Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Christopher Michael Conner entered a conditional plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to 28 months' imprisonment followed by three years' supervised release. On appeal, he argued that the officers who stopped and frisked him based upon an anonymous tip violated the Fourth Amendment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "[t]his [was] clearly not a case of police officers arbitrarily stopping an individual walking down the sidewalk during the middle of the afternoon. . . . nor [was] this a case of police officers arbitrarily stopping an individual walking down an alley late at night in a high-crime area. Here, the officers had a sufficiently reliable tip and a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity they believed Mr. Conner might have been involved in an armed confrontation. Reasonable suspicion requires a dose of reasonableness and simply does not require an officer to rule out every possible lawful explanation for suspicious circumstances before effecting a brief stop to investigate further." View "United States v. Conner" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of obstructing justice stemming from his disclosure of the existence of an ongoing undercover investigation to one of the targets of that investigation. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six months and one day, followed by six months of home confinement and a term of supervised release. Upon review of Defendant's arguments on appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the government presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Defendant obstructed justice when he informed the target of the ongoing undercover investigation. Accordingly, Defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed.View "United States v. Ahrensfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Ann and Greg Elwell were in the process of adopting T.S., a young boy who had been in their care almost his entire life. But approximately one month after a complaint of emotional abuse of another child in the Elwells' care, state officials withdrew the license allowing the Elwells to care for T.S. and removed him from their home without any advance notice. Despite a state court's finding that the agency acted wrongfully in removing the boy, he was never returned to them. The Elwells brought suit against several state officials involved in the removal under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that qualified immunity did not shield the state officials from liability. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the defendants violated the Elwells' Due Process rights when they removed T.S. without notice. However, despite the Court's sympathy for the Elwells' plight, the Court concluded that this violation was not clearly established in the case law at the time of T.S.'s removal. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment. View "Elwell, et al v. Byers, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Alvin Valenzuela, an enrolled member of the Tohono O’odham Nation filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from tribal court convictions and his sentence. While Petitioner's petition was pending in federal district court, he completed his sentence and was released from prison. The district court concluded that Petitioner's claims were moot because of his release. Alternatively, it concluded that Petitioner had failed to exhaust his tribal remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court. Based on these alternative grounds, the district court dismissed the petition. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground that Mr. Valenzuela failed to exhaust his tribal court remedies and remanded the case for the district court to dismiss his petition without prejudice. View "Valenzuela v. Silversmith, et al" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with the intent to distribute. He was sentenced to sixty months' imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release, and he appealed. Defendant argued to the Tenth Circuit that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when it refused to allow him to cross-examine a witness about a prior judicial determination that the witness was not credible. Considering the "Van Arsdall" factors, the Court concluded there was at least a "reasonable probability" the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the jury not believed the inspector smelled the strong smell of marijuana when Defendant opened the trailer doors, or if the impeachment value of the cross-examination had been fully realized: "At the very least, the government [did] not meet its extraordinary burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Accordingly, Defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Woodard" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether a judgment has been "entered on the criminal docket" for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(6) if it is noted only on an internal district court document that is not publicly accessible. Following sentencing of Defendant-Appellant Francisco Mendoza, the district court filed a sealed judgment on a document labeled "Criminal Docket . . .Internal Use Only." The criminal docket available to the public contained no indication that judgment was ever entered. Upon review, the Court concluded that this procedure did not satisfy Rule 4(b)(6): "Dockets and docket sheets have traditionally been considered public documents. Consistent with a centuries-long history of public access to dockets, we hold that the phrase 'entered on the criminal docket' contemplates public notation that judgment has been entered. Entry on a list of filings maintained for internal court use and inaccessible to the public does not qualify under the ordinary meaning of Rule 4(b)(6)." View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

After Defendant Austin Alan Ray was arrested for downloading child pornography using peer-to-peer file-sharing software, he pled guilty in federal district court to receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. This appeal presented the question whether the district court could properly apply a two-level sentencing enhancement for the distribution of child pornography under USSG section 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) when the record indicated only that Defendant used the peer-to-peer file-sharing software and that its sharing function was enabled, but not that Defendant actually knew his software was capable of sharing files. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the guideline was properly applied. The Court also rejected Defendant’s claims that the district court unconstitutionally made findings for sentencing enhancements under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that the court erred procedurally at sentencing, and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

Pro se prisoner Defendant Brian Prendergast petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court's denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant was convicted by a Colorado jury on twelve counts of securities fraud and one count of theft over $15,000. He appealed his conviction and was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years of probation on each count. After his conviction, Defendant violated the terms of his probation on a number of occasions and was accordingly resentenced. In 2009, the State revoked his probation and Defendant was ultimately resentenced to concurrent six-year terms in prison. On petition to the Tenth Circuit, Defendant raised five claims: two attached the constitutionality of his 2009 resentencing; the remaining three attached the basis of his original conviction. The district court dismissed the two claims relating to the 2009 resentencing, and dismissed the remaining three as untimely. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of appeals found no reason to disturb the district court's rulings and affirmed. View "Prendergast v. Clements, et al" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case filed interlocutory appeals from a district order that granted a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff, an association of individual members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and beneficiaries of a charitable religious trust (FLDS Association). The FLDS Association alleged six claims for relief: (1) a claim for declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging deprivation of the FLDS Association's rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) a claim for declaratory relief under Article 1, Sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution; (3) a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; (4) a claim that Utah Code Ann. 76-7-101, which prohibits plural marriage, was unconstitutional as applied under the federal and state constitutions; (5) a claim that Utah Code Ann. sections 75-7-1001, -412(1), and -413(1)(c) were unconstitutional as applied; and (6) a claim for injunctive relief against the defendants' continuing administration of the UEP Trust. The FLDS Association also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the probate court's ongoing administration of the UEP Trust. The federal suit was stayed pending the parties' settlement negotiations. After granting the defendants' motion for an emergency stay pending resolution of these appeals, the Tenth Circuit certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court regarding the preclusive effect of laches under Utah law of dismissal, of a petition for extraordinary writ. The Court received its answer from the Utah court and vacated the district court's preliminary injunction, remanding the case to dismiss the FLDS Association's claims as barred by res judicata. View "Fundamentalist Church of Jesus v. Wisan (Horne Appeal), et al" on Justia Law

John Doe pled guilty to two drug trafficking charges in a plea bargain. Prior to the plea deal, he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for breach of an immunity agreement and outrageous governmental conduct. The district court denied the motion. In the plea agreement, Doe did not negotiate a conditional plea in which he retained the right to appeal the court’s ruling, so he could not appeal unless he could establish a basis for the Tenth Circuit to ignore the appeal waiver. He attempted to do so in this appeal by contending: (1) the government cannot force the waiver of an immunity agreement on due process grounds; and (2) even if he could waive immunity, outrageous government conduct was an implied exception to any appeal waiver. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Doe lacked a basis to bring the appeal and the facts of the case did not implicate the outrageous governmental conduct exception. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Doe's conviction, dismissed his appeal, and granted his motion to seal the briefs. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law