would eventually drop all its claims against Plaintiff. The district court granted SFPS summary judgment on the discrimination claims. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on her claims premised on post-employment retaliation and discrimination. The Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not seek all administrative remedies available to her through before taking her case to court. The Court held that âneither the filing of her EEOC charge nor [Plaintiffâs] filing of this suit can serve as protected activity for purposes of her retaliation . . . because neither of those activities occurred before she filed the EEOC charge mentioned in her complaint.â The Court vacated the district courtâs judgment on Plaintiffâs post-employment retaliation claim, and remanded the case to the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for review.

For over a year, Plaintiff-Appellant Miriam Leverington worked as a cardiac nurse for the internal staffing agency of Memorial Health system (Memorial), which is an enterprise of the City of Colorado Springs (City). Plaintiff was fired from her position after she told a Colorado Springs Police Officer during a âless than cordialâ traffic stop, that she hoped she never had him as a patient. The Officer gave her a ticket, and later informed Plaintiffâs supervisors about her statement. Memorial terminated her employment. Plaintiff sued the officer and the City under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated her First Amendment right to free speech. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that Plaintiff had no case against them and proved nothing. The district court granted defendantsâ motion, holding that âthere is no authority to support a claim that such a single statement in that context can be considered protected speech.â Plaintiff appealed. The Tenth Circuit held that âwhile Ms. Leverington certainly has free speech rights even as a public employee, in this case, Memorial did not overstep its bounds in taking action against her for her statement to [the officer].â The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision dismissing Plaintiffâs claim.

Plaintiff-Appellant the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit against Defendant-Appellee C.R. England, Inc. (C.R. England) alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-213. The alleged violations stemmed from Walter Watsonâs employment with C.R. England. Mr. Watson was a driver and trainer for the trucking company. Mr. Watson voluntarily informed C.R. England that he was HIV positive in 1999. By 2003, Mr. Watsonâs workload had significantly decreased and he was unable to make lease payments on his truck. C.R. England terminated his truck lease, and repossessed it. Mr. Watson filed a complaint with the EEOC claiming C.R. Englandâs actions leading up to the repossession was discriminatory and retaliatory for his voluntary disclosure of his illness. The case went to trial in 2008. The EEOC moved for summary judgment, but the trial court denied it, and granted judgment in favor of C.R. England. The EEOC brought multiple issues on appeal, all of which were analyzed by the Tenth Circuit. The Courtâs review of the appeal concluded that the EEOCâs arguments were insufficient to support a discrimination claim under the ADA. The Court affirmed the district courtâs grant of summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on all of the EEOCâs and Mr. Watsonâs claims.

Plaintiff-Appellant Wythe Crowe appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee ADT Security Services on his claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff is African-American, and worked as a technician in Defendant's telephone support center. In December, 2006, a female co-worker made a sexual harassment allegation against Plaintiff; shortly thereafter, Defendant began an investigation into the complaint which involved a thorough review of Plaintiff's employment history. At about the same time of the complaint, Plaintiff and two other co-workers approached management to discuss concerns about the lack of African-Americans in management, and the perception that African-Americans were being passed over for promotions. Since the December incidents, more complaints about Plaintiff's behavior surfaced. The internal investigation on Plaintiff concluded July 25, 2007; two days later, Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the termination was race based due in part to his complaint about the dearth of African-Americans in management. Defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to make a prima face case of both discrimination and retaliation, and that he failed to raise a genuine dispute of material facts on whether Defendant's reasons for terminating him was pretext. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the record contained ample evidence that the termination was not based solely on complaints after his protected behavior, but on his personnel history, allegations of sexual harassment and insubordination.

Plaintiff-Appellant Mauerhan and the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee brought suit against Mauerhan's former employer Defendant-Appellee Wagner Corporation alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The lower court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs appealed. Mauerhan had tested positive for drug use and was fired from Defendant's employ, but was told he may return if he was able to complete a rehabilitation program. Mauerhan completed the program, but Defendant's job duties and compensation would be less than what it previously had been. Mauerhan declined Defendant's offer. Later that year, Mauerhan filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and received a discharge of his debts by the end of the year. After filing for bankruptcy, but before the case was closed, Mauerhan learned that he had a viable claim of discrimination against Defendant under the ADA, and filed it with the EEOC. The Bankruptcy Trustee learned of the claim, and moved to amend Mauerhan's bankruptcy petition to include the claim in the bankruptcy estate. The lower court found that Mauerhan had only abstained from drugs for one month, too short to receive protection from the ADA at the time Mauerhan asked to be rehired. On appeal, this Court upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment.

The Court affirmed the lower courtâs grant of summary judgment to Defendant, the Department of the Interior. Plaintiff-Appellant Villalpando sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Colorado state law, alleging the Department passed him over for a promotion based on his race and national origin. Both Plaintiff and Defendant did not dispute the otherâs meeting their respective burdens of proof under Title VII and Colorado case law. In meeting its burden, Plaintiff argued that the real reason behind Defendantâs alleged non-discriminatory reasons for passing him over was pretext for discrimination. However, the Court held that because Plaintiff conceded Defendantâs proffered non-discriminatory reasons, he remained âvulnerable to summary judgment because [his] concession of a lawful motiveâ removed motive as an issue from a juryâs purvey, âand preclude[d] the inference of a discriminatory motive that the jury could otherwise draw from the fact of pretext.â

The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant David Gerasâ contract claim for unpaid commissions and severance against his former employer International Business Machines (IBM). IBM canceled its sales incentive plan under which Geras maintained he accrued sales commissions worth over $100,000. The Court held that under Colorado law, the planâs incentive letter contained an effective disclaimer, and did not manifest an intent to be bound by the terms of its plan.

The employee attempted to enroll in his employer's ERISA-regulated health care plan. The employer deducted premiums, but did not enroll the employee, who subsequently left the company and fell ill. The employee won $157,182 plus attorney fees under ERISA, then filed state law claims of fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract, which the employer removed to federal court. The district court denied remand and dismissed the claims as res judicata. The Tenth Circuit ordered remand to state court, holding that the state law claims are not completely preempted by ERISA and that the federal court did not have jurisdiction over those claims. While he was employed by the company, the employee would have had standing, under ERISA, to challenge the actions underlying the state claims; at the time he filed the suit, he did not have standing. Having already won an ERISA award, the employee no longer qualified as a former employee with a colorable ERISA claim.