Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rural Water District No. 4, Douglas County, Kansas (“Douglas-4”) appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff City of Eudora, Kansas (“Eudora”) in this declaratory judgment action. Douglas-4 and Eudora disputed which entity could provide water service to certain areas near Eudora (the “Service Area”). In 2002, Douglas-4 was the water service provider for the Service Area, but was running low on water. Douglas-4 decided to purchase water from an adjacent rural water district, “Johnson-6.” The project required laying new pipes and building additional pumping stations at an estimated cost of $1.25 million. To finance the project, Douglas-4 received initial approval for a $1.25 million loan from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) with a fixed rate and twenty-year term. That same year, Eudora annexed the Service Area. The annexation positioned Eudora to potentially assume Douglas-4’s water customers. Understanding that it was facing a potential loss of customers, Douglas-4’s governing board reduced its KDHE loan to $1 million and sought the remaining $250,000 from a private, USDA-guaranteed loan. Douglas-4 believed that such a loan would come with federal protection under 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), which prevented municipalities from assuming water customers while a USDA-guaranteed loan was in repayment. Douglas-4 eventually secured a USDA-guaranteed loan for $250,000 from First State Bank & Trust and proceeded with the Johnson-6 project. Both the KDHE loan and the USDA-guaranteed loan had twenty-year repayment terms, beginning in 2004 and ending in 2024. Between 2004 and 2007, Douglas-4 and Eudora entered into negotiations in an attempt to resolve the disputed Service Area, but the discussions were not successful. Douglas-4 filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to prevent Eudora from taking its water customers. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Douglas-4, concluding the loan guaranteed by the federal government was necessary, and Eudora appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "City of Eudora v. Rural Water District No. 4" on Justia Law

Defendant Delano Medina filed an application for habeas relief, seeking dismissal of the charges against him on the ground that he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He apparently proceeded under 28 U.S.C. 2241 rather than under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because section 2255(a) required he be “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress.” At the time of his filing for relief, he had not yet been tried, much less sentenced. The district court dismissed Defendant’s application for failure to exhaust available remedies. He appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "Although there may be exceptional circumstances in which [section] 2241 is available to a federal prisoner awaiting trial in federal court, no such circumstances are present here." View "Medina v. Choate" on Justia Law

Defendant Delano Medina filed an application for habeas relief, seeking dismissal of the charges against him on the ground that he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He apparently proceeded under 28 U.S.C. 2241 rather than under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because section 2255(a) required he be “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress.” At the time of his filing for relief, he had not yet been tried, much less sentenced. The district court dismissed Defendant’s application for failure to exhaust available remedies. He appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "Although there may be exceptional circumstances in which [section] 2241 is available to a federal prisoner awaiting trial in federal court, no such circumstances are present here." View "Medina v. Choate" on Justia Law

A jury found Steven Meisel guilty of distributing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he argued the district court: (1) violated his right to present a complete defense by preventing him from adducing alternative perpetrator evidence; and (2) erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on “identity.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed: even assuming the district court erred in limiting Meisel’s ability to present alternative perpetrator evidence, any such error was harmless. And, since the jury instructions, considered as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury the gist of Meisel’s defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Meisel’s proffered instruction. View "United States v. Meisel" on Justia Law

A jury found Steven Meisel guilty of distributing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he argued the district court: (1) violated his right to present a complete defense by preventing him from adducing alternative perpetrator evidence; and (2) erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on “identity.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed: even assuming the district court erred in limiting Meisel’s ability to present alternative perpetrator evidence, any such error was harmless. And, since the jury instructions, considered as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury the gist of Meisel’s defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Meisel’s proffered instruction. View "United States v. Meisel" on Justia Law

The question presented in this appeal for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether Petitioner Juan Lucio-Rayos’s municipal theft conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), which would have made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Lucio-Rayos was convicted under a divisible municipal code provision that set forth several different theft offenses, some of which qualified as CIMTs and some of which did not. Applying a modified categorical approach, the Tenth Circuit determined it was not possible to tell which theft offense was the basis of Lucio-Rayos’s conviction. The Court held it was Lucio-Rayos’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal, and because the record was inconclusive to this end, the Court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)’s determination that Lucio-Rayos did not show that he was eligible for cancellation of removal. Furthermore, the immigration judge (“IJ”) did not deprive Lucio-Rayos of due process by refusing to recuse from hearing his case. View "Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The question presented in this appeal for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether Petitioner Juan Lucio-Rayos’s municipal theft conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), which would have made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Lucio-Rayos was convicted under a divisible municipal code provision that set forth several different theft offenses, some of which qualified as CIMTs and some of which did not. Applying a modified categorical approach, the Tenth Circuit determined it was not possible to tell which theft offense was the basis of Lucio-Rayos’s conviction. The Court held it was Lucio-Rayos’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal, and because the record was inconclusive to this end, the Court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)’s determination that Lucio-Rayos did not show that he was eligible for cancellation of removal. Furthermore, the immigration judge (“IJ”) did not deprive Lucio-Rayos of due process by refusing to recuse from hearing his case. View "Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Kenroy Benford of being a felon in possession of a firearm based on his constructive possession of a loaded pistol that police seized from an apartment bedroom he shared with his girlfriend. On appeal, Benford argued the district court: (1) abused its discretion by admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) about (i) his possession of a different firearm during a recent sidewalk confrontation, and (ii) text messages he had sent three months earlier suggesting he had firearms to trade; (2) letting the jury’s guilty verdict stand despite insufficient evidence that he had constructively possessed the pistol in the apartment by knowingly having the power to exercise dominion or control over the pistol; and (3) it incompletely instructed the jury on constructive possession by not advising the jury that it could convict only if it also found that Benford intended to exercise dominion or control over the pistol. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its denials of Benford’s motions for acquittal, but reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the erroneous jury instruction. View "United States v. Benford" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Kenroy Benford of being a felon in possession of a firearm based on his constructive possession of a loaded pistol that police seized from an apartment bedroom he shared with his girlfriend. On appeal, Benford argued the district court: (1) abused its discretion by admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) about (i) his possession of a different firearm during a recent sidewalk confrontation, and (ii) text messages he had sent three months earlier suggesting he had firearms to trade; (2) letting the jury’s guilty verdict stand despite insufficient evidence that he had constructively possessed the pistol in the apartment by knowingly having the power to exercise dominion or control over the pistol; and (3) it incompletely instructed the jury on constructive possession by not advising the jury that it could convict only if it also found that Benford intended to exercise dominion or control over the pistol. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its denials of Benford’s motions for acquittal, but reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the erroneous jury instruction. View "United States v. Benford" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma jury convicted Emmanuel Littlejohn of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. In this case's first appearance before the Tenth Circuit, the district court found Littlejohn’s ineffective-assistance and cumulative-error claims (among twelve other bases for relief) meritless or procedurally barred. The Tenth Circuit addressed the declaration of Dr. Manual Saint Martin, a psychiatrist who diagnosed Littlejohn (for the first time) with undefined, synapse-level neurological deficits, or an organic brain disorder. Given that evidence, the Court reasoned that the disposition of Littlejohn’s ineffective-assistance claim, and derivatively, his cumulative-error claim, hinged on whether Dr. Saint Martin’s averments would prove worthy of belief, because “[e]vidence that an organic brain disorder was a substantial factor in engendering Mr. Littlejohn’s life of deviance probably would have been a significant favorable input for Mr. Littlejohn in the jury’s decisionmaking calculus” during the penalty phase. As a result, the case was remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether Littlejohn’s trial counsel proved ineffective by failing to adequately investigate and present to the jury a mitigation theory of organic brain damage. On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing; the parties presented the testimony of various individuals - including Dr. Saint Martin and Littlejohn’s trial counsel. Following the hearing, the district court largely restated its earlier findings and again denied Littlejohn habeas relief on his ineffective-assistance and cumulative-error claims. Littlejohn appealed the district court’s judgment on remand. With the benefit of a more developed factual record relative to Littlejohn’s alleged organic brain damage, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the district court. View "Littlejohn v. Royal" on Justia Law