Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Rural Water District No. 2 Creek County, Oklahoma, a rural water provider covered by 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), and Defendant Glenpool Utility Services Authority, a public trust created to provide water service, and its beneficiary, Defendant City of Glenpool, entered into a Settlement Agreement under which Plaintiff agreed not to file a civil action pursuant to section 1926(b) during the term of the agreement unless Defendants defaulted on their contractual obligations. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the civil action underlying this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging Defendants violated section 1926(b). The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit centered on whether Plaintiff’s agreement not to file a civil action against Defendants, absent default, deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where a state court had not yet determined whether Defendants defaulted. Upon review, the Court held that such agreement did not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, and it reversed and remanded. View "Rural Wtr Dist No 2 Creek Cnty v. City of Glenpool, et al" on Justia Law

The dispute before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on interest earned on block grants made to Indian tribes pursuant to the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act. Specifically, Appellant Muscogee (Creek) Nation's Division of Housing challenged both a regulation placing a two-year limit on the investment of grant funds and two notices issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development stating that any interest accrued after the expiration of this two-year period must be returned to the Department. The Nation sought declaratory relief invalidating the regulation and notices as well as an injunction to prevent HUD from recouping interest earned on grant funds. The Nation also sought recoupment of the approximately $1.3 million of earned interest it wired to HUD after HUD sent a letter threatening an enforcement action based on the Nation’s investment of grant funds for longer than two years. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that HUD’s sovereign immunity was not waived by the Administrative Procedures Act and, in the alternative, that the Nation had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because HUD’s interpretation of the statute was permissible. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that HUD was authorized to promulgate a regulation limiting the period for investments, and required to demand remittance of interest earned in violation of the regulation. The Nation was therefore not entitled to recouping the interest it paid to HUD pursuant to HUD's enforcement of its rules. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. HUD, et al" on Justia Law

Debtor Peter Woodman filed two timely notices of appeal from an adverse decision by the bankruptcy court. One appeal was heard by the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP), which dismissed the appeal a month later for failure to prosecute. The other was heard by the district court, which decided to consider the matter despite the prior BAP ruling but ruled against Mr. Woodman on the merits. He appealed the district court's judgment. Finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment. View "Woodman v. Aspen Hills Properties, et al" on Justia Law

Debtor Fred Fausett Cranmer filed a Chapter 13 repayment plan, which excluded Social Security income (SSI) from the projected disposable income calculation. The bankruptcy trustee objected to the plan on that basis. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the plan, concluding, inter alia, SSI must be included in the projected disposable income calculation and Cranmer's failure to do so meant he did not propose his plan in good faith. Cranmer appealed and the district court reversed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that SSI need not be included in the calculation of projected disposable income and Cranmer's failure to include it was not grounds for finding he did not propose his plan in good faith. View "Anderson v. Cranmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Bridget Smith worked for Rail Link, Inc. (Rail Link) as a freight operator in Wyoming. She was injured on the job, and subsequently sued Rail Link and its corporate parent Genessee & Wyoming, Inc. (GWI) in federal district court, asserting that the companies were liable for her injuries under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they were not subject to FELA liability for Plaintiff's injuries because FELA only applies where a defendant is the injured worker's employer and is a common carrier. Rail Link argued it was a not a common carrier, and GWI argued it was neither a common carrier nor Plaintiff's Smith's employer. The district court agreed granted summary judgment for both Defendants. Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he concept of employment under FELA is a broad one, but to show an employment relationship a plaintiff still must offer some evidence that physical conduct was or could have been controlled by an alleged employer. The record here is lacking in [that] regard, compelling a ruling in GWI's favor." View "Smith v. Rail Link, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Kaufman brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the Defendants, all Colorado police officers, had violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause. In 2009, a vehicle driven by an unnamed female driver hit an unoccupied car in a jewelry store parking lot. Someone witnessed the incident, took down the car's license plate number and reported it to the Colorado State Patrol. Officers investigating the report learned that Plaintiff owned the car and had made a purchase at the store moments before the accident. Plaintiff cited "privilege" in refusing to tell the officers the name of the female driver. Frustrated, the officers advised Plaintiff that refusing to tell them the name of the driver could end in an arrest for obstruction of justice. Plaintiff refused and he was arrested. The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. As to a Fourth Amendment claim, the court concluded that there was no false arrest because the troopers had probable cause to believe Plaintiff's silence, accompanied by assertion of privilege, constituted a violation of the obstruction statute. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. The Defendants never contended that their encounter with Plaintiff was other than consensual; the law was well established that a citizen has no obligation to answer an officer's questions during a consensual encounter; and the Colorado Supreme Court had made it clear that the Colorado obstruction statute is not violated by mere verbal opposition to an officer's questioning. "It follows that the Defendants could not have reasonably thought that they were justified in arresting Plaintiff and their motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity should have been denied." View "Kaufman v. Higgs, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case concerned whether the amount of a federal tax refund equivalent to the "nonrefundable" portion of the child tax credit was exempt from a bankruptcy debtor's estate under Colorado law. The Bankruptcy Panel for the Tenth Circuit held that the disputed funds were exempt; upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed, finding that the nonrefundable portion was "property" of the bankruptcy estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 541(a). View "In re: Borgman, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Jose Salas-Garcia filed a direct appeal to the Tenth Circuit following his conditional plea of guilty to one count of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and one count of possessing more than 500 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Prior to his plea, he moved to suppress drugs found in the vehicle he was driving as well as statements he made to police, arguing that he was illegally arrested and the evidence subsequently obtained was the fruit of a constitutional violation. The district court denied his motion to suppress. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea on both counts. He then sought to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not fully understand the immigration consequences of his plea. He argued he had an absolute right to withdraw his plea because the district court had not yet accepted it. The district court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of sixty months' imprisonment and a four-year term of supervised release. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and dismissed his appeal of the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "United States v. Salas-Garcia" on Justia Law

In December 2008, Defendant Joe Maldonado pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence report (PSR) concluded that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) applied to him as a result of three prior burglary convictions, subjecting him to a mandatory sentencing enhancement. Defendant objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions, a first-degree burglary conviction in California, was not a violent felony under the ACCA. The district court overruled the objection and sentenced Defendant to the ACCA-mandated minimum sentence of 15 years. The sole issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether California's first-degree burglary statute was a violent felony under the ACCA. Upon review, the Court held that it was by virtue of the ACCA's residual clause. View "United States v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Jarrod Duran challenged the procedural reasonableness of his forty-one month sentence, claiming that his prior conviction for aggravated assault under Texas law was not a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Because the Tenth Circuit agreed that under Texas law aggravated assault could be committed with only a mens rea of recklessness, it is not categorically a crime of violence. The Court therefore remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Duran" on Justia Law