Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shortly before 3:00 a.m. on June 12, 2016, Sarah Ball was killed when the car in which she was a passenger drove off United States Forest Service Road 456.1A and over an earthen mound before falling into an abandoned mine shaft about 20 feet off the road. Plaintiffs, her parents and her estate filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), raising several causes of action alleging negligence by the United States Forest Service. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that the government was immune from liability under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Ball v. United States" on Justia Law

Denver Police Sergeant Justin Dodge fatally shot Joseph Valverde after he saw Valverde pull out a gun as a SWAT team arrived to arrest him after an undercover drug transaction. Plaintiff Isabel Padilla, as personal representative of Valverde’s estate, sued Dodge under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming Dodge used excessive force in violation of Valverde's Fourth Amendment rights. Dodge moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, but the district court denied the motion. The district court held: (1) a reasonable jury could find that Valverde had discarded the gun and was in the process of surrendering before Dodge shot him; and (2) the use of deadly force in that situation would violate clearly established law. Dodge appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court. "Dodge is entitled to qualified immunity because he had only a split second to react when Valverde suddenly drew a gun. He did not violate the Fourth Amendment by deciding to shoot without waiting to see whether Valverde was merely taking the gun from his pocket to toss away rather than to shoot an officer. And to the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that Dodge should be liable because he recklessly created the situation that led to the apparent peril, Dodge is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law." View "Estate of Joseph Valverde v. Dodge" on Justia Law

An employee of a federally supported health center failed to properly administer a drug to Alexis Stokes while she gave birth to Baby Stokes. As a result, Baby Stokes suffered from “cerebral palsy and spastic quadriplegia,” along with other disabilities, and his life expectancy was 22 years. The district court awarded damages to Baby Boy D.S. (Baby Stokes) and his parents, Alexis Stokes and Taylor Stokes, (collectively, the Stokes) in this Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in structuring damage payments. The Stokes cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred both by miscalculating the present value of a portion of the award and by awarding too little in noneconomic damages. After review, the Tenth Circuit: (1) vacated and remanded the portion of the district court’s order structuring a trust with respect to Baby Stokes’s future-care award, with instructions to fully approximate section 9.3 of the FTCA; (2) vacated and remanded the portion of the district court’s order calculating the present value of Baby Stokes’s future-care award, with instructions to apply Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); and (3) affirmed the portion of the district court’s order regarding noneconomic damages. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stokes v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Lozado appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Lozado was tried by jury and convicted of possessing ammunition as a previously convicted felon. The Presentence Report (“PSR”) prepared by the probation office in January 2014 recommended that he be sentenced as an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on five predicate violent-felony convictions, all from the state of Colorado: (1) a juvenile conviction for second-degree assault with a deadly weapon; and adult convictions for (2) robbery; (3) second-degree burglary of a building; (4) felony menacing; and (5) theft from a person. This increased the recommended offense level from 28 to 33. With Lozado’s criminal-history level of VI, the advisory Guidelines range was thus raised from 140–175 months to 235–293 months. Application of the ACCA changed the statutory maximum penalty of ten years for Lozado’s offense to a statutory minimum penalty of fifteen years. At Lozado’s sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the PSR with only a few non-substantive amendments. The district court then sentenced Lozado to 235 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the ACCA-enhanced advisory Guidelines range. In his 2255 motion, Lozad contended his sentence should have been vacated based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Lozado contended the Johnson ruling affected the violent-felony classification of at least three of the five prior convictions the district court had relied on at his sentencing. The district court denied his 2255 motion, holding that Johnson affected the classification of two of his prior convictions but that the remaining three convictions were sufficient to sustain the enhancement. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the sentencing court classified two of the prior convictions as violent felonies based on the invalidated residual clause, and that a third conviction should not have been counted as a violent felony because it was a juvenile offense that did not involve a firearm, knife, or destructive device. Furthermore, the Court concluded the government could not show harmless error because none of these three convictions would have qualified as a valid ACCA predicate if Lozado were sentenced under current law, thus Lozado no longer has enough qualifying convictions to trigger the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Lozado" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Tenth Circuit's review in this matter involved a police traffic stop that ended with the tragic death of the motorist. In 2016, Okfuskee County Sheriff Deputy Blake Frost shot and killed James Coale, as Coale was fleeing in his truck from a roadside police stop. Coale’s estate sued Deputy Frost, alleging the use of excessive force in violation of Coale’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Deputy Frost’s motion for summary judgment that was based on qualified immunity. Because the Tenth Circuit found it was clearly established that Deputy Frost’s use of deadly force to stop Coale’s fleeing vehicle was objectively unreasonable, it affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. View "Reavis v. Frost" on Justia Law

In January 2011, plaintiff-appellant Virgin Bunn was hired for a one-year probationary period as a human resources assistant at the United States Forest Service’s (“USFS”) Albuquerque Service Center. Ten months into the job, Bunn's supervisor became concerned about Bunn's job performance. After his supervisor asked a colleague to oversee Bunn’s work, Bunn complained to his supervisor about the colleague’s comments to him. Bunn later contacted USFS’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Counselor Office about these comments. On January 6, 2012, Bunn was fired. Bunn thereafter filed an EEO complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging harassment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. An administrative law judge dismissed the suit, granting summary judgment to the agency on all claims. The USDA’s Office of Adjudication issued a final order implementing the EEOC’s decision. Bunn appealed. The Office of Federal Operations affirmed the USDA’s final decision. After its review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found: Bunn's appeal of the summary judgment order was untimely; and (2) there was no reversible error in the district court's order striking Bunn's motion to vacate. View "Bunn v. Perdue" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Edgar Mier-Garces was separately charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in both the Western District of Texas and the District of Colorado. After pleading guilty in Texas, Mier-Garces argued that the District of Colorado indictment violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied his motion to dismiss. Mier-Garces was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 178 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s Double Jeopardy Clause ruling, arguing the district court erroneously calculated his advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines range by applying an enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(12). After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in either ruling and affirmed. View "United States v. Mier-Garces" on Justia Law

In 2001, two chiropractors, defendant-appellant Dr. Thomas Forster Gehrmann, Jr., and Dr. Eric Carlson, opened Atlas Chiropractic Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado. They hired a newly graduated chiropractor, Dr. John Davis, as a preceptee, who eventually completed his preceptorship at Atlas, enabling him to become an associate at the business. In the last few months of 2006, Dr. Davis negotiated with the other two doctors for a one-third share of the business. In January 2007, Dr. Davis became a full partner in the practice. Drs. Gehrmann and Carlson advised Dr. Davis of an income-diversion scheme: placing cash payments and checks written to the treating doctor (as opposed to the business) in a cookie jar and regularly split those proceeds. Dr. Davis understood that the purpose of the scheme was to avoid claiming the diverted money as income on their tax forms. After splitting the money, each doctor deposited his share of this diverted money into his personal bank account instead of Atlas’s business account. They neither reported this income to Atlas’s bookkeeper or tax preparer nor paid taxes on it. Federal agents executed a search warrant at Atlas' office in 2011. By July 2015, a grand jury indicted Drs. Gehrmann and Carlson on four felony charges each: one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and three counts of filing false tax returns. A month later, Dr. Davis, who was cooperating with investigators, and not indicted, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor willfully delivering a false tax return to the Internal Revenue Service. In October 2018, after the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order suppressing evidence seized under the search warrant, Dr. Carlson pleaded guilty to a felony count of filing a false tax return; Dr. Gehrmann went to trial, and a jury convicted him on all four counts. Dr. Gehrmann appealed a portion of the sentence he received. At district court, Dr. Gehrmann never objected to the adequacy of the sentencing court's explanation of its sentencing decision. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court did not adequately explain its basis for imposing its level adjustment to the sentence. But the Court also concluded that Dr. Gehrmann could not show a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome on a remand. The sentence was therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Gehrmann" on Justia Law

The parents of a teenage girl (L.M.) sued Premera Blue Cross under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), claiming improper denial of medical benefits. L.M. experienced mental illness since she was a young girl. L.M. was eventually placed in Eva Carlston Academy, where she obtained long-term psychiatric residential treatment. For this treatment, the parents submitted a claim to Premera under the ERISA plan’s coverage for psychiatric residential treatment. Premera denied the claim ten days into L.M.’s stay. But Premera agreed to cover the first eleven days of L.M.’s treatment, explaining the temporary coverage as a "courtesy." The parents appealed the denial of subsequent coverage, and Premera affirmed the denial based on a physician's medical opinion. The parents filed a claim for reimbursement of over $80,000 in out-of-pocket expenses for L.M.’s residential treatment at the Academy. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment to Premera based on two conclusions: (1) Premera’s decision was subject to the arbitrary-and- capricious standard of review; and (2) Premera had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that L.M.’s residential treatment was medically unnecessary. The district court granted summary judgment to Premera, and the parents appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard and in concluding Premera had properly applied its criteria for medical necessity. Given these conclusions, the Court reversed and remanded the matter back to the district court for de novo reevaluation of the parents’ claim. View "M. v. Premera Blue Cross" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged defendant Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC (“Affinity”) terminated them on the basis of age and sex. They brought disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The district court dismissed (1) the Title VII disparate impact claim, (2) the Title VII disparate treatment claim, and (3) the ADEA disparate impact claim. It granted summary judgment in favor of Affinity on the ADEA disparate treatment claim. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Title VII disparate treatment claim. With respect to the other claims, the Court reversed and remanded to the district court, finding that when the evidence was construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it sufficed to create a genuine issue of material facts with respect to the other allegations. View "Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk" on Justia Law