Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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United States Border Patrol agents found Defendant-appellant John Hargrove, his girlfriend Janelle Richter, and Edgar Silvas-Hinojos in the desert near the border between Arizona and New Mexico. They were all in Hargrove’s truck, along with nearly 300 pounds of marijuana and two firearms. Hargrove was charged with: (1) conspiracy to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana; and (2) possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, and aiding and abetting said possession. Hargrove was convicted by jury on both charges and sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hargrove argued: (1) the district court erred in failing to grant him a mistrial after the prosecutor elicited testimony that the district court had previously barred; and (2) the district court erred in failing to grant him safety-valve relief under section 5C1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects. View "United States v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

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In a span of eleven days, Davion Jefferson committed five robberies. Each was captured by multiple surveillance cameras. The first three robberies occurred on separate occasions at the same Fast Trip convenience store. All three involved Jefferson and an unnamed minor male accomplice. The last two robberies occurred less than two hours apart on the same date but at different locations. Jefferson’s cohort during the latter two robberies was Nicholas Lolar. Both Jefferson and Lolar were armed. After these robberies, Jefferson posted “Can’t wake up broke” on his Facebook page, and included a picture of a hand holding a wad of cash and a number of emojis, including a firearm emoji. Jefferson was indicted with five counts of Hobbs Act robbery (Counts 1-3, 5, and 7) and three counts of use and carry of a firearm (Counts 4, 6, and 8). At trial, he did not dispute his participation in all five robberies but tried to plant seeds of reasonable doubt with the jury as to the 924(c) counts by suggesting the weapons used during the last two robberies were not actual firearms. "Considering the very real possibility of a mandatory 32 years in prison if found to have twice brandished an actual firearm, it was sound trial strategy." The jury, however, was not convinced and he was sentenced to the mandatory 32 years plus a consecutive 70 months for the robberies, for a total sentence of 454 months. Jefferson raised several issues on appeal, namely: (1) Hobbs Act robbery was not a "crime of violence" under 924(c)(3)(A) because the statute required the predicate offense have a force element and Hobbs Act robbery had only a force means; and (2) even if Hobbs Act robbery had a force element, the judge erred in directing a verdict on that element, and should have instead submitted the issue to the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Jefferson's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant DTC Energy Group, Inc., sued two of its former employees, Adam Hirschfeld and Joseph Galban, as well as one of its industry competitors, Ally Consulting, LLC, for using DTC’s trade secrets to divert business from DTC to Ally. DTC moved for a preliminary injunction based on its claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition. The district court denied the motion, finding DTC had shown a probability of irreparable harm from Hirschfeld’s ongoing solicitation of DTC clients, but that DTC could not show the ongoing solicitation violated Hirschfeld’s employment agreement. After review, the Tenth Circuit determined the district court did not abuse its discretion when denying DTC's motion for a preliminary injunction, and affirmed. View "DTC Energy Group v. Hirschfeld" on Justia Law

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Oklahoma prisoner Kendrick Simpson sought habeas relief from his death sentence for two counts of first-degree murder. The district court granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on two of the Simpson's eighteen grounds for relief: (1) the trial court’s alleged improper exclusion of Simpson’s PTSD evidence from the guilt stage of the trial; and (2) an alleged Brady violation, whereby prosecutors withheld impeachment evidence as to a jailhouse informant. The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted a COA on five additional issues: (1) whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct denied Simpson a fundamentally fair sentencing proceeding; (2) whether a jury instruction and prosecutorial statements unduly limited jury consideration of mitigating evidence; (3) whether the heinous, atrocious or cruel ("HAC") aggravating factor determination as to one victim was unconstitutional and unreasonable; (4) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, prepare, and present lay witnesses, failing to request a second-degree murder instruction, failing to object to improper prosecutorial arguments, failing to object to the HAC instruction, and failing to object to the jury instruction limiting consideration of mitigating evidence; and (5) whether there was “cumulative error, limited to errors in the grounds on which a certificate of appealability has been granted.” After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error, and affirmed denial of habeas relief. View "Simpson v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

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Terry Schulenberg, a train engineer for BNSF Railway Company, was injured when the train he was riding “bottomed out.” Schulenberg filed suit against BNSF, alleging liability for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). BNSF filed motions to exclude Schulenberg’s expert witness and for summary judgment, both of which the district court granted. Schulenberg appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert witness because there was no discernable methodology offered for his opinions. And the Court concluded the district court was correct in granting summary judgment to BNSF because Schulenberg failed to present a dispute of material fact on his sole theory of liability on appeal, negligence per se. View "Schulenberg v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellee Ollisha Easley was onboard a Greyhound bus from Claremont, California, to her hometown of Louisville, Kentucky, when the bus made a scheduled stop in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Greyhound passenger list showed that Easley’s reservation included a second woman identified as “Denise Moore” - both Easley and Denise Moore had one checked bag and both tickets were purchased with cash. No one named Denise Moore boarded the bus in California, but her suitcase was stowed in the luggage hold of the Greyhound and was identified with the same reservation number and telephone number as Easley’s luggage. While the bus was stopped in Albuquerque, Special Agent Jarrell Perry of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and his partner that day, Special Agent Scott Godier, observed the luggage in the bus’s cargo hold. Agent Perry later testified that the use of a so-called “phantom passenger” is a common method of narcotics trafficking. Ultimately, the agents identified the bags traveling with Easley, searched them and found small bags of methamphetamine in the Denise Moore bag. Easley denied ownership of the bag, denied knowing the bag's owner, and denied ever having seen the bag before. She would be indicted for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Easley moved to suppress the evidence seized from the bag, and to exclude a confession she made to Agent Perry. The district court granted Easley’s motion holding that : (1) Easley had not established her bags were illegally searched while the bus was in the wash bay; (2) nor had she established that the bus was subject to an unreasonable investigatory detention; however, (3) under the totality of the circumstances, Easley had been illegally seized. The court found that Easley’s abandonment of the Denise Moore suitcase was the product of a Fourth Amendment violation, so it suppressed the evidence seized from the suitcase. The court also determined the earlier Fourth Amendment violation tainted Easley’s subsequent confession and suppressed her inculpatory statements. In reversing the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit concluded the agents’ search of the Denise Moore suitcase was a valid search of abandoned property; and there was preceding constitutional violation to taint Easley’s confession, suppression of her inculpatory statements. The parties did not brief or argue any other ground to support the district court’s decision on appeal, so the case was remanded to the district court to resolve the admissibility of Easley’s confession in the first instance. View "United States v. Easley" on Justia Law

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The issue raised on appeal in this matter centered on a trespass claim by Plaintiffs-Appellants Marvin and Mildred Bay that Defendants-Appellees Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC and Anadarko Land Corp. (together, “Anadarko”), that through a lessee, exceeded the scope of an easement by using excessive surface land to drill for oil and gas. The district court had diversity jurisdiction over the case and entered final judgment against the Bays pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The Tenth Circuit was presented with an issue of whether a deed reserving mineral rights in land (and the specific right to use the surface as “convenient or necessary” to access the minerals) requires applying a different test than the one prescribed in Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913 (Colo. 1997), to evaluate whether the mineral owner’s use of land constitutes a trespass. The Court concluded it did not, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bay v. Anadarko E&P Onshore" on Justia Law

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Darius Johnson was convicted for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. For these offenses, the district court initially imposed concurrent prison terms of 192 months, relying in part on Johnson’s classification as an armed career criminal because of three prior convictions for violent felonies. The district court later vacated this sentence, concluding that one of the three prior convictions had not involved a violent felony. Having vacated the sentence, the court resentenced Johnson to concurrent prison terms of 120 months and 128 months, relying in part on his classification as a career offender because of two prior convictions for crimes of violence. The government appealed the vacatur of the initial sentence, and Johnson appealed the new sentence. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court correctly ordered vacatur and resentencing based on a new U.S. Supreme Court decision. When imposing the initial sentence, the district court classified Johnson as an armed career criminal because he had three prior convictions for violent felonies. The government conceded this classification was erroneous because the district court had relied on the Residual Clause, which the Supreme Court later struck down as unconstitutional. This constitutional error was not harmless because one of the three prior convictions could have been based on battery of a law enforcement officer, which did not constitute a violent felony. Given this possibility, the district court needed to vacate the initial sentence. Given the concession of another crime of violence, the district court did not err in sentencing Johnson as a career criminal under the sentencing guidelines. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Gregory and Andrea Chernushin owned a second home in Colorado in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Eventually, Mr. Chernushin (not Ms. Chernushin) filed for bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Mr. Chernushin died. The bankruptcy trustee, Robertson Cohen, then filed an adversary complaint against Ms. Chernushin, seeking to sell the home. Ms. Chernushin argued the bankruptcy estate no longer included any interest in the home because Mr. Chernushin’s joint tenancy interest ended at his death. The bankruptcy court agreed with Ms. Chernushin, as did the district court on appeal. The trustee appealed, but the Tenth Circuit concurred the bankruptcy estate had no more interest in the home than Mr. Chernushin and Mr. Chernushin’s interest extinguished when he died. View "Cohen v. Chernushin" on Justia Law

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In May 2016, Anthony Bettcher pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. Afterward, a probation officer reviewed Bettcher’s past, including his criminal history, and prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The PSR informed the district court that in 2013, the State of Utah had charged Bettcher with second-degree aggravated assault. In the PSR, the probation officer recommended treating this earlier conviction as a crime of violence, which if adopted would enhance Bettcher’s base offense level. The government objected when the district court refused to consider the Utah aggravated assault as a "crime of violence" under the federal sentencing rules. The issue was brought before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court was presented with the question of whether Utah's second-degree aggravated-assault offense categorically qualified as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause in the federal sentencing guidelines. The Tenth Circuit held the Utah offense did qualify, and reversed the district court's decision to the contrary, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bettcher" on Justia Law