Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
Campbell v. City of Spencer
Municipalities City of Spencer and the Town of Forest Park, and Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, acting under a search warrant, seized 44 abused and neglected horses from plaintiff-appellant Ann Campbell’s properties. After a forfeiture hearing, a state district court in Oklahoma issued an order granting Spencer and Forest Park’s joint forfeiture petition. Campbell later sued the municipalities (and Blaze) in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint, applying both claim and issue preclusion to prevent relitigation of matters common to the state court forfeiture proceeding. Campbell appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court properly dismissed Campbell’s 1983 claims: because Campbell could have raised her constitutional claims in the forfeiture proceeding but did not do so, and because the Court's allowing her to raise these claims in this appeal would impair the Municipalities’ rights established in that proceeding, the Court held that the district court properly concluded that claim preclusion disallowed Campbell from pursuing her constitutional claims. View "Campbell v. City of Spencer" on Justia Law
CGC Holding v. Gache
Colorado Golf Club Holding Company LLC (CGC Holding), Harlem Algonquin LLC and James Medick proposed certification of a class action suit. They alleged a group of lenders conspired to create a fraudulent scheme to obtain non-refundable up-front fees in return for loan commitments , and misrepresented their ability and their objective to make good on the promises to meet certain financing obligations as part of a scheme to entice borrowers to pay the up-front fees. The class intended to offer generalized proof that the lenders concealed the financial history of Sandy Hutchens, the principal defendant, and his use of pseudonyms, to preserve the superficial integrity of the operation. The borrowers argued that had they known about this pretense, no putative class member would have taken part in the financial transactions that caused each to lose its up-front fees, amounting to millions of dollars of cumulative losses. The ultimate issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the class could pursue claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In opposing the claims, the lenders argued that each class member would have to demonstrate that it relied on the lenders’ misrepresentations or omissions to satisfy RICO’s causation element, making a single trial unwieldy and unworkable. The Tenth Circuit held that the lenders were wrong in this respect: RICO class-action plaintiffs are not entitled to an evidentiary presumption of a factual element of a claim. The Court agreed with the district court that a class could be certified in this context. Plaintiffs' theory sufficiently allayed any concerns about Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate over those idiosyncratic to individual class members. The Tenth Circuit affirmed certification of the class, but reversed the district court with regard to certification decision as to the lenders’ law firm and lawyers, Broad and Cassel, Ronald Gache and Carl Romano. Because several claims were not properly before the Court in this interlocutory appeal, the Court declined to address: (1) whether plaintiffs’ claims constituted an impermissible extraterritorial application of RICO; (2) whether the plaintiffs could prove proximate cause; or (3) whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over certain defendants. View "CGC Holding v. Gache" on Justia Law
Kane County, Utah v. United States
In April of 2008, Kane County Utah brought an action under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a, to quiet title to five roads or road segments. It later amended its complaint to cover a total of fifteen roads or road segments. The QTA contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for the settlement of property claims against the United States. This case centered on a dispute between Kane County (joined by the State of Utah as intervenors) and the United States over the existence and breadth of the County’s rights-of-way on federally owned land in Southern Utah. In 2013, the district court issued two final orders giving rise to the issues presented to the Tenth Circuit on appeal. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in allowing for unspecified improvements in setting the widths of the rights-of-way on Skutumpah, Swallow Park and North Swag roads. The case was remanded on the question of the scope of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way on these roads. The County did not explain how it arrived at “disputed title” to Sand Dunes, Hancock or the Cave Lakes roads; the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court and find it had no jurisdiction over the QTA claims to Sand Dunes and Hancock roads and reversed its decision with respect to those roads. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kane County, Utah v. United States" on Justia Law
United States v. Jones
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) grants grazing permits to private individuals who own land adjacent to public lands; adjacent, private lands are called "base properties." Grazing permits limit both the number of animals grazing on a specific allotment of public land and the number of days they are permitted to graze. Appellant Stanley Jones appealed his convictions for one count of unlawful
use or occupation of public lands, and two counts of allowing his livestock to graze without authorization on public lands. While Mr. Jones owned cattle in Wyoming, he was not the owner of the base properties adjacent to the two BLM public lands or allotments involved in this suit. Instead, his brother owned the adjacent base properties During the periods at issue, no grazing permit had been issued to Mr. Jones or his brother, nor has Mr. Jones leased his brother's property, as required for obtaining such a permit. After issuing Mr. Jones multiple administrative trespass notices and fines over the years for grazing his cattle on these and other allotments without a permit, the BLM, through the United States Attorney's Office for Wyoming, brought criminal charges against him, including one count of unlawful use or occupation, and for unauthorized grazing. A jury convicted Mr. Jones of all three criminal counts, and thereafter, the district court sentenced him to two years of supervised probation for each count, to be served concurrently, together with a $3,000 fine, contingent on his compliance with certain terms and conditions, and a $75 special assessment. Appearing pro se, Mr. Jones appealed, arguing that "the handling of the district court proceeding caused the jury to come to the wrong conclusion and that the true and honest facts should have been considered." Furthermore, Mr. Jones argued: (1) the district court improperly granted the government's motion in limine and excluded his witness from testifying, thereby depriving him of a fair trial; and (2) the proceedings against him were fundamentally unfair and denied him due process for a multitude of reasons. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.
View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Circle S. Feed Store, et al
I&W, Inc. owned a mining operation in Carlsbad, New Mexico. Excavation on its property created a cavern, which grew so large it infringed upon the subsurface property of the nearby Circle S Feed Store, LLC. This cavern, in turn, caused subsidence and damages to Circle S’s surface property. A New Mexico state court found I&W negligent and liable for damages its solution mining operations caused to Circle S’s property. I&W sought indemnification for the damages under its commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies, which had been issued by Mid-Continent Casualty Company. Mid-Continent, in turn, sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that it was not required to indemnify I&W for damages awarded in the state court action. The district court granted summary judgment for Mid-Continent, holding that a provision of the policies’ Oil Industries Limitation Endorsement (Oil Endorsement) excluded coverage of the damages awarded in state court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the Oil Endorsement excluded coverage under the excess/umbrella policies issued to I&W, but held the Endorsement did not affect coverage under the primary policies.
View "Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Circle S. Feed Store, et al" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC
The dispute between the parties in this case centered over mineral rights. Stull Ranches, LLC operated a grouse hunting business on its surface estate in rural Colorado. Entek GRB, LLC leased the right to explore and develop the minerals under much of Stull’s surface and adjoining surface estates from the federal government. This dispute arose when Entek asked permission to enter Stull’s surface estate (both to develop new oil well sites on Stull’s land and to get at one of its existing wells located on an adjacent surface estate owned by the Bureau of Land Management). Along the way, Entek pointed out that the only available road to the well on BLM’s estate crossed Stull’s land. Concerned that Entek’s presence would unsettle its grouse, Stull refused access. Entek sued to gain access. The district court held that Entek was entitled to access portions of Stull’s surface to mine certain leases lying below. But the court also held that Entek was entitled to no more than this - in particular, Entek could not cross Stull’s surface to service the well on the adjacent BLM land. Entek appealed, arguing to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred by not granting it access to BLM lands. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court in not granting Entek the relief it originally requested. The Court therefore vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Stull and remanded the case for further proceedings.
View "Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law
San Juan County, Utah v. United States
Salt Creek Road is an unimproved 12.3-mile road intertwined with the creek bed in Salt Creek Canyon. The state and county wanted to use their claimed right-of-way to prevent the United States from closing the Salt Creek Road to vehicle traffic. The road is the primary way for tourists to reach several scenic sites within the Canyonlands National Park, including Angel Arch. Without vehicle access, the only way to access Angel Arch is to make the nine-mile trek by foot. The state and county based their claim on Revised Statute (R.S.) 2477: "[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." Congress enacted R.S. 2477 in 1866, and it remained in effect until 1976. Even then, however, Congress preserved the rights-of-way established under the statute. This Quiet Title Act case presented to the Tenth Circuit the issue of whether the district court erred in rejecting the claims of San Juan County and the State of Utah to Salt Creek Road. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "San Juan County, Utah v. United States " on Justia Law
Esgar Corporation, et al v. Comm’r of Internal Rev.
Petitioners-Appellants Esgar Corporation, George and Georgetta Tempel, and Delmar and Patricia Holmes appealed two United States Tax Court decisions, arguing that the Tax Court erred in valuing conservation easements they claimed as charitable deductions and in determining the holding period of state tax credits they sold. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed that court's decision.
View "Esgar Corporation, et al v. Comm'r of Internal Rev." on Justia Law
City Center West v. American Modern Home Insurance
A bank purchased insurance on a commercial property mortgaged to it by a borrower. The policy prohibited an assignment "of this Policy" without the insurer's consent. After the property was damaged, the bank assigned its loss claim to the borrower. The insurer refused to pay the borrower's claim because of the nonassignment provision, and the borrower sued. The district court held that the suit was barred and awarded judgment for the insurer. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the nonassignment provision was enforceable. The Court concluded, after review of the provision in question, that the provision did not apply to the assignment of a postloss claim, so the Court did not determine the enforceability of a provision prohibiting such assignments. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Ute Mesa Lot 1, LLC v. First Citizens Bank & Trust, et al
Ute Mesa, a Colorado real estate developer, received a multi-million dollar loan to construct a single family home on property it owned in Aspen. To secure the loan, United Western Bank prepared a deed of trust incorrectly identifying Ute Mesa's sole member as the owner rather than Ute Mesa. The Bank filed suit seeking a reformation of the deed of trust and a declaration that it had a first priority lien on the property. Days later, the Bank filed notice of lis pendens in the county real property records. Ute Mesa filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, and continued as debtor-in-possession of the property. Ute Mesa then filed an adversary proceeding against the Bank to avoid the lis pendens as a preferential transfer. The bankruptcy court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss, and the federal district court affirmed. Ute Mesa argued on appeal that a "transfer of an interest in property" occurs when a bona fide purchaser cannot acquire an interest superior to that of a creditor. According to Ute Mesa, because the lis pendens prevented a bona fide purchaser from acquiring an interest in the property superior to the Bank’s interest, the lis pendens qualified as a transfer of an interest in the property. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that a lis pendens is "merely a notice" and does not constitute a lien, therefore, no transfer occurred. View "Ute Mesa Lot 1, LLC v. First Citizens Bank & Trust, et al" on Justia Law