Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lockheed Martin Corp. sought to set aside a decision of the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor (the "ARB" or the "Board") that concluded Lockheed violated Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Board affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who concluded Lockheed violated the Act by constructively discharging employee Andrea Brown after she had engaged in protected activity. Brown worked as Communications Director for Lockheed from June 2000 to February 2008. In 2003, she became the Director of Communications in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In May 2006, Brown began having difficulty getting responses from one of her supervisors on work-related matters. She discussed the problem with Tina Colditz, a coworker and personal friend. Colditz ran a pen pals program for the company, through which Lockheed employees could correspond with members of the U.S. military deployed in Iraq. Colditz told Brown that the supervisor had developed sexual relationships with several of the soldiers in the program, had purchased a laptop computer for one soldier, sent inappropriate emails and sex toys to soldiers stationed in Iraq, and traveled to welcome-home ceremonies for soldiers on the pretext of business while actually taking soldiers to expensive hotels in limousines for intimate relations. Colditz told Brown she was concerned the supervisor was using company funds for these activities. Brown thus became concerned Owen’s actions were fraudulent and illegal and that there could be media exposure which could lead to government audits and affect the company’s future contracts and stock price. Brown brought her concerns to Jan Moncallo, Lockheed’s Vice President of Human Resources. Moncallo told Brown she would submit an anonymous ethics complaint on Brown’s behalf, and that she would be protected from retaliation because no one would know her identity. Moncallo sent an Prior to 2006, Brown received a "high contributor" or "exceptional contributor" rating in her performance evaluations. In late 2006, and thereafter, however, Brown received a lower rating of "successful contributor." In 2007, Lockheed announced to all employees it was undergoing a corporate-structure reorganization. Brown began reporting to a new supervisor, who according to Brown, had a negative attitude toward her from the beginning of their professional relationship. Shortly thereafter, Brown received a phone call from the former supervisor telling her that Brown’s job had been posted on the internet and that she should get her resume together. Brown would suffer from an emotional breakdown, fall into a deep depression, and take medical leave over the changes. Brown brought a complaint alleging violations of Sarbanes-Oxley. In his Recommended Decision and Order, the ALJ found that Brown had engaged in protected activity; she suffered materially adverse employment actions, including constructive discharge; and her engagement in protected activity was a contributing factor in the constructive discharge. The ALJ awarded reinstatement, back pay, medical expenses, and non-economic compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000. Lockheed timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor, which affirmed. Finding no error in the Board's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Lockheed Martin v. DOL" on Justia Law

After Dr. Brian Howard received a knee implant manufactured by Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc. that failed to bond properly, Howard and his wife filed suit against Sulzer alleging negligence per se. Following the completion of earlier consolidated litigation, the district court dismissed the Howards' negligence per se claim, predicting that it would not be cognizable under Oklahoma state law. The Tenth Circuit stayed the Howards' appeal pending the resolution of a question of state law certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. That question was answered, and the Tenth Circuit now reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Oklahoma Court held that Oklahoma law allowed private individuals to maintain a parallel claim for negligence per se based on violation of a federal regulation whose enforcement lies with a governmental entity. The court further concluded that "[t]he existence of a provision in federal law providing that all enforcement proceedings 'shall be by and in the name of the United States' did not prohibit a state law claim for negligence per se based on violation of the federal regulation." Noting that Howard did not claim he should have been entitled to bring a private action under the FDCA, but rather brought a state claim based on duties that "parallel, rather than add to, federal requirements," the court determined that Howard's negligence per se claim should have been allowed to proceed. View "Howard, et al v. Zimmer, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

The district court permitted the government to foreclose on federal tax liens on a ski cabin titled in the name of the D.E. Brown Family Trust, whose beneficiaries were Douglas Brown's wife and children. The taxes were owed by Douglas Brown (Brown) and his wife, not the trust, but the court found that the Browns were the beneficial owners of the cabin because Brown had a purchase-money resulting trust (PMRT) arising from his having purchased the cabin and then conveyed it to the Family Trust. The trustee of the Family Trust, Robert Tingey, appealed. He argued: (1) that the government waived its claim that the Browns held the beneficial interest in the cabin; and (2) that the district court erroneously concluded that a PMRT arose under Utah law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the government did not intentionally relinquish its claim to the cabin, and the evidence supported the district court's determination that Brown intended the trust to hold the cabin for his benefit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Tingey" on Justia Law

In a copyright infringement case, Enterprise Management Limited, Inc. and Mary Lippitt appealed a summary judgment in favor of Donald Warrick. Lippitt contended, contrary to the district court's holding, she demonstrated a prima facie case of copyright infringement. At issue was a diagram Lippitt created in the course of her work in organizational management. The diagram aimed to encapsulate and communicate the results of her research on the failures of complex organizational change initiatives. She created and registered the first version of the diagram in 1987; sometime around 1996, she updated it. She registered the update as part of a larger work in 2000; it was also included in materials she registered in 2003. In his motion for summary judgment, Warrick argued: (1) Lippitt could not prove she held a valid copyright on the diagram because she could not produce the diagram from the materials accompanying her 1987 registration to show its similarity to Warrick's diagram; (2) Lippitt's diagram was not copyrightable; and (3) Warrick's diagram did not infringe on any protected expression in Lippitt's diagram. After hearing arguments, the court granted Warrick's motion without issuing a written opinion. Lippitt contended summary judgment was inappropriate. In her view, her copyright infringement claim was viable because her diagram was entitled to copyright protection and Warrick admits to copying her duly registered diagram. Finding no merit to Warrick's arguments on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Enterprise Management Limited, Inc. v. Warrick" on Justia Law

Officer Shane Prickett of the Florence City Police Department used a Taser on Petitioner Lara Roosevelt-Hennix while Petitioner's hands were cuffed behind her back and she was seated in the back seat of a police car. She brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Prickett subjected her to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Prickett argued he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity in an brief oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing on Prickett's summary judgment motion. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether Prickett clearly established by the evidence in the record, on his assertion that Petitioner actively resisted the officers' proper attempts to place her in leg restraints. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Petitioner informed the officers she was physically unable to comply with their request to move her feet outside the patrol vehicle. Furthermore, the record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude the officers never attempted to aid Petitioner in moving her feet before applying the taser. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Prickett's motion for summary judgment. View "Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin Koessel was terminated from his position as a deputy sheriff in Sublette County, Wyoming, due to concerns about the lingering effects of a stroke he suffered. In response, petitioner brought suit in district court against the Sheriff and the County alleging they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), breached his employment contract, and violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact for a jury. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred in granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, claiming fact disputes existed on all of his claims. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court that the Defendants' were entitled to summary judgment on all of petitioner's claims. View "Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 ("Lloyds") appealed the district court's denial of its summary judgment motion and subsequent grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. ("BYA") in an action arising out of a professional liability insurance contract. The district court concluded Lloyds failed to pay sufficient indemnity to BYA for claims brought against BYA in an arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers. The underlying suit alleged BYA agents mismanaged and unlawfully "churned" the investment accounts of its clients. The court concluded the claims brought in the arbitration did not relate back to earlier claims brought outside the policy period and, therefore, rejected Lloyds' argument coverage was precluded altogether. Additionally, the court rejected BYA's argument that Lloyds was equitably estopped from denying coverage due to its course of conduct in receiving and defending the claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of the law of the case, and therefore abused its discretion in making its judgments in this case. Accordingly, the district court's decisions were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v. Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003" on Justia Law

Petitioner Frances M. Flood, a federal inmate, sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of her 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Tenth Circuit granted a COA on two issues: (1) whether Petitioner's trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest that deprived her of effective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the district court erred in denying Petitioner's motions for an evidentiary hearing, discovery, and judicial notice. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion. "In short, we simply cannot find a conflict of interest based on these facts. . . . Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Ms. Flood's motions for discovery and judicial notice." View "United States v. Flood" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the federal district court found that Appellant Maggie Chapman violated the "assisting and facilitating" provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310.3(b). A consumer protection action was brought by the Federal Trade Commission and four states against several individual and corporate defendants who marketed and sold to consumers grant-related goods and services with false representations that the consumers were guaranteed or likely to receive grants. After the claims against the other defendants were settled or adjudicated by entry of summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial on the remaining claim against Ms. Chapman. Following the trial, the court found that Ms. Chapman violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule by providing substantial assistance to telemarketing defendants while knowing or consciously avoiding knowing of their deceptive telemarketing practices. The court accordingly ordered a permanent injunction and $1,682,950 in monetary damages against Ms. Chapman. The court also denied Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment or, alternatively, for remittitur. Ms. Chapman appealed both the finding she violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule and the denial of her post-judgment motion. Not persuaded that the district court's underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous, and concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Squires filed an action against Defendant Breckenridge Outdoor Education Center asserting claims for negligence and gross negligence following a ski accident in which she was injured. The magistrate judge granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that Plaintiff's mother, Sara Squires, had validly released any claim for negligence against Defendant by signing an acknowledgment of risk and release of liability. Plaintiff appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate because the Release was unenforceable for three reasons: (1) the Release was as an invalid exculpatory agreement; (2) Mrs. Squires's decision to sign the Release was not voluntary and informed, as required by Colorado Revised Statute Section 13-22-107; and (3) to the extent the Release was otherwise enforceable, it was voidable because it was procured through fraud. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to grant partial summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Squires v. Breckenridge Outdoor Educ Cntr" on Justia Law