Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two infrastructure companies formed a joint venture to bid on a Colorado highway express lane project, relying on engineering designs from a subsidiary of one partner. After winning the contract, the joint venture entered a subcontract with the engineering firm that incorporated many of their earlier terms but added a liability cap. During the project, disputes arose over the design work, resulting in multiple redesigns and delays. The engineering firm submitted change orders for additional work, but the joint venture either failed to process them according to contract procedures or “shelved” them as litigation began.The engineering firm sued the joint venture in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The joint venture counterclaimed for breach of both the subcontract and the original teaming agreement, and later added a negligent misrepresentation claim. The district court dismissed the negligent misrepresentation counterclaim under the economic-loss rule and later granted summary judgment to the engineering firm on the teaming agreement counterclaim, holding that the subcontract superseded the earlier agreement and imposed a liability cap. The joint venture sought to add fraud counterclaims more than a year after the final pretrial order, but the district court denied this as untimely and prejudicial. The court also rejected the joint venture’s attempt to concede liability and assume the plaintiff’s role at trial, and denied its Rule 50 motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the district court did not err in denying the joint venture’s various motions, including its attempt to add new counterclaims, to instruct the jury on an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, or to enter judgment against itself. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the engineering firm on all claims and counterclaims. View "AECOM Technical Services v. Flatiron | AECOM" on Justia Law

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a coal mining lease in Wyoming originally executed in 1986 between Rock Springs Royalty Company and Bridger Coal Company. Under this lease, Bridger gained exclusive rights to mine coal from a specified area (the “Nine Mile Lease”) and was required to mine at least forty-five percent of the total coal from both the leased lands and “Adjoining Lands” every five years. Bridger was obligated to pay production royalties based on actual coal mined or, if it failed to meet the threshold, advance royalties based on projected production. For nearly thirty years, payments proceeded without issue. In 2020, Bridger, anticipating it would not meet the production threshold, paid an advance royalty, but Wildcat Coal LLC, which had succeeded as lessor, objected to the calculation, particularly the definition of “Adjoining Lands.” Bridger then withheld future royalties to recover what it claimed was an overpayment, prompting Wildcat to sue for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted summary judgment for Wildcat, finding Bridger’s definition of “Adjoining Lands” was incorrect and that the term included both public and private lands as well as surface and underground mining. In a footnote, the district court sua sponte required Bridger to recalculate all royalties paid since 1986, although neither party had requested this. Bridger subsequently moved to correct the order, arguing that a thirty-six-month protest provision in the lease barred recalculation for earlier years, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the lease’s protest provision precluded recalculation of royalties for payments made before 2016, reversed the district court’s order requiring recalculation from 1986, affirmed the district court’s interpretation of “Adjoining Lands,” and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wildcat Coal v. Pacific Minerals" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a tenant at an apartment complex operated by a public housing authority, alleged that she was raped by a maintenance worker employed by the complex. According to her account, the worker initially contacted her in the course of his employment to respond to a maintenance request but subsequently began to harass her through calls, texts, and inappropriate conduct. The alleged sexual assault occurred when the worker entered her unlocked apartment without using his employer-issued master key, at a time when he was not scheduled to perform work in her unit.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord and the maintenance worker on the plaintiff’s federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims. The district court found that the landlord was not directly liable because it had no notice of the employee’s conduct prior to the alleged assault and could not have taken action before the worker had already quit. The court also concluded that there was no vicarious liability because the worker was not acting within the scope of his employment and the plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the worker’s employment and the assault under the aided-by-agency exception. The court sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of the worker on the FHA claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that while the FHA incorporates common law agency principles, the aided-by-agency exception is narrowly construed and applies only when an employee exercises significant authority over the victim or uses a special privilege of employment to commit the tort. Here, there was no evidence the worker used such authority or privilege—he did not use his master key or any special access. The court further affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the worker and the district court’s refusal to retain supplemental jurisdiction. View "Trujillo v. Amity Plaza" on Justia Law

Several New Mexico landowners, holding title to non-navigable streambeds, asserted that they once had the right to exclude the public from walking or wading in these streambeds. They alleged that a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court eliminated this right, amounting to a judicial taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The relevant background includes longstanding provisions in New Mexico law declaring all natural waters in the state to be public, subsequent proclamations and statutes requiring permission to access private streambeds, and a 2022 New Mexico Supreme Court decision which clarified that the public had a right to walk and wade in the beds of public water crossing private land, so long as such use was reasonably necessary and minimally invasive.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the landowners’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were not traceable to enforcement by the named state officials, but rather to the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision. The district court also concluded that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, reasoning that any relief would require payments from the state treasury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the landowners did have standing, as they faced a credible threat of enforcement by the state officials, and their injuries were traceable to those officials and redressable through prospective relief. The Tenth Circuit also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims and that no abstention or jurisdictional doctrine prevented adjudication.Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the landowners failed to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an established property right to exclude the public from the streambeds, but rather that the New Mexico Supreme Court had merely clarified the scope of the public’s preexisting easement. View "Sanchez v. Torrez" on Justia Law

A property owner, Gary Binning, purchased land in Wyoming that was subject to a conservation easement held by The Nature Conservancy (TNC). This easement restricted the types of structures that could be built on the property, allowing only one single-family residential structure per parcel. Binning sought to build a guest house in addition to a main house, but TNC denied his request, citing the easement’s terms. This dispute led to litigation, and the Wyoming Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the easement did not permit construction of any guest house or secondary residential structure.Following this decision, Binning met with TNC’s Wyoming state director, Hayley Mortimer, who, according to Binning, suggested during an informal lunch meeting that he could build a structure accommodating overnight guests as long as it was not called a “guest house” and did not include a kitchen. Binning later sought approval for new building plans, but TNC rejected them, and Mortimer’s subsequent written communication did not confirm any such oral promise. Binning then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, asserting a claim of promissory estoppel based on Mortimer’s alleged statements.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TNC, finding that Binning failed to establish the required elements of promissory estoppel under Wyoming law: a clear and definite promise, reasonable reliance, and that enforcement was necessary to avoid injustice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that Mortimer’s alleged statements were not sufficiently clear and definite to constitute a promise, any reliance by Binning was unreasonable under the circumstances, and no injustice would result from refusing enforcement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Four B Properties v. The Nature Conservancy" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law

Two related Wyoming companies, one owning the surface estate and the other owning the mineral estate in an adjacent tract, sought to drill a horizontal well. The plan involved drilling from the surface owner’s land, traversing through federally owned subsurface minerals, and ending in the mineral owner’s adjacent tract. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the federal minerals, informed the companies that they needed to obtain a permit to drill through the federal mineral estate, as the process would involve removing a small amount of federal minerals. The companies disagreed, arguing that BLM lacked authority to require a permit for a well that would not produce from the federal minerals, and filed suit seeking a declaration of their right to drill without BLM’s consent.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming ruled in favor of BLM, holding that Congress had retained sufficient regulatory authority over the mineral estate and had delegated that authority to BLM under the Mineral Leasing Act. The court concluded that BLM could require a permit for the proposed traversing well and that the companies qualified as “operators” under BLM regulations, thus subject to the permit requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The Tenth Circuit determined that the dispute was fundamentally about property rights—specifically, whether the surface owner had the right to drill through the federal mineral estate without BLM’s consent. The court held that such disputes must be brought under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), which is the exclusive means for challenging the United States’ title or property interests in real property. Because the companies brought their claim under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act instead of the QTA, the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "True Oil v. BLM" on Justia Law

Christopher Fucci and over 50 other individuals and family entities (Plaintiffs) purchased interests in real estate development projects in Florida and Ohio. Each sale was documented in a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) containing an arbitration clause. However, none of the projects were completed, and Plaintiffs sued First American Title Insurance Company (First American) and its employee Kirsten Parkin (FA Defendants), who acted as the escrow agent in the closing of each sale. Although the FA Defendants were not signatories to the PSAs, they moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clauses in the agreements.The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied the motion to compel arbitration. The FA Defendants argued on appeal that they could enforce the arbitration clauses because they were parties to the PSAs, third-party beneficiaries, agents of a party to the PSAs, and that Plaintiffs were equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration. The district court had previously denied the motion without prejudice, waiting for a related case ruling. After the related case was decided, the FA Defendants filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration, which was denied by a magistrate judge. The district court overruled the FA Defendants' objections and adopted the magistrate judge's order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FA Defendants were not parties to the PSAs, were not third-party beneficiaries, and could not compel arbitration as agents because Rockwell, the principal, had waived the arbitration provision. Additionally, the court ruled that equitable estoppel could not be invoked to expand the scope of the arbitration clause to include disputes between Plaintiffs and the FA Defendants. View "Fucci v. First American Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves an ancillary proceeding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). Jesse Dunn filed a third-party petition claiming ownership of a parcel of land in West Jordan, Utah, which the government sought to forfeit in Justin Peck’s criminal case. Peck was convicted of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. The government alleged Peck held an ownership interest in the land. The district court agreed with Dunn and blocked the forfeiture, leading to the government's appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially found the land forfeitable based on Peck’s plea agreement. However, during the ancillary proceeding, the district court determined that Dunn had a superior interest in the property. Dunn had purchased the land with untainted funds and later paid off a loan using funds authorized by Peck. The court found that Dunn’s interest in the property was superior to Peck’s at all relevant times under Utah law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Dunn’s interest in the property was superior to Peck’s and the government’s under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). The court noted that the government had only sought to forfeit the land and had not pursued other potentially forfeitable property or substitute property. The court also emphasized that the government did not challenge the district court’s findings under Utah law, which governed the determination of property interests in federal forfeiture proceedings. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly vacated the preliminary forfeiture order and granted Dunn’s third-party petition. View "United States v. Peck" on Justia Law