Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Market Synergy Group appeals from the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee United States Department of Labor. This case stemmed from the Department of Labor’s (DOL) final regulatory action on April 8, 2016, as it applied to fixed indexed annuity (FIA) sales. Plaintiff-Appellant Market Synergy Group (MSG) was a licensed insurance agency that works with insurers to develop specialized, proprietary FIAs and other insurance products for exclusive distribution. It partnered with independent marketing organizations (IMOs) to distribute these products. MSG did not directly sell FIAs but conducted market research and provided training and products for IMO member networks and the independent insurance agents that IMOs recruit. In April 2015, the DOL issued a proposed rule redefining who is a “fiduciary” of an employee benefit plan under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code, which would “update existing rules to distinguish more appropriately between the sorts of advice relationships that should be treated as fiduciary in nature and those that should not.” The final rule contained two changes important to this case: (1) it created a new exemption, with added regulatory requirements, the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE), which imposed a more stringent set of requirements on prohibited transactions than those required under PTE 84-24; and (2) the DOL removed FIAs (as well as variable annuities) from the PTE 84- 24 exemption and placed them in the newly created BICE. MSG filed this suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claiming the DOL violated the APA: (1) by failing to provide adequate notice of its intention to exclude transactions involving FIAs from PTE 84-24; (2) arbitrarily treated FIAs differently from other fixed annuities by excluding FIAs from PTE 84-24; and (3) by not adequately considering the detrimental economic impact of its exclusion of FIAs from PTE 84-24. MSG alleged that it would lose 80% of its revenue if the new regulation were to be enforced and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the DOL from implementing the new regulation. The district court denied the preliminary injunction. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the DOL, finding that there was adequate notice, no arbitrary treatment of FIAs as compared to other fixed annuities, and an adequate economic impact analysis. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Market Synergy Group v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a 2007 injunction, which prohibited Paragon Contractors Corporation and its president, Brian Jessop, from engaging in oppressive child labor. The Department of Labor procured a contempt citation, with the district court finding that Paragon and Jessop had violated the injunction by employing children to harvest pecans. For this violation, the district court sanctioned Paragon and Jessop by: (1) appointing a special master to monitor Paragon’s ongoing compliance with the injunction; and (2) ordering Paragon and Jessop to pay $200,000 into a fund to compensate the children. Paragon and Jessop appealed the contempt finding and the sanctions. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in (1) finding that Paragon and Jessop had violated the injunction by oppressively employing children; and (2) ordering Paragon and Jessop to pay $200,000. But the Court reversed the district court’s appointment of a special master. View "Acosta v. Paragon Contractors" on Justia Law

In 2014, defendant Joseph Degeare pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the sentencing court imposed a 15-year prison sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In doing so, the sentencing court treated five of Degeare’s previous Oklahoma convictions as ACCA predicates: (1) his 1990 conviction for forcible sodomy; (2) his two 1994 convictions for forcible sodomy; (3) his 1994 conviction for lewd molestation of a minor; and (4) his 2003 conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Degeare didn’t appeal. But in 2015, he sought habeas relief . After the district court denied his motion, Degeare filed an untimely notice of appeal. The Tenth Circuit dismissed, and the Supreme Court denied review. Relying on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), Degeare then sought and received authorization to file a second or successive postconviction motion for relief. In that motion, Degeare argued that the sentencing court erred in treating his previous convictions as ACCA predicates. The Tenth Circuit was faced with the issue of what offenses constitute violent felonies to make them predicate offenses for the ACCA. The Tenth Circuit hadn’t yet addressed the precise level of certainty this standard requires; whatever the term “certainty” might mean, “it doesn’t encompass the significant doubt we’re left with here. And because we can’t be ‘certain’ that the offense at issue in this appeal is ‘necessarily’ a violent felony,” the Court concluded the district court erred in treating it as one for purposes of denying defendant’s successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "United States v. Degeare" on Justia Law

Denver Detention Center (“DDC”) prisoner Craig Ralston filed a 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 civil rights suit against Hosea Cannon. Ralston alleged Cannon, the official charged with “coordinating, directing[,] and monitoring the religious activities” of DDC inmates, violated his First Amendment right to free exercise by denying his request for a kosher diet. Cannon moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, asserting his conduct was, at most, negligent and, thus, did not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. The district court denied Cannon’s request for qualified immunity. The district court concluded it was clearly established that a kosher-meal accommodation was necessary if Ralston had an honest belief the accommodation was important to his free exercise of religion. Importantly, the district court further concluded the record, read in the light most favorable to Ralston, was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find Cannon consciously or intentionally interfered with Ralston’s right to free exercise by denying the kosher-diet request. Cannon appealed. The Tenth Circuit determined that each aspect of Cannon’s appeal amounted to a challenge of the district court’s determinations of evidentiary sufficiency. Accordingly, the Court lacked jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, and dismissed Cannon’s appeal. View "Ralston v. Cannon" on Justia Law

The United States Bureau of Land Management leased 2,500 acres of geothermal mineral rights in Hidalgo County, New Mexico to Plaintiff Lightning Dock Geothermal HI-01, LLC (LDG), a Delaware company. LDG developed and owned a geothermal power generating project in Hidalgo County. LDG also developed a geothermal well field on the subject tract as part of its project. Defendant AmeriCulture, a New Mexico corporation under the direction of Defendant Damon Seawright, a New Mexico resident, later purchased a surface estate of approximately fifteen acres overlying LDG’s mineral lease, ostensibly to develop and operate a tilapia fish farm. Because AmeriCulture wished to utilize LDG’s geothermal resources for its farm, AmeriCulture and LDG (more accurately its predecessor) entered into a Joint Facility Operating Agreement (JFOA). The purpose of the JFOA, from LDG’s perspective, was to allow AmeriCulture to utilize some of the land’s geothermal resources without interfering or competing with LDG’s development of its federal lease. Plaintiff Los Lobos Renewable Power LLC (LLRP), also a Delaware company, was the sole member of LDG and a third-party beneficiary of the JFOA. The parties eventually began to quarrel over their contractual rights and obligations. Invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiffs LDG and LLRP sued Defendants Americulture and Seawright in federal court for alleged infractions of New Mexico state law. AmeriCulture filed a special motion to dismiss the suit under New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute. The district court, however, refused to consider that motion, holding the statute authorizing it inapplicable in federal court. After review of the briefs, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. View "Los Lobos Renewable Power v. Americulture" on Justia Law

The United States Bureau of Land Management leased 2,500 acres of geothermal mineral rights in Hidalgo County, New Mexico to Plaintiff Lightning Dock Geothermal HI-01, LLC (LDG), a Delaware company. LDG developed and owned a geothermal power generating project in Hidalgo County. LDG also developed a geothermal well field on the subject tract as part of its project. Defendant AmeriCulture, a New Mexico corporation under the direction of Defendant Damon Seawright, a New Mexico resident, later purchased a surface estate of approximately fifteen acres overlying LDG’s mineral lease, ostensibly to develop and operate a tilapia fish farm. Because AmeriCulture wished to utilize LDG’s geothermal resources for its farm, AmeriCulture and LDG (more accurately its predecessor) entered into a Joint Facility Operating Agreement (JFOA). The purpose of the JFOA, from LDG’s perspective, was to allow AmeriCulture to utilize some of the land’s geothermal resources without interfering or competing with LDG’s development of its federal lease. Plaintiff Los Lobos Renewable Power LLC (LLRP), also a Delaware company, was the sole member of LDG and a third-party beneficiary of the JFOA. The parties eventually began to quarrel over their contractual rights and obligations. Invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiffs LDG and LLRP sued Defendants Americulture and Seawright in federal court for alleged infractions of New Mexico state law. AmeriCulture filed a special motion to dismiss the suit under New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute. The district court, however, refused to consider that motion, holding the statute authorizing it inapplicable in federal court. After review of the briefs, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. View "Los Lobos Renewable Power v. Americulture" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Sherida Felders, Elijah Madyun and Delarryon Hansend filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, among other things, that Defendant Brian Bairett and other law enforcement officers violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights during a traffic stop. In February 2009, before Plaintiffs served Bairett (or any other defendant) with a summons and the complaint, Bairett offered to settle the case by paying the driver, Felders, $20,000 and passengers Madyun and Hansend $2,500 each. Plaintiffs did not accept Bairett’s offer. Two months later, Plaintiffs timely sent Bairett’s counsel a request to waive service of the summons and complaint, which Bairett’s attorney executed. Six years later, a jury found Defendant Bairett liable for unlawfully searching Plaintiffs’ car and awarded the driver, Felders, $15,000, and her two passengers, Madyun and Hansend, nominal damages of $1 each. After the jury’s verdict, Plaintiffs moved “To Strike and/or Deem Ineffective Bairett’s Alleged ‘Offer of Judgment.’” The district court granted that motion, ruling that Bairett’s February 2009 offer to settle the case did not qualify as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 offer to allow judgment against Bairett because he made that settlement offer before he became a party to this litigation. Ordinarily prevailing parties can recover litigation costs from their opponent. Bairett argued on appeal that he effectively invoked Rule 68 to limit his liability for Plaintiffs’ costs. But the district court ruled that Bairett’s Rule 68 offer of judgment was premature, and thus ineffective, because Bairett made it before he had become a party to this litigation. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed: because Rule 68 required the “party defending against a claim” to make an “offer to allow judgment” against him, and because a court cannot enter judgment against the offeror until he has first been made a party to the litigation, Bairett’s offer, filed before Plaintiffs served him with the summons and complaint or obtained his waiver of service, was too early to be effective. View "Felders v. Bairett" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant Joseph Pacheco was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and Pacheco was sentenced to a within-guidelines term of 355 months in prison. On appeal, Pacheco argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence gleaned from a cell phone recovered by officers at the scene of his arrest because the device was originally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In the alternative, he maintained the evidence from the cell phone should have been suppressed because the warrant ultimately authorizing officers to search the phone was authorized in Kansas but executed at a computer lab in Missouri. Further, Pacheco contended the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included charge of simple possession. As for his sentence, Pacheco argued the district court further abused its discretion in how it defined the amount and type of methamphetamine with which Pacheco was charged for sentencing purposes. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Pacheco’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant Joseph Pacheco was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and Pacheco was sentenced to a within-guidelines term of 355 months in prison. On appeal, Pacheco argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence gleaned from a cell phone recovered by officers at the scene of his arrest because the device was originally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In the alternative, he maintained the evidence from the cell phone should have been suppressed because the warrant ultimately authorizing officers to search the phone was authorized in Kansas but executed at a computer lab in Missouri. Further, Pacheco contended the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included charge of simple possession. As for his sentence, Pacheco argued the district court further abused its discretion in how it defined the amount and type of methamphetamine with which Pacheco was charged for sentencing purposes. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Pacheco’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Michael Banks of sixteen drug-related crimes, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison plus 60 months. In a direct appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Banks challenged his convictions. A split panel of the Tenth Circuit found and rejected Banks’ sufficiency arguments, finding he largely ignored the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, the Court determined the evidence was sufficient to support most, if not all, of the crimes he was ultimately convicted of, “Banks appears to make the curious assertion that when a victim disputes that a defendant committed a particular offense against him or her, the evidence is necessarily insufficient to support a conviction for that offense. The Court rejected Banks’ argument the evidence at trial did not constructively amend the indictment, resulting in a fatal variance requiring reversal. Furthermore, the Court found the district court did not miscalculate the sentence Banks received. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law