Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Todd Newmiller and several of his friends went to a Colorado Springs strip club to celebrate Newmiller’s birthday. After leaving the club, they had a fight with another group of men, during which Newmiller fatally stabbed Anthony Madril in the heart. Newmiller was charged, convicted of second-degree murder, and sentenced to thirty-one years’ imprisonment. The Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA) affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Newmiller later challenged the constitutionality of his conviction under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c). After an evidentiary hearing, the state post-conviction court denied relief. The CCA affirmed the denial. And the Colorado Supreme Court again denied certiorari review. Newmiller next sought habeas relief at the federal district court, arguing his trial counsel were ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment because they failed to investigate, challenge, and rebut the prosecution’s expert medical testimony. The district court ruled trial counsel’s performance was deficient and the CCA’s conclusion to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). But the district court denied relief because Newmiller failed to show counsel’s performance was prejudicial. Newmiller appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed habeas relief. View "Newmiller v. Raemisch" on Justia Law

In 2015, Wichita and affiliated tribes made plans to build a History Center on a plot of land held by the federal government in trust for the Wichita Tribe, Delaware Nation, and Caddo Nation jointly. One of those neighbors, the Caddo Nation, claimed the land may contain remains of ancestral relatives. Before the Wichita Tribe began construction, Caddo Nation sued the Wichita Tribe for allegedly violating the procedures required by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) throughout the planning process. Caddo Nation sought an emergency temporary restraining order preventing Wichita Tribe from continuing construction until it complied with those procedures. When the district court denied that request, Caddo Nation appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals without seeking further preliminary relief. In the intervening year while the case was on appeal with the Tenth Circuit, Wichita Tribe completed construction of the History Center. The Tenth Circuit concluded it had no jurisdiction over this appeal because the relief Caddo Nation requested from the district court was moot. View "Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Western Energy Alliance (“WEA”) filed this lawsuit against two Defendants: the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management (the “BLM”). WEA alleged that the BLM violated the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. secs. 181-287 (the “MLA”), by holding too few oil and gas lease sales. Several environmental advocacy groups moved to intervene in the suit: The Wilderness Society, Wyoming Outdoor Council, Southern Utah Wilderness Society, San Juan Citizens Alliance, Great Old Broads For Wilderness, Sierra Club, WildEarth Guardians, Center For Biological Diversity, and Earthworks (collectively, the “conservation groups”). The district court denied the motion to intervene. The court concluded that the conservation groups had failed to show that the pending litigation has the potential to harm their environmental interests, or that the presently named parties could not adequately represent their interests. The conservation groups filed this interlocutory appeal over the denial of their motion to intervene. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the conservation groups could intervene in the lawsuit as a matter of right, and reversed the district court’s previous denial. View "Western Energy Alliance v. Zinke" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Phillip Garcia pled guilty to one count of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but the judge denied the motion. His crime carried a prison term of up to 10 years, but because he had three or more prior “violent felony” convictions, the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) increased his punishment range to a mandatory 15 years to life. In 2008, the judge sentenced him to a prison term of 188 months. He appealed; the Tenth Circuit affirmed. In 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Johnson II). Under the ACCA, to fall within the definition of a violent felony, a prior conviction must be “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and must satisfy one of three predicates, at issue in this case, the Residual Clause, must "otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." The Supreme Court held because the Residual Clause was unconstitutionally vague, “imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause . . . violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.” Garcia filed a section 2255 motion contending his sentence was unconstitutional under Johnson II. He claimed one of his three predicate convictions, possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, only qualified as a violent felony under the then defunct Residual Clause. The government argued Garcia's robbery conviction qualified as a violent felony under the Elements Clause and was an apt substitution for the conviction for unlawful weapon possession. Before the judge decided Garcia’s 2255 motion, the government changed course, now contending the robbery conviction did not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s Elements Clause after all. On the same day the district court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the government filed a supplemental brief in which it again reversed course; the government’s second revised position was that “New Mexico robbery in the third degree is indeed a qualifying violent felony under the ‘force clause’ [or “Elements Clause”]." The judge denied the 2255 motion. Agreeing with the district court's d View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a protective sweep of a house incident to the arrest of one of its occupants, defendant-appellant Stephen Bagley. The protective sweep yielded items that allowed law enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant for the entire house. Executing this warrant, officials found incriminating evidence. Bagley was a convicted felon who was named in an arrest warrant for violating the terms of his supervised release. Bagley moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the protective sweep had gone too far. The district court denied the motion. The Tenth Circuit, after review of the district court record, concluded the protective sweep under the circumstances of this case was not permissible under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Abeyta challenged the sentence he received for pleading to being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The district court enhanced Abeyta’s sentence pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.2(c), counting Abeyta’s prior conviction for “damaging, defacing or destruction of private property” under Denver Revised Municipal Code (“Den.”) section 38-71 as a local ordinance violation that also violates state criminal law. Because Den. 38-71 offense was a local ordinance violation, it qualified as an exception under 4A1.2(c)(2), meaning that it did not count toward Abeyta’s criminal history score. But, if a Den. 38-71 offense also violated state criminal law, then the exception to the exception applies, meaning that it did count under the guidelines. Abeyta argued (among other things) that his Den. 38-71 conviction was a local ordinance violation that did not necessarily violate state criminal law. He noted that Colorado has a similar offense, Colo. Rev. Stat. (“Colo.”) section 18-4-501 (making it “unlawful for any person knowingly to damage, deface, destroy or injure” another person’s property), but argued that the Colorado statute only criminalized conduct that actually damaged property, whereas Den. 38-71 criminalized broader conduct, including defacement that does not cause damage. Because a violation of Den. 38-71 does not necessarily violate Colo. 18-4-501, Abeyta argued, the “exception to the exception” did not apply. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court erred by applying a "common sense approach" in making the Den. 38-71 conviction count towards his criminal history score. The Court remanded this case with direction to vacate Abeyta's sentence and for resentencing. View "United States v. Abeyta" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Gabriel Acosta and his girlfriend, Chante Dillon, killed their roommate, Kimberly Dotson, after Dotson wrecked their car. Acosta and Dillon duct-taped, beat, and suffocated Dotson to death, then bagged her body in trash bags and threw her in a dumpster. Patricia Medina was the only eyewitness to the murder. Acosta and Dillin were both charged with first-degree murder. Before Acosta’s trial, Medina described the killing in a recorded statement to the police, in two criminal depositions at which she was cross-examined, and at Dillon’s trial, where she was again subjected to cross-examination. But Medina was deemed unavailable to testify at Acosta’s trial, so the transcripts of her testimony were read to the jury. Acosta was convicted and sentenced to life without parole. The Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA) affirmed his conviction. Acosta then sought habeas relief in federal court, claiming he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him and to the assistance of counsel, both in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied relief. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Acosta v. Raemisch" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit addressed whether the federal district court in Colorado may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant Continental Motors, Inc. based upon its contacts with Colorado through its website. Continental Motors’ website allows airplane repair businesses known as fixed- base operators (“FBOs”) to obtain unlimited access to its online service manuals in exchange for an annual fee. Arapahoe Aero, a Colorado-based FBO participating in the program, accessed and consulted the manuals in servicing an airplane that contained engine components manufactured by Continental Motors. The airplane later crashed in Idaho on a flight from Colorado. After the crash, Old Republic Insurance Company, the airplane’s insurer, paid the owner for the property loss and filed a subrogation action against Continental Motors in Colorado federal district court, seeking reimbursement. Old Republic alleged that Continental Motors’ online service manuals and bulletins contained defective information, thereby causing the crash. Continental Motors moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it did not purposely direct its activities at Colorado. Old Republic conceded that Continental Motors did not maintain sufficient contacts with Colorado to support jurisdiction for all purposes. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that it did not have specific jurisdiction over Continental Motors. On appeal, Old Republic maintains that Continental Motors was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Colorado for purposes of this case. Finding no reversible error in dismissal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Continental Motors" on Justia Law

Anthony Kendall pleaded guilty to forcibly assaulting a federal officer and inflicting a bodily injury. Kendall had two prior felony convictions: a federal conviction for aggravated assault while carrying a firearm and a conviction for assault on a District of Columbia police officer in violation of a local provision. At sentencing, the district court held all three of these convictions supported a career offender sentence enhancement because each constituted a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Kendall appealed, contending the district court erred in classifying his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 111(b) in this case and his prior conviction under D.C. Code 22-405(c). Finding that all three of his convictions constituted crimes of violence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence Kendall received. View "United States v. Kendall" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Wayne Benton challenged his sentence. Benton pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His presentence investigation report (PSR) concluded Benton’s 2006 Kansas conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was a crime of violence as defined in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applied to his guilty plea, resulted in a six-level enhancement. Benton appealed, arguing his aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence, and that he should have had a base offense of 14 and a corresponding Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months, instead of the 92 to 115 month range he ultimately received. Benton argued that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon could not be a crime of violence because, in some cases, a perpetrator may commit the crime with a harmless object. Yet, under Kansas law, the actual ability to effectuate harm is irrelevant because assault “requires only an apparent ability, not a present ability, to do bodily harm.” The Tenth Circuit concluded the 2006 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction qualified as a predicate offense under the Sentencing Guidelines and affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law