Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Miguel Bustamante-Conchas was convicted on drug distribution charges and sentenced to 240 months in prison. At sentencing the district court found that Bustamante-Conchas was responsible for a significant amount of drugs and for a firearm in the possession of a co-conspirator, and then after a lengthy hearing sentenced him before he could speak on his behalf to the court. He appealed, challenging the district court’s factual findings at sentencing, as well as the court’s failure to allow him to allocute before sentencing. The Tenth Circuit concluded the factual findings were supported by the record and justified the eventual below-guideline sentence imposed by the trial court. Although the court should have allowed Bustamante-Conchas to allocute, any error was not plain. The Court therefore affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Bustamante-Conchas" on Justia Law

Walter Ackerman's internet service provider (ISP) had an automated filter designed to thwart transmission of child pornography. The filter identified one of four images attached to an email sent by Ackerman as pornography, immediately shut down his account, and forwarded a report to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC then alerted law enforcement. Ackerman would ultimately be investigated and indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of possession and distribution of child pornography. Ackerman entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of NCMEC's investigation. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Ackerman argued that NCMEC's actions amounted to an unreasonable search of his email and attachments because no one sought a warrant or invoked any lawful basis for failing to obtain one. "But the Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches undertaken by the government or its agents — not private parties. So Mr. Ackerman’s motion raises the question: does NCMEC qualify as a governmental entity or agent?" Even if it did, it raised another question pertaining to a “private search:” the government doesn’t conduct a Fourth Amendment “search” when it merely repeats an investigation already conducted by a private party like AOL. So the ancillary issue raised was whether NCMEC simply repeated AOL's investigation, or did exceed the scope of AOL’s investigation. The district court denied Ackerman’s motion to suppress both because NCMEC was not a governmental actor and, alternatively and in any event, because NCMEC’s search didn’t exceed the scope of AOL’s private search. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with that conclusion, finding that NCMEC was indeed a governmental entity or agent and searched Ackerman's email without a warrant. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

ACE Fire Underwriters Insurance Company appeals the district court’s declaration that a policy ACE issued offered total coverage up to $2 million for an accident involving two insured vehicles: a tractor and trailer. The trailer detached from the tractor. The driver pulled off the roadway to reattach, then hoped to make a quick u-turn and continue down the road. But before he could complete the turn, another vehicle collided with the trailer, killing the vehicle's driver. As the insurer of the tractor and the trailer, ACE reached a settlement with the Estate of the vehicle's driver. But the parties conditioned the settlement upon litigating the available limits of the policy. ACE maintained that the policy provisions limited its liability to $1 million per accident, regardless of the number of covered autos involved. The Estate, on the other hand, insisted that ACE’s liability under the policy was $1 million per covered auto involved in each accident. That interpretation of the policy would cap ACE’s liability in this case at $2 million because, according to the Estate, the tractor and the trailer were both involved in the accident. Under the terms of the settlement, ACE initially paid the Estate $1 million. But it agreed to pay it an additional $550,000 if the court accepted the Estate’s interpretation of the policy. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed with ACE that the policy instead limits its liability to only $1 million, it reversed. View "ACE Fire Underwriters v. Romero" on Justia Law

A recreational boating accident killed four adults. The boat had been rented from Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC. Because the accident occurred on navigable waters, the case fell within federal admiralty jurisdiction. Anticipating that it would be sued for damages, Aramark filed in the United States District Court for the District of Utah a petition under the Limitation of Liability Act, which permitted a boat owner to obtain a ruling exonerating it or limiting its liability based on the capacity or value of the boat and freight. The district court denied the petition, leaving for further proceedings the issues of gross negligence, comparative fault, and the amount of damages. Aramark appealed the denial. After review, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in its application of admiralty principles of duty and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Aramark Sports" on Justia Law

Eugene Foster appeals from a district-court order granting summary judgment in favor of Mountain Coal Company, LLC (Mountain Coal) on his retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Foster injured his neck while working for Mountain Coal. Mountain Coal terminated Foster several months after the injury, citing that Foster “gave false information as to a credible Return To Work Slip.” After Mountain Coal terminated his employment, Foster filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Colorado Civil Rights Division. Ultimately, the EEOC issued Foster a right-to-sue notice; armed with the notice, Foster filed a complaint against Mountain Coal, seeking relief under the ADA and Colorado law. On the briefs, the district court entered summary judgment for Mountain Coal on Foster’s ADA and state-law discrimination claims and on Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. Foster appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. "We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Foster established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to both his April 3 and April 11 purported requests for accommodation." The Court further concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Mountain Coal’s asserted basis for terminating Foster’s employment was pretext. Therefore the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Foster v. Mountain Coal Company" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a 2004 oil and gas lease with a five-year term between Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. and United States Gypsum Co. (“USG”). Trans-Western contacted USG to lease its land at the conclusion of an existing lease between USG and Wolverine Oil & Gas. USG and Trans-Western agreed to terms, and Trans-Western recorded its lease. Wolverine protested the recording of the new lease, claiming that its lease with USG remained valid under pooling and unitization provisions contained in its lease. In response to the protest, USG, in writing and by phone, rescinded the Trans-Western lease. Trans-Western sued for a declaration that the Wolverine lease expired. The district court determined that the Wolverine lease had expired. As part of their agreement, USG and Trans-Western executed a ratification and lease extension. Armed with the determination that the Wolverine lease was no longer in effect, in 2010, Trans-Western also filed a second amended complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that its lease with USG was valid and damages for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, among other claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Trans-Western, determining that USG had breached the lease but denied attorney’s fees due to disputed material facts on damages. During a bench trial on damages, Trans-Western contended that it was entitled to expectation damages for both breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment because USG deprived it of the opportunity to assign the lease during its five-year term. USG contended, inter alia, that damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease, like any real property, were measured at the date of breach and not pegged to a hypothetical sale at the market’s peak. The district court rejected Trans-Western’s damages theories, finding that Trans-Western was entitled only to nominal damages based on the value of the contract on the date of breach, which had not increased since the date of execution. The Tenth Circuit certified a question of how expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease should have been measured to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court held that general (or direct) and consequential (or special) damages were available for the breach of an oil and gas lease and should be measured in “much the same way as expectation damages for the breach of any other contract.” In light of the Utah Supreme Court’s holding, the Tenth Circuit remanded this case to the district court for consideration of damages. View "Trans-Western Petroleum v. United States Gypsum Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two provisions of a title insurance policy underwritten by Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. One provision insured against unmarketability of title, and the other insured against a lack of access to property. The owner of the policy, Woody Creek Ventures, LLC, contended that both provisions covered losses it sustained when it learned, after purchasing two parcels of land, that one parcel lacked permanent access. And although Fidelity obtained a 30-year right-of-way grant to that parcel, Woody Creek argued Fidelity failed to cure the lack of access and the title remained unmarketable. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusions that: (1) the policy did not insure a permanent right of access; (2) the right-of-way cured the lack of access to the parcel; and (3) the lack of permanent access did not render Woody Creek’s title unmarketable. View "Fidelity National Title v. Woody Creek Ventures" on Justia Law

At the heart of this appeal was the dispute over the scope of an insurance policy. The insureds, BV Jordanelle, LLC and BV Lending, LLC (collectively, "BV") obtained a mortgage on real property as security for a loan and acquired a title-insurance policy from Old Republic National Title Insurance Company. When the borrower defaulted, BV foreclosed on the property. But when a municipal assessment went unpaid, the municipality foreclosed, too. BV and the municipality litigated in state court; the municipality prevailed and obtained title to the property. After losing title to the property, BV sued Old Republic in federal district court, alleging that Old Republic had breached the title insurance policy by: (1) refusing to compensate BV for its loss of the property; and (2) failing to defend BV in the state-court litigation. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Old Republic, concluding that the policy did not entitle BV to either payment for its loss of the property or a defense in the state-court suit. BV appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "BV Jordanelle v. Old Republic National" on Justia Law

Darrell Jent suffered serious injuries while working on an oil rig. The rig’s owner, Precision Drilling Company, L.P., paid him a settlement, then made a claim on its insurance. The insurance company, Lexington Insurance Company, denied the claim. Precision sued, contending that Lexington should have reimbursed the money it paid Jent. Lexington issued two insurance policies covering Precision for accidents exactly like Jent's. However, Lexington argued that under Wyoming state law, the policies were a nullity, so any coverage here was more illusory than real and that Precision was solely responsible. "There can be no doubt that Wyoming law usually prohibits those engaged in the oil and gas industry from contractually shifting to others liability for their own negligence." The district court agreed with Lexington and granted its motion for summary judgment. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court misinterpreted the statute that was grounds for Lexington's motion. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lexington Insurance v. Precision Drilling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant A.M. filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of her minor child, F.M., against two employees of the Albuquerque Public Schools: Cleveland Middle School (“CMS”) Principal Susan LaBarge and Assistant Principal Ann Holmes. A.M. also filed suit against Officer Arthur Acosta of the Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”). A.M. brought several claims stemming from two school-related events: (1) the May 2011 arrest of F.M. for allegedly disrupting his physical-education class, and (2) the November 2011 search of F.M. for contraband. Holmes and LaBarge sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and the district court granted their respective motions. The court also denied A.M.’s motion for summary judgment on her claims pertaining to Officer Acosta after determining that Officer Acosta was entitled to prevail on qualified-immunity grounds too. On appeal, A.M. argued that the district court erred in awarding qualified immunity to all of the defendants. The Tenth Circuit consolidated these matters for review, and found o reversible error in the district court's grant of qualified immunity. View "A.M. v. Holmes" on Justia Law