Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anthony Buntyn, an employee of a private company that transported detainees for law enforcement agencies, was charged with willfully violating the detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause due to inhumane conditions of confinement. The conditions developed while Buntyn transported the detainees in a van to various detention facilities. The government alleged that Buntyn had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause through deliberate indifference to intolerable conditions of confinement and that this indifference had resulted in bodily injury to three detainees. The jury found Buntyn guilty of depriving the detainees of humane conditions, acting willfully and with deliberate indifference, and causing bodily injury to one detainee.Buntyn appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for a finding of guilt, that the district court erred in preventing his attorney from using the term malice in closing argument, and that the court coerced the jury to reach a verdict. The Tenth Circuit rejected Buntyn's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of inhumane conditions, deliberate indifference, and willfulness. The court also found that the district court did not err in prohibiting the use of the term malice in closing argument, and that Buntyn had waived his challenge to the district court's instruction for the jury to continue deliberating. View "United States v. Buntyn" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Breeze Aviation Group, Inc. (Breeze), an airline company, and its dispute with the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA). Breeze challenged the administration of a union-representation election by the NMB, which resulted in the NMB’s certification of ALPA as the representative of pilots employed by Breeze. Breeze argued that the NMB improperly excluded trainee pilots from voting in the union election and improperly refused to extend the cut-off date for voter eligibility to allow more pilot trainees to complete their training and become eligible to vote.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district court dismissed Breeze's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction to review NMB certification of union representation only where the complaining party shows that the certification decision was a gross violation of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) or that it violated the constitutional rights of an employer, employee, or Union. The district court determined that Breeze’s complaint did not make the required showing.Breeze appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the NMB had fulfilled its statutory duty to investigate and acted within the broad bounds of its statutory discretion when it designated who could participate in the election, set the rules that governed that election, and held the election itself. The court concluded that Breeze's arguments did not point to any specific requirement in the RLA that the NMB violated, and were more in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the RLA should provide. View "Breeze Aviation Group v. National Mediation Board" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Gary Avant, was a truck driver for Muskogee County. County officials believed that Avant was complaining to other citizens about the county’s road plan and the assignment of a county worker. Avant was subsequently fired by the county commissioner. Avant sued the commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. However, during the litigation, Avant denied making the statements that led to his firing. The commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the perceived speech hadn’t involved a matter of public concern. The district court denied this part of the motion, and the case was remanded for the district court to develop the record.After remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, leading the commissioner to appeal again. On appeal, the commissioner argued that Avant hadn’t pleaded a claim for perceived speech and that qualified immunity applies given the lack of precedent on how to assess a public concern for perceived speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the pleadings. However, it did have jurisdiction over the commissioner’s argument for reversal based on the absence of a clearly established violation. The court concluded that Avant had not shown that the perceived speech involved a clearly established public concern. Therefore, the commissioner was entitled to qualified immunity, and the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for the district court to grant summary judgment to the commissioner in his personal capacity on the First Amendment claim for retaliation based on perceived speech. View "Avant v. Doke" on Justia Law

The case involves Alonzo Cortez Johnson, a state prisoner who petitioned for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Johnson, a Black man, claimed that his constitutional rights were violated because the state court failed to follow the appropriate procedural steps under Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits racial discrimination in jury selection. Johnson alleged that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory strikes based on race. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the state court had mishandled the Batson procedural framework and remanded the case to the district court to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing, unless doing so would be impossible or unsatisfactory.On remand, the district court granted Johnson conditional habeas relief, deciding that holding a Batson reconstruction hearing would be “both impossible and unsatisfactory.” The court reasoned that it could not sufficiently reconstruct all relevant circumstances to meaningfully apply Batson’s third step, which involves determining whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the strikes were actually a pretext for discrimination.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's decision. The court found that the district court had enough evidence to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing at step two, which involves the prosecution providing a race-neutral reason for the objected-to strike(s). The court concluded that the district court had applied the “impossible or unsatisfactory” standard too harshly and remanded the case back to the district court to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing. View "Johnson v. Rankins" on Justia Law

Steven Robert Venjohn pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced him to 41 months' imprisonment, considering his prior conviction for Colorado felony menacing as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). This classification increased his sentencing range. Venjohn appealed, arguing that the district court's ruling improperly inflated his sentencing range.The district court's decision was based on the probation officer's calculation in the presentence investigation report. The officer found that Venjohn's previous conviction for Colorado felony menacing qualified as a § 4B1.2(a) "crime of violence" and increased his base offense level accordingly. The district court agreed with this assessment and sentenced Venjohn to 41 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Taylor, Colorado felony menacing no longer categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that the district court's characterization of Venjohn's prior conviction as a "crime of violence" and the subsequent enhancement of his sentence was an error. The court concluded that this error was plain under current federal law and Colorado law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Venjohn" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott Johnson, Harlene Hoyt, and Covey Find Kennel, LLC, who challenged the constitutionality of a Kansas statute that allows warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business that houses and trains bird dogs. They also claimed that their constitutional right to travel was infringed by a statutory requirement that they make the premises available for inspection within 30 minutes of the arrival of an inspector. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their right-to-travel claim but remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Mr. Johnson’s business is closely regulated and, if so, whether warrantless inspections are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the boarding or training kennel industry was not clearly closely regulated, and the government had not shown that warrantless searches were necessary. The court also held that the regulations did not impose burdens beyond those commonly borne by owners of businesses who travel away from the locations of their businesses, and thus did not violate the plaintiffs' right to travel. View "Johnson v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Lewis Dear Jr., who was charged with attacking a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs, Colorado, in 2015. Dear was found incompetent to stand trial due to a diagnosis of delusional disorder, persecutory type. Despite being found incompetent multiple times, the district court ordered Dear to be involuntarily medicated in an attempt to restore his competency, following a motion by the government.Previously, Dear had been in state custody for about four years, during which he was continually found incompetent to stand trial. In December 2019, the federal government indicted Dear on 68 counts. The government moved for a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which led to Dear being transferred to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. There, a psychiatrist evaluated Dear and determined that although he remained incompetent due to his delusional disorder, he was substantially likely to be restored to competency through the administration of antipsychotics.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order for involuntary medication. The court held that the district court made sufficiently detailed factual findings and that those findings were not clearly erroneous. The court placed greater weight on the government’s experts due to their extensive experience restoring competency and their personal experience observing and interacting with Dear. View "United States v. Dear" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a mobile home fire that resulted in two deaths. The government accused Mr. Joseph Allen Hernandez of intentionally setting the fire, supported by expert testimony from a fire investigator. Mr. Hernandez claimed that he had accidentally started the fire. The trial resulted in convictions on two counts of second-degree murder in Indian Country and one count of arson in Indian Country.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma had allowed the fire investigator to give expert testimony, despite objections from the defense. The court also permitted the investigator to testify that he did not believe Mr. Hernandez's explanation of the fire's cause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court had erred in allowing the fire investigator's expert testimony and whether the investigator's disbelief of Mr. Hernandez's explanation had intruded on a reasonable expectation of privacy. The appellate court found no error in the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court had not abused its discretion in allowing the fire investigator's expert testimony. It also found that the investigator's disbelief of Mr. Hernandez's explanation did not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court affirmed the district court's rulings and Mr. Hernandez's convictions. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Leachco, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation that manufactures and markets various products, appealed the denial of its request for a preliminary injunction to halt administrative enforcement proceedings by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Leachco argued that the statutory removal protections for CPSC commissioners and administrative law judges (ALJs) violated Article II of the Constitution and the separation of powers. The district court denied Leachco's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating that even if Leachco's constitutional arguments were valid, the alleged constitutional violations were insufficient to establish that Leachco would suffer "irreparable harm" if the injunction was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that under current Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, Leachco's subjection to proceedings before an agency whose officials allegedly have unconstitutional protection against removal is insufficient, by itself, to establish irreparable harm. The court also found that Leachco failed to show that the removal protections for CPSC commissioners and its administrative law judge were unconstitutional. Therefore, Leachco failed to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction. View "Leachco v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Jose Luis Amador-Bonilla, a citizen of Guatemala and Nicaragua, who was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, Illegal Reentry After Removal from the United States. Amador-Bonilla had entered the United States without authorization multiple times and had been removed six times. He was arrested in Oklahoma and charged with illegal reentry, an offense for which he had already been convicted twice. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the illegal reentry provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act violates his right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Amador-Bonilla's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court determined that rational basis review applied to Amador-Bonilla’s challenge and that the challenge failed because Amador-Bonilla failed to show there was no “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” The court also found that even if the Arlington Heights framework arguably applied, Amador-Bonilla “failed to demonstrate that [8 U.S.C. § 1326] was passed with a discriminatory purpose as a motivating factor.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment. The court found that Amador-Bonilla failed to show that Congress enacted the provision in 1952 with a discriminatory purpose as a motivating factor. The court also noted that all parties agreed that the provision otherwise satisfies rational basis review. View "United States v. Amador-Bonilla" on Justia Law