Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants William L. Pickard and Clyde Apperson were convicted of drug-related crimes in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. An important witness for the prosecution was informant Gordon Todd Skinner, a criminal associate of Defendants. After the convictions were affirmed on appeal, Defendants filed motions for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 claiming, among other things, that the prosecution had violated their rights under "Brady v. Maryland",(373 U.S. 83 (1963)), and "Giglio v. United States", (405 U.S. 150 (1972)), by suppressing evidence of Skinner's criminal and informant background. The district court rejected the claims. Defendants applied for certificates of appealability (COAs) to appeal the district court's decision, but we denied their applications. They also filed district-court motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside the court's judgment in the Section 2255 proceedings, raising multiple claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Defendants' claims of "Brady/Giglio" violations at trial were second-or-successive claims; and because Defendants did not establish the requisites for authorizing a second-or-successive claim, the Court denied authorization. On the other hand, Defendants' claims that prosecutorial misconduct in the Section 2255 proceedings affected the integrity of those proceedings are proper Rule 60(b) claims; and the Court remanded those claims to the district court for resolution. View "In re: Apperson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Arrienne Mae Winzler brought state law claims against Defendant-Appellee Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc. (Toyota) on behalf of a proposed nationwide class of 2006 Toyota Corolla and Toyota Corolla Matrix owners and lessees. She alleged that the cars harbored defective "Engine Control Modules" ("ECMs"), making them prone to stall without warning. As relief, she asked for an order requiring Toyota to notify all relevant owners of the defect and then to create and coordinate an equitable fund to pay for repairs. Before addressing whether Plaintiff's class should be certified, the district court held her complaint failed to state a claim and dismissed it under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As Plaintiff began her appeal, Toyota announced a nationwide recall of 2005-2008 Toyota Corolla and Corolla Matrix cars to fix their ECMs. Arguing that these statutory and regulatory processes were exactly the relief sought in Plaintiff's complaint, Toyota asked the Tenth Circuit to find that its recall rendered Plaintiff's case moot. "Because prudential mootness is arguably the narrowest of the many bases Toyota has suggested for dismissal, and because it is sufficient to that task, [the Court has] no need to discuss any of Toyota's other arguments for the same result." The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc" on Justia Law

Defendant Johnny Black was convicted of first-degree murder and battery with a dangerous weapon. On the recommendation of the jury, Defendant received a death sentence on the first-degree murder conviction. After unsuccessfully appealing to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) and pursuing two postconviction proceedings in state court, Defendant unsuccessfully applied for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 in the Oklahoma federal district court. Defendant appealed the district court's decision, raising 14 claims of error at trial, including ineffective assistance of counsel. On the first eight claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on the merits generally because the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting these claims. On the remaining claims the district court denied relief on the ground of procedural bar. Before the Court could determine whether it agreed with the district court, the Court needed to resolve a question of Oklahoma procedural law: whether Oklahoma's bar of Defendant's second postconviction application was independent of federal law or instead required the OCCA to examine the merits of Defendant's federal constitutional claims. The Court therefore certified a question of state law to the OCCA, abating this appeal pending consideration by the OCCA of the Tenth Circuit's certification request. View "Black v. Workman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Jaramillo appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Adams County School District 14 on her 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim for race discrimination. Plaintiff was employed as principal of Hanson PreK-8 school. More than 70% of the students attending Hanson are Hispanic, and Plaintiff was the only Hispanic principal in the District. In 2008, the District contemplated policy changes, including implementing an English Language Learners policy, which stresses English immersion (rather than teaching subjects in Spanish as well as English), and operating Hanson on the same academic year as other schools in the District. These proposals were controversial in the Hispanic community and apparently with some of the teachers at Hanson. Dr. Sue Chandler, interim superintendent of the District, received a copy of an e-mail about a planned teachers’ meeting before the public study session which contained false and inaccurate information. Dr. Chandler met with Plaintiff to ask for the name of the person who had misinformed her as to the specifics of the policy. Plaintiff refused to give the name. They met again later in the afternoon and Dr. Chandler questioned Plaintiff about her lack of support for the administration’s policy, and requested that Plaintiff provide Dr. Chandler with the name of the person who informed Plaintiff about the Board’s upcoming study session. Dr. Chandler informed Plaintiff that failing to provide the name would result in disciplinary action. Plaintiff refused to provide the name. Dr. Chandler placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave; Plaintiff was subsequently notified by letter that Dr. Chandler recommended Plaintiff's termination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment: "What the record does reveal in this case is disagreement about administrative policy choices --hardly infrequent in the education setting. But that does not constitute pretext [of discrimination]." View "Jaramillo v. Adams County School Dist. 14" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Flying Phoenix Corporation appealed a district court’s dismissal of its claims against Defendants North Park Transportation Company and R&L Carriers Shared Services (the carriers), with prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Flying Phoenix purchased a machine designed to package fireworks for sale to end users from Defendant Creative Packaging Machinery, Inc. The machine arrived severely damaged. Creative Packaging was responsible for shipping the machine to Flying Phoenix. Creative Packaging used R&L Carriers Shared Services to ship from North Carolina to Wyoming. The bill of lading limited the period for filing claims with a carrier to nine months, and limited the time for filing civil suit to two years and one day following denial of a claim. At some point during the delivery, R&L Carriers transferred the machine to North Park Transportation Company to complete delivery to Flying Phoenix. Three days after the machine was delivered, Flying Phoenix filed a claim with North Park based on damage to the machine. Roughly two weeks later, North Park inspected the machine and confirmed that it was damaged. A little less than a month later, North Park and R&L Carriers notified Flying Phoenix that its claim was denied, citing evidence that the shipment was issued with insufficient packaging or protection. Flying Phoenix renewed its claim approximately six months later, in November 2007, and the carriers again denied the claim, asserting that the machine was "used" and inadequately packaged. On appeal, Flying Phoenix argued that the district court erred by holding that (1) its claims were based on the bill of lading, and (2) it was bound by the terms of the bill of lading even though it was not a party and did not consent. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Flying Phoenix's claims: "Flying Phoenix claim[ed] that, although it was listed as consignee on the bill of lading, it never saw the bill of lading until after the limitations period lapsed. It argue[d] that, since it did not know the terms of the carriage, it should not be bound. [The Court found] no precedent for Flying Phoenix’s position, and Flying Phoenix [did] not direct [the Court] to any. There is no suggestion in the record that Flying Phoenix ever sought a copy of the bill of lading but was denied access, and it is well-established that a party may not sit idly by, making no effort to obtain obviously necessary documents, and then claim ignorance. Lack of diligence precludes equitable intervention." View "Flying Phoenix Corp. v. Creative Packaging Machinery" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce McDonald took out a loan (Note) secured by a deed of trust on Colorado real property in favor of the lender, IndyMac Bank. Plaintiff made payments on the loan from its 2003 inception until April 2009, including while IndyMac was operated in receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC sold IndyMac to a holding company that operated it as Defendant-Appellee OneWest, F.S.B. and OneWest, as the new loan servicer, notified Plaintiff of the sale. Plaintiff stopped making payments because OneWest "did not provide [him] with the instrument or reasonable evidence of authority to make such a presentment" in accordance with his demands for the original Note. Ultimately, OneWest foreclosed on the property and obtained a Rule 120 Order authorizing the sale of the property, after it produced the original Note, the deed of trust, and a pooling and servicing agreement governing the Note. The property was sold in 2010. OneWest purchased it, later assigning its interest in the property to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp (FHLMC). Plaintiff filed suit in state district court claiming that OneWest was not entitled to payment on the Note and the order of sale was void. FHLMC filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Plaintiff seeking to evict him; Plaintiff obtained a stay pending resolution of his state court action. Plaintiff then amended his state-court complaint to join FHLMC and include a quiet title action; neither defendant answered and the state district court granted a default judgment quieting title in Plaintiff. Onewest appealed the default judgment. While the appeal was pending, Plaintiff filed this federal action against OneWest Bank on civil RICO, pattern of racketeering activities, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, fraud, and violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. The federal district court noted that it probably lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine given that Plaintiff was attempting to litigate the same claims that the Rule 120 court had rejected. The court ultimately dismissed the action on the basis of Plaintiff's failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review of the case, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's counsel admitted that the issue of the validity of the Note was presented at state court, but was not covered by the notice of appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Furthermore, Plaintiff's Rule 60 motion was not filed until nearly six months after the notice of appeal was filed, and no new notice of appeal was entered on this issue. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit was unable to consider these claims in this appeal, and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "McDonald v. OneWest Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant David R. Ribeau, Jr., appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Dean Katt and Richard Smith. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim alleging that Defendants violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Smith was Plaintiff's immediate supervisor at the Unified School District 290 (USD 290) in Ottawa, Kansas. Plaintiff worked as a maintenance mechanic. In 2008, Plaintiff was fired after 24 years on the job for alleged poor work performance. Mr. Katt, USD 290's superintendent, told Plaintiff that the USD 290 Board of Education had given its approval for his termination. Due to the Defendants' representations, Plaintiff believed he could not file a grievance because the Board had already approved his termination. The Board, however, had not yet given its approval: the Board did not approve Plaintiff's termination until approximately one month later. The district court found Plaintiff was an at-will employee and had no protected property interest in his continued employment. Plaintiff timely appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Court found that any entitlement Plaintiff had to a pre-termination Board hearing derived from his express employment contract. The language of that contract was unambiguous and did not provide for a pre-termination hearing before the Board. Plaintiff therefore had no legitimate claim of entitlement to a pre-termination hearing under state law, and the district court was correct to dismiss his 1983 claim. View "Ribeau v. Katt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Jean Rosenfield appealed a district court's order that granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee HSBC Bank, USA (HSBC). Plaintiff brought claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages against HSBC for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), contending her lender failed to make required disclosures in a residential loan refinancing agreement executed by the parties, and that because of this, she was entitled to a rescission of her loan agreement. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her claims and by holding that she failed to timely exercise her right of rescission within the applicable three-year time bar specified by TILA. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and affirmed its judgment. View "Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Raul Cruz was convicted, after a jury trial, of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and was sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred (1) by not requiring the government to disclose a confidential informant involved in a controlled buy, and (2) in relying on certain disputed facts about the controlled buy contained in the PSR. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of the district court's discretion and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

"By all appearances, Defendant Howard Kieffer had a successful nationwide criminal law practice." Defendant managed to gain admission to multiple federal trial and appellate courts across the country where he appeared on behalf of numerous criminal defendants. Defendant never attended law school, sat for a bar exam, nor receive a license to practice law. A North Dakota jury convicted Defendant of mail fraud and for making false statements. The jury found Defendant gained admission to the District of North Dakota by submitting a materially false application to the court, then relied on that admission to gain admission to the District of Minnesota, District of Colorado, and Western District of Missouri. The district court sentenced Defendant to 51 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to six victims of his scheme. A jury in Colorado also convicted him of making false statements, wire fraud and contempt of court. The district court sentenced Defendant to 57 months' imprisonment to run consecutively to the 51 month sentence previously imposed on him in North Dakota. The court further ordered him to pay restitution to seven victims of his scheme unaccounted for in North Dakota, and directed him as a special condition of supervised release to obtain the probation office's preapproval of any proposed employment or business ventures. Defendant appealed his most recent convictions and sentence from Colorado, each based on his Sixth Amendment right to have the Government prove, and a jury find, all elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, Defendant presented five challenges to his sentence, three of which bore directly upon the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record reflected that by the time of Defendant's actual sentencing, the district court had decided to sentence him within the advisory guideline range. The court then proceeded to calculate Defendant’s guideline range incorrectly on the basis of numerous procedural errors, both factual and legal. As a result, the court selected a sentence from the wrong guideline range. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence on Counts I and II of the superceding indictment and remanded the case for resentencing. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "United States v. Kieffer" on Justia Law