Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

To alleviate some of the impacts caused by the statutory sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“2010 FSA”). In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act (“2018 FSA”), which, inter alia, made the Fair Sentencing Act’s benefits retroactively applicable to offenders who committed offenses prior to the 2010 FSA’s effective date of August 3, 2010. Arthur Mannie, Jr., and Michael Maytubby moved the district court for reductions in their sentences pursuant to the 2018 FSA. In 2009, Mannie pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50g or more of crack cocaine; Mannie's was ultimately sentenced to 262 months, the bottom of the guideline range. Because the 2010 FSA reduced the statutory maximum sentence for Mannie’s offense from life to forty years imprisonment, his alternate offense level was 34, rather than 37. This reduction, combined with a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulted in a new advisory guideline range of 188 months to 235 months. Mannie requested a below-guidelines sentence of 120 months or, in the alternative, a sentence at the bottom of the range, 188 months. In 2006, a jury convicted Maytubby of eight counts relating to his participation in a drug trafficking organization, including one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. In 2007, Maytubby’s three original 235-month sentences were each reduced to 188 months, pursuant to Amendment 706. Seven years later, pursuant to Amendment 782, each of Maytubby’s three, modified, 188-month sentences was further reduced to 151 months. The district court declined to reduce either sentence under the FSAs; both Mannie and Maytubby appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that in Mannie's case, the sentencing court presented a "thorough and reasonably articulated basis" for denying relief, and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Mannie's request. With regard to Maytubby, the Tenth Circuit found his original sentences were not below the guideline range, and had been reduced to the bottom of the then-current guideline range. The court had no authority to reduce Maytubby's drug offense sentences further. Maytubby's appeal was dismissed for lack of standing. View "United States v. Mannie" on Justia Law

Kimberly Meadows appealed a district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop, arguing that the officer’s stop was unreasonable because it was based on probable cause of a Utah equipment violation, and the state decriminalized such violations. On December 4, 2017, a Utah highway-patrol officer pulled Meadows over after he observed that tinted glass obscured the brake light inside the rear window of her car, which he believed violated Utah law. He issued Meadows a warning citation for an equipment violation. During the stop, he found drugs and drug paraphernalia. The Tenth Circuit rejected Meadows' argument, concluding that the officer’s stop was reasonable regardless of whether Utah has decriminalized such violations. Accordingly, the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Meadows" on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal were a Bolivian company, Compania de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A. (“CIMSA”), and Mexican companies known as Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A.B. de C.V. and GCC Latinoamerica, S.A. de C.V. (collectively “GCC”). Plaintiff-appellant CIMSA brought a district court action pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act to confirm a foreign arbitral award issued in Bolivia against Defendant-appellee GCC. The underlying dispute stemmed from an agreement under which CIMSA and GCC arranged to give each other a right of first refusal if either party decided to sell its shares in a Bolivian cement company known as Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento, S.A. (“SOBOCE”). GCC sold its SOBOCE shares to a third party after taking the position that CIMSA failed to properly exercise its right of first refusal. In 2011, CIMSA initiated an arbitration proceeding in Bolivia. The arbitration tribunal determined that GCC violated the contract and the parties’ expectations. GCC then initiated Bolivian and Mexican court actions to challenge the arbitration tribunal’s decisions. A Bolivian trial judge rejected GCC’s challenge to the arbitration tribunal’s decision on the merits. A Bolivian appellate court reversed and remanded. During the pendency of the remand proceedings, Bolivia’s highest court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the original trial judge. But as a result of the simultaneous remand proceedings, the high court also issued arguably contradictory orders suggesting the second trial judge’s ruling on the merits remained in effect. GCC filed a separate Bolivian court action challenging the arbitration tribunal’s damages award. That case made its way to Bolivia’s highest court too, which reversed an intermediate appellate court’s nullification of the award and remanded for further proceedings. Invoking the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, CIMSA filed a confirmation action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. After encountering difficulties with conventional service of process in Mexico under the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, CIMSA sought and received permission from the district court to serve GCC through its American counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). The district court then rejected GCC’s challenges to personal jurisdiction, holding (among other things) that: (1) it was appropriate to aggregate GCC’s contacts with the United States; (2) CIMSA’s injury arose out of GCC’s contacts; (3) exercising jurisdiction was consistent with fair play and substantial justice; and (4) alternative service was proper. The district court rejected GCC's defenses to CIMSA's claim under the New York Convention. Before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the district court: the district court properly determined that CIMSA’s injury arose out of or related to GCC’s nationwide contacts. "The district court correctly decided that exercising personal jurisdiction over GCC comported with fair play and substantial justice because CIMSA established minimum contacts and GCC did not make a compelling case to the contrary." The Court also affirmed the district court's confirmation of the arbitration tribunal's decisions. View "Compania De Inversiones v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua" on Justia Law

Jane Doe appealed the dismissal of her Title IX claim against School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (the District or DPS) for failure to state a claim. According to the complaint, a group of students began sexually harassing Ms. Doe after she was sexually assaulted by another student in March of her freshman year at East High School (EHS). She alleged that despite her numerous reports of the harassment to school personnel, as well as reports from teachers and a counselor, the school administration never investigated her complaints and little if anything was done to prevent the harassment from continuing. She stopped attending regularly scheduled classes about 14 months after the assault, and she transferred to a different school after completing her sophomore year. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Ms. Doe's complaint contained sufficient allegations to support an inference of deliberate indifference. View "Doe v. School District Number 1" on Justia Law

In 2013, a fire caused the Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company to restrict operations for several months. It filed a claim with its eighteen insurers, including Infrassure, Ltd., which collectively provided Sinclair coverage for business interruption losses under an all-risk insurance policy. In 2015, after twenty months of claim adjustment, Sinclair and the other seventeen insurers settled the claim. But Infrassure did not agree with the settlement value and eventually exercised its right under the policy to have Sinclair’s covered loss calculated by a panel of three appraisers. The panel valued the loss at $60,365,508, with Infrassure liable for $4,527,413. Infrassure, still unsatisfied, sought to invalidate the award in district court, arguing that the appraisers relied improperly on the settlement amount rather than independently valuing the loss. The district court rejected this theory and confirmed the award, holding Infrassure failed to show any actionable misconduct on behalf of the appraisers. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed the record revealed nothing warranting setting aside the appraisal award, and therefore affirmed. View "Sinclair Wyoming v. Infrassure" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant-appellant Donovan Muskett was indicted by grand jury, charged with four counts: assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian Country; aggravated burglary in Indian Country (based on New Mexico’s aggravated burglary statute by way of the federal Assimilative Crimes Act); using, carrying, possessing, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of a crime of violence; and negligent child abuse in Indian Country. Muskett entered into a plea agreement, under which he pled guilty to the brandishing a firearm charge, the government dismissed the remaining three counts. The parties agreed that, contingent on the district court's acceptance of the plea agreement, Muskett would be sentenced to 84 months in prison. The district court accepted Muskett’s plea and sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release. In this matter, Muskett appealed the denial of his motion to vacate the brandishing conviction as a crime of violence based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidating the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” as unconstitutionally vague). The parties’ primary disputed whether Muskett’s predicate federal felony—assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3)—qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause, thereby rendering harmless the Davis defect in his conviction. Muskett suggested the Tenth Circuit conduct this analysis using the law as it existed at the time of his conviction because application of current law would violate due process limits on the retroactive application of judicial decisions enlarging criminal liability. The Tenth Circuit found precedent compelled the conclusion that assault with a dangerous weapon was categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause. "And we conclude that at the time of his offense, Mr. Muskett had fair notice that section 924(c)’s elements clause could ultimately be construed to encompass his commission of assault with a dangerous weapon." The Court thus affirmed the district court's denial of Muskett’s section 2255 motion. View "United States v. Muskett" on Justia Law

Attorney Ruston Welch received approximately $350,000 in fees for representing David and Terry Stewart in their Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. This appeal stemmed from Welch's failure to disclose his fee arrangements and payments until ordered to do so by the bankruptcy court more than two years after he should have disclosed his fee agreement, and more than a year after he should have disclosed the payments. For these violations the bankruptcy court sanctioned Welch, requiring him to pay $25,000 to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed the sanction after the Stewarts’ largest creditor, SE Property Holdings (SEPH), which had initiated the proceedings as an involuntary bankruptcy, challenged the sanction as so inadequate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. SEPH appealed that decision. The Tenth Circuit concurred, reversed and remanded the matter for further consideration. "The presumptive sanction ... is forfeiture of the entire fee. For good reason the bankruptcy court can impose a lesser sanction. But the court thus far has not provided good reason. It assumed facts that were not in evidence and, most importantly, apparently assumed good faith without examining the possible motives for nondisclosure." View "SE Property Holdings v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lynda Hickey, a former employee of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), filed a discrimination complaint against Defendant Megan Brennan, the Postmaster General of the USPS, in her official capacity. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that Hickey had not properly exhausted her administrative remedies because she did not contact an Equal Employment Office (“EEO”) counselor within forty-five days after her employment was terminated. The magistrate judge, exercising full jurisdiction with the consent of both parties, granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Finding that Hickey indeed, failed to initiate contact with an EEO counselor within forty-five days after the effective date of her termination as required by 29 C.F.R. 1614.105(a), the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Furthermore, the Court found Hickey did not show either that Defendant should have been equitably estopped from raising her lack of timeliness as an affirmative defense or that she was entitled to an extension of time for initiating contact with the EEO. View "Hickey v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned two horses registered to race, but state racing officials determined that the horses were ineligible. The owners sued, alleging denial of due process in disqualifying one of the horses. The district court dismissed the claim based on the absence of a property or liberty interest. The owners asked the district court to alter or amend the judgment. The district court denied this request, and the owners appealed. Finding that the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting these arguments as a basis to alter or amend the judgment, as procedurally and substantively invalid, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to alter or amend and dismissal of the suit. View "Castanon v. Cathey" on Justia Law

Since 2007, EC Design, LLC, sold its popular personal organizer, the LifePlanner. In 2015, Craft Smith, Inc., wanting to enter the personal-organizer market, reached out to EC Design about a possible collaboration. EC Design and Craft Smith couldn't agree to a collaboration. Craft Smith, with input from Michaels Stores, Inc., designed and developed a personal organizer to sell in Michaels stores, leading to this action in Utah federal district court. EC Design claims the Craft Smith and Michaels product infringed on the LifePlanner’s registered compilation copyright and unregistered trade dress. The district court disagreed, granting summary judgment in favor of Craft Smith and Michaels (collectively, the Appellees) on both issues. On the copyright issue, the district court concluded that EC Design did not own a valid copyright in its asserted LifePlanner compilation. On trade dress, the district court held that EC Design had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact over whether the LifePlanner’s trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. Though the Tenth Circuit disagreed with how the district court framed the copyright issue, the Tenth Circuit affirmed because no reasonable juror could conclude that the allegedly infringing aspects of Appellees’ organizer were substantially similar to the protected expression in the LifePlanner compilation. With respect to the trade dress issue, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court: EC Design had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact over whether the LifePlanner’s trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. Summary judgment as to both claims was affirmed. View "Craft Smith v. EC Design" on Justia Law