Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Ute Indian Tribe challenged three amendments to the articles of incorporation of Defendant Ute Distribution Corporation (UDC). UDC represents former members of the tribe and jointly manages assets with the Tribe's leadership. Perceiving a takeover threat from the Tribe, the UDC board of directors proposed (and the shareholders adopted) the amendments in question, which prohibited persons affiliated with the Tribe from serving on the board. The Tribe sued, arguing the amendments violated Utah state law. The district court granted summary judgment to the UDC. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the amendments were reasonable as a matter of law, and that the UDC board of directors did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in proposing the amendments or adopting them. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of UDC's motion for summary judgment. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Ute Distribution Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Kerry Raina Bryant appealed her conviction for theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Choctaw Indian lands. She entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. She was sentenced to a two-year probation, and ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that the statute under which she was charged (18 U.S.C. 1168) did not apply to her because she was not a casino employee, and that 18 U.S.C. 2 did not apply because it punishes illegal acts against the "United States," and the Choctaw tribe is "not the United States." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Defendant committed her crime with her sister, who was a casino employee, and the applicable statute declares Defendant a "principal" for aiding and abetting theft by a casino employee. Furthermore, the Court found Defendant's crime was against a "a gaming establishment licensed by the National Indian Gaming Association that sits on territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Plainly, there was a crime against the United States." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Patrick Talk and Kenneth Martinez, both enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe, challenged the procedural reasonableness of their sixty-month sentences of imprisonment. The district court imposed the sentences after Defendants pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country in the death of Shawn Begay, also an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe. Mr. Talk argued that the district court procedurally erred in finding that he did not fully accept responsibility for Mr. Begay's death, and by failing to adequately explain his sentence, because it explained neither why he received the same sentence as Mr. Martinez nor why his sentence was longer than the Sentencing Guidelines' range for aggravated assault. Mr. Martinez argued that the district court procedurally erred by enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3A1.1 because Mr. Begay was not a "vulnerable victim" and, even if he was, Mr. Martinez neither knew nor should have known that he was. Finding that Mr. Talk's challenge was "misguided" and that the district court "did not commit procedural error in explaining its upward variance," the Tenth Circuit affirmed his sentence. Because Mr. Begay was heavily intoxicated at the time of his death, the Tenth Circuit found that he was unable to protect himself, and was therefore "unusually vulnerable." The Court found that the district court did not err in finding Mr. Begay was a vulnerable victim, and that Mr. Martinez's challenge to the district court's ruling that he knew or should have known of Mr. Begay's vulnerability "[could not] succeed under plain-error review, regardless of whether his argument [was] framed as a factual or legal one." The Court affirmed Mr. Martinez's sentence.

Petitioner Christopher Yancey filed an action in district court contending that Oklahoma state-court rulings terminating his parental rights over his Indian child were invalid under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The district court dismissed his action, determining that either federal abstention was mandated, or the action was barred by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Tiffany Leatherman and Petitioner are the natural parents of Baby Boy L. Petitioner was a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Indian Nation of Oklahoma, but Leatherman was not a member of any Native American tribe. Petitioner and Leatherman were teenagers when the child was conceived, and they never married. Before the child was born, Leatherman decided to place him for adoption, and she located Timothy and Tammy Thomas who were interested in adopting him. In December 2002, Leatherman brought an action in Oklahoma state court to terminate Petitioner's parental rights and to determine the child’s eligibility for adoption without Petitioner's consent. Leatherman appeared in court, relinquished her parental rights, and consented to the adoption. Petitioner appeared in the proceedings and objected to the adoption. On May 18, 2010, the Oklahoma trial court entered an order terminating Petitioner's parental rights. The court found that the ICWA had been complied with and that the Thomases had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner's custody of Baby Boy L. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. There was no indication in the record that Petitioner appealed that order. On the day after the Oklahoma trial court entered its order, Petitioner filed this action against the Thomases. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did not err in dismissing Yancey’s federal-court action because it was barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision terminating Appellant's parental rights.

This was the second appeal in litigation arising from the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (HHS) decision not to enter into a self-determination contract with the Southern Ute Indian Tribe (Tribe). In an initial order, the district court ruled that HHS's decision was unlawful, granted summary judgment to the Tribe, and directed the parties to prepare a proposed order for injunctive relief. After the parties were unable to agree on the proposed order, the district court issued an interlocutory order in which it endorsed HHS's approach to the contract’s start date and contract support costs. The Tribe appealed, and the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, the district court issued a final order, directing the parties to enter a self-determination contract including HHS's proposed language regarding the contract start date and contract support costs and denying the Tribe’s request for damages. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that HHS was required to contract with the Tribe and regarding the contract start date, but reversed the court's decision regarding contract support costs.

The Tenth Circuit considered whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) properly exercised its discretion to reject a gift of property by a member of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to the tribe. The Court noted that this appeal also raised a novel jurisdictional question regarding its review of administrative decisions following a remand from district court. James Smith wanted to transfer to the tribe a portion of his property interest in the Maria Christiana Reserve No. 35 (southwest of Kansas City) where the tribe had plans to develop gaming facilities. Federal law and restrictions on Smith’s fee interest required the BIA to approve any transfer. Citing concerns regarding fractional land interests in the Reserve as well as the long-range best interests of Reserve landowners, the BIA denied Smith’s application to transfer the land. The Tribe challenged that decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held the BIA properly exercised its discretion in denying the application. With regard to the jurisdictional question raised, the Court concluded that the government has not abandoned its right to challenge the district court’s remand order, even though the government substantially prevailed in the district court’s final judgment. The Court found the district court erred in its remand order reversing the BIA’s denial of Smith’s application. Therefore the Court vacated the district court’s final judgment and its order reversing the BIA, and remanded the case for further consideration of Smith’s application consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner Charles Medicine Blanket unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on sexual assault charges. He sought the writ of habeas corpus from the Tenth Circuit to challenge the district court’s denial of his appeal. Though he committed his crimes in Colorado, Petitioner was arrested on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota, and was extradited back to Colorado to stand trial. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested with an "invalid" federal warrant, and then removed from the reservation without an extradition hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner alleged that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge his arrest warrant and extradition. The district court concluded that Petitioner failed to exhaust "certain due process claims" in his state post-conviction proceedings before bringing his appeal to the district court. Specifically, Petitioner failed to pursue his due process claims through "one complete round of the state’s appellate process." Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Petitioner did not exhaust his due process claims in the lower courts, and as such, the lower courts were correct in denying him the relief he sought.

This case stems from Plaintiff Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C.'s (Crowe) legal representation of the Thlopthlocco in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District Court in 2007. Nathan Anderson, a member of the Thlopthlocco Nation attempted a coup d'etat by declaring himself the only valid leader and purported to appoint a new government. While the "coup" proceeded through the tribal courts, the matter of paying the legal bill for Crowe's representation came up. With the "official" government in dispute, and tribal business halted from an injunction issued until the case was resolved, Mr. Anderson argued that his legal fees should be paid from the tribal treasury. The tribal district court dismissed his claim, reasoning that until the litigation was resolved, no one knew who had authority to spend Thlopthlocco funds. The court then ordered that any attorney fees paid from the tribe's treasury be refunded. Instead of complying with the order, Crowe filed suit with the federal district court, seeking to enjoin the tribal court from ordering a return of the legal fees. The federal court ruled in favor of Crowe, and the tribal judge, Defendant Judge Gregory Stidam, appealed. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Judge Stidham argued the case should have been dismissed because he was entitled to sovereign and judicial immunity. The Tenth Circuit found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction against Judge Stidham's order. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Pursuant to the Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), the United States enters into contracts with Indian tribes and tribal organizations for âthe planning, conduct and administration of programs or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes and their members pursuant to Federal law.â These agreements (Contract Support Cost contracts, or CSCs) include costs which are used for the running of essential tribal services, such as law enforcement, economic development and natural resource management. Congress mandated all CSCs be provided with full funding, but then failed to appropriate funds sufficient to pay all CSCs. Instead Congress capped appropriations at a level well below the sum total of CSCs. Several tribes sued seeking to collect the promised-but-unappropriated CSC money. The government argued that the phrase âsubject to the availability of appropriationsâ relieves it of the obligation to pay if the Congress doesnât appropriate the funds. The tribes argued that only Congressional funding decisionsânot the discretionary allocation decisions made by the Department of the Interiorâcan render an appropriation âunavailable.â The Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffsâ interpretation is âreasonable,â and it reversed the district courtâs grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The defendant was convicted of being a spectator at a cockfight that occurred in Indian Country, in violation of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13, (assimilating Oklahoma law criminalizing cockfighting and being a spectator) as applied through the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1152. The Tenth Circuit remanded for dismissal. The prosecution failed to present any evidence that the defendant was an Indian; Indian status of the victim or perpetrator is an element of the federal criminal statute. Federal courts lack jurisdiction over a victimless crime, committed in Indian Country by a non-Indian. The court noted that the state retains jurisdiction.