Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved a criminal defendant’s obligation to pay restitution to his victims. Kapelle Simpson-El was convicted of crimes involving the sale of stolen cars. His sentence included a restitution obligation of $432,930.00. Since obtaining release, Simpson-El has paid at least 5% of his gross monthly income toward restitution. Simpson-El was injured while serving his prison sentence at a federal prison. The injury was allegedly exacerbated by inadequate medical attention and a lack of treatment, leading Simpson-El to sue the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. After obtaining release from prison, Simpson-El settled with the government for $200,000. The government sought modification of the restitution order based on a material change in economic circumstances, requesting an order for Simpson-El to pay the entire $200,000 as restitution. The district court granted the motion in part, applying $145,640 of the settlement funds toward restitution. The Tenth Circuit found a restitution payment schedule could be modified when the defendant’s economic circumstances materially change. Simpson-El appealed, arguing the settlement funds were not a “material change in economic circumstances.” Finding no reversible error in the district court’s restitution order, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Simpson-El" on Justia Law

In 2009, Jacquelyn Jacks bought a manufactured home from CMH Homes, Inc., on an installment plan. The purchase was financed through CMH Homes under a manufactured home retail installment contract. The contract contained an arbitration agreement, which provides that all disputes arising from, or relating to, the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. By its terms, the agreement also covered all co-signors and guarantors, and any occupants of the manufactured Home (as intended beneficiaries of the arbitration agreement. Jacks moved into the home with her husband and their children. Five years later, the Jacks family sued CMH Homes, CMH Manufacturing, and Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance (not a party to this appeal). They claimed: (1) CMH negligently installed and repaired the manufactured home’s water system, which caused toxic mold to grow; (2) the manufactured home was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of CMH; (3) the manufactured home was not fit for habitation. Jacks also sought to rescind her purchase of the manufactured home, along with her agreement to pay Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance the indebtedness incurred to purchase the home. The CMH defendants removed the case from state to federal court and moved to compel arbitration and stay the court proceedings. The district court granted the motion to compel as to the claims of Jacks, but denied the motion as to the remaining plaintiffs who were not parties to the installment contract. Defendants had argued that Jacks’ husband and their children were likewise bound by the arbitration agreement, even though they never signed the contract. The district court held that “the single sentence in the Arbitration Agreement generically referencing ‘any occupants of the Manufactured Home (as intended beneficiaries of this Arbitration Agreement)’ was not sufficient to make the nonsignatory plaintiffs third party beneficiaries of the Arbitration Agreement and subject to being compelled to arbitration. The district court also rejected Defendants’ contention that the nonsignatory plaintiffs were “bound to arbitrate their claims” under “the doctrine of equitable estoppel.” Defendants timely appealed the district court’s partial denial of their motion to stay and to compel arbitration. The Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s judgment and affirmed it. View "Jacks v. CMH Homes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Bryan “Shane” Jones appealed the dismissal of his Title VII sex discrimination claim against Defendant-Appellee Needham Trucking, LLC and his state law tort claim for wrongful interference with a contractual relationship against Defendant-Appellee Julie Needham. Jones completed an intake questionnaire with the EEOC. In response to questions seeking more detailed explanations, Jones wrote “[s]ee attached.” The attachment never made it to the EEOC, nor did the EEOC alert Jones that it was missing. Nevertheless, the EEOC prepared a charge form on his behalf, and issued a right-to-sue letter. Jones then filed his lawsuit, alleging sexual harassment, negligence, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful interference with a contractual or business relationship, and violation of the Oklahoma Employment Security Act of 1980 (“OESA”). The district court held that Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, that his state law tort claim was precluded by the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (“OADA”), and that his OESA claim failed for want of a private right of action. Needham Trucking argued that the facts alleged were insufficient to put it on notice of the quid pro quo harassment claim made in Jones’s amended complaint because the facts from the attachment were not reflected in the EEOC charge form or right-to-sue letter. The Tenth Circuit concluded that though the complaint Jones filed was more detailed than his charge form, the form only needed to “describe generally” the alleged discrimination. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to the discrimination claim, but affirmed on the state law tort claims. View "Jones v. Needham" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Mark Ellis of five felony offenses and one misdemeanor offense involving child sexual assault on his adopted daughter, V.E. Child sexual assault allegations against Ellis first arose during his contentious divorce from V.E.’s mother. At trial, defense counsel Rowe Stayton argued that Ellis had been falsely accused: that V.E.’s vengeful mother was coaching her, and that V.E.’s sexual knowledge came only from admitted sexual abuse by her older brother. After he was convicted, Ellis moved for postconviction relief in Colorado state district court, alleging his counsel had been constitutionally ineffective for failing to interview and/or call to testify: (1) an expert forensic; and (2) several lay witnesses who could testify in particular about the Ellises’ family dynamics when the allegations arose. The state district court denied relief. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.Ellis never sought review of his ineffective-assistance claim with the Colorado Supreme Court. On appeal to the federal courts Ellis raised similar arguments raised at the state court level. His motion was granted, and the State appealed, arguing the federal district court erred in finding Ellis exhausted state remedies, and in granting habeas relief on Ellis’ ineffective assistance claim. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Ellis adequately exhausted his ineffective assistance claim, but the district court erred in granting him conditional habeas relief on that claim. Any question as to the propriety of the district court’s ninety-day retrial condition was effectively moot because the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court should not have granted habeas relief in the first place. View "Ellis v. Raemisch" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the ownership of mineral rights appurtenant to several tracts of land located in Haskell County, Kansas. Michael Leathers and his brother Ronald Leathers each inherited half of these mineral rights from their mother. But an error in a quit claim deed subsequently executed between the brothers left it unclear whether Ronald’s one-half interest in the mineral estate had been conveyed to Michael. In a series of orders spanning several years, the district court (1) reformed the quit claim deed to reflect that Ronald had reserved his one-half interest in the mineral estate; (2) awarded half of Ronald’s one-half interest to Ronald’s wife Theresa (pursuant to Ronald and Theresa’s divorce decree); and (3) held that Ronald owed approximately $1.5 million to the IRS and that the IRS’s tax liens had first priority to any present and future royalties due to Ronald from his remaining one-quarter mineral interest. Ronald appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment with respect to the reformation and the interests, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on all grounds. View "Leathers v. Leathers" on Justia Law

Patrolling a high-crime area in Tulsa, Oklahoma, an officer saw a man riding a bicycle against traffic and not using a bicycle headlight, in violation of Tulsa’s traffic law. Unknown to the officer, the bicyclist was Phillip Morgan, who had a string of felony convictions: (1) unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, (2) accessory after the fact to first-degree murder, (3) unlawful possession of a controlled drug, and (4) unlawful possession with intent to distribute a controlled drug. After a lawful traffic stop, an officer has authority to order a driver and passengers from a car. The issue presented here was whether an officer has authority to order a person to step off his bicycle after a lawful traffic stop. Under the circumstances of this case, the Tenth Circuit held that the officer had that authority. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

“Lowrie v. United States,” (824 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1987)), is still the controlling case law in matters challenging “activities leading up to and culminating in” an assessment. The Green Solution was a Colorado-based marijuana dispensary being audited by the Internal Revenue Service for tax deductions and credits taken for trafficking in a “controlled substance.” Green Solution sued the IRS seeking to enjoin the IRS from investigating whether it trafficked in a controlled substance in violation of federal law, and seeking a declaratory judgment that the IRS was acting outside its statutory authority when it made findings that a taxpayer trafficked in a controlled substance. Green Solution claimed it would suffer irreparable harm if the IRS were allowed to continue its investigation because a denial of deductions would: (1) deprive it of income, (2) constitute a penalty that would effect a forfeiture of all of its income and capital, and (3) violate its Fifth Amendment rights. The IRS moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to the IRS, Green Solution’s claim for injunctive relief was foreclosed by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which barred suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” Similarly, the IRS asserted that the claim for declaratory relief violated the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), which prohibited declaratory judgments in certain federal tax matters. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on “Lowrie.” Green Solution timely appealed, contending the district court had jurisdiction to hear its claims because the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Lowrie in “Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl,” (135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015)). The Tenth Circuit concluded it was still bound by Lowrie and affirmed. View "Green Solution Retail v. United States" on Justia Law

The Cervenys sued the manufacturer of Clomid (Aventis, Inc.), asserting various tort claims under Utah law: failure to warn under theories of strict liability and negligence, breach of implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. They presented two theories, pointing to two types of warning labels that Aventis had allegedly failed to provide: (1) a label that warned of risks to the fetus when a woman takes Clomid before becoming pregnant; and (2) a label that unmistakably warned about harm to the fetus when Clomid is taken during pregnancy. The district court rejected the Cervenys’ claims based on preemption. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court ruling was correct on the Cervenys’ first theory, because the undisputed evidence showed that the FDA would not have approved a warning about taking Clomid before pregnancy. But on the second theory, the Tenth Circuit found the district court did not explain why a state claim based on the FDA’s own proposed language would be preempted by federal law. The district court also erred in failing to distinguish the remaining claims (breach of implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud) from the failure-to-warn claims. These claims are based at least partly on affirmative misrepresentations rather than on a failure to provide a warning. The district court failed to explain why claims involving affirmative misrepresentations would have been preempted. View "Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc." on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit found that Terry Margheim failed to show an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim against deputy district attorney Emela Buljko to establish a constitutional violation. For that reason, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Buljko. Margheim sued Buljko under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. This case arose from Margheim’s involvement in three state criminal matters - two domestic violence cases and a later drug case. His malicious prosecution claim was based on his prosecution in the drug case, but the three cases were tied together. When Buljko raised the qualified immunity defense in district court, Margheim had the burden to show a violation of clearly established federal law. (CA-D) Save Our Heritage Organization (McConnell) View "Margheim v. Buljko" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose out of the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish. The injunction followed the release, without a state permit, of two Mexican gray wolf pups on federal land located in New Mexico by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”). The district court’s order enjoined the Department of the Interior, FWS, and certain individuals in their official capacities from importing or releasing: (1) any Mexican gray wolves into the State without first obtaining the requisite state permits; and (2) any Mexican gray wolf offspring into the State in violation of prior state permits. Interior, FWS, Ryan Zinke, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior, Jim Kurth, in his capacity as Acting Director of FWS, Dr. Benjamin Tuggle, in his capacity as Southwest Regional Director for FWS, and intervening defendants Defenders of Wildlife, Center for Biological Diversity, WildEarth Guardians, and New Mexico Wilderness Alliance, separately filed timely appeals contending the district court abused its discretion in granting the Department a preliminary injunction. After review, the Tenth Circuit determined the Department failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. As a result, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Department’s request for injunctive relief. The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed and vacated the district court’s order enjoining Federal Appellants from importing and releasing: (1) any Mexican gray wolves into the State without first obtaining the requisite state permits; and (2) any Mexican gray wolf offspring into the State in violation of prior state permits. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "NM Dept. of Game & Fish v. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law