Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Shane Young appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress a confession. A sheriff's deputy witnessed Young's vehicle swerving on the roadway, and signaled for Young to stop his car. Young continued to drive, ultimately pulling into a nearby residential property, stopping his car, and fleeing on foot. The deputy pursued, tasing and arresting Young. After the arrest, the deputy retraced Young’s path and found a small case containing about four grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. Officers later found a black bag containing about 93 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine near where Young previously stopped his car. The deputy arrested and interviewed Young; Young admitted to possessing the smaller quantity of methamphetamine but denied that the larger quantity was his. Days later, while still held in the county jail, Young was interrogated by a Federal Bureau of Investigations Special Agent. The agent told Young he tried to help people in trouble, and would do his best to try and help. The agent then told Young he had met with the prosecutor about Young’s arrest. He said the prosecutor had met with the judge. The agent reiterated that Young needed to trust him, and he asked Young about the bag with the larger quantity of drugs in it, suggesting that Young could explain that he threw the bags in different directions as he ran from the car. In response, Young wondered aloud whether he should have a lawyer present. Following the agent's earlier suggestion, Young admitted that after he exited his vehicle, he lost his grip on the containers of methamphetamine, and they flew in different directions as he was running away. He also provided information about the source of the methamphetamine and about his drug-dealing activities. After his confession, Young was charged with possession with intent to distribute approximately 97 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. Although the court found the agent made false representations and improper promises of leniency that were “coercive in nature under the circumstances,” it ultimately concluded Young’s confession was not involuntary and denied his motion to suppress. Young pled guilty and was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Tenth Circuit concluded Young’s capacity for self-determination was critically impaired, rendering his confession involuntary. Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

In separate claims, appellees Willie Carr and Kim Minor sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). In each case, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied the claim, and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review. While his case was pending in district court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) ALJs were “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause, and therefore must be appointed by the President, a court, or head of the agency. Shortly thereafter, Minor also sued in district court to challenge the denial of benefits in her case. In response to the Supreme Court case, Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA's ALJs to address any Appointments Clause questions Lucia posed. After the Commissioner’s action, Carr and Minor each filed a supplemental brief, asserting for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court upheld the ALJs’ denials of the claims, but it agreed with the Appointments Clause challenges. The court vacated the SSA decisions and remanded for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. It held that appellees did not waive their Appointments Clause challenges by failing to raise them in their SSA proceedings. On appeal, the Commissioner argued Appellees waived their Appointments Clause challenges by failing to exhaust them before the SSA. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner and reversed. View "Carr v. Commissioner, SSA" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Randy Hamett was convicted of kidnapping, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of firearms while subject to a domestic violence protective order. Hamett was represented by counsel throughout much of his jury trial. Near the end of the government’s case-in-chief, however, Hamett requested a sealed ex parte hearing, where he discussed with the court, with his counsel present, the possibility of representing himself. At this hearing, despite stating that he “ha[d] two great attorneys,” but Hamett asked the district court if he could “talk to another attorney . . . that might be able to answer just some legal [] questions.” The court declined this request, giving Hammett two options: to continue with his appointed counsel, or to proceed pro se. Hamett stated that he did not want to represent himself, and the trial resumed. At the conclusion of the government’s case-in-chief, Hamett requested another sealed ex parte hearing with his attorneys and the court. At this hearing, Hamett asked the court various questions regarding post-conviction relief and his right to appeal. He then told the court that he would like to take over his own representation in order to recall various witnesses to demonstrate “untruths.” Hamett acknowledged he did not know the elements of the crimes of which he was charged, nor had he read the jury instructions. At the conclusion of its colloquy, the district court allowed Hamett to proceed pro se, “based upon [Hamett's] knowledge of the facts in wanting to ask questions that counsel have not asked for their own strategic reasons.” Trial resumed with the assistance of standby counsel. Hamett recalled various witnesses and made his own closing argument. The jury convicted Hamett on all three counts. Hamett was appointed new counsel to represent him at sentencing. The Tenth Circuit reversed conviction, "considering the rigorous restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant before permitting him to waive counsel at trial," the Court found the district court’s warnings did not adequately ensure Hamett was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Furthermore, the Court held there were no case-specific factors permitting it to conclude that, despite the inadequate warnings, the district court nevertheless correctly determined that Hamett’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent when it was made. Accordingly, the Court concluded the district court erred in finding Hamett knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hamett" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service approved two forest thinning projects in the Santa Fe National Forest pursuant to authority granted by a 2014 amendment to the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA). By thinning the forest and then conducting prescribed burns in the project areas, the Forest Service sought to reduce the risk of high-intensity wildfires and tree mortality related to insects and disease. Certain environmental organizations and individuals (collectively Wild Watershed) challenged the projects’ approval under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), asserting the Forest Service failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and HFRA. The district court rejected these claims, and the Tenth Circuit concurred, finding the Forest Service adequately considered the projects’ cumulative impacts as well as their potential effects on sensitive species in the area and the development of old growth forest. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Wild Watershed v. Hurlocker" on Justia Law

In 2016, Defendant-Appellant Timothy Merritt crashed into a vehicle containing a family of three while driving within the borders of the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation. Merritt was intoxicated at the time of the accident and had been driving in the wrong lane. Cecil Vijil, a passenger in the other vehicle, died by the time the ambulance arrived. Cecil’s wife Sallie Vijil, also a passenger, was seriously injured. Their son Creighton, who was driving, suffered minor injuries. The government charged Merritt with second-degree murder for the death of Cecil Vijil, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury for the injuries sustained by Sallie Vijil. At trial, the government introduced evidence of three other drunk-driving incidents involving Merritt. The jury convicted Merritt on both counts. Merritt appealed the murder conviction, arguing that the district court should not have allowed testimony about the facts and circumstances of 2012 and 2014 incidents, and that no evidence concerning the 2016 arrest should have been admitted. Determining that it was within the district court's discretion to admit the facts and circumstances of Merritt's 2012 and 2014 drunk driving arrests, and that any error in admitting the 2016 incident was harmless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Merritt's convictions. View "United States v. Merritt" on Justia Law

The federal government twice charged Scott Arterbury with the same crime for the same possession of child pornography. In the original prosecution, the district court suppressed the child-pornography evidence seized from Arterbury’s personal computer. The government appealed the suppression order but withdrew its appeal without filing a brief. Once back in district court, the government obtained an order dismissing the case without prejudice. Eight months later, in a case involving a defendant in a different state, the Tenth Circuit reversed an order suppressing child-pornography evidence obtained in reliance on the same FBI search warrant as at issue in Arterbury’s case. The government re-indicted Arterbury on the original child-pornography charge. Arterbury argued that the court was bound by collateral estoppel to enforce its earlier order suppressing the evidence. But the district court disagreed and later denied the motion to suppress on the merits. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred in its analysis of criminal collateral estoppel, and vacated the order denying Arterbury’s motion to enforce the original suppression order. The matter was remanded for the district court to enforce its earlier suppression order. View "United States v. Arterbury" on Justia Law

The district court granted Defendant-Appellee Julian Trujillo Morales’s motion to suppress 4.11 kilograms of methamphetamine. Thirty-two minutes after he was stopped for a traffic violation, Morales and his passenger consented to an officer’s search of the car that yielded the methamphetamine. During the first 10 minutes after the stop, the officer questioned Morales and developed reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. He next questioned Morales’s passenger for seven minutes and then called the El Paso Intelligence Center (“EPIC”), a national law enforcement database, which took another 15 minutes. The district court said that the officer’s actions were reasonable up to the EPIC call, but the EPIC call unreasonably prolonged the detention. The Government appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Morales" on Justia Law

Deborah and Dallas Platt purchased a 2016 Winnebago Era RV in 2016. This purchase was subject to Winnebago’s New Vehicle Limited Warranty, which required the Platts to bring the RV for repairs to an authorized dealer and then, if those repairs were insufficient, to Winnebago itself before they could bring an action against Winnebago. The RV suffered from a litany of defects and the Platts took it in for warranty repairs to Camping World of Golden, Colorado (Camping World), an authorized Winnebago dealership, on numerous occasions for numerous separate defects within the first seven and a half months of their ownership. When the Camping World repairs did not resolve the Platts’ issues with the RV, they scheduled an appointment for repairs with Winnebago in Forest City, Iowa, but they subsequently cancelled the appointment, claiming they had "lost faith" that Winnebago would repair their RV. The Platts sued Winnebago for breach of express and implied warranties under both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Colorado state law, and also for deceptive trade practices in violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). Winnebago filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted, dismissing all of the Platts’ claims. The Platts appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Winnebago Industries" on Justia Law

Colorado Center Development, LLC, the owner of certain property in Denver, Colorado, hired J.E. Dunn Construction Company to construct an office building (the Project). Colorado Center purchased from Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company a Builder’s Risk insurance policy (the Policy). The Policy provided protection against “direct physical loss or damage caused by a covered peril to ‘buildings or structures’ while in the course of construction, erection, or fabrication.” J.E. Dunn hired plaintiff Rocky Mountain Prestress, LLC (RMP) as a subcontractor to perform work including “engineer[ing], supply[ing,] and install[ing] all precast concrete components, connections, and erections aids” and “[s]upply[ing] and install[ing] grout and/or patching of all connections required by the engineering for the structural integrity of the precast.” Because of “potential concerns that arose at another project” relating to “sinking pillars/columns,” J.E. Dunn requested RMP to retain a third-party engineering firm to investigate “potential structural issues” with RMP’s work on the Project. The engineering firm concluded that the Project required “repairs to insufficiently grouted joints between precast concrete column and pilaster elements” at 264 locations throughout the structure. The engineering firm began its investigation in August 2016, and the final grouting repair work was completed in February 2017. In the meantime, in November 2016, RMP submitted a claim to Liberty seeking coverage under the Policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company on three independent grounds: (1) RMP had not shown that the claimed loss was fortuitous; (2) the claimed loss did not constitute “direct physical loss or damage” as required for coverage under the policy; and (3) even if there might otherwise have been coverage, the claimed loss fell within the policy’s exclusion for defective workmanship. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision based on the defective-workmanship exclusion. View "Rocky Mountain Presstress v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, a district court decided that Defendants RaPower-3, LLC, International Automated Systems, Inc. (IAS), LTB1, LLC, Neldon Johnson, and R. Gregory Shepard had promoted an unlawful tax scheme. Defendants’ scheme was based on a supposed project to utilize a purportedly new, commercially viable way of converting solar radiation into electricity. There was no “third party verification of any of Johnson’s designs.” Nor did he have any “record that his system ha[d] produced energy,” and “[t]here [were] no witnesses to his production of a useful product from solar energy,” a fact that he attributed to his decision to do his testing “on the weekends when no one was around because he didn’t want people to see what he was doing.” Defendants never secured a purchase agreement for the sale of electricity to an end user. The district court found that Johnson’s purported solar energy technology was not a commercial-grade solar energy system that converts sunlight into electrical power or other useful energy. Despite this, Defendants’ project generated tens of millions of dollars between 2005 and 2018. Beginning in 2006, buyers would purchase lenses from IAS or RaPower-3 for a down payment of about one-third of the purchase price. The entity would “finance” the remaining two-thirds of the purchase price with a zero- or nominal- interest, nonrecourse loan. No further payments would be due from the customer until the system had been generating revenue from electricity sales for five years. The customer would agree to lease the lens back to LTB1 for installation at a “Power Plant”; but LTB1 would not be obligated to make any rental payments until the system had begun generating revenue. The district court found that each plastic sheet for the lenses was sold to Defendants for between $52 and $70, yet the purchase price of a lens was between $3,500 and $30,000. Although Defendants sold between 45,000 and 50,000 lenses, fewer than 5% of them were ever installed. Customers were told that buying a lens would have very favorable income-tax consequences. Johnson and Shepard sold the lenses by advertising that customers could “zero out” federal income-tax liability by taking advantage of depreciation deductions and solar-energy tax credits. To remedy Defendants' misconduct, the district court enjoined Defendants from continuing to promote their scheme and ordered disgorgement of their gross receipts from the scheme. Defendants appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. RaPower-3" on Justia Law