Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding for debtors Theodore William White, Jr., and Porscha Shiroma. White and Lynn E. Wardley had previously started a business that failed. The Chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against Wardley, alleging a constructively fraudulent obligation and transfer under federal bankruptcy statutes and the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). The Trustee sought to avoid a $750,000 obligation and transfer made by White to Wardley.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment in favor of Wardley, rejecting the Trustee’s claims. The court found that White received reasonably equivalent value for both the guaranty obligation and the $750,000 transfer. The Trustee appealed to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment orders, agreeing that White received reasonably equivalent value for the guaranty obligation and the $750,000 transfer. The court found that White’s benefits, including employment, a 15% equity stake in the business, cash and equity incentives, and a business opportunity, were approximately equivalent to the value of the debt he took on. The court also held that the guaranty obligation was unconditional, making the $750,000 transfer a dollar-for-dollar exchange that constituted reasonably equivalent value. View "White v. Wardley" on Justia Law

A thirteen-year-old girl, D.C., reported to her stepmother that her stepfather, Edgar Rene Garcia-Limon, had sexually abused her over several years, beginning when she was about four and continuing until she was eleven. During the investigation, D.C. described multiple incidents of abuse, and Garcia-Limon admitted to law enforcement and his wife that he had sexually touched D.C. on several occasions. Law enforcement also found firearms in the home, leading to additional charges.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Garcia-Limon on four counts: felon in possession of a firearm, aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country, abusive sexual contact in Indian Country, and illegal reentry. Garcia-Limon challenged the sufficiency of the indictment for the sexual abuse counts, arguing that the eight-year date range was too broad and that the counts improperly charged a scheme rather than specific acts. The district court denied his motions, finding that the indictment properly charged a scheme of abuse and that the counts were not constitutionally defective or duplicitous. At trial, the jury found Garcia-Limon guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms, including life sentences for the sexual abuse counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the indictment was constitutionally sufficient, whether the statutes allowed charging a scheme of abuse, whether the indictment was duplicitous, and whether there was a constructive amendment at trial. The court held that the indictment met constitutional requirements, that the statutes permitted charging a scheme of repeated, similar acts in a single count, and that there was no unconstitutional duplicity or constructive amendment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Garcia-Limon’s convictions on the challenged counts. View "United States v. Garcia-Limon" on Justia Law

Bethany Scheer was employed by Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Inc. (SCL) from 2014 to 2019. During her employment, Scheer faced performance issues and was placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP) that included mandatory counseling through SCL’s employee assistance program (EAP). Scheer initially agreed to the PIP but later refused to sign a form authorizing the disclosure of her counseling attendance and compliance, leading to her termination. Scheer sued SCL under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging discrimination based on a perceived disability.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of SCL. The court concluded that the mandatory referral to counseling did not constitute an adverse employment action because it did not cause a significant change in Scheer’s employment status, as required by precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis rejected the significance test previously used and established a new standard requiring plaintiffs to show they suffered "some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment." The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the new standard set forth in Muldrow. The district court must now determine if Scheer suffered "some harm" as a result of SCL’s actions. View "Scheer v. Sisters of Charity" on Justia Law

David Jenny, an employee of L3Harris Technologies, Inc., suffered from recurring cellulitis, which was aggravated by frequent international travel required by his job. He requested and was granted an accommodation to book seats with extra legroom on long flights. However, within three months of this accommodation, Jenny was denied permission to travel for routine business, removed from his leadership role, and ultimately discharged. Jenny sued L3Harris for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the District of Utah acknowledged that Jenny established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation and produced sufficient evidence that L3Harris’s explanation for his discharge was pretextual. Despite this, the district court granted summary judgment to L3Harris, citing the exception set out in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., concluding that Jenny’s evidence did not sufficiently link his discharge to any discriminatory or retaliatory motive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court improperly applied the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit held that Jenny had indeed met the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Jenny, did not meet the requirements for invoking the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to L3Harris and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jenny v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Kay was convicted after pleading guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court found that Kay had hidden the firearm in the trunk of his vehicle before his arrest and imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, despite the defense's objection. Kay was sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Kay challenged the imposition of the § 3C1.1 enhancement, arguing that his pre-investigative conduct was not "likely to thwart" the investigation of the offense, as required by application note 1 in the commentary to § 3C1.1.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially reviewed the case. The court found that Kay's act of hiding the firearm in the trunk was sufficient to warrant the obstruction of justice enhancement. The court noted that Kay's conduct was purposefully calculated to obstruct justice and that the firearm was hidden in a manner that was likely to thwart the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Kay's conduct was likely to thwart the investigation. The Tenth Circuit noted that the firearm was hidden behind multiple barriers in the trunk, and the officers only discovered it after Kay's son directed them to the trunk. The court concluded that the district court's finding was plausible and permissible in light of the entire record, and thus, the obstruction enhancement under § 3C1.1 was appropriately applied. View "United States v. Kay" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages wild horse herds in southern Wyoming under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. This Act mandates the protection and management of wild horses on public lands. The land in question is a checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private ownership. Since 1979, BLM managed these herds with the consent of private landowners. However, in 2010, private landowners revoked their consent, making it difficult for BLM to maintain the herds. In 2022, BLM amended its Regional Management Plan (RMP) to change two Herd Management Areas (HMAs) to Herd Areas (HAs), reducing the wild horse population goal to zero in two areas and significantly reducing it in another.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and ruled in favor of BLM, finding that the agency had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in amending the RMP. The court held that any challenge to BLM’s decision to remove horses was unripe and that BLM had complied with the relevant statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that BLM failed to consider whether its decision would achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance, as required by the Wild Horse Act. The court held that BLM’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not base its decision on this statutory requirement. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy, considering the practical consequences of vacatur and the potential for BLM to substantiate its decision on remand. View "American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby" on Justia Law

The case involves the appeal of Lev Aslan Dermen, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering offenses, and money laundering. The charges stem from a scheme orchestrated by Dermen and his co-conspirators to file false claims for federal biofuel incentives, resulting in over $500 million in fraudulent payouts. The scheme involved laundering the fraud proceeds through various channels, including domestic and foreign entities and accounts.In the lower court, the United States District Court for the District of Utah conducted a seven-week trial, after which the jury convicted Dermen on all counts. Dermen was sentenced to forty years in prison and ordered to forfeit assets and pay a money judgment. Dermen raised several issues on appeal, including juror misconduct, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the trial, alleged Brady violations, improper expert testimony, insufficient evidence for some convictions, and errors in sentencing and forfeiture orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed Dermen's appeal. The court rejected all of Dermen's arguments, affirming the lower court's decisions. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's handling of juror misconduct and the impact of COVID-19. It also held that the alleged Brady violations were not material, the expert testimony was properly admitted, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court upheld the sentencing and forfeiture orders, finding no error in the district court's application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and its admission of hearsay evidence in the forfeiture proceedings. View "United States v. Dermen" on Justia Law

Vivos Therapeutics, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Ortho-Tain, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The lawsuit stemmed from communications made by Ortho-Tain’s CEO and attorney to Benco Dental Supply, alleging that Vivos misrepresented Ortho-Tain’s products as its own. Vivos’s amended complaint included claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, libel per se, slander per se, intentional interference with contractual relations, and a declaratory judgment that Vivos did not violate the Lanham Act.The District Court for the District of Colorado denied Ortho-Tain’s motion to dismiss, which argued that certain claims should be dismissed based on the Colorado litigation privilege. Ortho-Tain appealed the denial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of immunity for Neff’s communications due to disputed factual issues. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider whether the communications were made in good faith contemplation of litigation.On remand, the district court again denied Ortho-Tain’s motion to dismiss, stating that it would not make a factual determination on whether the communications were made in good faith at the pleading stage. Ortho-Tain appealed this decision, arguing that the district court failed to properly analyze the good faith of the communications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could not review the district court’s denial of immunity because it involved disputed factual issues. Without jurisdiction over the denial of immunity, the Tenth Circuit also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining interlocutory rulings. View "Vivos Therapeutics. v. Ortho-Tain" on Justia Law

Robin Niceta, a former caseworker with the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, was assigned to investigate allegations of child abuse against Paul Berryman. Niceta allegedly made false statements during the investigation and custody proceedings, which led to the removal of Berryman’s daughters from his custody for a year and a half. After the Berrymans regained custody, they sued Niceta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming her conduct violated their procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Niceta’s motion to dismiss the claim, rejecting her assertions of qualified immunity and absolute testimonial immunity for statements made at a custody hearing. Niceta then filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the district court that Niceta was not entitled to qualified immunity because she failed to adequately raise the defense. However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court regarding absolute testimonial immunity. The court held that Niceta is entitled to absolute immunity for statements made during her testimony at the custody hearing but not for statements made outside of that hearing.The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether any of the Berrymans’ claims could survive without considering Niceta’s testimonial statements made at the custody hearing. View "Berryman v. Niceta" on Justia Law

Nancy Stark, as the legal guardian and mother of Jill Finley, an incapacitated person, filed a lawsuit against Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Finley, who suffered a hypoxic brain injury in 2007, was initially approved for long-term disability benefits by Reliance. However, in 2022, Reliance terminated her benefits, claiming recent testing did not support her total disability. Stark appealed, and Reliance reinstated the benefits in 2023. Stark then sued, seeking a surcharge for financial harm caused by the wrongful termination, claiming breach of fiduciary duty for not providing internal records, and contesting the deduction of social security payments from Finley's disability payments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted Reliance's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Stark did not plausibly allege a claim for equitable relief under ERISA, nor did she demonstrate that Reliance's actions violated the terms of the insurance policy or breached fiduciary duties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Stark was not entitled to attorney’s fees incurred during the administrative appeal under ERISA’s § 1132(a)(3) or § 1132(g). The court also found that Stark's claims regarding the SSD offset were time-barred and waived due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Additionally, the court concluded that Stark did not allege any concrete harm resulting from Reliance's alleged failure to provide requested records during the administrative appeal. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss all of Stark's claims. View "Stark v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law