Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Miguel Hernandez-Valdez appealed his sentence of thirty-three months' imprisonment for having been convicted of being an alien in possession of a firearm. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for his possession of the firearm in connection with another felony offense. Although the Court concluded the district court failed to engage in fact finding as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant did not show that the court committed plain error. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's calculation of Defendant's sentence.

Defendant Lazaro Villalobos-Varela appealed a district court’s sentence of thirty months' imprisonment for re-entry as a removed alien in violation of federal immigration law. According to Defendant, the district court incorrectly concluded that his Colorado felony menacing conviction was a crime of violence and subjected him to a 16-Level Enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guideline Manual (USSG) 2L1.2. Upon review and analysis of Defendant's Colorado conviction, the Tenth Circuit concluded that indeed "felony menacing" was a crime of violence, and that the district court correctly calculated his sentence. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.

On the morning his jury trial was scheduled to begin, Defendant Francisco Solorio-Mondragon pled guilty to (1) conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute, and (2) possessing more than fifty grams of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The district court calculated the applicable sentencing guidelines range to be 151 to 188 months of imprisonment for both counts. In light of additional drug activity that Defendant admitted to, the court imposed a sentence at the high end but still within the calculated guidelines range. On appeal, Defendant’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to "Anders v. California," (386 U.S. 738 (1967)), explaining why counsel believed there to be no reasonable grounds for appeal. Defendant and the government were both given the opportunity to file a response to the Anders brief, but neither did so. Upon review of the record and counsel's brief, the Tenth Circuit agreed that none of Defendant's arguments raised a meritorious issue for appeal. As such, the Tenth Circuit granted counsel's motion to withdraw and dismissed Defendant's appeal.

Defendant Larry Koch appealed a jury’s verdict that found him guilty of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Defendant admitted others committed bank fraud but disputed that he knowingly participated in their conspiracy. Alternatively, Defendant argued his conviction should have been overturned because the government failed to indict him sooner than it did. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found sufficient evidence presented at trial with which the jury could conclude Defendant was guilty. Furthermore, Defendant's failed to carry his burden of proving he suffered actual prejudice from the time the government charged him with conspiracy and the time he went to trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Petitioner Joe Mendoza was docked 40 days good time credit for violating the Bureau of Prison's (BOP) policy on drug use. He filed a habeas petition to challenge the fairness of the disciplinary proceeding and requested the Tenth Circuit expunge the sanction from his record and restore the good time credit. Finding no constitutional violation in the BOP's proceedings, the district court affirmed. Upon review of the BOP and district court records, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding none of Petitioner's allegations rose to violations of his constitutional rights.

The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CTFC) and the Oklahoma Department of Securities brought suit against multiple corporate defendants (including Prestige Ventures Corporation) and several individuals, Kenneth Lee and his wife and two sons, Simon Yang. The Lees and Mr. Yang appealed pro se a district court's order entered in favor of CTFC. In their complaint, the CTFC alleged that defendants operated a Ponzi scheme that bilked at least 140 investors out of millions of dollars, in violation of a number of provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Oklahoma Uniform Securities Act of 2004. Plaintiffs also alleged that millions of dollars were funneled to Defendants from Prestige by Mr. Lee, in cash and in the form of houses, cars, and boats. The court authorized a receiver to take possession of and sell the houses and boats. further, the court entered a broad array of permanent injunctive orders prohibiting defendants from further dealings in commodity futures and transacting investment-related business in Oklahoma. The court further ordered Defendants to pay over $5 million in restitution and a number of penalties, and ordered Defendants to disgorge large sums of cash. Each of the Lees filed a substantively identical motion for reconsideration of the Order. Having considered these issues and having reviewed the briefs, the record,and the applicable law in light of the applicable review standards, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s order of summary judgment and its Order.

Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Rose, a Utah lawyer, initiated the underlying federal lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of state disciplinary proceedings brought against her by the Utah bar. She also sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin those proceedings. The district court denied the injunction, and while this appeal from the injunction decision was pending, it dismissed the underlying action. The Bar moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming it was mooted by the dismissal of the underlying action. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed this appeal was moot, and granted the Bar's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lawrence Harris filed a pro se complaint naming the "Tulsa 66ers" NBA Development League basketball team and two individual employees of the team as defendants. Harris sought damages from the defendants for "herresment" and "false adveretisement" due to the fact that he was not selected to play for the team after attending an open tryout in October 2010. From Plaintiff's filings, the court could not determine whether it had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court was correct in concluding it did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, and affirmed the court's ruling and dismissed Plaintiff's case.

Boston Scientific Corporation and Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corporation (Boston Scientific) filed suit to enforce a non-compete agreement against Mikelle Mabey, a former employee, and St. Jude Medical Neuromodulation Division (St. Jude), her new employer. The district court held in favor of Mabey and St. Jude, and Boston Scientific appealed. In 2009, after Mabey had worked for Boston Scientific for three years, the company asked her to sign a non-compete agreement. If she signed, she would remain eligible for a quarterly bonus that had been offered the year before. If she did not sign, Boston Scientific would reduce her bonus eligibility by $1,000 for each of the final three quarters of 2009; however, she would remain employed at-will and would continue to receive the same base salary. Mabey signed the agreement in March. As a result, she earned $3,000 more in bonus pay than if she had not signed the agreement. In May 2010, Mabey left Boston Scientific to work for its competitor, St.Jude. Boston Scientific filed suit in Utah federal district court to enforce the non-compete agreement. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the non-compete was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration because Boston Scientific "merely kept Mabey’s compensation the same" in exchange for her signing the agreement, and that "no more constituted a 'clear additional benefit' than continuing a person’s employment does in an at-will employment situation." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit was unpersuaded by Mabey's "failure of consideration" argument: in exchange for signing the non-compete, Mabey received a benefit to which, as an at-will employee, she had no legal right. This was sufficient to form a valid agreement. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2005, Appellant CCCOK, Inc. filed a complaint at the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) against Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P.(SWBT). CCCOK sought an order directing SWBT to pay it over two-million dollars in compensation for SWBT's alleged breach of a contract between them. The OCC rejected CCCOK’s claim, concluding that CCCOK was not entitled to compensation under the "clear and unambiguous" language of the Parties' contract. The federal district court affirmed the OCC's ruling. CCCOK appealed. On appeal, CCCOK contended that the OCC's ruling was arbitrary and capricious because it: (1) disregarded the terms of the parties' contract; (2) contradicted record evidence; and (3) violated CCCOK's rights under state and federal law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the OCC's ruling was not arbitrary and capricious and it affirmed the district court's decision.