Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a consolidated appeal, Oklahoma state prisoner Petitioner-Appellant Victor Hooks appealed two district court orders that denied him habeas relief. He sought relief on three alternate grounds: (1) he is mentally retarded and thus categorically ineligible for the death penalty; (2) aspects of his mental-retardation trial ("Atkins trial") denied him his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial; and (3) his counsel was ineffective during both the guilt and sentencing phases of his original trial. Grounds 1 and 2 arose in Appeal No. 10-6076; ground 3 arose in Appeal No. 03-6049. The district court granted certificates of appealability on all claims. In No. 10-6076, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on all claims arising out of the Atkins trial; the Court affirmed the district court in No. 03-6049 which denied habeas relief as to Petitioner's 1989 conviction, but reversed the district court as to Petititioner's sentence. The writ was conditionally granted as to Petitioner's sentence. View "Hooks v. Workman" on Justia Law

Eureka Water Company contended that a 1975 agreement granted it the exclusive license in 60 Oklahoma counties to sell spring water and other products using the "Ozarka" trademark. It sued Nestle Waters North America, Inc., the current owner of the Ozarka trademark, to obtain a declaratory judgment of that right and to obtain monetary relief under several theories, including breach of contract, tortious interference with business relations, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. A jury found for Eureka on its contract and tortious interference claims, and the district court entered a judgment declaring that the 1975 agreement granted Eureka the exclusive right that it claimed in the Ozarka mark. In a post-verdict ruling, the district court denied as duplicative Eureka's equitable claims based on unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. Nestle appealed. The Tenth Circuit agreed with most of Nestle's principal arguments. First, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Nestle's motion for JMOL on the contract claim because the 1975 agreement unambiguously did not cover spring water and under Oklahoma contract law. The Court reversed the denial of JMOL on the tortious-interference claim because Eureka failed to show that Nestle's decision to charge Eureka what it charged other vendors for bottled water was not privileged or justified. Third, the Court affirmed the denial of Eureka's unjust enrichment claim because the claim is based on the false premise that Eureka's license to use the Ozarka trademark covers spring water. The Court reversed, however, the denial of Eureka's promissory-estoppel claim, and remanded that claim for further consideration by the district court. View "Eureka Water Company v. Nestle Waters North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Armijo, former police chief of the Village of Columbus in New Mexico, filed a civil suit against several individual and entity defendants, including Appellants Armando Perales, Arnold Chavez, Adrian Flores, and Mirabel Jimenez. The civil suit arose out of an earlier criminal investigation that resulted in Appellants executing search and arrest warrants against Plaintiff. At the time in question, Appellants were criminal investigators in the district attorney’s office. In early 2007, Appellant Chavez assigned Appellants Jimenez and Perales to investigate Plaintiff on allegations of improper evidence handling, inventory problems relating to both police equipment and evidence, and the mishandling of city funds and impounded vehicles. Around the same time period, Plaintiff reported an alleged battery by the Village of Columbus mayor to state police. A conflicting bid sheet and purchase order relating to a city firearm purchase caused Appellants to investigate Plaintiff’s role in the transaction. In his Section 1983 complaint, Plaintiff raised a number of claims against several defendants, including claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, illegal search and seizure, and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment arising from Plaintiff’s report of the mayor’s alleged battery. Appellants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment, holding the search and arrest warrants were invalid and thus Appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and illegal search and seizure claims. Further, the district court held genuine issues of material fact existed as to certain elements of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and therefore denied summary judgment on that claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusions and affirmed the court's denial of summary judgment. View "Armijo v. Perales, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in evaluating whether Defendant Hasan Ali Hasan was entitled to a court interpreter at grand jury proceedings that led to his indictment for perjury. The conviction was appealed and remanded because the Court concluded that Defendant may not have been able to communicate effectively in English in violation of the Court Interpreters Act. The case was remanded to the district court so the court could make findings related to Defendant's comparative ability to understand the grand jury proceedings. After remand, Defendant again appealed, this time arguing the court had not adequately followed the Tenth Circuit's directions spelled out in the prior case. The Tenth Circuit agreed, leading to a second remand for more specific findings. The district court then entered additional findings and conclusions, based on its review of the grand jury transcripts and its observations of the trial proceedings, that Defendant could sufficiently comprehend and communicate in English at the grand jury proceedings, and that whatever linguistic limitations he had were not so great as to make the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The question presented in this appeal was whether the district court's findings and conclusions satisfied the Tenth Circuit's directions in the first and second cases. Upon review, the Court concluded the district court did. View "United States v. Hasan" on Justia Law

In 2007, while Plaintiffs-Appellants Scott and Lisa Sanders were attempting to refinance their home, they discovered Salt Lake City Credit Union had “reported twelve new maxed-out accounts on the Sanders[es]’ credit [reports].” They say this “destroyed [their] credit and made it impossible to refinance.” Afterward, the credit union “apologized for the misreporting” and “offered to make amends by providing [them] with a ‘free’ refinance.” They accepted this conciliatory offer and closed on the refinancing loan in July 2007. Salt Lake City Credit Union later merged with appellee Mountain America. In March 2009, the Sanderses applied to Mountain America to again refinance their loan. They completed the application by phone, but Mountain America denied their application at the end of the call. Pertinent to this appeal, the Sanderses’ complaint alleged: (1) they had not been provided with the disclosures required under the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) thereby entitling them to invoke statutory rescission; (2) Mountain America violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) when it failed to provide a notice of adverse action after denying their application for refinancing; and (3) Mountain America’s inaccurate credit reporting violated the Fair Credit Report Act (FCRA). The district court dismissed these claims on the pleadings. Although the Tenth Circuit had not addressed the issue, several circuits allow district courts to equitably condition the creditor’s duty on the borrower’s ability to repay the loan proceeds. In this case, however, the district court went further by concluding a borrower seeking to compel rescission must plead ability to repay. The court invoked this rule to dismiss the TILA rescission claim of the Sanderses. It also dismissed their claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings: the Court affirmed with respect to the FCRA claim and reversed with respect to the TILA rescission and ECOA claims. View "Sanders v. Ethington" on Justia Law

Defendant Alfredo Huizar pled guilty to reentering the United States illegally after an earlier deportation. The district court held that Defendant's 1995 California conviction for residential burglary qualified as a "crime of violence," triggering a sixteen-level enhancement. On appeal, Defendant argued the enhancement wasn't legally authorized and his sentence should have been reconsidered. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in calculating Defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Huizar" on Justia Law

AECOM, Inc. hired Centennial Archaeology, Inc. to perform cultural resources survey work in connection with a wind-energy project. When AECOM refused to pay Centennial for some of its work, Centennial brought suit against AECOM in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. Centennial prevailed on several claims and the parties ultimately settled on appeal the issues raised with respect to the merits of the litigation. This appeal concerned the parties' dispute about the district court's postjudgment order requiring AECOM to pay Centennial $58,361.51 in attorney fees for misconduct in the course of discovery. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: the magistrate judge and district court reasonably found that AECOM had frustrated the discovery process and stalled the resolution of this case. And the amount of the fee award was proper. In particular, Centennial was entitled to an award under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 even though its attorneys were working for a fixed fee. View "Centennial Archaeology, Inc. v. AECOM, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Tina Marie Somerlott appealed a district court's dismissal of her claims against Cherokee Nation Distributors, Inc and CND, LLC ("CND") for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioner brought federal employment discrimination claims against CND, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. After allowing discovery by both parties, the district court concluded CND was immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, therefore, dismissed Petitioner's complaint in its entirety. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the court's reasoning and affirmed its decision. View "Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distributors, et al" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court has construed section 66-7-325 N.M. Stat. Ann. to require a motorist changing lanes to signal "even when there is only a reasonable possibility that other traffic may be affected by the signaling driver's movement." The broader question in this case was whether a New Mexico highway patrol officer lawfully stopped Defendant Francisco Burciaga's vehicle based on a suspected violation of 66-7-325, where Defendant without timely engaging his turn signal, changed from the left to the right lane on the interstate after passing the officer's patrol car. The district court held the stop violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures because the officer's testimony failed to establish that traffic "could have been affected" by Defendant's lane change absent facts not in evidence. Consequently, the court granted Defendant's motion to suppress over 17 kilograms of heroin recovered as a result of the stop. The Government appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that section 66-7-325 as applied to the facts of this case provided the officer with an objectively justifiable basis for stopping Defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "United States v. Burciaga" on Justia Law

Defendant Agapito Franco-Lopez appealed his conviction on one count of transporting an illegal alien. Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the government did not present evidence that the transported alien illegally "entered" the United States. In support, Defendant relied on the definition of "entry" used in the context of civil immigration law or in illegal reentry cases charged under 8 U.S.C. 1325 and 1326. As to this element of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), the Tenth Circuit concluded the government needed only prove that the transported alien was present in the United States in violation of the law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Franco-Lopez" on Justia Law