Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shawn Gorrell was an insurance salesman based in Tulsa, Oklahoma. His father was an accountant in Tulsa whose clients included several dentists and Gorrell sold insurance to some of them. In 2009, Gorrell began to pitch investments to these dentists that were outside of his typical insurance products. Some dentists initially gave Gorrell modest sums to invest, but later the amounts ballooned to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Gorrell would ultimately be convicted by jury on three counts of wire fraud and three counts of tax evasion. He appealed only the tax evasion charges, seeking a new trial on those counts. He argued the trial court plainly erred when it instructed the jury to consider “specified theories of an affirmative act (an element of tax evasion), which were legally invalid theories of guilt as a matter of law, the jury was instructed to be unanimous in finding an affirmative act, and the jury returned a general verdict of guilt.” The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err, “much less plainly err,” in its instructions to the jury. Given the evidence elicited at trial, in light of those instructions, Gorrell’s convictions for tax evasion were supported. View "United States v. Gorrell" on Justia Law

John and Deanne Roth appealed a Tax Court decision that imposed a 40% penalty for the Roths’ “gross misstatement” of the value of a conservation easement they donated to a land trust in Colorado. On appeal, the Roths largely argued that, before imposing the penalty, the IRS failed to obtain written, supervisory approval for its “initial determination” of a penalty assessment as required by I.R.C. 6751(b). The Roths also sought a deduction in 2007 for repayments they made on the proceeds from their sale of tax credits generated by their donation of a separate conservation easement in 2006. The Tenth Circuit disagreed as to both counts and therefore affirmed the Tax Court. View "Roth v. CIR" on Justia Law

Antonio Smith pleaded guilty in Oklahoma state court to drug trafficking, possessing a firearm as a felon, and a variety of related charges. Smith’s habeas claims centered around a plea offer that one of Smith’s attorneys allegedly didn’t communicate to him: Smith said he rejected a 25-year plea offer from the state that his first attorney presented to him; Smith’s first attorney subsequently withdrew; the sentencing court appointed a new attorney; Smith says his second attorney told him shortly after she was appointed that the state had withdrawn an offer for a 20-year sentence. On the day his case was set to go to trial, Smith pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement. During the plea hearing, the state told the court Smith rejected its offer for a 20-year sentence. When the sentencing court asked Smith’s second attorney if the state’s recollection of its prior offer coincided with her own, Smith’s second attorney confirmed it. When the court specifically asked Smith’s second attorney if she discussed the 20-year offer with Smith, she equivocated and responded, “We discussed recommendations; we discussed counter-offers; I conveyed counteroffers. Those were rejected.” It was undetermined whether the second attorney mentioned the deal presented to the first attorney. Nor did she mention that she didn’t represent Smith when plea bargaining began, despite her representation to the court that she discussed prior offers with Smith. Adding to this confusion, Smith’s first attorney told the Oklahoma Bar Association that, contrary to what the state told the sentencing court, the lowest sentence the state ever offered Smith was 25 years. The sentencing court ultimately sentenced Smith to 30 years in prison. Smith neither sought to withdraw his plea nor appealed within the 10 days in which Oklahoma allowed him to do so. Smith petitioned the district court under 28 U.S.C. 2254 seeking habeas relief. After review of the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded Smith had shown both cause and prejudice, and there were unresolved factual issues to be addressed before habeas relief could be granted. The Tenth Circuit reversed the sentence Smith received and remanded for the district court to hold further proceedings. View "Smith v. Allbaugh" on Justia Law

Leonard Aragon was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. He appealed, arguing the district court erred in finding that two packages found in his car contained 28.5 grams of methamphetamine and 11 grams of heroin, respectively. He also contended “the judge abused his discretion by sua sponte presenting his own evidence in support of a higher sentence.” The Tenth Circuit found that although the suspected heroin appeared to be wrapped in light packaging, the same could not be said for the suspected methamphetamine. “Even adding all 11.5 grams of heroin to the amounts from the controlled buys would require more than 7 grams of methamphetamine to make Mr. Aragon’s offense level 24 as the district court found.” The Tenth Circuit found nothing in the record to suggest the trial judge would be unable or unwilling to set aside the additional drugs in accordance with its conclusion that their net weights were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, therefore the Court declined to reassign the case on remand. The sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for further development. View "United States v. Aragon" on Justia Law

Daniel Cookson pled guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography after the FBI identified him in the course of a large-scale sting operation involving the website “Playpen.” At his sentencing hearing, the district court determined Cookson’s criminal history and total offense level correlated to a Guidelines range of 97–121 months. The district court announced its intention to sentence Cookson to a term of seventy-two months’ imprisonment. But after entertaining argument from both parties, the district court imposed a sentence of five years’ probation. The Government appealed, challenging Cookson’s sentence as substantively unreasonable. Cookson cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained from his computer by the FBI pursuant to a warrant issued in the Eastern District of Virginia. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s suppression ruling based on United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017), but vacated Cookson’s sentence as unreasonable. The matter was remanded back to the district court for resentencing. View "United States v. Cookson" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellees Air Methods Corporation and Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC provide air ambulance services. Defendants provided air ambulance services to Plaintiffs-Appellants, or in some cases to their minor children. Plaintiffs dispute their obligation to pay the full amounts charged by Defendants because Plaintiffs claim to have never agreed with Defendants on a price for their services. Plaintiffs filed suit, asserting jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), to determine what, if any, amounts they owe Defendants. Plaintiffs also sought to recover any excess payments already made to Defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims were pre-empted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. 41713. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all Plaintiffs’ breach of implied contract claims, the Scarlett Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim, all Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims, and the Scarlett Plaintiffs’ due process claims; the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Cowen Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim, only with respect to the existence of contracts between the Cowen Plaintiffs and Defendants; and the Court remanded for further proceedings. View "Scarlett v. Air Methods Corporation" on Justia Law

Benjamin Grice suffered severe burns after an oil pump exploded at the refinery where he worked. He and his wife brought suit against the refinery’s two parent corporations, CVR Energy and CVR Refining, alleging the parent companies assumed responsibility for workplace safety at the oil refinery by entering into a services agreement for the benefit of Grice’s employer, Coffeyville Resources. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the parent companies, concluding that the agreement did not obligate them to provide safety services to the oil refinery. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) CVR Refining should have been dismissed as a party under 28 U.S.C. 1332, to preserve complete diversity of citizenship; and (2) the company did not have a duty to Grice to maintain the oil pump since the services agreement was for administrative and legal services and not for safety services that would subject CVR Energy to liability under Kansas law. View "Grice v. CVR Energy" on Justia Law

In 2008, Aaron Copeland pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed an enhanced sentence of 15 years in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) based on his two prior drug offenses and one prior burglary. Copeland did not appeal. After he brought several unsuccessful motions for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, the Tenth Circuit authorized Copeland to bring a successive Section 2255 motion to assert that his sentence was invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the ACCA’s definition of violent felony in its residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. In his motion, Copeland claimed the sentencing court relied on the unconstitutional residual clause to find that his prior burglary was a violent felony and therefore the court should not have enhanced his sentence. The district court denied the motion, finding that it did not sentence Copeland under the residual clause and that his motion accordingly could not rely on Johnson. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding Copeland showed the district court relied on the residual clause when it sentenced him in 2008. Further, the Court determined Copeland showed he should have prevailed on the merits. View "United States v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Sixty-one year old defendant Joan Osborn has been diagnosed at different times with schizophrenia, possible depression, and possible post-traumatic stress disorder. In mid-October 2014, Defendant allegedly called a United States district court judge and left a voicemail conveying a variety of brutal and obscene threats. A grand jury subsequently indicted Defendant for threatening to assault and murder a United States judge. Based on a forensic psychologist's evaluation, defendant's disorder would interfere with her ability to assist in her own defense. The district court found Defendant incompetent to stand trial, and committed her to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization to gauge whether she could be restored to competency. The district court stayed its order of commitment so Defendant could appeal its competency determination to the Tenth Circuit. While that appeal was pending, the United States Marshals Service held Defendant at the Salt Lake County Jail in Utah. And while at jail, employees there forcibly injected Defendant with an antipsychotic drug against her will from approximately June to October 2016 without notifying her attorney. The district court initially ordered the jail to stop this practice after Defendant’s attorney brought an emergency motion to halt it. But after a hearing, the district court allowed the jail to continue its forcible medication of Defendant based on Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990, "Harper") “after finding [that] her mental state had deteriorated so severely to the point where she presented a significant danger to herself and to other inmates and officers.” Two hearings pursuant to Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) were held. Although just a little over a year prior, the district court had allowed Salt Lake County Jail officials to forcibly medicate Defendant under Harper because she was a danger, the district court concluded that “involuntary commitment pursuant to Harper is unwarranted.” After determining that the government had met each of Sell’s stringent requirements, the district court permitted the government to medicate Defendant with antipsychotic medication, every two weeks for six months. Defendant appealed the district court's order allowing her to be forcibly medicated under Sell. The issue this appeal presented to the Tenth Circuit was whether changed circumstances necessitated defendant be forcibly medicated under Harper but after the trial court already authorized forced medication under Sell. The Court held courts generally should vacate the Sell order and begin anew "armed with the findings of the intervening Harper proceedings." View "United States v. Osborn" on Justia Law

Gaspar Leal appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. He argued the drug conspiracy charged in this case was the same conspiracy for which he was convicted in a previous case, and that continued prosecution would violate his double jeopardy rights. The district found the conspiracies were not interdependent, the indictment therefore charged a separate offense, thus double jeopardy did not apply. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of Leal’s motion. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law