Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Estate of Clayton Lockett, through its personal representative Gary Lockett, filed suit against the Governor of Oklahoma Mary Fallin; corrections officials, medical officials, EMTs and drug manufacturers, all in relation to the execution of Clayton Lockett. In 1999, Lockett kidnapped, assaulted, and killed nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman. Lockett shot Neiman with a shotgun and then had an accomplice bury her alive. In 2000, a jury found Lockett guilty of 19 felonies arising from the same incident, including the murder, rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, and assault and battery of Neiman. The jury recommended that the court impose the death penalty. Oklahoma used a common drug protocol previously administered in at least 93 Oklahoma executions: three drugs (1) sodium thiopental; (2) pancuronium bromide; and (3) potassium chloride. In 2010, facing difficulty obtaining sodium thiopental, Oklahoma officials amended the Field Memorandum to substitute in its place pentobarbital. In 2014, Oklahoma officials amended their “Field Memorandum” to allow several new alternate procedures for use in executions by lethal injection. As one of these new procedures, officials substituted midazolam as he first drug used in the protocol. Before Lockett’s execution, Oklahoma had not used midazolam during an execution. Warden Anita Trammell and Director of Corrections Robert Patton chose this new protocol. The Estate asserted several constitutional violations related to Lockett’s execution with respect to the new procedures, essentially arguing that changing of the drugs caused Lockett intense pain as additional drugs were entered into the mix. The State parties moved to dismiss the estate’s suit against them, asserting qualified immunity (among other defenses). The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the estate failed to show defendants violated any established law. Finding no error in this judgment, the Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "Estate of Clayton Lockett v. Fallin" on Justia Law

In 2009, Jeremy Gilmore was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Due to two prior drug felonies, he was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. He moved to have his sentence reduced in accordance with a retroactive sentencing amendment, arguing his prison term was not “based on” a guidelines sentencing range, as required by 18 U.S.C. 3582 (c)(2). To be afforded a sentencing reduction under section 3582(c)(2), a defendant had to show that his term of imprisonment was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Defendant argued that his 168 month sentence mirrored the low end of a guideline sentence corresponding to a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of IV, and was thus “based on” a guidelines sentencing range. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to reduce his sentence because the sentence was based on the parties’ stipulation and not on a “sentencing range” that had been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Defendant argued to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction, and that the stipulation did not bind the district court in reaching his sentence. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court however, that Defendant’s sentence was not “based on” a guidelines sentencing range, and affirmed. View "United States v. Gilmore" on Justia Law

In 2009, Luna County Deputy Sheriff Gabriel Maynes attempted to pull over plaintiff Anna Gutierrez for running a stop sign. Instead of pulling over, Gutierrez sped up, driving to an apartment complex where her mother, plaintiff Patsy Flores, lived. The deputy managed to taser Gutierrez as she exited her vehicle. When the deputy caught up with her, a scuffle ensued. Flores came out of her apartment and pleaded for the deputy to stop hitting her daughter, but she too was tasered. The State of New Mexico would later charge Gutierrez with several offenses, but those charges were dismissed. Because of the traffic stop and later scuffle, Gutierrez suffered multiple injuries, including two fractured ribs. Plaintiffs Gutierrez and Flores appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment (based on qualified immunity) to Deputy Maynes on three of their 42 U.S.C. 1982 claims: excessive force, unlawful entry, and unlawful seizure. The district court concluded plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to overcome the qualified immunity defense. They appealed the district court’s judgment, but after careful consideration of the arguments the parties made at trial and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed plaintiffs failed to meet their burden, and affirmed judgment in favor of the deputy. View "Gutierrez v. Luna County" on Justia Law

Terrill Graf, bought his fiancee a van for her 50th birthday. Celebrating the birthday and new purchase, Graf drank liquor and then gathered four friends in the van. Plaintiff Wendy Peden was one of those friends. She says that she expected Graf only to show off the van and to photograph the group. But Graf drove away with his friends in the van, crashing it, and causing serious injuries to Peden. She obtained $240,000 in insurance benefits. But Peden claimed more under her insurance policy for underinsured-motorist benefits. The insurer (State Farm) initially denied the claim, but ultimately paid her an additional $350,000, the maximum amount that she could receive under the underinsured-motorist coverage. Peden sued State Farm under Colorado’s common law and statutory law, claiming an unreasonable denial or delay in paying benefits. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review was whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that State Farm unreasonably denied or delayed payment of benefits. The district court answered “no.” But the Tenth Circuit disagreed after careful consideration of the facts of this case, and reversed the grant of summary judgment to State Farm. The denial of Peden’s motion for partial summary judgment was vacated, and the entire matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Peden v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee James Durkee sued defendants Sheriff John Minor, Sheriff, and Sergeant Ron Hochmuth, both of Summit County Sheriff’s Department, in their individual capacities. Plaintiff argued defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when he was attacked by Ricky Michael Ray Ramos, a fellow inmate, at the Summit County Detention Center. In a written order, the district court denied defendants qualified immunity in the context of their motion for summary judgment, and they appealed. Ramos had a history of aggressive behavior at the jail, and had been charged with several violations of jail rules on several occasions for threatening behavior towards jail staff, including a threat to stab a deputy in the neck, and toward other inmates, including the Plaintiff. Ramos had threatened Plaintiff shortly after Plaintiff’s arrival at the jail, and Plaintiff requested that he be reassigned to another housing pod away from Ramos. After an argument between Ramos and Plaintiff, Plaintiff again expressed concern about Ramos’ aggression toward him. In 2012, Ramos was being escorted back from a court proceeding by Defendant Hochmuth, and was unshackled in the booking area of the jail, which was adjacent to the professional visitation room. At that time, Plaintiff was in the visitation room, meeting with a mental health counselor. Defendant Hochmuth proceeded to unshackle Ramos in the booking area, and instructed him to return to his housing pod. After taking one or two steps toward the housing pod door, Ramos suddenly turned around and ran into the visitation room through its unlocked door and assaulted Plaintiff. Although the altercation was brief, Plaintiff suffered a facial fracture from the assault. After review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of immunity as to Defendant Hochmuth and reversed as to Defendant Minor. View "Durkee v. Minor" on Justia Law

Defendant Elias Amado appealed two district court decisions denying his respective motions for reduction of sentence. Defendant, an illegal immigrant, was caught in 2013 with lots of guns, ammunition, drugs, money, and other incriminating evidence. As part of his plea agreement, Defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] his right to . . . move to modify under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by the court[.]” Based on an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of II, Defendant’s guideline range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment on the drug count. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months’ imprisonment on that count and a concurrent term of 120 months’ imprisonment (the maximum allowable) on the illegal reentry count. Consistent with the terms of his plea agreement, Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. Subsequently, Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines took effect on November 1, 2014. Despite his plea waiver, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for a reduction of sentence. Three months after filing his first appeal, Defendant moved to “hold briefing in abeyance.” According to Defendant, the Government had decided not to oppose any subsequent motion he might make for a sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782. The Tenth Circuit tolled briefing. With his first appeal still pending, Defendant returned to district court and again moved for a reduction of sentence. And again the district court denied the motion. This time, however, the court explained in a written order not only why it denied Defendant’s second motion but also his first motion: Defendant’s first motion did not present a close question. Turning to the second motion, the court initially questioned its jurisdiction over the motion, relied on "an obscure federal rule" to exercise jurisdiction, considered the second motion as one for a sentence reduction, then denied it. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's ruling on the first motion. Defendant’s second motion fell "within the very definition of a motion to reconsider," and the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in denying it. View "United States v. Amado" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Acha worked as a Purchasing Agent for the Forest Service at the White River National Forest in Glenwood Springs, Colorado. In January 2012, a few months into his job, Petitioner submitted a report to his direct supervisor that documented an apartment rental he had helped secure on behalf of the Forest Service. In this report, Petitioner believed another employee violated the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) when he made an unauthorized deposit. Petitioner’s supervisor, however, did not act on Petitioner’s concerns; in fact, his supervisor instructed him to delete the report’s reference to the deposit. Petitioner followed the instructions and deleted the reference. Several months later in April, Petitioner sent an email to the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector General in which he again mentioned that the Forest Service employee had violated regulations. Petitioner also indicated in his email that he had previously told his supervisor about this violation; that, in response, his supervisor had instructed him to cover up the violation; and that he was punished afterward and treated poorly for following this instruction. Petitioner was eventually terminated during his probationary period from his position with the Forest Service. He filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that he was terminated because he was a whistleblower. The OSC eventually closed its inquiry into Petitioner’s complaint and refused to seek any corrective action on his behalf from the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The OSC determined that no official involved in Petitioner’s termination knew of his email to the Inspector General and, as such, his email could not have contributed to his termination. Petitioner appealed the OSC’s determination and sought corrective action from the MSPB himself. This time, he also argued that he was fired for disclosing the FAR violation to his direct supervisor earlier in the year. The Department objected to Petitioner’s new allegation that he was terminated for making a whistleblowing disclosure: arguing that because Petitioner had not raised this argument before the OSC, he had not exhausted all of his administrative remedies, and therefore the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to consider whether Petitioner was terminated for the alleged whistleblowing. Before the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner did not challenge the MSPB’s ruling regarding his disclosure to the Inspector General; he appealed only the MSPB’s ruling regarding his disclosure to his supervisor. Petitioner argued that the MSPB erred by making him prove a retaliatory motive as a prerequisite before it would consider his disclosure to his supervisor to be protected. The Tenth Circuit concluded the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to consider whether Petitioner was terminated for disclosing the FAR violation to his supervisor. The Court vacated the MSPB’s decision insofar as it concluded that Petitioner’s disclosure was not a protected disclosure and remanded this case back to the MSPB to dismiss that issue for lack of jurisdiction. The MSPB’s decision regarding disclosure to the Inspector General was affirmed. View "Acha v. Dept. of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In this case, Plaintiffs Jane Felix and B.N. Coone challenged the City of Bloomfield’s allowing the installation of a Ten Commandments monument on the City Hall Lawn. Two threshold issues raised were: (1) whether plaintiffs had standing; and (2) whether the monument was government speech subject to the limitations of the Establishment Clause. The Tenth Circuit found that plaintiffs suffered a legally sufficient injury to bring their claim in federal court, and that the First Amendment applied here. To downplay the religious overtones, City officials added several secular monuments next to the Ten Commandments to "dampen the effect of endorsement." The Tenth Circuit found that despite adding additional monuments, the inclusion of the Ten Commandments still violated the Establishment Clause: "The City has never explicitly said this Monument was not for religious purposes, nor that it was exhibited only for its historical significance. [. . .] In fact, [the City] has taken no public, purposeful, and persuasive action to distance itself from the sponsor and his message other than two ineffective disclaimers - one small, the other vague. The only meaningful public action Bloomfield undertook was to add secular monuments around the Ten Commandments." The Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the City impermissibly endorsed religion with its display of the Commandments, and the act was insufficiently mitigated by its curative efforts. View "Felix v. City of Bloomfield" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ashley Tidzump was convicted of assault and requested an 18-month prison term, admitting an addiction to opiates and a need for treatment. Tidzump would have ordinarily qualified for the prison’s drug treatment program only if she began treatment with at least two years remaining on her sentence. The district court lengthened her prison sentence to 31 months. Though the sentence dipped below the guideline range, the sentence was long enough to allow Tidzump to become eligible for the prison’s drug treatment program. Tidzump appealed the sentence, presenting the issue for the Tenth Circuit’s review of whether the district court’s explanation for the sentence was permissible under “Tapia v. United States,” (564 U.S. 319 (2011)). In “Tapia,” the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal district court could not impose or lengthen a prison term to promote rehabilitation. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the sentence was impermissible because the district court expressly lengthened the sentence for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation. View "United States v. Tidzump" on Justia Law

Two years ago, Entek GRB, LLC appealed a district court decision holding that it could not cross Stull Ranches' surface estate to access minerals lying under other estates in the same unitized area. Stull defended the district court’s decision on two grounds: (1) the doctrine of issue preclusion mandated the result; and (2) the district court’s judgment was decided on the merits because nothing in the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) permitted Entek the access it sought. In reviewing Entek's appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and returned the matter to the district court. Eventually, the district court entered judgment in favor of Entek, and on the second appeal, Stull asked the Tenth Circuit to reconsider essentially the same issues raised in the first appeal. The Tenth Circuit remained unmoved and affirmed judgment in favor of Entek: "[U]nder this circuit’s law of the case doctrine, '[a] legal decision made at one stage of litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity to do so existed, [generally] becomes the law of the case.'" View "Entek GRB v. Stull Ranches" on Justia Law