Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce McDonald took out a loan (Note) secured by a deed of trust on Colorado real property in favor of the lender, IndyMac Bank. Plaintiff made payments on the loan from its 2003 inception until April 2009, including while IndyMac was operated in receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC sold IndyMac to a holding company that operated it as Defendant-Appellee OneWest, F.S.B. and OneWest, as the new loan servicer, notified Plaintiff of the sale. Plaintiff stopped making payments because OneWest "did not provide [him] with the instrument or reasonable evidence of authority to make such a presentment" in accordance with his demands for the original Note. Ultimately, OneWest foreclosed on the property and obtained a Rule 120 Order authorizing the sale of the property, after it produced the original Note, the deed of trust, and a pooling and servicing agreement governing the Note. The property was sold in 2010. OneWest purchased it, later assigning its interest in the property to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp (FHLMC). Plaintiff filed suit in state district court claiming that OneWest was not entitled to payment on the Note and the order of sale was void. FHLMC filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Plaintiff seeking to evict him; Plaintiff obtained a stay pending resolution of his state court action. Plaintiff then amended his state-court complaint to join FHLMC and include a quiet title action; neither defendant answered and the state district court granted a default judgment quieting title in Plaintiff. Onewest appealed the default judgment. While the appeal was pending, Plaintiff filed this federal action against OneWest Bank on civil RICO, pattern of racketeering activities, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, fraud, and violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. The federal district court noted that it probably lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine given that Plaintiff was attempting to litigate the same claims that the Rule 120 court had rejected. The court ultimately dismissed the action on the basis of Plaintiff's failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review of the case, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's counsel admitted that the issue of the validity of the Note was presented at state court, but was not covered by the notice of appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Furthermore, Plaintiff's Rule 60 motion was not filed until nearly six months after the notice of appeal was filed, and no new notice of appeal was entered on this issue. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit was unable to consider these claims in this appeal, and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "McDonald v. OneWest Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Jean Rosenfield appealed a district court's order that granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee HSBC Bank, USA (HSBC). Plaintiff brought claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages against HSBC for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), contending her lender failed to make required disclosures in a residential loan refinancing agreement executed by the parties, and that because of this, she was entitled to a rescission of her loan agreement. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her claims and by holding that she failed to timely exercise her right of rescission within the applicable three-year time bar specified by TILA. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and affirmed its judgment. View "Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Anne George wanted to corral her horse on her property with a fence. The United States Forest Service held an easement across Plaintiff's land. Plaintiff offered to leave a gate across the road unlocked, but the Service rejected this option, arguing that the public needs unfettered access to the adjacent Gila National Forest. The parties' wrangling dragged on for years but led nowhere until Plaintiff filed suit to quiet title in 2009. In the end, the Tenth Circuit ruled against her. "Whatever legal entitlement she might have had to build a fence across the Forest Service's road she lost years ago thanks to an even less permeable barrier to entry: the statute of limitations." Plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest to the land granted the government an easement for access to the forest, and each time Plaintiff attempted to fence her property, the government promptly removed it. That, she argued, was inadequate for the government to assert its claim to the easement as being fence-free. Under the plain terms of the Quiet Title Act, the statute of limitations began to run whenever a plaintiff or her predecessor-in-interest knew or should have known of the government’s claim: "[o]ne can be on notice of a claim even if that claim lacks any legal merit. . . . [o]ur precedent does not allow plaintiffs to wait until the adverse claims of the title asserted by them and the United States crystallize into well-defined and open disagreements before commencing a quiet-title action."View "George v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant Baker Hughes Inteq, Inc. appealed the district court's order that denied its motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff EEC, Inc. and Baker contracted for Baker to provide drilling equipment for use in EEC's horizontal oil and natural gas well in Oklahoma. The equipment was lost in the well. EEC filed suit in Oklahoma state court alleging that Baker’s negligence damaged its well. Baker removed the case to federal court, invoked diversity jurisdiction, and filed counterclaims for the value of its equipment. Baker also sought to compel arbitration. Baker prepared and EEC signed numerous documents containing arbitration clauses which were ultimately ruled as unenforceable by the district court. The court also denied Baker’s motion to reconsider. Further, the court enjoined Baker from proceeding with arbitration, and stayed further district court proceedings pending appeal of its orders. Upon review of the arbitration clauses at issue in this case, the Tenth Circuit found disagreed that because there were differences in the multiple clauses they were rendered unenforceable. The Court reversed the district court's judgment denying Baker's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case with directions to order the parties to pursue arbitration. View "EEC, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Oilfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Russell appealed a district court's order that denied his "Motion to Vacate the Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)(6) (FRCP), and Motion for Appointment of Counsel Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(d), and, or, Alternatively, Second Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint." Plaintiff filed his pro se civil rights complaint against "a plethora" of business, attorney and judicial defendants arising out of the foreclosure of real property he held in Colorado. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that his claims were repetitive of claims previously asserted in two cases that had been resolved against him. Finding that Plaintiff did not raise a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on law or facts in support of the issues he raised on appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff's case. View "Russell v. Financial Capital Companies" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC, acquired title to three pieces of real property in Utah from three defaulting borrowers. Plaintiff then filed three suits in diversity against various Defendants which held interests in the property, seeking to prevent foreclosure. Plaintiff argued Defendants had no authority to foreclose because the notes in each case had been securitized and sold on the open market. Because the security followed the debt, Plaintiff argued once Defendants sold the security they could not foreclose absent authorization from every investor who had purchased an interest in the securitized note. Defendants in all three cases filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the district court granted those motions. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's diversity jurisdiction claims had no legal basis under Utah law, and as such, the district court properly dismissed all three complaints.

In 1999, Christopher Sullivan learned through a business acquaintance, Robert Weaver, acquired all interests in a particular oil and gas lease. The then-current operators of the wells on the lease, QEP Energy, made regular payments to Mr. Sullivan for several years. In early 2006 QEP determined that the total payments to Mr. Sullivan by all operators on the lease exceeded his interest in the leases. QEP therefore ceased further payments and sought reimbursement of the overpayment from Mr. Sullivan. He disputed the claim, asserting that QEP owed him additional payments. QEP brought this action in Utah state court, seeking a declaration of the amounts due Mr. Sullivan. It also sought recovery from Mr. Sullivan for the alleged overpayment. Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment on their claims for declaratory relief. The district court held that the terms of Mr. Sullivan's interest (from when he acquired the original interest in the lease) unambiguously described he should have only received a three percent production-payment. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of QEP, and dismissed Mr. Sullivan's claims with prejudice. Mr. Sullivan appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis of the leases in question and affirmed its decision in favor of QEP.

This appeal arose from a suit filed by the United States that asked the district court to reduce certain of Defendant-Appellant Jack Wilson’s tax liabilities to judgment, to set aside a fraudulent transfer of real property from Wilson to Defendant Joey Lee Dobbs-Wilson, and to enforce the government’s new liens, as well as one preexisting tax lien, against the real property by ordering a sale. Wilson appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States. Wilson argued in his response to the government’s motion for summary judgment and in his cross-motion for summary judgment that Ms. Dobbs-Wilson was not his nominee when he transferred the property to her in 1998 and, as a result, a 1997 lien became invalid when the government mistakenly released it in 2003, after he no longer owned the property. Assuming the validity of Wilson's argument, and after supplemental briefing on the matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate any injury to him that the Court could redress. Having determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, the case was dismissed.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Ark Initiative, Alex Forsythe, and Paul Smith appealed a district court's judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellees, the U.S. Forest Service and its Chief. The district court upheld the Defendants' acceptance of a 2003 Master Development Plan (MDP), as well as a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis, and decisions concerning a 2006 Snowmass Ski Improvements Project. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants violated NEPA by approving the project without examining certain cumulative effects-- namely, effects on water resources, endangered fish, forest habitats, and "other resources." Defendants countered that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their claims, and that the NEPA does not require a federal agency to examine the cumulative effects of its proposed action with those of an unrelated proposal where the proposed action will not affect the resource concerns pressed by the Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and affirmed the district court's judgment.

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether property damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship is an "ocurrence" for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The issue arose from the appeals of Plaintiffs-Appellants Greystone Construction, Inc., The Branan Company, and American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American) who all appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant National Fire & Marine Insurance Company (National). Greystone was the general contractor that employed multiple subcontractors to build a house in Colorado. As is common along Colorado’s front range, the house was built on soils containing expansive clays. Over time, soil expansion caused the foundation to shift, resulting in extensive damage to the home’s living areas. The homeowners sued Greystone for damages, alleging defective construction by the subcontractors who installed the foundation. Greystone was insured under CGL policies provided by two insurers. American provided policies for 2001 to 2003, and National provided policies for 2003 to 2006. The American and National policy periods did not overlap. Greystone tendered a claim to American and then National. National denied it owed Greystone any defense. In district court, the builders and American sought to recover a portion of their defense costs from National. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that damage arising from a poor workmanship may fall under a CGL policy’s initial grant of coverage, even though recovery may still be precluded by a business-risk exclusion or another provision of the policy. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.