Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the District of Utah's decision to dismiss the charge against Jonathan Alexander Morales-Lopez, who was accused of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). This statute prohibits any person who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm.The district court held that the phrase "unlawful user" in the statute is unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to the facts of Morales-Lopez's case. However, the appellate court disagreed on both counts.First, the appellate court held that the district court erred in considering whether § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional on its face. The court cited longstanding precedent that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot pose a facial challenge to it.Second, the appellate court held that the district court erred in finding § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional as applied to Morales-Lopez's conduct. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence of a temporal nexus between Morales-Lopez's drug use and his possession of a firearm.The facts of the case are as follows: Morales-Lopez and another man were caught stealing firearms and ammunition from a store in Utah. Morales-Lopez was found with a stolen gun and methamphetamine. He also admitted to using drugs regularly in the month prior to his arrest.The appellate court concluded that the phrase "unlawful user" in § 922(g)(3) is clear in its application to Morales-Lopez's conduct and that the district court should reinstate the jury’s verdict. The case was remanded back to the district court with instructions to proceed accordingly. View "United States v. Morales-Lopez" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal of a case involving Charles Cline, who was terminated by Clinical Perfusion Systems, Inc. after a medical emergency led to an extended hospital stay. Cline brought forward disability discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the Oklahoma AntiDiscrimination Act (OADA); and age discrimination claims under the OADA. The court concluded that Cline was unable to establish a disability discrimination claim as he failed to plausibly allege that he could perform his job functions with a reasonable accommodation by his employer. The court also disagreed with the district court's dismissal of Cline's age discrimination claim, arguing that Cline had sufficiently alleged that age was a but-for cause of his termination. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Cline's disability discrimination claims, reversed the dismissal of his age discrimination claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cline v. Clinical Perfusion Systems" on Justia Law

In a criminal appeal, the defendant, Kenneth Devereaux, challenged his sixty-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argued that the district court erred in treating his prior conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury as a "crime of violence" and using that conviction to increase his base offense level. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with Devereaux and the government that the district court had erred. The court concluded that the differing mental states (intentional or reckless) that could constitute a violation of the assault statute were different means of committing a single, indivisible offense, rather than elements of separate offenses. The court applied the Supreme Court's guidance in Mathis v. United States and its own post-Borden decision in United States v. Benally to reach this conclusion. As a result, because the least criminalized conduct the assault statute proscribes is recklessness, a conviction under the statute does not categorically involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. Therefore, the court vacated Devereaux's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Devereaux" on Justia Law

In a dispute between ORP Surgical, LLC (ORP), and Howmedica Osteonics Corp., also known as Stryker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling. ORP and Stryker, both involved in medical device sales, had a successful business relationship under two sales contracts, the Joint Sales Representative Agreement (JSRA) and the Trauma Sales Representative Agreement (TSRA). The relationship soured when Stryker terminated the JSRA and hired one of ORP's sales representatives, and later, when ORP terminated the TSRA, Stryker hired a dozen of ORP's representatives. The district court ruled in favor of ORP, finding that Stryker breached the sales contracts and owed ORP damages, attorneys’ fees, sanctions, and costs. On appeal, Stryker challenged the rulings on the breach of contract claims, the attorneys’ fees award, and the nominal damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holdings on the breach-of-contract claims but reversed its award of attorneys' fees under the indemnification provision. It also affirmed the award of nominal damages for Stryker's breach of the non-solicitation/non-diversion provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "ORP Surgical v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff, Donald Ray Logsdon, Jr., alleged that Deputy United States Marshals used excessive force when executing a state-court warrant for Logsdon's arrest. The plaintiff relied on a precedent, Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, which established a cause of action against federal agents for violations of the Bill of Rights. However, the district court dismissed Logsdon's case, holding that the Bivens claim was not applicable, and the plaintiff appealed.The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Logsdon had no claim under Bivens. The court found that there were two "special factors" that distinguished this case from Bivens and thus justified not recognizing a Bivens claim.Firstly, the court stated that agents of the United States Marshal Service (USMS) were a new category of defendant not considered by the Supreme Court in Bivens. The USMS is required by statute to partner with state and local law-enforcement authorities to create Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces. The court found that the potential chilling effect on such partnerships of recognizing Bivens liability for USMS officers was a special factor that suggested that Congress, not the courts, should create a remedy.Secondly, the court found that the availability of alternative remedies for misconduct by Deputy U.S. Marshals, including the internal USMS grievance procedure and the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigation procedure, was a special factor suggesting that the courts should not create a remedy. The court stated that the judiciary should not assess the adequacy of such remedies, indicating that this was the role of Congress or the Executive.The Appeals Court also rejected Logsdon's argument that the district court abused its discretion by granting the defendants' motion to reconsider its initial ruling that Logsdon had a Bivens claim. The court held that the district court had the discretion to reconsider any order short of a final decree. View "Logsdon v. United States Marshal Service" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction of John Miguel Swan, who had pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a material misrepresentation made by his plea counsel. His counsel had told him, just before he decided to plead guilty, that all minorities would be removed from his jury, and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. The court held that this misrepresentation about Swan's right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. The court found that the misrepresentation was not corrected during the district court’s plea colloquy nor negated by Swan’s prior experience in the criminal-justice system. As such, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, vacated Swan's conviction, and remanded for the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea and for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swan" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction of Montelito Simpkins for sexually abusing a minor and engaging in abusive sexual contact in Indian country. The government charged Simpkins under the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which only applies if either the victim or the defendant, but not both, is an Indian. In this case, Simpkins argued that the government provided insufficient evidence to prove that he was not an Indian, an essential element required for a conviction under the Act. The court clarified that a sufficiency challenge must be assessed against the legal elements of the crime, not against the elements listed in the jury instructions. The government conceded it had offered no evidence of Simpkins’s non-Indian status at trial. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove Simpkins’s non-Indian status, reversed his convictions, and remanded the case to the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Simpkins" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Jonathan Kearn, was initially indicted on three child pornography offenses involving his own children. He faced up to 30 years’ imprisonment for these charges. However, the government offered a plea agreement for a 10-year sentence if Kearn pled guilty to one of the counts. Following a six-minute conversation with his trial counsel about the plea agreement, Kearn decided to reject the offer and proceed to trial. He was then convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 24 years in prison. After exhausting his appeals, Kearn filed a pro se motion arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining phase.The district court granted Kearn's motion, finding that his trial counsel provided deficient advice about the proposed plea deal, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Kearn would have pleaded guilty. The court ordered the government to reoffer the plea. It then accepted Kearn’s guilty plea, vacated the prior judgment, and resentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Kearn's trial counsel's brief discussion with him was inadequate to explain the complexities of the plea and that counsel had given Kearn inaccurate and misleading information. The court also found that given the substantial difference in sentencing exposure—20 years—and the evidence suggesting Kearn was amenable to pleading guilty if he had been adequately advised, the district court reasonably found that Kearn would have accepted a properly presented plea deal and avoided trial. View "United States v. Kearn" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was considering an appeal by Elite IT Partners Inc. and its officer, James Michael Martinos, against a decision by the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had previously sued the defendants and alleged a fraudulent scheme to sell unnecessary services. The parties had settled the suit with a stipulated judgment providing equitable monetary relief under § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and waiving future challenges. However, a year after the entry of the stipulated judgment, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC that § 13(b) does not allow equitable monetary relief. The defendants then requested vacatur of the stipulated judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which the district court denied.Two main issues were considered by the Court of Appeals: whether the defendants' agreement to waive their right to challenge or contest the stipulated judgment prohibited them from arguing that the judgment was invalid, and whether the change in case law could be used as a basis for vacating the judgment. The court held that the defendants had indeed waived their rights to challenge the stipulated judgment and that the change in case law could not be used as a basis for vacating the judgment as it was unrelated to the facts of their case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Elite IT Partners" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, John Miguel Swan, appealed the district court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The case originated from a grand jury indictment of Swan for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan initially plead guilty, but five months later, the district court allowed Swan's plea counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel. Swan later wrote a pro se letter to the district court asserting his factual innocence and indicating that his plea counsel had compelled him to plead guilty. This appeal focuses on the claim that plea counsel materially misrepresented the nature of Swan's right to a jury trial, which, Swan argued, rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.The court found that Swan’s plea counsel informed him that all minorities would be removed from his jury and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. This was seen as a material misrepresentation about Swan’s right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means. The court determined that under these circumstances, Swan’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case back to the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swan" on Justia Law