Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In an interlocutory appeal, Defendant Mark Moralez, a Las Cruces, New Mexico police officer, challenged a district court’s decision to deny him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity from two of Plaintiff Warren McCowan’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Those claims alleged that the officer: (1) used excessive force against McCowan while driving him to the police station after having arrested him for drunk driving; and (2) was deliberately indifferent to McCowan’s serious medical needs (his injured shoulders) while at the police station, before transporting McCowan to the county detention center where medical care was available. McCowan based his excessive-force claim on his assertion that Officer Moralez placed McCowan in the back seat of a patrol car, handcuffed behind his back and unrestrained by a seatbelt, and then drove recklessly to the police station, knowing his driving was violently tossing McCowan back and forth across the backseat. This rough ride, McCowan contended, injured his shoulders, after McCowan had advised the officer before the trip to the station that he had a previous shoulder injury. McCowan’s second claim alleged that Officer Moralez was deliberately indifferent to McCowan’s serious medical needs by delaying McCowan’s access to medical care until he arrived at the county detention center. The Tenth Circuit affirmed as to both counts; the allegations alleged a clearly established violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Officer Moralez qualified immunity. View "McCowan v. Morales" on Justia Law

Antonio Caballero filed the underlying lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah seeking a “judgment on a judgment” he had obtained from a Florida state court. The complaint asserted he expected to proceed against assets located in Utah pursuant to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”). Caballero served defendants with process in the federal suit; none answered or otherwise participated i the Utah action. The federal district court registered the Florida state-court judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1963, but denied all other relief because Caballero did not establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants. As a result, Caballero could not utilize federal district court collection procedures. Caballero moved to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court denied. He appealed both orders. The Tenth Circuit determined section 1963 applied only to registration of federal-court judgments in federal courts, not to state-court judgments. Consequently, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment registering the Florida state-court judgment in Utah federal court. The Court determined Caballero’s civil cover sheet filed with the district court indicated the basis of jurisdiction was federal question; Caballero might have been able to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the TRIA if permitted to amend his complaint. The Tenth Circuit reversed to allow Caballero to amend his complaint. View "Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria" on Justia Law

Following his conviction by jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm, Jared Faulkner failed to object to the Presentence Investigation Report’s (“PSR”) conclusion that his prior Oklahoma felony of endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine qualified as a predicate “controlled substance offense” for purposes of base offense level computation. As a result, the district court adopted the PSR in full and sentenced Faulkner to a guidelines-range, 96-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, Faulkner contended the district court plainly erred by finding that his prior conviction qualified as a “controlled substance offense” as that term is defined by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Although it was error to treat Faulkner’s conviction for endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine as a controlled substance offense for purposes of base offense level computation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the error was not plain or obvious. The district court was thus affirmed. View "United States v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

In 1991, at age three, petitioner Karen Robles-Garcia was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor authorized to remain in this country for up to seventy-two hours and to travel within twenty-five miles of the Mexican border. She stayed longer and traveled further than permitted. In 2008, DHS served Robles-Garcia with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), the document that the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issues an immigrant to initiate removal proceedings, charging her with violating her visitor permissions from almost seventeen years earlier. Robles-Garcia admitted the five factual allegations charged in the NTA and conceded she was removable. But she applied for cancellation of removal and adjustment of her status, asserting that her removal would work an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on her two children, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D), who were U.S. citizens. Relying on Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), Robles-Garcia argued for the first time that the immigration judge who initially presided over her removal proceedings never acquired jurisdiction over those proceedings because DHS initiated those proceedings by serving Robles-Garcia with a defective Notice to Appear. Because Robles-Garcia had not yet made that argument to the IJ or the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it was unexhausted and the Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to address it. In addition, Robles-Garcia argued the BIA erred in concluding that she was ineligible to apply for discretionary cancellation of removal. The Tenth Circuit upheld that determination because Robles-Garcia was unable to show that a theft conviction was not a disqualifying crime involving moral turpitude. The Court therefore denied Robles-Garcia’s petition for review challenging the BIA’s determination that she was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction to the extent that it asserted the Pereira question. View "Robles-Garcia v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Barnes filed a putative class action against defendant Security Life of Denver Insurance Company (SLD) alleging that SLD, in the course of administering life insurance policies purchased by Barnes and other similarly-situated class members, breached its contractual duties and committed the tort of conversion by imposing certain administrative costs that were not authorized under the terms of the policies. Jackson National Life Insurance Company (Jackson) moved to intervene, asserting that, as a result of reinsurance agreements entered into by SLD, Jackson was actually the entity responsible for administering Barnes’s policy and numerous other policies listed within the putative class. The district court denied Jackson’s motion. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded Jackson established the requirements for intervention as of right, and accordingly reversed the decision of the district court and remanded with directions to grant Jackson’s motion to intervene. View "Barnes v. Security Life of Denver" on Justia Law

In 2018, a burglar broke into H&H Pawn Gun & Tool (H&H) and stole a substantial amount of property. An inventory revealed that 62 firearms were among the property stolen. Of the 62 firearms, only 13 to 15 were eventually recovered. A subsequent investigation by the sheriff’s office and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives led to Stoney Mendenhall. Numerous pieces of evidence suggested Mendenhall committed the burglary. Notwithstanding this evidence and for reasons not stated in the record, Mendenhall was not charged with burglary. Instead, in a single-count indictment, a grand jury only charged Mendenhall with “knowingly possess[ing], receiv[ing] and conceal[ing] a stolen firearm.” Mendenhall pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing and concealing the firearms listed on the indictment. In the plea colloquy, he did not go further and accept guilt for the burglary or other related acts. Mendenhall did not object to any provision of the PSR at sentencing. The district court sentenced Mendenhall to 34 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release and ordered Mendenhall to pay restitution to H&H in the amount recommended by the PSR. At issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case was the appropriate scope of the restitution order. Relying on controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit concluded Congress authorized restitution only “for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.” In ordering restitution for losses related to, but not arising directly from, defendant’s offense of conviction, the district court exceeded the range of restitution authorized by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "United States v. Mendenhall" on Justia Law

Daniel Rodriguez appealed his sentence for a supervised release violation, arguing the district court misapplied Colorado law in determining the grade of his offense under the Guidelines. Rodriguez was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release. Rodriguez began his term of supervised release on May 10, 2018. On October 4, 2018, Mr. Rodriguez’s probation officer petitioned the district court for an arrest warrant and revocation of Rodriguez’s supervised release, alleging, among other violations, two instances of “possession and use of a controlled substance.” The district court determined, over Rodriguez’s objection, that Rodriguez’s conduct constituted possession of cocaine under Colorado law, an offense punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, and was therefore a Grade B violation of his supervised release conditions. The district court declined to analyze whether Rodriguez’s conduct would have constituted a Grade B or a Grade C violation under federal law. It sentenced Rodriguez to 21 months’ imprisonment (the Government’s recommended sentence, at the low end of the Grade B range). Explaining its choice of sentence, the district court emphasized the danger Rodriguez posed to the public because of his history of repeated drug use while in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Rodriquez argued the district court improperly classified his conduct as a Grade B violation rather than a Grade C because it wrongly determined his conduct was punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year under Colorado law. Because the district court could have reached the same result by applying federal law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Applicant Douglas Winn sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma of his application for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Applicant was charged in Oklahoma state court with domestic abuse (assault and battery) and related offenses. At a pretrial hearing he signed a waiver of his right to a jury trial so that he could qualify for a state mental-health court program. Because he did not complete the program, his case was put back on the trial docket. He then filed a motion in the state trial court for reinstatement of a jury trial, stating his waiver was not knowing, willing, or voluntary. There was no transcript of the pretrial hearing, so the court held an evidentiary hearing. Applicant testified that he had believed he was signing paperwork to enter the mental-health program, rather than signing a waiver, because he did not read the paperwork. He further claimed he did not recall either his attorney or the judge advising him about the waiver. Applicant’s then-attorney testified that although he could not remember specifically discussing the waiver with Applicant, his standard practice was to advise defendants of the rights they were waiving and the permanence of such a waiver. The court determined that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and denied Applicant’s motion. The State responded that Applicant had validly waived his right to a jury trial, and the district court agreed. The court also held: (1) Applicant had exhausted his available state remedies by raising his invalid- waiver claim in the state trial court and then seeking emergency relief from the OCCA on the same ground; and (2) it was not required to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Because the Tenth Circuit held the district court should have abstained, it did not address any other issues. View "Winn v. Cook" on Justia Law

Rumsey Land Company, LLC (“Rumsey”) owned a property subject to a first deed of trust held by Pueblo Bank & Trust Company, LLC (“PBT”). In 2010, Rumsey filed for bankruptcy. Resource Land Holdings, LLC (“RLH”) offered to purchase the property, but the bankruptcy court did not approve the sale. Shortly thereafter, PBT purchased the property at a bankruptcy auction. PBT then transferred the land to RLH. In 2015, Rumsey discovered that during the bankruptcy proceedings, RLH had entered a loan purchase agreement to purchase PBT’s interest in the property. The agreement eventually led to litigation in state court between RLH and PBT, which culminated with a settlement agreement allowing RLH to purchase Rumsey’s property from PBT for $4.75 million. Rumsey believed the loan agreement, lawsuit, and settlement influenced the price at its bankruptcy auction. It initiated this adversarial proceeding in bankruptcy court against RLH and PBT (collectively “Defendants”), alleging: (1) fraudulent concealment in violation of state law; and (2) collusive bidding activities in violation of 11 U.S.C. 363(n). The case was transferred to federal district court, which granted summary judgment to defendants on both claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed finding: (1) Rumsey forfeited its arguments about PBT’s duty to disclose its transaction with RLH and did not argue plain error on appeal; and (2) in the section 363(n) collusive bidding claim, it was time-barred by a one-year limitations period in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), and Rumsey failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material face as to whether Defendants intended to control the sale price at the bankruptcy auction. View "Rumsey Land Company v. Resource Land Holdings" on Justia Law

In March 2018, Defendant Nowlin Waugh, Jr. was driving on Interstate 40 in Eastern Oklahoma when Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper Aaron Lockney observed his vehicle cross over the fog line. Believing the driver was fatigued, texting, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, Trooper Lockney initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Lockney activated his emergency lights, but Defendant refused to yield and continued eastbound on Interstate 40. After following Defendant for approximately 10 miles, Trooper Lockney performed a “tactical vehicle intervention,” ramming Defendant’s vehicle and bringing it to a stop. Inside the vehicle, Trooper Lockney and other officers found two trashcans, four gallon-size bottles of bleach, shards of suspected methamphetamine strewn about the vehicle, six kilo-sized vacuum-sealed bags that had been ripped open, two or three gallon-sized Ziploc bags, and some shrink wrap. The interior of the vehicle was wet in places and smelled strongly of bleach. The troopers believed Defendant used the bleach to destroy large quantities of methamphetamine during the ten-mile police chase. The troopers recovered the largest shards of suspected methamphetamine for testing. The suspected methamphetamine was subsequently weighed at 54.19 grams of methamphetamine with a 93% purity rate. Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of methamphetamine. Defendant proceeded to trial and argued that, although he possessed methamphetamine, he did not intend to distribute it. Defendant introduced no evidence he was a user of methamphetamine but, during opening and closing statements, defense counsel argued the Government could not prove Defendant possessed the requisite intent to distribute. In furtherance of this defense, Defendant asked the district court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession. The district court denied Defendant’s request, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in refusing to give the lesser included instruction on mere possession. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Waugh" on Justia Law